



THE PERFECTION OF THE SOUL 
IN 















A dissertation submitted in 
fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Combined 
Historical Studies 
 
The Warburg Institute 
 





 I declare that the work presented in this dissertation is my own. 
 








Al-Sirr al-Maktūm is one of the most compelling theoretical and practical 
accounts of astral magic written in the post-classical period of Islamic thought. 
Of central concern to its reader is to understand why the great philosopher-
theologian, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.606/1210) should have written it. The occult 
practices described therein are attributed to the Sabians, a historical group who 
lived in Ḥarrān in Upper Mesopotamia. Representing the last vestiges of Ancient 
Mesopotamian paganism during the early Islamic period, their religion involved 
the veneration of the seven planets, which they believed were ensouled celestial 
beings and the proximate causes of all sublunary change. By means of such 
astrolatry they were able, remotely, to change reality in ways which defied the 
customary pattern of causation in this world. The main focus of al-Rāzī‘s 
treatment of their practice is a long ritual during which the aspirant 
successively brings under his will each of the seven planets. On completion of 
the ritual, the aspirant would have transcended the limitations of his human 
existence and his soul would have attained complete perfection.  
This thesis will argue that for al-Rāzī, the Sabians constituted a heresiological 
category, representative of a soteriological system which dispensed with the 
need for the Islamic institution of prophethood. It relied instead on the 
individual‘s ability, by means of spiritual discipline and intellectual rigour, to 
attain noetic connection with the celestial souls. In so doing, the Sabian adept 
not only gains occult knowledge and power, but more importantly he realizes 
the ultimate aim of perfecting his soul. Al-Rāzī constructs this soteriology as a 
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synthesis of cosmological and psychological doctrines gleaned from Avicenna, 
and Abū‘l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī. In this way, al-Rāzī hoped to state as succinctly 
as possible the intellectual challenges to which any systematic theological 
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Chapter 1: al-Sirr al-Maktūm 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Arguably the most mysterious of all the works by the philosopher and 
theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) was al-Sirr al-maktūm (‗The Hidden 
Secret‘). Written for an unnamed king, it describes, in remarkable detail, the 
occult beliefs and rituals of astral magic.1 For practical purposes, when I refer to 
‗astral magic‘ and ‗occult science‘, I shall restrict the meaning of these terms to 
the descriptive definition of talisman formulated by Rāzī:  
…the blending of <dynamically> active heavenly forces with passive 
elemental forces to make manifest that which runs contrary to the 
natural course of events or to prevent from occurring what normally 
would agree with it.2 
The masters of this science are identified as the ‗Sabians‘ (al-ṣābi’a): I shall refer 
to their beliefs and practices as ‗Sabianism‘. For Rāzī, the Sabian was a 
                                                             
1 Rāzī addresses this royal figure in the concluding section of al-Sirr in the following terms:  ‗O 
King, aided with all the good of the world, by the affairs of the heavens (al-mu’ayyad bi-khayrāt al-
ʿālam bi-umūr al-samāwāt)‘, (Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 164).  Establishing who the identity of this king is part 
of my on-going research. According to Ibn Taymiyya, it was Terken Khāṭūn (d.630/1232-3), a 
Qipchaq-Turk princess (Griffel, ‗On Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī‘s Life‘, fn. 71, p. 332). Griffel thinks this 
unlikely. The early dating of al-Sirr (see section 1.3) places it at a time when Rāzī was not 
enjoying the luxury of royal patronage. That the work could have been a means of currying 
favour with a potential royal patron might be a way of explaining this. This speculation, 
needless to say, would require further research. For full titles see the Bibliography below.  
2 Al-Sirr, p.7: tamzīj al-quwā al-faʿʿāla al-samāwiyya bi’l-quwā al-munfaʿila al-ʿunṣuriyya li-ajli al-
tamakkuni min iẓhāri mā yukhālifu al-ʿāda aw al-manʿi min mā yuwāfiquhā. Compare the close 
wording from al-Maṭālib which states that ‗talisman‘ is an expression for: ‗…the blending of 
<dynamically> active heavenly forces with passive earthly forces to bring about that which runs 
contrary to the natural course of events or prevents from occurring what would normally agree 
with it.‘ Al-Maṭālib 8, p. 149. In al-Sirr, sublunary passive forces are referred to as ‗elemental‘ 
(ʿunṣuriyya) whilst in al-Maṭālib, they are referred to as ‗earthly‘ (arḍiyya).  
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practitioner of this science, irrespective of his theological commitments, his 
race, language, and culture. A practitioner could be a Sabian whether or not he 
believed in: multiple necessarily existent beings; in God as the only Necessarily 
Existent Being, and as an agent possessed of volition (fāʿil mukhtār); or God as 
the only Necessarily Existent whose creation is by way of non-volitional 
emanation. Since, theoretically, someone of any theological conviction could 
learn and practice Sabianism, it was less of a religion and more of an approach 
to understanding the hidden forces which determined ‗generation and 
corruption‘ in the sublunary world. To what ends this knowledge was put would 
determine the extent to which it could foster the soul‘s perfection, or hasten its 
debasement into pure idolatry, the pursuit of sublunary gain and immersion in 
corporeal pleasure.  
 
This thesis will be the first study of al-Sirr, a highly popular, problematic and 
unusual work. The number of manuscript witnesses affirms its popularity. The 
controversy which it provoked amongst subsequent Islamic scholars, some of 
whom could not believe that Rāzī wrote it, others who did, declaring him infidel 
as a result, is evidence of its problematic nature.3 And the fact that it was one of 
the rare attempts, by an Islamic intellectual of Rāzī‘s calibre, to engage with this 
occult science, motivated by other than a polemical or destructive aim, is 
testament to its unusual nature.4  
                                                             
3 See the discussion by Fūda on the controversy amongst Islamic scholars concerning Rāzī‘s kufr 
as a result of al-Sirr in the introduction to his edition of Rāzī’s Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl (pp. 24-25 and pp. 
47-85).  
4 Previous examples include al-Kindī‘s De Radiis (on which see Adamson‘s ‗al-Kindi‘); the Epistles 
of the Brethren of Purity On Magic; and Maslama al-Qurṭubī‘s Ghāyat al-Ḥakīm.  
13 
 
Two key questions will define the scope of this study. Firstly, it will ask why Rāzī 
wrote al-Sirr. This question will prompt an examination into how he pursued 
that purpose. Secondly,  it will ask why much of the material which is treated in 
al-Sirr reappears, albeit in a far more systematized form, in Fī al-nubuwwāt wa-mā 
yataʿallaqu bihā, (‗On Prophethood and related matters‘), the eighth volume of 
Rāzī‘s philosophical summa al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliyya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī (‗The Sublime 
Goals of the Divine Science‘). This will prompt an investigation into the 
integration of certain doctrines, associated with the Sabians in al-Sirr, into Rāzī‘s 
formulation of a new prophetology and soteriology in al-Maṭālib.  
Before I can summarize my argument in answer to these two research 
questions, I must deal with a number of preliminary matters. Firstly, in 1.2, I 
shall briefly outline Rāzī‘s intellectual career. His biography has been treated in 
detail elsewhere and does not warrant repetition.5  But how he developed and 
matured as a thinker assists in contextualizing what I shall argue is the intimate 
connection between al-Sirr and al-Maṭālib.  
                                                             
5 For a succinct summary, see Griffel, ‗On Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī‘s Life and the Patronage he 
received‘. See also Street, ‗Concerning the Life and Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī‘. Despite his 
prolific output, modern scholarly interest in Rāzī is a relatively recent phenomenon. For an 
overview of his thought generally, not just on his ethical theory, see Ayman Shihadeh, 
Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. See also Shihadeh‘s articles: ‗From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī‘; 
his ‗Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī‘s Response to Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mas‗ūdī‘s Critical Commentary on 
Avicenna‘s Ishārāt’; ‗Theories of Ethical Value in Kalām‘; 'Avicenna's Corporeal Form and Proof of 
Prime Matter‘; and 'The Mystic and the Sceptic in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.'  For a study of Rāzī‘s 
Qur‘ān commentary, see Arnaldez, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī: commentateur du Coran et philosophe, and 
Tariq, Rāzī: Master of Qur’anic Interpretation and Theological Reasoning. For Rāzī‘s treatment of 
natural philosophy in his Qur‘ān commentary, see Morrison, ‗The Portrayal of Nature in a 
Medieval Qur‘an Commentary‘. On Rāzī and Aristotelian science, see Ibrahim, ‗Fakhr al-Dīn al-
Rāzī, Ibn al-Haytham and Aristotelian Science‘. See in addition the following: Eichner, 
‗Dissolving the Unity of Metaphysics: From Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to Mullā Ṣadrā al-Shīrāzī‘; 
Janssens, ‗Ibn Sina‘s impact on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī‘s al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyya’; Abrahamov, 
‗Fakhr‗ al-Dīn al-Rāzī on God's Knowledge of the Particulars‘ and ‗Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the 
Knowability of God's Essence and Attributes‘; Setia, ‗Atomism Versus Hylomorphism in the 
Kalām of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī‘. 
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Following this overview, in 1.3 I mention briefly the questions of the authorship 
of al-Sirr and its dating. Then in 1.4 I provide a brief outline of the Sabians as 
they emerge in the Islamic historical imagination, in order to provide some 
context as to why they came to be associated with the astral magic described in 
al-Sirr. Following this, in 1.5, I present in broad terms the nature of their beliefs 
and practices as they are depicted in the work. A summary of my argument 
appears in 1.6, followed by an explanation of its approach and scope in 1.7. I 
hope that by the end of this introduction, the objectives, scope and direction of 
this study will be clear.  
1.2 Rāzī’s intellectual career 
 
According to Shihadeh, Rāzī‘s earliest works are characterised by a very classical 
Ashʿarī kalām style and content such as al-Ishāra fī al-kalām (‗The Pointer in 
Kalām‘). Later, in his highly influential Ashʿarī manual Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl (575-
576/1179-1180) (‗the Limit of Intellects‘), he deploys Aristotelian logic to defend 
the orthodox creed. Subsequently he begins to write philosophical works, the 
most notable of which is al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya (574-575/1178-1179) (‗the 
Eastern Inquiries‘) an exploration of various philosophical doctrines, mainly of 
Avicenna (d. 429/1037) and Abū‘l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 560/1164-1165). A year 
later (576/1180) he writes Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt (‗Commentary on ―the 
Pointers and Reminders‖‘), a critical commentary on Avicenna which mentions 
al-Sirr. Towards the end of his career, he begins to write works which attempt to 
synthesize the approaches of kalām and philosophy. The most ambitious of these 
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attempts is al-Maṭālib (603-605/1207-1209).6 A key development in his 
intellectual career is his shift away from the approach of classical Ashʿarī ethical 
theory of voluntarism which upholds ‗the doctrine that value terms can be 
defined only in terms of divine command‘, to frame ethics, under Sūfī and 
Falsafī influence, in terms of human perfection, or what Shihadeh has called his 
‗teleological ethics‘: the perfection of the soul as a simple primary end, sought 
for its own sake, the pursuit of which engenders its own pleasure. 7  My analysis 
of al-Sirr is indebted to Shihadeh‘s penetrating insights.  
 
1.3 The questions of authorship and the dating al-Sirr 
 
The earliest mention of al-Sirr as a work of Rāzī‘s, in sources other than his own, 
was by Ibn al-Qifṭī (d. 646/1248) in his Ta’rīkh al-ḥukamā.8 The only existing 
edition available of al-Sirr is an undated lithograph produced in Cairo, produced 
by Mirza Muhammad Shirāzī, using MS 1482, from the Cârullah Effendi 
collection of the Sûleymaniye Library, Istanbul.  For all subsequent page 
references to al-Sirr I will refer to the Cairo lithograph. Aside from the 
discrepancy which I will treat in section 2.5 of this thesis, which is easily 
explicable on the grounds of scribal error, the text to which it bears witness 
does not differ in any significant respect from the manuscript witnesses I have 
                                                             
6 For the dates of all these works, I rely on the most up-to-date and comprehensive study of 
Rāzī‘s oeuvre conducted by Altaş, in his survey ‗Fahreddin er-Rāzī‘nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi‘. 
See pp. 152-154. 
7 Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, p. 111. See chapter 3 for Shihadeh‘s analysis of Rāzī‘s perfectionist 
theory of virtue. On ethical theories of value in kalām in general, see Shihadeh, ‗Theories of 
Ethical Value in Kalām: a New Interpretation‘. For Shihadeh on the development of Rāzī‘s 
thought and the chronology of his works, see Teleological Ethics, pp. 5-11.  
8 Al-Qifṭī, Ta’rīkh al-ḥukamā’, p. 292.  
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consulted for this study.9 The most valuable of these witnesses is Tehran MS 
6853 kept in the Majlis Library. It is dated to 616 AH, a mere six years after Rāzī‘s 
death.  
But here, I wish to mention two further discrepancies between the Cairo 
lithograph and Tehran MS 6853. In the concluding section (khātima), on p. 164, 
in the Cairo lithograph, the author refers to himself as ‗jāmiʿ al-kitāb al-imām al-
muḥaqqiq Fakhr al-dīn Muḥammad al-Rāzī‘ (‗the compiler of the work, the imam 
and investigator Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Rāzī‘) whilst in the equivalent spot 
in the text, on line 5, fol. 274a of Tehran MS 6853, we read: ‗al-dāʿī ilā Allāh bi’l-
ḥaqq ḥujjat al-ḥaqq ʿalā al-khalq nāṣir al-sunna raḍiya Allahu ʿanhu wa ʿan aslāfihi‘ 
(‗the caller to God in truth, the Proof of the Truth to the creation, the champion 
of the Sunna, may God be pleased with him and his predecessors‘). Further on in 
the concluding section, in the Cairo lithograph, on p.164, we read: qāla al-Imām 
al-muḥaqqiq Fakhr al-dīn Muḥammad al-Rāzī (‗said the imam and investigator 
Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Rāzī‘) 10 In Tehran MS 6853, fol. 274b, line 2, the 
equivalent place in the text reads: ‗mawlānā al-ḍāʿī  ilā Allāh bi’l-ḥaqq raḍiya 
Allah ʿanhu wa ʿan aslāfihi‘ (‗our lord, the caller to God with truth, may God be 
pleased with him and his predecessors‘).  Tehran MS 6853 omits the author‘s 
name and provides no evidence as to his real identity.  But the fact that Rāzī did 
indeed compose a work with the title al-Sirr al-Maktūm is indicated by references 
to it as one of his own in such works as his al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī’l-ḥikma wa’l-manṭiq 
                                                             
9 These are: Oxford, Bodleian Library,  MS Huntington 544; Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Marsh 
125; Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Marsh 212; Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Selden Superius 66; 
Berlin, Staatsbibliothek- Preußischer Kulturbesitz, MS 5886 (Peterman. I 207); Tehran, Majlis 
Library, MS 6853.  
10 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 164.  
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(576/1180) his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt (576/1180) and his Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-
ḥikma (605/1209).11 
As I have already said, much of the material of al-Sirr reappears, almost verbatim 
in parts, in al-Maṭālib. Whilst this fact alone does not ensure its safe attribution 
to Rāzī, its style, content, and method of reasoning display such a high level of 
consistency with Rāzī‘s oeuvre, as I hope to demonstrate, that we can be 
confident that the likelihood of his authorship is indeed very high.12   
Now, the development of Rāzī‘s later teleological ethics was facilitated by his 
formulation and adoption of three key interdependent doctrines: (1) the 
ontological superiority of the celestial angels over man; (2) the origin of the 
individual human soul in the perfect nature (al-ṭibāʿ al-tāmm), a celestial spirit 
(rūḥ falakī), the perfection of which determines the upper limit of the human‘s 
potential for perfection; (3) human perfection, conceived of as an 
epistemological ascent through the celestial spheres towards angelomorphosis.13  
These key doctrines are central to the Sabian belief system he describes in al-
Sirr.  
I hope to show that in the concluding section of al-Sirr, Rāzī reveals his own 
commitment to the Sabian doctrines of the perfect nature and a ritualized 
ascent towards perfection and angelomorphosis (see sections 1.5 and 2.6). This 
insight provides the impetus for this study, for it demands a crucial qualification 
to Shihadeh‘s narrative that Rāzī‘s gradual evolution from the standard Ashʿarī 
                                                             
11 Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, p. 8.  
12 Although outside the focus of this thesis, a detailed comparison between al-Sirr and al-Maṭālib 8 
would afford great insight into the ways in which Rāzī‘s thinking about the occult sciences 
developed and deepened.  
13 On Rāzī‘s reception of the doctrine of the perfect nature, see Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics 
pp.118-119; on Rāzī‘s assertion of angelic superiority, see Teleological Ethics pp. 114-116.  
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theologian who authored Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl, to the philosopher-theologian who 
wrote al-Maṭālib was fostered by an increasing engagement with Sufism and 
philosophy. I do not of course exclude these influences. Indeed Rāzī himself 
refers to the completion of occult knowledge described in al-Sirr as ‗the perfect 
philosophy‘ (al-falsafa al-tāmma).14 But Shihadeh, as far as I can tell, does not 
intend to include astral magic in his definition of philosophy when he speaks of 
Rāzi‘s increasing engagement with it in his later career. So accepting Shihadeh‘s 
more narrow definition of philosophy, I hope to show that Rāzī‘s shift is just as 
much attributable, if not even more so, to his deep engagement with astral 
magic; and that, rather than being of marginal interest to the ‗renewer‘ 
(mujaddid) of the Islamic faith at the end of the twelfth century, occult ideas 
played a crucial role in bringing about the synthesis of theology and philosophy 
that Shihadeh has so insightfully described.15 This is the first crucial 
qualification to his narrative.  
The most recent chronology of Rāzī‘s oeuvre by Altaş confirms Shihadeh‘s 
impression that al-Sirr was an early work, dating it to 575/1179.16 If I am correct 
about Rāzī‘s expression in al-Sirr of personal commitment to key Sabian beliefs, 
then this would mean that these Sabian ideas were patiently awaiting 
integration into the grand philosophical-theological systematization of al-
Maṭālib, for thirty years. Evidently, this process of integration had barely begun 
when he wrote al-Sirr, for around that same time (575-576/1179-1180) he also 
wrote his influential kalām manual Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl in which he defends standard 
Ashʿarī positions, with albeit an Aristotelianizing style of argumentation, 
                                                             
14 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 164.  
15 It was Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d.771/1370) who bestowed on him this honorofic (See Shihadeh, 
‗From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī‘), p. 141.  
16 Altaş, ‗Fahreddin er-Rāzī‘nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi‘, p. 151.  
19 
 
despite his private Sabian convictions.17 This of course would threaten the 
simple narrative of Rāzī‘s career as a gradual intellectual evolution from 
standard Ashʿarism to his later more philosophical (in the narrower sense of the 
word) theology. I believe that the situation was far more complex. For at the 
same time as he was defending standard Ashʿarī positions, he was also 
counselling in al-Sirr his potential royal patron to invoke his perfect nature - his 
personal celestial spirit - and to perform a Sabian ritual of planetary ascent 
which would bestow on him supreme occult power and knowledge.  
1.4 Sabians in the historical imagination  
 
It was during the reign of the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma‘mūn (r. 813-833) that the 
pagans of the Syrian city of Ḥarrān, which had by the sixth century become a 
refuge for pagans resistant to Christianization, are reported to have secured 
official toleration for their religion by adopting the name ―Sabian,‖ a Qur‘ānic 
designation for a religious group which the early Muslim community regarded 
as worthy of the kind of protected status extended to Jews and Christians.18 
Some Ḥarrānian Sabians went on to become accomplished scholars in the court 
of the caliph, crucial to the translation movement transmitting key 
philosophical and scientific texts from Greek into Arabic.19 Of greatest renown 
was the Sabian Thābit ibn Qurra (d.901) who, migrating from Ḥarrān, settled in 
Baghdad where, being closely associated with the court of the Caliph al-
Muʿtaḍid (r. 892-902), he became a mathematician and translator of great 
                                                             
17 For the date of the Nihāyat, see Altaş, ‗Fahreddin er-Rāzī‘nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi‘, p.  151.  
18 See Qur‘ān 2:62; 5:69; 22:17. The issue of who the original referents of the Qur‘ānic term were 
remains a matter of dispute within modern scholarship, a good survey of which is to be found in 
Van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, pp.67-68. 
19 See Gutas Greek Thought, Arabic Culture; Adamson, Philosophy in the Islamic World: A History of 
Philosophy without Any Gaps, pp. 19-25. 
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repute.20  He was also the leader of the Ḥarrānian Sabian community in Baghdad, 
where he authored works describing Sabian astrolatrous ceremonies and 
providing instructions on the practical casting of talismans.21 Many of his 
descendants, retaining their astrolatrous religion for at least a century after 
him, went on to become prominent intellectuals serving the caliphal court. 
Indeed such pagans appear in the Arabic sources as late as the eleventh 
century.22   
Van Bladel describes the information contained in the historical sources relating 
to actual Ḥarrānian Sabian belief and practice as scanty and tendentious. 
Nevertheless, he observes that the Syriac and Arabic reports are almost 
unanimous that they involved planet worship and ritual sacrifice.23 But by the 
early tenth century: 
...any supposed ―pagans‖ or idolaters of any period, such as the ancient 
Greeks, pre-Christian Romans and Egyptians, and the Buddhists, were 
also called Sabian. The precise identity of the Sabians whom God 
sanctioned in the Qur‘ān was and is a matter of persistent controversy 
for Muslim exegetes and heresiographers.24 
Nevertheless, the Ḥarrānian Sabian connection remains relevant to al-Sirr in the 
figure of Thābit Ibn Qurra. An anecdote describing his application of occult 
astral knowledge to thwart a plot hatched against him by an envious courtier at 
                                                             
20 Burnett, ‗Tābit ibn Qurra the Ḥarrānian‘. On Thābit Ibn Qurra in general, see ‗Thābit Ibn Qurra‘, 
ed. Rashed.  
21 Burnett, ‗Tābit ibn Qurra the Ḥarrānian‘ , p.16.  
22 Van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, p.65. See also Roberts‘s ‗Being a Sabian.‘ 
23 Some modern scholars connect it to Babylonian and Hellenistic religion. For the Babylonian 
aspect, see Tamara Green‘s The City of the Moon God: Religious Traditions of Harran, Leiden, Brill 
1992; for the Hellenistic background see David Pingree, ‗The Sabians of Ḥarrān and the Classical 
Tradition’ .  
24 Van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, p.67.  
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the court of al-Muwaffaq, is adduced in the introduction of al-Sirr as an 
illustration of its invaluable utility.25 The Ḥarrānian Sabian represents the ideal 
of how this arcane knowledge can be put into practice to serve very real, 
sublunary concerns. Moreover, Thābit reappears as an important unnamed 
source for Rāzī‘s practical instructions for the casting of a talismanic idol in al-
Sirr 3:1, an account which seemingly combines the talismanic astrolatry of the 
Ḥarrānian Sabians with that of the ‗Indian‘ Sabians .26   
By the ninth century, Ḥarrānian Sabians were claiming Hermes as the founding 
prophet of their religion.27 In the middle of that same century, Jāhiẓ reported 
the claim, subsequently corroborated by Abū Maʿshar, that Hermes was 
identified with the Qur‘ānic Idrīs and the Jewish Enoch, the prophet who 
ascended the celestial spheres where he received visions and learnt mysteries 
from angelic teachers. In the century that followed, this heavenly ascent had 
become the means by which he received angelic instruction in the mysteries of 
the natural sciences and astrology.28 Intellectuals serving the Ismā‘īlī mission in 
Qayrawān and in northern Iran deployed a form of this narrative to support 
their argument that all branches of human knowledge were based on principles 
which were not generated by reason, but received by revelation. Van Bladel 
observes that a survey of those who used works attributed to Hermes from late 
antiquity until the time that Rāzī was writing, included members of all religions 
                                                             
25 The anecdote appears in al-Sirr, p.4. A full translation appears in Burnett‘s ‘Thābit ibn Qurra 
the Ḥarrānian‘.  
26 Rāzī‘s account is to be found in al-Sirr, pp. 95-96. As we shall discover in the following chapter, 
‗Sabian‘ in Rāzī‘s use referred to any form of learned astrolatry or paganism.  
27 Van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, p.66. Despite this fact, Van Bladel argues that the evidence for 
Ḥarrānian Sabian transmission of Hermetic texts remains elusive:  ‗…the evidence for the 
Ḥarrānian transmission of Hermetica into Arabic faces a major impediment: no one has hitherto 
been able to show a single surviving Arabic work attributed to Hermes to be definitely Ḥarrānian 
in origin […]. The great influence that some historians suppose ‗Ḥarrānian Hermeticism‘ to have 
had on Arabic culture and on Islam lacks sure evidence at this stage.‘  
28 On the theme of the heavenly ascent of Hermes, see Van Bladel, the Arabic Hermes, pp.164-184. 
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represented in Islamicate civilization at that time. Due to the late antique Greek 
chronographic tradition, he was universally understood as an antediluvian sage 
and thus sufficiently remote in time to be accepted as an authority: 
Yet Hermes would not have acquired the specific character of a prophet 
if it had not been for the Ḥarrānian Sabians, descendants of the ancient 
pagans, living in a milieu in which every sect required a prophetic 
founder. Even after the Sabians had entirely disappeared, Hermes was 
remembered as the prophet of paganism and the founder of the 
sciences.29 
By the time we encounter him as the Sabian prophet in Kitāb al-Milal wa’l-niḥal of 
Rāzī‘s immediate predecessor Shahrastānī, Hermes had become the great 
primordial preceptor of astrology whose revealed knowledge establishes the 
names of the planets, the zodiacal signs, and the principles of astrology.30 In 
contrast with the revelation of the Abrahamic traditions, it is by means of the 
revealed knowledge of Hermes, that Man learns the principles of natural science 
which inform the astral ritual that he uses to obtain noetic connection with the 
celestial souls.  Although Hermes does not appear prominently in al-Sirr as an 
obvious hierophantic figure, the Sabian beliefs and practices described therein 
are deeply informed by the principles and motifs with which he had come to be 
closely associated: astrolatrous religion; talismanic technology; the mediation of 
the celestial spheres between Man and the divine principle; and the notion of a 
noetic ascent through the spheres whereby the soul can reach perfection.  
                                                             
29 Van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, p. 237. See al-Milal wa’l-Niḥal, (ed.) Fāʿūr, pp. 353-354.   




1.5 Sabianism in al-Sirr 
 
Concurring with most of the heresiographers from the time of the early tenth 
century, Sabianism represented for Rāzī any form of paganism connected with 
astrolatry.  But in al-Sirr, it is presented as an alternative soteriology, grounded 
in the belief in an ensouled geocentric cosmos. All events in its terrestrial centre 
are generated by the configurations of the planets. The planets and celestial 
spheres – the orbits in which they move – are animated by a plenitude of spirits. 
The powers of these spirits can be directed by means of ritual in order to 
influence change in this world. Each natural phenomenon and product of 
human artifice has its own special occult correspondence (munāsaba, pl. 
munāsabāt) with the specific planet or planets which presided over its coming-
to-be (ḥudūth). Planetary correspondence thus describes a special kind of 
ontological relationship in which sublunary effect somehow participates in the 
nature of its celestial principle: they share in a congenerity (mujānasa). For the 
Sabian, the significance of any terrestrial phenomenon derives from its 
participation in this infinitely complex web of celestial correspondence. Astral 
ritual gathers together sublunary objects of planetary correspondence and co-
ordinates them with action and words to engender an intended result. Certain 
planets are effective for certain results: Mars for an aggressive aim; Venus if the 
aim relates to friendship and love.  
For astral ritual to be effective, the practitioner must establish a noetic 
connection with the celestial spirits appropriate for his aim. To achieve this, he 
must purify his soul and cease its engrossment in material reality and sensual 
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pleasure by engaging in rigorous spiritual discipline, fasting, and mental focus 
on the operative planet. Ritual preparatory diet serves two functions. Firstly, in 
ceasing engrossment with material reality, he must reduce his consumption of 
food to the barest minimum required to sustain life. Such privation causes 
inevitable imbalances in the soul and thus requires a subtle knowledge of 
medicine (ṭibb) to ensure its well-being. Secondly, consumption of ritual foods 
assists in establishing the desired congenereity with the spirit that is invoked. 
Two major categories of Sabian astral ritual can be discerned from Rāzī‘s 
account. The first involves the casting of a ‗talisman‘ (sing. ṭilasm; pl. ṭilasmāt) A 
talisman is an anthropomorphic idol, cast in a mould at the astrologically 
appropriate time. Its metal corresponds to the operative planet: silver for the 
Moon; iron for Mars; gold for the Sun; lead for Saturn. Ritualized actions, 
mimetic of the intended aim, are then performed on or before this idol: when 
the practitioner enjoys a strong, stabilized noetic connection with the 
appropriate planet, then the intended result follows.31  
The second major category of astral magic in al-Sirr involves invocations which 
address the planets (daʿwat al-kawākib). It represents the central focus of the al-
Sirr. I shall refer to it as the planetary ascent ritual.32 A condition which the 
aspirant must fulfil before undertaking the ritual is to establish, by means of 
rigorous spiritual discipline, a stabilized noetic connection with his perfect 
nature, which plays a hierophantic role of initiating him into the long ritual 
which lasts several years. It comprises seven distinct successive stages, 
                                                             
31 For an excellent overview of talismans in the Islamic tradition, see Saif, ‗From Ġāyat al-ḥakīm 
to Šams al-maʿārif‘. 
32 As will be seen, this is not a literal ascent, but a metaphorical one. An astral magical ritual in 
al-Sirr is usually referred to as an ‗ʿamal‘.  
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observing the Ptolemaic order.  During each, an astral ritual is performed, and 
the rational soul of the planet addressed. For some stages, the aspirant is to 
expect a certain visionary experience.  At each, the aspirant receives a sign that 
the planet has accepted his devotions and is willing to co-operate with his will. 
Then, he is to ask the planet for knowledge and power over all in the sublunary 
world which it governs.  
Given that all change in the world of generation and corruption falls under the 
sway of the planets, the aspirant by the end of this long ritual will have attained 
knowledge of and power over all in the sublunary world: by the power of his 
own soul, he would – like the celestial souls - be able to command 
metereological and geological phenomena such as the rain and earthquakes. He 
would have transcended his own humanity and realized the ontological rank of 
the spirits which move the heavenly spheres. By means of their occult practices 
the Sabians were able to gain mastery and control of the imbalances of their 
own souls and the vicissitudes of sublunary reality.  
1.6 The argument of this thesis 
 
This study will focus primarily on the intellectual project of al-Sirr. As has now 
become apparent, I will argue that when he wrote it, he was already personally 
committed to key Sabian doctrines. The most significant of these was that of the 
perfect nature, which in the Sabian belief served as the individual‘s hierophant 
inducting him into the mysteries of the cosmos, leading him through successive 




In the introduction to al-Sirr, Rāzī frames the pursuit of occult knowledge as a 
soteriology that was rooted in a teleological ethics, the goal of which was the 
perfection of the soul as a simple primary end, sought for its own sake, the 
pursuit of which engenders its own pleasure.  Its method was grounded in 
natural philosophy: cosmology justified Sabian belief in an ensouled cosmos; 
psychology informed the science of spiritual discipline by which this noetic 
connection was established; astrology determined the timing and materials used 
in ritual. As well as occult power, this noetic connection with the celestial spirits 
divulged to them mysteries of the cosmos hitherto unknown. With the 
successful completion of a long ritual representing a planetary ascent, the 
Sabian adept perfected his occult knowledge and power to become like the 
celestial spirits. As the aspirant‘s initiator into this ritual, the perfect nature was 
crucial to this very personal occult soteriology.  
 
I argue that, being committed to a soteriological doctrine so alien to Islamic 
theology as the perfect nature, Rāzī harboured the ‗sublime goal‘ of its 
integration into the divine science of Islamic theology. To achieve this, he 
wanted to construct a rational explanatory model, using the available 
philosophical ideas of his time, to account for its efficacy as a soteriology. As 
well as the compilation of astral magical ritual, this philosophical theorizing on 
Sabianism was a chief concern of al-Sirr.  
In pursuit of this purpose, Rāzī presented Sabian doctrines and practices using 
the sources on astral magic available to him. But more importantly, he 
hypothesized on the most plausible philosophical justifications for Sabian 
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doctrines, and ruminated on the most rationally convincing explanations for the 
efficacy of their practices. For the philosophical theorization which we 
encounter in al-Sirr can only make sense if we assume the author‘s belief in their 
doctrines, and thus his requirement for an explanatory model and his need to 
reconcile them with his own theological commitments. The philosophical 
sources which he used for his model, he found in the works of Avicenna and 
Abū‘l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī. This thesis will be primarily concerned with this 
theoretical project. Rāzī‘s theory on the astral magic worked by the Sabians in 
al-Sirr is best approached from the perspective of his commentary on Avicenna‘s 
tanbīh (reminder) on preternatural events (umūr gharība) in the tenth namaṭ of 
his Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt.33 Avicenna says: 
Preternatural events proceed to the realm of nature (tanbaʿith fī ʿālam al-
tabīʿa) due to three principles. The first is the above-mentioned psychical 
dispositions (al-hay’a al-nafsāniyya). The second is the occult properties 
(khawwāṣ) of elemental bodies (al-ajsām al-ʿunṣuriyya), such as the 
attraction, <by> the magnet, of iron by means of an <occult> force special 
to the magnet. And the third is the special <occult> correspondence 
(munāsaba) <that exists> between heavenly forces and combinations of 
earthly bodies in special arrangements (amzija ajsām arḍiyya makhṣūṣa bi-
hay’āt waḍʿiyya); or <between heavenly forces> and the forces of earthly 
souls specifically <affected> by celestial states, either deliberately or 
otherwise (quwā nufūs arḍiyya makhṣūṣa bi-aḥwāl falakiyya fiʿliyyatan aw 
infiʿāliyyatan), as a result of which preternatural effects occur. Magic 
                                                             
33 For the text of Avicenna‘s Ishārāt, I rely on the version as it appears in Najafzadeh‘s edition of 
Rāzī‘s Sharḥ.  
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(siḥr) is the first category (qism) – indeed so are <Prophetic> miracles and 
<saintly> prodigies (al-muʿjizāt wa’l-karāmāt); nīranjāt are of the second 
category. And talismans are of the third category. 34  
For Avicenna, magic (siḥr) is confined to the power of the human soul to exert 
an effect directly on sublunary reality. Indeed, this power of the soul also 
provides the explanation for the prophetic or saintly miracle. Spirits, angels, 
jinn and God play no role: this is a purely naturalistic account. The second – the 
nīranj is just as naturalistic. The third, the talisman, which concerns Rāzī, is 
more ambiguous, as it involves in some way the participation of earthly souls, 
acting either ‗actively‘ or ‗passively‘. 35  What does Avicenna mean? Rāzī explains 
it as follows:  
 Know that celestial forces do not bring about preternatural events 
without the bringing together (inḍimam) of passive receptive elemental 
forces (al-quwā al-ʿunṣuriyya al-qābila) with active earthly psychic forces 
(al-quwā al-nafsāniya al-arḍiyya al-fāʿiliyya) and this is the talisman. This is 
what he [i.e. Avicenna] is relating here, and thus have we explained it. If 
you desire an in-depth investigation (taḥqīq) then you should consult al-
Sirr al-Maktūm.36 
So in this thesis, I take up Rāzī‘s suggestion. Here, he adapts his description of 
the talisman from al-Sirr, but renders explicit the crucial role of human agency 
                                                             
34 Avicenna, Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt, quoted in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 663. Since I shall it only 
discuss it in light of Rāzī‘s commentary, for the text of Avicenna‘s Ishārāt, I rely on the version as 
it appears in Najafzadeh‘s edition of Rāzī‘s Sharḥ. Although I rely on Inati‘s translations of 
Avicenna‘s Ishārāt, in many passages, especially this, my reading radically differs (see  Inati, 
Mysticism: Remarks and Admonitions,  pp.106-7) 
 
35 For the best introduction to talismans, see Burnett ‗Tābit ibn Qurra the Ḥarrānian‘; and on 
nīranj, see Burnett, ‗Nīranj: a Category of Magic‘.  
36 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 664.  
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in the talismanic process: active earthly psychic forces. So the talisman is a 
liminal category of occult action, occupying the space between the raw psychic 
force of the magician or prophet, and the humbler power of the magnet 
attracting iron. In making a talisman, the human soul must somehow interact 
with celestial forces. Al-Sirr can be read as an attempt to theorize on that 
interaction, which can be used either for transitive sublunary ends, or for a 
subjective, soteriological goal.  
Rāzī attempts his theory of astral magic by engineering Avicenna‘s theory on 
prophethood, which is grounded in his theory of the internal senses.37 So before 
I can explain his engineering of the former, I must explain briefly the general 
shape of the latter.  Avicenna accounts for human cognition by positing five 
internal senses: the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak), which orders external 
sense data into an integrated experience of extra-mental reality; the 
imagination (al-mutakhayyila), which also functions as the cogitative faculty (al-
mufakkira); the estimative faculty (al-wahm) which perceives non-material 
intentions such as the hostility of the enemy or the goodwill of a friend; and two 
separate storage faculties which record material and non-material experiences 
(al-khayāl and al-dhikr respectively). Each of these faculties inheres in a material 
substrate in the brain.  
Now, Avicenna‘s theory on imaginational prophethood explains veridical 
dreams and visions as the result of the human soul receiving an immaterial 
trace (athar) from one of the celestial souls. Crucially, as I shall argue in chapter 
7, it is the estimative faculty (al-wahm), mercurially mediating between the 
material and immaterial worlds, that delivers this celestial ‗trace‘ to the 
                                                             
37 See al-Akiti, ‗The Three Properties of Prophethood‘.   
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imagination. The imagination then sets about constructing what is experienced 
as a revelatory vision or a veridical dream. In this way, Avicenna explains that 
whilst the immediate object of the vision is the creation of the perceiver‘s own 
internal senses, its cause is nevertheless extra-mental, of a celestial origin.  
Imaginational prophethood by means of noetic connection with the celestial 
souls is one of three aspects (ḍurūb) of prophethood. The other two are: (2) the 
extraordinary ability to intuit, by means of connection with the Active Intellect, 
the middle terms of syllogisms; (3) the ability to perform acts which breach the 
natural course of events by means of the muḥarrika or motive faculty: this is 
achieved by the possession of a powerful internal sense called the estimative 
faculty (wahm).  
So, in al-Sirr, Rāzī builds his theory on astral magic on what is common to both 
imaginational prophethood and prophetic occult power: the estimative faculty. 
Now, the raw occult power of a prophet or magician, exercised by the wahm is, 
in the Avicennan theory, and in the terminology of al-Sirr, fiṭrī (innate). Rāzī‘s 
interest in al-Sirr 1:4 is in the notion that spiritual techniques can develop and 
train this power in one not so fortunate to possess this capacity innately. Once 
trained, the practitioner can connect with the celestial souls and somehow draw 
down their forces into a talisman: then under the focused attention of the 
practitioner, these talismanic forces are directed towards a transitive objective.  
So the talismanic idol is the earthly force which passively receives celestial 
forces under the direction of the practitioner‘s focused intent. But how does this 
theoretical model also apply to the ritual of planetary ascent, during which a 
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talismanic idol is conspicuous for its absence. Why should this long ritual be the 
focus of al-Sirr, when it purports to be a work describing talismans?  
Although when he describes the practicalities of the Sabian craft, Rāzī uses the 
word ‗talisman‘ in the sense of an object (either an idol or a ring), in his 
definition at the beginning of al-Sirr, he uses it in the sense of a process: tamzīj 
(‗blending‘). I hope to show that, during the ritual of planetary ascent, the 
earthly forces which passively receive the dynamically active celestial forces are 
internal faculties of the aspirant‘s soul; the active earthly psychic force which is 
involved in the process is the aspirant‘s rational soul which willingly submits to 
transformation. It is in this sense that he himself becomes a ‗talisman‘. With the 
completion of the ritual, into which he is initiated by his perfect nature, he 
gains knowledge of and power over all that the celestial spheres hold sway. This 
is the Sabian soteriology.  
In chapter 2, I shall examine the general introduction to al-Sirr. I will show that 
its discussion of the virtue of occult knowledge and its practical application is 
expressed in terms of a teleological ethical theory: its pursuit is a soteriological 
enterprise, the completion of which results in the perfection of the soul and its 
transformational elevation to the ontological level of the celestial spirits. Then 
having presented an overview of the Sabians as depicted in al-Sirr and in Rāzī‘s 
al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, and a discussion of the Indic influence on Rāzī‘s understanding 
of Sabianism, I shall turn to the conclusion (khātima) of the work and its parting 
counsel (waṣiyya) to its royal patron. I will show that Rāzī, who declares himself 
as the author of the work, exhorts whomsoever would attain the complete 
philosophy (al-falsafa al-tāmma) to invoke his own perfect nature (ṭibāʿahu al-
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tāmm). Furthermore, he urges him to rely on the fourth treatise of al-Sirr in 
order to master how the ritual of planetary ascent is to be performed. Not only 
does Rāzī speak of both doctrine and ritual with approval, but he even 
prescribes for his royal patron the adoption of the former and the practice of 
the latter. These facts constitute compelling evidence that Rāzī was himself 
personally committed to beliefs central to Sabianism. This must determine how 
we read the work as a whole.  
Having established Rāzī‘s attitude towards Sabianism, we will proceed in 
chapter 3 to examine the cosmological beliefs which justify their astrolatry as 
the means by which noetic connection is established with the celestial spirits. 
For these, Rāzī formulates philosophical proofs, mainly gleaned from Avicenna, 
for their belief in the celestial spheres as: living, rational beings possessed of 
volition; the causes of sublunary change; cognizant of both universals and 
particulars; and responsive to human communication by means of adoration 
and ritual. Integrated into these philosophical proofs are arguments, derived 
from Abū‘l-Barakāt, of the reality of the perfect nature as the celestial origin of 
the human soul, connection with which is a necessary precondition for 
undertaking the planetary ascent ritual. This model has no role for the 
Avicennan Active Intellect or the Giver of Forms: the former is replaced by the 
perfect nature, the latter by the starless sphere.38   
Chapter 4 is essentially a commentary on the definition of talismans with which 
al-Sirr begins, examining how Rāzī deploys Avicennan arguments to show how 
                                                             
38 Rāzī rejects the Active Intellect in his Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma (See Rāzī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 2, 
281-284, observed by Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, fn. 45, p. 118).  For the Active Intellect and 





celestial motion determines sublunary change, and how the talisman can 
harness the powers of this process. This is followed by chapter 5 which explores 
Rāzī‘s more technical account of how talismans are practically made. Chapter 6 
examines how Rāzī draws on Avicennan internal sense theory to account for 
how spiritual discipline might be trained for the purpose of working astral 
magic. I will argue in chapter 7 that, given Rāzī‘s reliance on Avicennan internal 
sense theory, the Avicennan account of celestial soul noesis provides the best 
model for understanding how Rāzī was trying to rationalize Sabian astral ritual. 
The chapter will conclude with my argument that the adept who has completed 
the planetary ascent is consciously co-ordinated with what I will call the 
Avicennan ‗perfected man‘ who has developed all three capacities of 
prophethood. Chapter 8 will argue that from al-Sirr and al-Maṭālib, it is possible 
to discern a distinct theory of occult epistemology which Rāzī roots in the wahm. 
In chapter 9, I shall explore an alternative account of visions and dreams 
expressed in al-Sirr, which is rooted in an extramission theory of vision. Chapter 
10 will demonstrate that Rāzī‘s ‗clarification‘ (bayyina) concerning the error, or 
more accurately ‗weakness‘ (ḍuʿf) of the Sabian approach does not reject a 
science of talismans per se, but the belief in any agency outside of God‘s power 
(qudra). And chapter 11 will look forwards from al-Sirr to show how doctrines 
which he attributed to the Sabians, especially that of the perfect nature, were 
incorporated into the anthropology, soteriology, and epistemology of al-Maṭālib.  
By the end of this thesis, I hope that I will have shown: that when he wrote al-
Sirr, in spite of his declarations in his kalām works, Rāzī was, privately at least: 1) 
sympathetic to the Sabian doctrine of the ensouled nature of the celestial 
spheres; 2) not principally opposed to a science of talismans, the chief tool for 
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performing astral magic; 3) already committed to the teleological ethics which 
characterized both the Sabianism of al-Sirr and the soteriology which he 
articulates in al-Maṭālib; 4) thoroughly convinced of the doctrine of the perfect 
nature as a spiritual and philosophical guide; and 5) believed in some form of 
planetary ascent in the pursuit of this perfection. The philosophical 
justifications for all of these five commitments he carried forward into al-Maṭālib 
to synthesize these Sabian commitments with Islamic theology to formulate a 
new soteriology.  
 
1.7 Approach of this study 
 
This study is interested in analysing the theory of astral magic which Rāzī 
formulates in al-Sirr and how it can be understood as a soteriology which was 
subsequently integrated into his late philosophical-theological summa al-
Maṭālib. It is for this reason that it will focus on a limited range of Rāzī‘s works. 
These works will be consulted in order to illuminate proofs in al-Sirr which are 
expressed in a condensed or obscure way. These works will be those most fully 
engaging with Avicennan thought such as the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, and al-Mabāḥith 
al-mashriqiyya, both written just after he wrote al-Sirr. With this same aim, I will 
also turn to Avicennan works such as al-Shifā and Aḥwāl al-Nafs.  To explore the 
perfect nature doctrine, I shall examine the relevant passage from Abū‘l-
Barakāt‘s Kitāb al-Muʿtabar. And since I shall argue that key Sabian doctrines 
which feature in al-Sirr were to be subsequently integrated into the 
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systematizing thought of Rāzī‘s later soteriology, I shall focus my attention on 
al-Maṭālib 8, especially in the last chapter.  
This study is focused on al-Sirr as a philosophical and theological work on astral 
magic. A broader investigation into the development of Rāzī‘s thought relating 
to such issues as causality and the nature of the soul and perception will clearly 
fall beyond the limits of this scope. Its focus also precludes it from pursuing a 
number of other very valuable approaches, all of which will have to remain for 
now desiderata. It will add nothing to the inquiry into the historical origins of 
the Sabians and their development as a trope in Islamic thought.39  It will not 
investigate the occult sources which Rāzī used to write his technical account of 
astral magic; nor will it analyse the ways in which his understanding of the 
technical aspects of the talismanic craft matured and developed by the time he 
came to write al-Maṭālib. Nor will it examine the obvious relationship between 
the Sabian religion that Rāzī depicts and the mystery religions of late Antiquity, 
especially that which is evidenced in the Corpus Hermeticum, particularly the 
Ascelpius.40 Nor will it pursue the history of the perfect nature doctrine before 
Rāzī, including: (1) its obvious affinities with the Platonic concept of the 
personal daimon; (2) its inclusion in Ghāyat al-Ḥakīm in close association with the 
Sabians, the Pseudo-Aristotelian Hermetica and ritual invocation of the planets; 
and (3) its reception in al-Wāridāt wa’l-taqdīsāt of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī in 
connection with planetary prayers.41 Lastly it will not aim at contributing to the 
                                                             
39 For this, see Van Bladel‘s The Arabic Hermes.  
40 See Burnett, ‗The Establishment of Medieval Hermeticism‘, p.111-112. 
41 On the personal daimon, see Adamson, ‗Present without being Present: Plotinus on Plato‘s 
Daimon‘; and Greenbaum, The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology. For the perfect nature in Ghāyat al-




lively modern scholarly debate on the analytical categories of: magic; the occult; 
the esoteric; science and religion.  
 
1.8 Summary of the Contents of al-Sirr 
 
Al-Sirr comprises five treatises (maqālāt) prefaced by a general introduction. 
Each treatise divides into separate chapters (fuṣūl). The general introduction 
opens with a eulogy of occult knowledge and concludes with a discussion of 
twelve conditions relating to the attitude of mind which must be possessed by 
the one who would aspire to the acquisition of occult knowledge.42 
The first treatise opens with a definition of talismans as the blending of active 
heavenly powers with receptive earthly powers. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the 
epistemology of astrology, the science which identifies patterns of relationship 
between celestial configurations and sublunary phenomena. The fourth chapter 
is of great significance to the work as a whole, describing the occult power 
which can be exerted by the soul‘s estimative faculty and how it can be 
developed through spiritual training. Chapter five describes the various 
practices involved in astral ritual, including the use of images, suffumigations, 
and incantations. The sixth and last chapter of the treatise provides a 
‗clarification‘ on the ‗weakness‘ of approach of the philosophers and the Sabians 
and a defence of Islam.43 
The second treatise, comprising just under half of the total length of the 
treatise, summarizes, without acknowledging its source,  the astrology of Abū 
                                                             
42 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 1-7.  
43 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 7-20.  
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Maʿshar as presented in his al-Madkhal al-Kabīr (Great Introduction to 
Astrology).44 
The third treatise treats of talismans. Its first chapter provides a detailed 
description of the process and ritual associated with the forging of the 
talismanic idol; its second and third chapters present instructions for talismans 
derived from two different sources. Its fourth and last chapter concludes by 
reconciling between Islamic scripture and the Sabian belief in an entirely 
ensouled cosmos.45  
The first chapter of the fourth treatise describes the eight doctrines of the 
Sabians, amongst which is included the doctrine of the perfect nature. The long 
ritual of planetary ascent is detailed in chapter two. The third prescribes rituals 
to propitiate the anger or hostility of any planet, whilst the fourth describes 
various aspects of the ritual such as specific sacrifices, suffumigations, and 
prayers. Chapters Five to Seven comprise technical instructions for invoking the 
Head and Tail of the Dragon; specific planetary magical operations and then 
descriptions of poisons and antidotes. Chapters Eight to Ten are devoted to 
operations for: neutralizing magic and amorous obsession; causing strife and 
enmity; and striking down a victim with illness.46  
The Fifth treatise describes the talismans of the seven planets according to Kitāb 
al-Siḥr al-kabīr by Ibn Waḥshiyya.47  
Translations of the ritual of planetary ascent and its invocations appear in 
Appendices 1 and 2; the third Appendix will contain a full reproduction of the 
                                                             
44 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 20-95.  
45 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 95-110.  
46 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 110-158. 
47 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 158-174.  
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Cairo lithograph of al-Sirr. Here follows a concise summary of the main divisions 
of al-Sirr (numbers in square brackets refer to page numbers in the Cairo 
lithograph).  
General Introduction [1-7] 
1. On the general merit of knowledge [2-3] 
2. On the merit of occult Knowledge and the perfection of the theoretical and 
practical capacities [3- 5] 
3. Twelve conditions for engaging with this kind of knowledge [5-7] 
(a) Conviction [5] 
(b) Persistence [5] 
(c) Industry   [5-6] 
(d) Concealment [6] 
(e) Nocturnal Practice [6] 
(f) Preponderance of good acts over bad [6] 
(g) Veganism [6] 
(h) Employment of Spirits for Important Matters [6] 
(i) Refrainment from excessive petition of Spirits [6] 
(j) Astrological Knowledge [6] 
(k) Steadfastness and perseverance [6]  
(l) Spiritual sensitivity [7]  
Treatise 1: On General Principles [7-20] 
1.1  
Definition of talismans [7-9]; 
1.2  




On the method by which knowledge of the states of the celestial spheres can be 
attained [10] 
1.4  
On the fact that magic is based on the purification of the soul and the focusing of 
the wahm (ta’liq al-wahm) [11-17] 
1.4.1 
 Ten illustrations of the occult power of the wahm over physical reality [11-12]; 
1.4.2 
 Innate (fiṭrī) occult power [12-13]; 
1.4.3 
Acquired occult power [13-17]; 
(a) Astrological indications of predisposition for the acquisition of occult power 
[13-14;]  
(b) Rejection of worldliness; [14]  
(c) Physical and Psychological balance through regulation of the humours [14]; 
(d) Vegan diet and reduction in food consumption [14]; 
(e) Use of colours, fragrance and music to fortify the soul [14]; 
(f) Single-minded purpose [15-16] 
(g) Establishment of connection with the celestial spirit by means of ritual, 
prayer and concentrated focus on an idol [16] 
(h) Ṭumṭum al-Hindī on meditative focus, occult power, and directing the 
celestial powers with the power of the soul [16-17]  
1.5  
An adumbration of the ritual acts that the master of the craft performs (ḍabṭ al-
aʿmāl allatī yuzāwiluhā sāḥib al-ṣanʿa) [17-19] 
1.5.1 
Four proofs that images exert an occult effect on the soul [17] 
1.5.2 




On images (ṣuwar) and their occult effects, knowledge of which was only 
acquired by means of revelation and inspiration (waḥy wa’l-ilhām) [17]  
1.5.4 
Proof that each image has its archetype (mithāl) in the heavens and that lower 
forms are subject (muṭīʿa) to their archetypes in the higher world: serpents are 
subject to Draco; scorpions to Scorpio; predators to Leo [18]  
1.5.5 
On planetary correspondence with sublunary phenomena and their use in 
magnifying power of astral magical ritual [18]  
1.5.6 
Images are to be inscribed on materials sympathetic to the planet [18]  
1.5.7 
 Repetition of incantations  
1.5.8 
Burning of aromatics before planetary idol and representation of the person in 
relation to whom the ritual is being performed [18] 
1.5.9 
Tying and blowing on knots and the utterance of incantations over them [18] 
1.6   
A ‗clarification‘ (bayyina) on the weakness of the approach (madhhab) of the 
philosophers and the Sabians and an explanation of the correctness of the 
Islamic religion. [19-20] 
Treatise 2: Astrology  [20-95] 
2.1  
On the proofs that the heavenly bodies influence this world [20-26] 
2.2  
Response to the denial of planetary influence [26-29] 
2.3  
A Summary of Astrology [29-95]  
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Treatise 3: On Talismans [95-110] 
3.1  
General principles on making talismans [95-96] 
3.1.1 
A complete talisman draws on the influence of one fixed star and three assisting 
planets in order to capture the four elements: Mercury; the Moon; and the 
operative planet; 
3.1.2 
On the precise measurement of the four elements in the raw material within the 
raw material;  
3.1.3 
Correct seasonal timing for making the talisman; 
3.1.4 
How distance and speed of the planets determines their influence 
3.1.5 
Instructions for astrological timing;   
3.1.6 
On how and when to cast the metal into the mould to make the talisman, and 
the ritual performed. 
3.2  
Talismans of Abūdhāṭīs al-Bābilī [96-104]  
3.3 
Selections from Kitāb Yawāqīt al-Mawāqīt [105-109] 
3.4  
A Qur‘ānic defence of the doctrine of the ensouled universe [109-10] 
 




Sabian Beliefs [110-114] 
4.1.1  
Three Sabian Sub-sects [110] 
4.1.2  
Eight Sabian doctrines [110-4] 
4.2   
Ritual of Planetary Ascent [114-120]  
4.3  
How to avoid hostility of the planets during the ritual [120-22] 
4.4  
On the suffumigations, sacrifices and invocations used in the ritual [122-7] 
4.5  
On the invocation of Draco [127-132]  
4.6  
On the operations of the Spirits of the Planets [132-7] 
4.7  
On Poisons and Teriacs [137-139] 
4.8  
On the Neutralization of Magic and Obsessive Love [139-141] 
4.9.  
On Operations to sow hatred and cause separation [141-151] 
4.10  
On causing illness [151-158] 












Chapter 2: Sabians 
 
The alternative Sabian soteriology depicted in al-Sirr enshrined the perfection of 
knowledge and power, the central theme of the general introduction to the 
work.  In Rāzī‘s thought, ‗Sabians‘ (al-ṣābi’a), whose historicity was not a central 
concern for Rāzī , represented a generic term denoting the adherents of any 
form of learned astrolatrous paganism, such as those who constituted the 
ancient civilizations of the Greeks, the Chinese, the Egyptians, the 
Mesopotamians and the Indians.48  
After examining the central theme of the general introduction to al-Sirr, this 
chapter will present an overview of Sabian belief and practice as presented in 
the work, supplemented by a brief exploration of their depiction in Rāzī‘s 
commentary on the Qur‘ān, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr. From these two works will emerge 
the shape of the Sabian religious construct which represented the oldest 
religion of Man, with antediluvian origins, rooted in the observation of the 
natural rhythms of the cosmos. Thereafter, I shall briefly examine the use of 
Indian spiritual practice in the shaping of Rāzī‘s Sabian construct.  
2.1 The justification for the study of occult knowledge in al-Sirr 
 
Praise is due to God whose knowledge encompasses and whose wisdom 
penetrates all things; and prayers and blessings on the prophet of mercy, 
the mediator of the <Muslim> community Muḥammad, and on his pure 
                                                             
48 A synonym for this term might be ‗talisman masters‘ (aṣḥāb al-ṭilasmāt), whose views on the 
celestial spirits Rāzī records in al-Maṭālib 7 in a chapter entitled: ‗a report on what the talisman 
masters said concerning the attributes of the high celestial spirits‘, which reports the views of 
the Greeks, the Chinese and especially the Indians (see al-Maṭālib 7, pp. 387-395).  
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family. This book gathers together whatever has reached us of the 
science of talismans, magical operations (siḥriyāt), evocations (ʿazā’im) 
and planetary invocation <daʿwat al-kawākib>, whilst disavowing all that 
is opposed to the faith, the peace of religious certainty (salm al-yaqīn) and 
reliance on the benevolence of the Merciful.49  
The concise exordium of al-Sirr represents a general panegyric of knowledge and 
wisdom. Appropriately the traditional pious opening passage begins with praise 
of God ‗whose knowledge encompasses and whose wisdom penetrates all 
things‘. Implicit in this prayer is a proleptic defence of the subject material he is 
about to treat, material that might appal the ―orthodox‖ Muslim: ‗the science of 
talismans, magical operations (siḥriyāt), evocations (ʿazā’im) and planetary 
invocation (daʿwat al-kawākib)‘.   
This implicit proleptic defence argues that since God‘s knowledge embraces all 
things, no knowledge should be deemed accursed; since God‘s wisdom infuses 
all, nothing can be said to be created in vain. And since this science invokes the 
mediation of spiritual beings (rūḥāniyāt), by the will of the adept, to achieve 
intended effects in the world of generation and corruption Rāzī, emphatically 
declaring his own Islamic confessional commitment, appropriately invokes 
blessings on the prophet of mercy in his capacity as the true mediator between 
God and the Muslim community.  
He presents al-Sirr as as a compendium of magical theory and practice that 
‗gathers together whatever has reached us‘ (kitāb yajmaʿ fīhi mā waṣala ilaynā) 
concerning talismans. He adopts the tone of a neutral observer, whose Islamic 
                                                             
49 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 2. 
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confessional commitments do not intrude much into the presentation; the 
passages in which Rāzī defends Islamic orthodoxy against the claims of the 
masters of talismans are rare, relatively brief and do not detract from the main 
purpose of the work. Rāzī is robust in his ‗disavowal of all that is opposed to the 
faith‘ (maʿa al-tabarri’ ʿan kulli mā yukhālif al-dīn). With this disavowal, Rāzī 
acknowledges the provocative nature of the material which he presents which 
would outrage any ―orthodox‖ sensibility.   
Knowledge, according to the general exordium of al-Sirr, is the means by which 
the rational human soul is delivered from the darkness of material reality and 
corporeal desire, which veil the soul from perceiving reality as it is. In 
knowledge and wisdom is the soul‘s ennoblement; in engrossment in sublunary 
reality lies its utter ruin:   
Knowledge (al-ʿilm) is the <very> life of the rational soul drawing out the 
heart from the darkness of nature (al-ṭabīʿa) which has enshrouded living 
souls and veiled them from the world of life with the ornaments of 
nature that are ruinous for he who conceives not the realities and is not 
honoured with knowledge (lā yataṣawwir al-ḥaqā’iq wa-yatasharrafu bi’l-
ʿilm).50 
To amplify this, Rāzī relies not on Islamic authorities but the pre-Islamic Greek 
sages. According to a saying attributed to Socrates, the wise have:  
…asserted the living soul is the vessel of wisdom, and denied that it is to 
be found in scrolls and books. For it is pure, living, holy, incorruptible, 
containing neither filth nor mortal pollution. It cannot be entrusted to 
                                                             
50 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 2. 
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aught but living souls, untouched by moribund flesh. Souls are fortified 
with wisdom just as bodies are fortified with eating and drinking. 
Wisdom washes souls from the filth and impurities of nature as clothes 
which are washed in a basin. When the soul knows wisdom, it yearns and 
longs for the world of life; inclines towards the rejection of natural base 
desires, which are fatal to living souls; and escapes from the captivity of 
nature and its condition by which the people of <this> world are bound 
(al-shahawāt al-tabīʿiyya al-mumīta li’l-nufūs al-ḥayya wa-najat min asr al-
ṭabīʿa wa-ḥālatiha allatī qad taʿallaqa ahl al-ʿālam bihā).51 
Wisdom is living: it does not dwell in inanimate books but the soul of the one 
that inclines towards it. Wisdom nourishes the soul; purifies it of filth; and 
secures its salvation from captivity in the world of gross materiality.  By the 
following words, attributed to Hippocrates, the reader is exhorted, in the 
strongest possible terms, to embody its reality:  
The wise man is not he who knows the path but then swerves away from 
it, donning the robe of ignorance; nor does he find <eternal> life who 
does not strive for the salvation of his soul (wa-laysa yaḥyā man lam yasʿa 
fī najāt nafsihi). A <final> death in <bodily> decomposition (al-mawt fī al-
bilā) is better for the ignorant man than life <after physical> death: for 
when the base cravings of nature (radhā’il al-ṭabīʿa) attach themselves to 
the soul and bind it in their snare, then it dies death after death, and 
endures pain upon pain, and perhaps may remain bound, never to find 
salvation from it (wa-rubbamā baqiyat marbūṭatan lā tanjū minhā). If the 
captive prefers the humiliation of his captivity to the glory of salvation 
                                                             
51 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 2. 
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and liberation (al-najāt wa’l-khalāṣ), contenting himself with that which is 
worthless, then for him a <final> death would <indeed> be a peaceful 
repose <rāḥa>.52   
Nothing could be of more concern to man‘s immortal soul than the pursuit of 
knowledge. For in it lies his salvation and liberation from the pain and suffering 
of embodiment. Knowledge is a soteriological enterprise. 
Of all fields of inquiry, occult knowledge has the highest virtue. According to its 
masters, as reported by Rāzī, occult astral knowledge is the summit of human 
intellectual endeavour, combining the most dignified knowledge with the most 
dignified power:  
The masters of this knowledge combined the pleasure (ladhdha) of 
possessing the noblest knowledge with the pleasure of the noblest kind 
of power (ashraf al-ʿulūm wa-ashraf anwāʿ al-qudra). As for the pleasure of 
<this> knowledge, it is because this knowledge guides you (yuwaffiquka) 
to the mysteries of the higher and lower worlds (asrār al-ʿālam al-aʿlā wa 
asrār al-ʿālam al-asfal); indeed it transforms you such that you become a 
witness unto the spiritual beings, their interlocutor – indeed one of their 
company and one of their like (yajʿaluka bi-ḥaythu taṣīr mushāhidan li’l-
rūḥāniyāt wa-mukhāṭiban lahum bal mukhtaliṭan bihim wa-ka-wāḥidin min 
amthālihim) . As for the pleasure of power, it is because <practitioners> 
are empowered to perform all objects of desire (yaqdirūna ʿalā jamīʿ al-
murādāt), including curing difficult illnesses which defy the expertise of 
doctors, such as leprosy, paralysis and obsessive love, for they enlist the 
                                                             
52 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 2. I have not yet located the source for this quote.  
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aid of the spirits (yastaʿīnūn bi-rūḥāniyāt) whilst doctors use corporeal 
means (jismāniyāt): and spiritual means (rūḥāniyāt) are stronger than the 
corporeal, without a doubt. Moreover, the master of this knowledge is 
empowered to subdue his enemy without engaging in war and exposing 
himself to combat.53 
The object of this most noble knowledge is the mysteries of the Higher and 
Lower Worlds and how the spirits which inhabit the former effect the 
generation and corruption of temporally originated phenomena (ḥawādith) in 
the latter.54 These spirits, referred to alternatively, but inconsistently, as ‗arwāḥ‘ 
(sing. rūḥ) or ‗rūḥāniyāt‘, are the denizens of the celestial spheres. In al-Sirr, Rāzī 
co-ordinates these celestial spirits with the angels of the Islamic revelation.55  
A corollary of this occult knowledge is pleasure (ladhdha): the perfection of the 
soul as a simple primary end, sought for its own sake, the pursuit of which 
engenders its own pleasure. Its result is the ontological transformation of the 
knowing subject such that he becomes: ‗a witness unto the Spiritual Beings, 
their interlocutor – indeed one of their company and one of their like‘. From 
Rāzī‘s perspective, the claim made by the masters of this occult knowledge to 
such a transformation constitutes a claim to angelomorphosis. By means of this 
transformational knowledge, the adept is represented as being able to enlist the 
aid of the celestial spirits to act in ways in the sublunary world which are 
stronger and superior to those who act by means of the corporeal. In so doing, 
                                                             
53 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 3. 
54 Rāzī often speaks of the ‗nobility‘ (sharaf) bestowed on the one who possess knowledge. 
Compare for instance the first chapter of his epistemological introduction to al-Maṭalib in which 
he explores the ‗nobility of knowledge‘ (sharaf al-ʿilm) (Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 1, pp. 37-41).  
55 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 109-110.  
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he is liberated from engrossment in material reality and raised to the rank of 
the celestial angels.  
2.2 Sabians in Al-Sirr: A General Overview 
 
The alternative Sabian soteriology, which substituted the mediating guidance of 
prophets with that of the celestial spirits, was rooted in the veneration of the 
heavenly bodies. The wandering planets; the fixed stars; the signs of the Zodiac; 
and the three hundred and sixty degrees of the starless sphere which surrounds 
them -- all exerted their influence on the generation and corruption of 
terrestrial phenomena. As long as Man remained ignorant of them, he remained 
in their thrall; but once he understood them, and their effect on the rhythms of 
the cosmos and his own soul, then he stood the chance of gaining some kind of 
agency, and ultimately, of transcending his own incarnated existence. Of central 
importance to the system of Sabian practice as conceived by Rāzī was the 
talisman, a planetary statue or idol. Its construction, at the correct astrological 
timing, allowed the practitioner to affect, in accordance with his intent, reality 
in the centre of his geocentric universe, in ways which ran contrary to the usual 
course of apparent cause and effect.   
The definition of the talisman that introduces the first treatise of al-Sirr 
structures the subsequent presentation of the theory. Whilst in al-Sirr, he cites 
no authority for this definition, in al-Maṭālib, where the definition reappears 
verbatim, it is explicitly attributed to the Sabians. A talisman is:  
 …the blending of <dynamically> active celestial forces with passive 
elemental forces to make manifest that which runs contrary to the 
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natural course of events or to prevent from occurring what normally 
would agree with it.56 
Two levels of reality are introduced: the supralunary reality of the heavenly 
spheres, the ‗<dynamically> active celestial forces‘, and the reality of the myriad 
sublunary phenomena which fall under their sway. The higher are ontologically 
linked with the lower by a web of sympathetic connections, or planetary and 
zodiacal correspondences (munāsabāt). The base products of nature and human 
endeavour only have meaning and significance insofar as they participate in the 
intricate geometry of celestial movement. The definition implies a third level of 
reality, which brings together the supralunary with the sublunary, through a 
process of active ‗blending‘ (tamzīj). This third level is the link between them: 
the soul of the practitioner and the talisman which he casts. It is on this level 
that the products of nature and human artifice are gathered together to 
participate in celestial reality in ways determined by the intent of the Sabian 
adept. These three levels, the superlunar, sublunary and psychic, provide the 
organization for the theoretical passages of al-Sirr. They also inform Rāzī‘s 
exposition of talismans in his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, as we have already encountered 
(see section 1.6). Explaining the concept of the talisman as the bringing together 
of celestial with sublunary forces, he divides the latter into the receptive forces 
of the material used in the talismanic ritual and the active psychic forces – 
which can safely be presumed to be those of the talisman master: 
                                                             
56 Al-Sirr, p.7: tamzīj al-quwā al-faʿʿāla al-samāwiyya bi’l-quwā al-munfaʿila al-ʿunṣuriyya li-ajli al-
tamakkuni min iẓhāri mā yukhālifu al-ʿāda aw al-manʿi min mā yuwāfiquhā. Compare the close 
wording from al-Maṭālib 8 which states that ‗talisman‘ is an expression for: ‗…the blending of 
<dynamically> active celestial forces with passive elemental forces to bring about that which 
runs contrary to the natural course of events or prevents from occurring what would normally 
agree with it.‘ Al-Maṭālib 8, p. 149. In al-Sirr, sublunary passive forces are referred to as 
‗elemental‘ (ʿunṣuriyya) whilst in al-Maṭālib, they are reffered to as ‗earthly‘ (arḍiyya).  
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Know that celestial forces do not affect preternatural events without 
the bringing together (inḍimām) of passive receptive elemental forces 
(al-quwā al-ʿunṣuriyya al-qābila) with active earthly psychic forces (al-
quwā al-nafsāniya al-arḍiyya al-fāʿiliyya) and this <bringing together> is 
the talisman. This is what he [i.e. Avicenna] is relating here, and thus 
have we already explained it, so consult al-Sirr al-Maktūm if you desire 
an in-depth investigation (taḥqīq).57  
So, returning to al-Sirr, Rāzī begins his theoretical discussion with the first 
treatise on the level of the talisman master‘s soul and its ‗active earthly psychic 
forces‘.  After examining the various epistemological difficulties which underlie 
astrology, a branch of knowledge necessary for the timing of talismanic 
operations, Rāzī argues that empirical analysis must be supported by revelation 
(waḥy) to the human soul and its inspiration (ilhām) by a numinous external 
source in order to secure the sound basis of astrology as a valid field of inquiry. 
Rāzī then shifts his focus to the operation of the soul itself and the necessity of 
focusing its estimative faculty (wahm) in order to secure the success of any 
task.58 This discussion provides an introduction to the real core of the first 
treatise: an exploration of: (1) the nature of the soul innately imbued with occult 
power; and (2) of the spiritual austerities by which such power may be acquired 
by the soul not so naturally predisposed. A crescendo of philosophical 
arguments, to establish the reality of the former and the efficacy of the latter, 
reaches its climax with a long passage of a distinct Indian yogic tone, quoted on 
the authority of a certain ‗Tumtum al-Hindī‘ (‗Tumtum the Indian‘), which 
                                                             
57 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 663-664. Notice here that the referent of ‗talisman‘ here is more 
process than object.  
58 We shall examine the nature and importance of this internal sense faculty, which is so crucial 
in Avicennan psychology in the third part of this thesis.  
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expounds on the occult powers developed by someone who attains a heightened 
meditative state (markaz al-fikr).  Thus does Rāzī present the level of reality of 
the adept‘s soul, the focus of which blends the ‗<dynamically> active celestial 
forces‘, referred to in his definition of the talisman, with ‗passive elemental 
forces‘.  
These supralunary active forces and sublunary passive elemental forces are the 
subject of the second treatise. After presenting arguments establishing that the 
heavenly bodies influence generation and corruption in this world, Rāzī 
presents what amounts to a summary of the Kitāb al-madkhal al-kabīr (‗Great 
Introduction to Astrology‘) of Abu Maʿshar whose rational justification for 
astrology, Pingree argues, derives from the rationalizations of the 
philosophizing Sabians of Ḥarrān.59 His subsequent presentation of long lists of 
different sublunary phenomena and their planetary correspondences relies too 
on Abu Maʿshar. The importance of their inclusion resides in the fact that the 
products of nature and human artifice, which derive their meaning from their 
participation in the transcendent celestial reality, are brought together in 
Sabian astral ritual.60 Ultimately the aim of the planetary ascent ritual is self-
                                                             
59 See Abū Maʿshar‘s ‗Kitāb al-madkhal al-kabīr‘. On Abū Maʿshar, see Pingree in Dictionary of 
Scientific Biography. For a refutation of David Pingree‘s theory of a Sabian Ḥarrānian influence on 
Abu Maʿshar, see Van Bladel, the Arabic Hermes, pp.115-118. Whether or not there was a historic 
Sabian Harrānian influence on Abu Maʿshar is irrelevant to the present discussion. What is 
relevant is the fact that, citing him as the authority for the ritual of planetary ascent, Rāzī 
believed Abu Maʿshar to have had intimate knowledge of Sabian practice. For Abū Maʿshar‘s 
theory on astral causation, see Adamson ‗Abū Maʿshar‘.   
60 A brief glance at the detailed contents of al-Sirr 2:11, entitled ‗On the distribution of all colours, 
tastes, occult properties, actions, character traits amongst the Seven Planets‘, assists us in 
gaining some impression of how comprehensive and all-encompassing was the Sabian vision of a 
sublunary reality entirely governed by planetary correspondence. (see al-Sirr, pp. 53-8) Included 
in the list are individual examples of the following categories of natural phenomena and 
products of human culture: tastes; colours; textures; physical attributes; terrains; dwelling 
places; countries and regions; non-precious metals; precious materials; fruit and grains; trees; 
plants and crops; foods and medicines; forces and powers; animals; birds; simple organs and 
limbs; complex organs and limbs; organs of perception; ages of man; members of the family 
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divinization through mimesis of the celestial bodies and thus the celestial souls 
that move them.61  The Sabian claim that astral ritual can be relied on as a means 
to change some aspect of terrestrial reality issues a direct challenge to the 
Islamic theological doctrine that since God‘s power (qudra) extends to all 
existing things, no agency exists except God‘s. Seeing that, for Rāzī‘s Sabians, 
astral ritual represents a praxis by which the Avicennan prophetic properties of 
unseen knowledge and occult power might be achieved by all, it is natural that 
al-Sirr should include a robust and detailed defence of astrology, the science par 
excellence which informs Sabian belief and determines its rituals.62  
Moreover, Rāzī draws on an eclectic range of authorities to explain this occult 
system of belief and practice including Greeks, Persians and Indians. The Indian 
contribution, as represented by Ṭumṭum al-Hindī, to the general Sabian 
construct is particularly important. His two contributions to Rāzī‘s general 
account of this astral religion come at highly significant junctures in the 
narrative. The first derives from his book on the images of the three hundred 
                                                                                                                                                                      
household; human physical appearance; character traits; behavioural traits; actions and nature; 
professions and social classes; religions and clothes; planetary images.  
61 See conclusion of chapter 4. 
62 He lodges a defence in the belief in celestial influence by first demonstrating the effects of 
solar and lunar motion on the terrestrial world. He then applies this conclusion mutatis mutandis 
to the other heavenly bodies. Thus, drawing on Abu Maʿshar, he adduces as evidence of solar 
influence on both celestial and terrestrial reality the Sun‘s effect on: the orbits of the higher 
planets; the waxing and waning of the Moon; the vitalization of animal life; variation in global 
temperature and its different environments; the seasons and growth of plants; the seven climes 
and the races to be found therein. (Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 20-23). By way of contrast, the Moon affects: 
the tides; the bodies of animals; the humoral balance; hair growth; milk production; egg white; 
sleep (it is especially bad to sleep in moonlight). Certain fish emerge at the beginning of the 
lunar month; the Moon exerts an influence on the planting of trees and seedlings and on the 
growth of grasses and herbs. There are three ways in which the Moon exerts a greater effect on 
the sublunary world than the Sun. Firstly it is the closest planet to our world and therefore its 
effect on it is the most powerful. Secondly the movement of the Moon is swift, and its changes of 
state are many. Since the movements of the rest of the planets are slow, whilst the changes that 
occur in this world are many, it is more logical to attribute the changes which occur in this 
world to the motions of the Moon. And thirdly, because of its swift motions, the Moon blends the 
lights of some planets with the lights of the others: this blending is the most proximate principle 
cause of temporally originated events in this world. (Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 25). For the philosophical 
defence of astrology, see Adamson, ‗Abū Maʿshar‘; Saliba ‗Ashʿarites and the science of the stars‘; 
Kukkonen, ‗Causality and Cosmology‘; McGinnis, ‗Natural Knowledge‘.  
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and sixty degrees of the starless sphere, which provides crucial information for 
the successful casting of talismanic idols. The second is his striking description 
of the ability of the adept who has mastered meditative focus, to control the 
elements with the power of mental concentration and to communicate with the 
celestial souls. These two contributions provide the necessary bridge between 
cosmology and psychology vital for the Sabian soteriological system.63 
2.3 Sabians in al-Tafsīr al-kabīr 
 
Just as he did in al-Sirr, so Rāzī treats the Sabians in his highly influential 
Qur‘ānic commentary Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr as a heresiological category comprising a 
wide range of historical groups and nations and theologically distinct positions. 
But in the attempt to place them within a hierarchy of religions, Rāzī‘s al-Tafsīr 
equivocates between designating them as privileged ‗ahl al-kitāb‘ (people of the 
book) and relegating them to an intermediary status between this dignified 
category and that of degenerate polytheists.  
2.3.1 Sabians as People of the Book 
 
The Sabians are mentioned explicitly on just three occasions in the Qur‘ān. The 
first appears in the second sūra:  
                                                             
63 For Rāzī‘s discussion of the images of the degrees of the starless sphere described by Ṭumṭum 
al-Hindī, see chapter 5. For the description of the power of perfected meditative focus, see 
Chapters 6 and 7.    
56 
 
As for the believers, for the Jews, the Christians and the Sabians who believe 
in God and the Last Day, and who do righteous deeds – these have their 
wage with their Lord. No fear shall fall upon them, nor shall they grieve.64 
Commenting on the identity of the Sabians in this verse, Rāzī gathers three 
opinions. The first defines the ‗ṣābi‘ as one who ‗abandons his religion for 
another‘: thus did the Arabs call Muḥammad, who manifested a religion 
contrary to theirs.65  The second opinion cited provides detail as to their beliefs: 
As for the second <opinion>, Qatāda said: ‗they are a people who worship 
the angels and pray to the Sun five times a day.‘ He also said: ‗Religions are 
of five <types>, four of which belong to Satan and one of which belongs to 
the Merciful. <The four are>: the Sabians who worship the angels; the 
Magians who worship fire; those who commit polytheism, worshipping 
idols; and the Jews and Christians.66 
In this second opinion the Sabians, who like Muslims observe five daily prayers, 
but who unlike them direct their worship to angels and pray to the Sun, are 
accorded an intermediary position which lies between the honoured status of 
the People of the Book and the depravity of idolaters. This intermediary status 
in the religious hierarchy is maintained in the third opinion concerning the 
Sabians, an opinion which Rāzī himself adopts:  
The third <opinion>, which is the closest <to the truth>, is that they are a 
people who worship the planets (al-kawākib) and they are associated with 
one of two theological positions (thumma la-hum qawlān): the first is that the 
                                                             
64 Qur‘ān 2:62. 
65 Al-Tafsīr 3, p.112. For the medieval Islamic sources which support variations on this 
interpretation, see Gunduz, The Knowledge of Life, pp. 17-19.  
66 Al-Tafsīr 3, p. 112-3. 
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Creator of the world is God – exalted is He! – except that He enjoined the 
veneration (taʿẓīm) of these planets and that they should provide the 
direction of prayer, supplication and veneration (taʿẓīm). The second <of 
their theological positions> is that God – exalted is He! – created the spheres 
and the planets but it is the planets which govern this world, both its good 
and evil, its sound health and disease, and that it is they which indeed 
created it; thus it behoves Man to venerate them for they are the gods 
which govern this world but which worship God – exalted is He! This 
doctrine (madhhab) is the position attributed to the Chaldeans whom 
Abraham – upon whom be peace – came to refute and whose doctrine he 
came to repudiate.67 
This third opinion thus collapses the three categories of Sabians we encounter 
in al-Sirr into two groups. The first asserts the existence of the Creator who 
enjoins on them the veneration (taʿẓīm) of the planets, as opposed to their 
worship (ʿibāda). Their veneration of the planets is thus the fulfilment of a 
divine injunction. The religion of the second group is more degenerate in 
nature. For them the planets are the creators and governors of this world: since 
man is hostage to their caprices, they are to be worshipped as gods in their own 
right. The link between God and man, the former being too transcendent to be 
the object of the latter‘s attentions, is severed. Thus, whilst for the first group of 
Sabians the planets provide the focus of veneration, for the second group they 
are the very objects of worship.68 This second group is explicitly identified as the 
                                                             
67 Al-Tafsīr 3, p. 112-13.  
68 Elsewhere in al-Tafsīr, when discussing astrolaters in general (not Sabians in particular), Rāzī 
says: ‗As for those engaged in the worship of things other than God, their creeds are many. They 
include those who worship the planets. Such people fall into two categories. There are those 
who maintain that God – exalted is He! – created the planets to which He delegated the 
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Chaldeans, the very community in which Abraham was raised and whose 
religion he was divinely commissioned to repudiate, just as Muḥammad was 
commissioned to repudiate the religion of Mecca‘s Arabs. The Chaldeans are 
thus a specific subcategory of Sabian.  
Rāzī mentions the Sabians elsewhere in al-Tafsīr in his exegesis of Qur‘ān 22:17, 
where he includes the Sabians amongst the Muslims, Jews and Christians, who 
believe in the Creator as an agent ‗possessed of volition‘ (fāʿil mukhtār), and who 
follow the teachings of the divinely inspired prophets.69  This category of 
believers is contrasted with those who follow false prophets, such as the 
Magians (Majūs), and with those who reject the very notion of prophethood, 
namely the idolaters, the polytheists and the Brahmins (al-barāhima). 
Presumably, therefore, the prophet whom the Sabians followed was divinely 
inspired. And yet somehow their belief in prophethood remains deficient and 
the divine revelation in which the Sabian religion is rooted enjoys a lesser status 
to that of the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims.  
Rāzī‘s Qur‘ānic exegesis is thus ambivalent towards the Sabians. On the one 
hand they are categorized as People of the Book, who believe in a Creator 
possessed of volition, and affirm prophethood; the religions of the People of the 
Book are set in opposition to those of the polytheists, of whom the Indian 
Brahmins are representative, who have no revealed religion and deny 
                                                                                                                                                                      
government of the lower (terrestrial) world; so the planets are the governors of this world and 
they say that it is necessary to worship these planets; the spheres and planets then worship God 
and obey Him (in their turn). Others who are more extreme deny the Creator and maintain that 
the spheres and the planets are by their very nature necessarily existent, their non-existence 
and their cessation being impossible; they govern the conditions of the lower world. Such are 
pure Dahriyya. Those who worship other than God include the Christians, who worship the 
Messiah, and also the worshippers of idols (ʿabadat al-aṣnām).‘ Al-Tafsīr 13, p. 38.  
69 See al-Tafsīr 23, p. 19 for commentary on Qur‘an 22:17: ‗As for the believers, the Jews, the 
Sabeans, the Christians, the Magians and the polytheists – God shall judge between them on the 
Day of Resurrection‘.  
59 
 
prophethood. On the other hand, there are those amongst the Sabians, namely 
the Chaldeans to whom Abraham preached, whose religion is pure astrolatry.  
2.3.2 Aetiology of Idolatry 
 
Rāzī is not content merely to condemn idolatry as abominable polytheism. He 
wants to understand why any rational human soul would be seduced by such a 
practice. So it is the people of Noah, the first people to have adopted idolatry, to 
whom he turns for his exploration of the phenomenon. Reflecting on the 
idolatrous abominations of the community to which the patriarch was sent to 
reform, Rāzī asserts that ‗there is no religion older than idolatry‘ (lā dīna aqdam 
min ʿabdat al-aṣnām).70 He observes the fact that it is self-evident that a graven 
image which human hand has wrought cannot be the creator of that same 
human hand. What, asks Rāzī, can be the rationality that explains idolatry? He 
says the most likely explanation (al-ta’wīl al-aqwā)71 is that: 
People saw the changes in the conditions of the lower world as being 
contingent on changes in the conditions of the planets (marbūṭa bi-
taghayyurāt aḥwāl al-kawākib). For the four seasons are occasioned by 
either the Sun‘s proximity or distance from the zenith, and by reason of 
                                                             
70 Al-Tafsīr 13, p.38. Exception must be made, presumably, for the religion of Adam. 
71 In the same passage Rāzī mentions two other explanations which he finds less compelling. The 
first he quotes on the authority of Abu Maʿshar whom he reports as saying:  
‗Many of the people of China and India affirmed the existence of the Deity and angels except 
that they used to believe that He – may He be exalted – is a body of the most beautiful form and 
that the angels also have beautiful forms except they are veiled from us by the heavens. And so 
it follows that they took for themselves images and statues of exquisite shape and form.‘ (Al-
Tafsīr, 13, p. 39.) As for the second Rāzī says: ‗they believe that God – exalted is He – delegated 
the government of everything within the climes to an angel and that He delegated the 
government of every division of each of the world‘s dominions to a heavenly spirit (rūḥ samāwī). 
Thus they say the governor of the seas is an angel; the governor of mountains is another angel; 
the governor of the clouds and the rains is an angel; the governor of provision is an angel; the 
governor of war and fighting is an angel. Since they believed this, they took for each angel a 
specific idol and temple constructing each idol with that which is appropriate for the celestial 
spirit.‖ (Al-Tafsīr 13, p. 39.) 
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the changing of the four seasons different conditions are brought about 
in this world. Then people observed the conditions of the other planets 
(aḥwāl  sā’ir al-kawākib) and so began to believe that states of felicity and 
affliction were connected to the way in which the planets were 
positioned in relation to people‘s ascendant signs (at the time of their 
birth). So when they began to believe this, most people were led to 
suppose (ghalaba ʿalā ẓunūn akthar al-khalq) that the principle cause of 
events which come to be in this world was the celestial applications and 
the planetary correspondences (ittiṣālāt al-falakiyya wa’l-munāsabāt al-
kawkabiyya). When they adopted that belief, they exerted their utmost in 
the veneration <of the planets>.72  
By means of direct observation, Rāzī‘s idolaters come to associate the Sun‘s 
distance from the zenith with the changing of the seasons in the sublunary 
world and therefore go on to posit a causal link between the two phenomena. 
They then extend this reasoning to the movements of the other heavenly bodies 
surmising that the fortunes of individuals are determined by the configurations 
of the planets at the time of their birth. They then draw the conclusion that 
sublunary events are caused by the configurations of the planets to which 
veneration is owed. The arc of Rāzī‘s presentation of the justification of 
astrology in the second treatise of al-Sirr is determined by the same logical 
trajectory.    
The same passage in the al-Tafsīr continues: 
                                                             
72 Al-Tafsīr, 13, p. 39. This passage is a repetition of what appears in al-Tafsīr 2, p. 123. 
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Then, there were those amongst them who believed <the planets> were 
by their very essence necessarily existent (wājiba al-wujūd li-dhawātihā). 
Others believed <the planets> were contingent, being created by the 
Greatest God, but who nevertheless governed the conditions of this 
world; thus did they assert belief in mediators between the Greatest God 
and changing conditions in the <sublunary> world.73  
Whilst the theological position that Rāzī attributes to the first group represents 
the most degenerate form of polytheism, the position of the second group most 
closely resembles that of Abraham‘s Chaldeans who worshipped the heavenly 
bodies as divine mediators with an utterly transcendent God. Returning to the 
idolaters of Noah, Rāzī says:  
Irrespective of these two suppositions, they busied themselves in the 
worship and veneration of <the planets> but when they saw that they 
would disappear from sight for most of the time, they took for each 
planet an idol wrought from material the essence of which corresponded 
to it (min al-jawhar al-mansūb ilayhi).74 So for the Sun they adopted an idol 
wrought of gold, adorning it with precious stones corresponding to the 
Sun, namely rubies and diamonds. Observing the same principle, they 
adopted for the Moon an idol wrought of silver. Thus they turned 
                                                             
73 Al-Tafsīr, 13, p. 39.  
74 The practical measure of adopting idols to serve as the focus of worship when the planets had 
disappeared from sight is explicitly attributed to the Sabians by Rāzī in his I’tiqadat firaq al-
Muslimīn wa’l-Mushrikīn (Beliefs of Muslim and Polytheist Sects) where he says the Sabians are: ‗a 
people who say that the governor and creator of the world is the seven planets and the stars. 
They are worshippers of the heavenly bodies. When God sent Abraham on his prophetic mission, 
the people were following the religion of the Sabians [...] Know that their worship of idols was an 
innovation in their religion for they used to worship the stars when they rose and when they 
wanted to worship them when they had set, they had no choice but to fashion images and 
likenesses of the planets. So they wrought idols and devoted themselves to their worship and 
from there emerged the worship of the planets.‘ (Rāzī, Iʿtiqādāt, p. 90.) 
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themselves in worship of these idols, their objective being the worship of 
the planets and the pursuit of their favour. In light of this examination, it 
becomes clear that the original intention behind idolatry is the worship 
of the planets.75  
Like the philosophers and the Sabian talismanic magicians described in al-Sirr, 
Noah‘s idolaters conclude by way of empirical observation that the heavenly 
bodies determine change in the sublunary world. Moreover the planetary idols 
they fashion are wrought of metals and jewels which correspond to the planet 
which is the object of veneration. The resemblance of idol to talisman becomes 
clearer.76 
This explanation for the development of idolatry also appears in Rāzī‘s 
commentary on Qur‘ān 2:22. To it, however, he adds an observation that 
explicitly links idolatry to talismanic magic. He says:  
Astrologers (aṣḥāb al-aḥkām) used to avail themselves of certain 
astrological times which would occur only after long intervals such as 
one or two thousand years (kānū yuʿīnūn awqātan fī al-sinīn al-mutaṭāwila 
naḥwa al-alf wa’l-alfayn) and they used to claim that whoever struck a 
                                                             
75 Rāzī, al-Tafsīr 13, p. 39. 
76 The passage continues to describe the responses of the prophets to the reasoning 
underpinning idolatry: ‗As for the prophets – peace be upon them – they had in this regard a 
number of responses. One was to establish proof that the planets exert no effect at all on 
conditions in this world, as God – exalted is He – said: ―His is the creation, His is the Command‖ 
(Qur‘ān 7:54), having made clear that the planets have been made subject (to His Command). The 
second is that the planets, whilst they do exert effects on this world, display all the evidence of 
contingency and therefore they must be created and thus engagement in the worship of the 
Principle is more fitting than engagement in the worship of that which is subordinate (al-
ishtighāl bi-ʿibādat al-aṣl awlā min al-ishtighāl bi-ʿibādat al-farʿ) so the evidence indicates that what 
results is the religion of idolatry as we have mentioned […] thus it is clear that the doctrine of 
idolatry cannot be refuted unless the belief in the Sun, the Moon and the other planets as gods 
which govern this world is refuted.‘ Al-Tafsīr 13, p. 39. As we shall later examine, Rāzī explores 




talisman at that time in a specific way would derive benefit from it in 
certain ways, enjoying felicity or fertility or the repulsion of disasters. So 
when they wrought that talisman, they would venerate it, believing that 
they were deriving benefit from it. So when they exaggerated their 
veneration it became like worship and with the passage of time they 
forgot the original purpose and busied themselves in the worship of 
<talismans> out of ignorance.77 
2.3.3 Sabian Idols as Talismans 
 
Discussing the idolatrous Chaldean Sabian community in which Abraham was 
raised and whose polytheism he repudiated, Rāzī writes:  
They were rational people and therefore knew, of necessity, that they 
[i.e. their idols] were inanimate objects (jāmidāt). However, perhaps it 
was the case that they used to believe they were statues of the planets 
(tamāthīl al-kawākib) and that they were talismans (ṭilasmāt) wrought in 
such a way that they would bring benefit to anyone who worshipped 
them and bring grievous harm to anyone who would scorn them.78 
                                                             
77 Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr 2, pp. 123-124. In the same passage, Rāzī speaks of the astral idolatry of the 
Greeks before Alexander: ‗Know that before the conquests of Alexander the practice of the 
Greeks was to build for themselves temples which were named after the spiritual powers and the 
luminary bodies each of which they adopted as objects of worship. There was the temple of the 
First Cause – which was for them the Divine Command – the temple of the Pure Intellect (‗Aql 
Ṣarīḥ), and the temple of Absolute Governance (al-Siyasa al-Muṭlaqa), the temple of the Soul and 
Form; all of them were circular. The Temple of Saturn was hexagonal; Jupiter‘s was triangular; 
Mars‘ was rectangular; the Sun‘s was square; the <external shape of the> temple of Venus was 
triangular but its internal shape was square; the <external shape of the> Temple of Mercury was 
triangular whilst its internal shape was rectangular; the Temple of the Moon was octagonal‘.  
(Al-Tafsīr 2, p. 125.) This passage is derived from al-Milal wa’l-Niḥal of Shahrastānī whose 
understanding of the Sabians as a religious category clearly influences Rāzī‘s presentation in his 
Tafsīr. See al-Milal wa’l-Niḥal, p. 368. For how ‗kaldānī‘ and ‗kasdānī‘ came to be Arabic appelations 
for ‗Chaldeans‘,  see Hämeen-Anttila, Last Pagans of Iraq, p.48.  
78 Al-Tafsīr 22, p. 183. Rāzī‘s identification of the community to which Abraham preached as 
Sabian is confirmed in his I’tiqādāt p. 90. 
64 
 
Elsewhere, Rāzī reinforces the association he makes between idols and talismans 
during his exegesis of Qur‘an 6:80, which describes Abraham remonstrating with 
his native community whose religion was one of idolatrous astrolatry.79 
Commenting on Abraham saying: ‗I have no fear of your idol worship‘, Rāzī says:   
They tried to strike in him fear of their idols […] but fear only arises in 
relation to someone who can either cause benefit or harm; idols, being 
inanimate objects, are impotent, incapable of bringing about benefit or 
harm, so how could fear of them ever arise? Were it said there is no 
doubt that talismans exert special effects, why then should it not be 
possible that fear of them should arise in this respect? We respond by 
saying: the power of a talisman depends on the influences of the planets 
and we have demonstrated that the power of the planets to influence 
only occurs by the creation of God – exalted is He – so only God in reality 
can be the object of hope and fear.80 
The Sabians as a category occupy an ambiguous position within the religious 
hierarchy which mediates between pure idolatry and the revealed Abrahamic 
religions. Their practice was one of astrolatry. Grounded in the belief that the 
movements of the heavenly bodies determine change in the sublunary world, 
their worship focused on planetary statues which, acting as talismans, could 
direct planetary influence in accordance with their will. Their antediluvian 
religious practice was identical to that of the idolaters to whom Noah preached. 
Theirs was the oldest religion in world.  
                                                             
79 ‗His people disputed with him [i.e. Abraham]. He said: ‗Do you dispute with me about God now 
that He has guided me? I have no fear of your idol worship, unless my Lord intends some matter. 
My Lord encompasses all in His knowledge. Will you not reconsider?‖‘Qur‘ān 6:80 
80 Al-Tafsīr 13, p. 62.  
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The construct of the Sabian religion, as evidenced in both al-Sirr and al-Tafsīr, 
thus challenged the following Islamic theological beliefs: that there is only one 
Necessarily Existent; that all besides the Necessarily Existent is merely possible; 
that all possibles are originated in time; that nothing has agency expect God; 
and that only prophets can receive revelation.  
2.4 Sabians and Indians 
 
It was the figure of Ṭumṭum al-Hindī which provided Rāzī with the necessary 
solder to weld together the cosmology of Abu Maʿshar and the psychology of 
Avicenna to forge the idol of Sabian religion. As we shall discover in chapter 5, 
Ṭumṭum al-Hindī is the authority cited by Rāzī for the images of the starless 
sphere, so crucial for the process of forging a talisman in the account that 
appears in al-Sirr 3:1; he is also the authority for the fullest description of the 
adept‘s meditative focus when performing occult ritual. For Sabian soteriology 
lies at the point where macrocosm and microcosm meet. I shall now turn briefly 
to a few works in which Indic thought and practice came to be associated with 
Sabians. My intention is to bring into focus the utility of Indian religion, with its 
emphasis on meditative concentration, for understanding the Sabianism 
depicted in al-Sirr.  
It was Pingree who first noted the occurrence of Sanskrit names in the Sabian 
planetary prayers transmitted in the tenth-century grimoire Ghāyat al-Ḥakīm.81 
He subsequently noted that these prayers appeared for the first time in the 
Arabic tradition recorded by ʿUmar ibn al-Farrūkhān al-Ṭabarī; a less 
                                                             
81 Pingree, ‗Some Sources of the Ghāyat al-ḥakīm’.  
66 
 
contaminated version is preserved in a mediaeval Latin translation.82 Sometime 
in the ninth century, additions were made to the prayers recorded by al-Ṭabarī. 
In the original version, the planets were invoked by their Arabic names; in the 
version that is incorporated into the Ghāyat, Greek, Pahlavī, and importantly, 
Sanskrit names were added.83 Pingree notes the similarity between the 
planetary rituals with which these prayers are associated in the Ghāyat and 
astrolatrous ritual recorded in the Sanskrit Yavanajātaka of Spujidhvaja. He 
observes: 
Among the earliest descriptions of the ceremonies (grahapūjā) performed 
in honour of the planets themselves is that preserved in the first khanḍa 
of the Visnudharmottarapurdna, a compilation from earlier sources 
apparently put together in the sixth century. In this are described the 
incenses, flowers, substances (for making images of the stellar deities), 
foods and drinks utilized in the rituals not only of the planets, but of the 
nakṣatrāni as well. The prayers are short invocations calling upon the 
planets by several of their names and epithets to be present. The 
similarities of such rituals to those used in the West are quite striking, 
though of course they are also thoroughly Indianized.84 
As for Shahrastānī, his chapter on Indian religion entitled Ārā al-hind (‗Opinions 
of the Indians‘), in his al-Milal wa’l-niḥal, leads the reader to infer a close 
                                                             
82 Pingree, ‗Al-Ṭabari on the Prayers to the Planets‘. 
83 Pingree, ‗Sabians of Ḥarrān and the Classical Tradition‘, p.22.  
84 David Pingree, ‗Some Sources of the Ghāyat al-ḥakīm‘ (1980). Pingree adduces these planetary 
rituals as evidence of some kind of connection between Ḥarrān and India, without proof to 
support his restriction of the meaning of the term ‗Sabian‘, as it is used in the Ghāyat, to the 
pagans of Ḥarrān. On this point, see Van Bladel, the Arabic Hermes, pp. 115-118.  
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philosophical and theological affinity between Sabianism and Indian religion.85 
The various categories of Sabian whose gradual decadence from worship of 
supracelestial spiritual beings; to worship of the planets; to worship of idols; and 
finally into the self-deifying delusion of Pharaoh, provide the basic structure for 
his analysis of Indian religion.86 Indeed this decadence of the Sabians is a theme 
which deeply informs the theory of the history of religions in Rāzī‘s al-Tafsīr, as 
already noted in the previous section. Of particular interest to the exploration of 
Rāzī‘s Sabians, is Shahrastānī‘s description of a certain sect of the Brahmins 
whom he designates as the masters of meditation and estimation (aṣḥab al-fikra 
wa’l-wahm).87  
For these Brahmins, the practice of meditation (fikr)  is given the utmost 
importance as the mediator between the sensible and intelligible worlds (al-
mutawassiṭ bayn al-maḥsūs wa’l-maʿqūl); the means by which the forms of 
sensibilia, and the essences of intelligibilia, are apprehended; and the reservoir of 
knowledge derived from the two worlds  (mawrid al-ʿilmayn min al-ʿālamayn).  
This being the case: 
                                                             
85 Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa’l-niḥal, pp. 305-369. Lawrence observes: ‗…Sabianism provides the 
organizing principle as well as the theological impetus for ‘Ārā al-hind. All the groups which 
Shahrastānī cites and all the data which he has gathered are related to the categories transposed 
from the earlier section on the Ḥarrānian Sabians.‘ Shahrastānī on the Indian Religions, Lawrence, 
p. 74.  
86 Shahrastānī categorizes Indian religion into five categories: the Brahmins; the people of the 
spiritual beings (aṣḥāb al-rūḥāniyyāt); the worshippers of the planets (ʿabadat al-kawākib); the 
worshippers of idols (ʿabadat al-aṣnām); the sages of India (ḥukamā’ al-hind).  
87 Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa’l-niḥal, pp.604-605. For a full translation of and commentary on the 
relevant passage, see Shahrastānī on the Indian Religions, Bruce Lawrence, pp. 44-45 and pp. 114-
118. Lawrence translates ‗aṣḥab al-fikra wa’l-wahm‘ as proponents of ‗meditation and 
imagination‘. This translation overlooks the significance of al-wahm was a faculty distinct from 
the imagination. This sect is not only the most accomplished in the use of meditation and the 
direction of the estimative faculty, but it is also ‗the most knowledgeable concerning the starless 
sphere‘ (wa hā’ulā’I ‘aʿlam minhum bi’l-falak). The significance of this fact will only become 
apparent when we examine in chapter 6 Rāzī‘s account in al-Sirr 3:1 of how to forge a talismanic 
idol, for which process, knowledge of the degrees of the starless sphere and their associated 
images is crucial. According to al-Sirr, this is a field in which the Indian Ṭumṭum al-Hindī has 




 …they exert their utmost to divert the faculty of estimation (al-wahm) 
and their meditative focus (al-fikr) from sensible objects by means of 
rigorous spiritual disciplines and strenuous exertions. So when the 
meditating mind (al-fikr) is abstracted from this <sensible> world, that 
<intelligible> world discloses itself to it. Sometimes it is informed of 
occult matters; sometimes it is empowered to withhold the rains; 
sometimes it can direct the estimative faculty to <strike> a living man 
dead in an instant. This is possibility is not remote for the estimative 
faculty <can> wield an astonishing effect which acts on bodies.88  
Once the mind has been trained to a high level of meditative focus, it acquires 
both knowledge of occult matters, and the power to act directly on bodies and to 
influence souls: it can even influence the rain and kill a man remotely. The 
ability to perform such remarkable acts at a distance is by means of the wahm, or 
the estimative faculty, a mysterious internal sense faculty, crucial to human 
cognition, theorization on which represents Avicenna‘s key development on 
Aristotelian psychology. Noted by Avicenna, and reproduced by Rāzī for the 
same purpose in al-Sirr 1:4, Shahrastānī adduces, as evidence of the operative 
power of the estimative faculty on the physical world, the reality of the Evil Eye, 
and the estimative faculty‘s vertiginous effect on a man walking on a high wall: 
…is not the power of the Evil Eye (iṣābat al-ʿayn) the action of the 
estimative faculty on an individual? Does not a man, walking along a 
                                                             
88 ‘fa-yajtahidūna kulla al-juhd ḥattā yuṣarrifū al-wahm wa’l-fikr ʿan al-maḥsūsāt bi’l-riyāḍāt al-balīgha 
wa’l-ijtihādāt al-mujahhada ḥattā idhā tajarrada al-fikr ʿan hādhā al-ʿālam tajallā lahu dhālika al-ʿālam 
fa-rubbamā yukhbar ʿan mughayyabāt al-aḥwāl wa-rubbamā yuqwā ʿalā ḥabs al-amṭār wa-rubbamā 
yūqiʿ al-wahm ʿalā rajulin ḥayyin fa-yaqtuluhu fī’l-ḥāl. Wa-lā yustabʿadu dhālika fa’inna li’l-wahm 
atharan ʿajīban fī taṣrīf al-ajsām wa’l-taṣarruf fī’l-nufūs.’ Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa’l-niḥal, p. 604. In 
order to convey the range of meanings conveyed by the word fikr as it is used in this passage, I 
have rendered it in three different ways: ‗meditation‘;  ‗meditative focus‘; and ‗meditating mind‘.  
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high wall, instantly fall, though the steps which he takes are no longer 
than those which he takes on flat ground.89 
 Both examples are adduced by Avicenna, and reproduced by Rāzī for the same 
purpose in al-Sirr 1:4.90       
The power of heightened meditative focus, inculcated by spiritual discipline and 
a strict diet, to facilitate: (1) the cognition of intelligibilia; (2) communication 
with spiritual beings; and (3) controlling natural phenomena, is enjoyed not just 
by Rāzī‘s masters of the occult astral craft, as described in the first treatise of al-
Sirr, but also by the rishis depicted by Gardizi:   
Some others connect a <true> sage with <the knowledge of> astronomy, 
medicine and the other sciences. They are all philosophers using their 
senses perpetually to that purpose. According to them, through hardship 
and great pain, one can reach a state in which one can see angels, converse 
with them, and derive benefit from them. They have produced books of 
sciences and arts. They say that through sensibilia they can rise to the 
conception of intelligibilia […] They prepare their food of dates, plants and 
herbs, so that it should be light for their senses. As they eat such plants all 
their life, their eyes become sharper and their hearts quicker in the uptake. 
They obtain what they wish, be it rain or wind, or hail; they bring down 
birds; or capture animals; or fly like birds.91 
                                                             
89 Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa’l-niḥal, p. 605.  
90 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 11. For further discussion, see chapter 6.   
91 Gardīzī, Abū Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn al-Ḍaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd, Zayn al-Akhbār, MS. King‘s College, 
213, Cambridge, translated by Vladimir Minorsky, in Gardīzī on India, Bulletin of the School of 




But far more impressive than these accounts by either Shahrastānī or Gardīzī of 
Indian meditative power is that attributed by Rāzī in al-Sirr to Ṭumṭum al-Hindī. 
It merits full quotation:  
…the meditator (mufakkir) abstains from sex. He does not fill his stomach. 
His gaze does not fall on aught but that on which he meditates (yufakkir). 
He does not seek anything other than that on which he meditates. He 
does not meditate on anything other than that element (jins) to which 
the object of his meditation belongs: if it belongs to the element of fire, 
then his meditation is of a fiery nature; if to water, then it is of water; if 
to air then it is of air; if to earth then it is of earth. He inhales no air 
unless it resembles that on which he meditates. He does not move a limb 
unless it is in the pursuit of attaining the object of his meditation. He 
does not descend from the height of his meditation that he has reached 
except to seek respite. He does not gaze on the light of meditation itself 
(lā yanẓuru ilā nūr al-fikr bi-aynihi); he does not gaze on anything except 
the centre-point of meditation (markaz al-fikr); no concern of his own 
affairs commands his attention like his meditation. He eats nothing that 
derives from an animal; he does not eat aught that he fears may harm his 
meditation. This is the etiquette observed by the one who would ascend 
to the centre-point of meditation (hādhā adab al-murtaqī ilā markaz al-fikr).  
As for he whose meditation has connected with the centre-point of 
meditation (ammā man ittaṣala fikru-hu bi-markaz al-fikr), his meditation 
feeds him, waters him, brings slaves under his command, dispatches rain, 
lightning, thunder, lightning bolts and earthquakes. At this point, he is in 
command of the Earth‘s elements, the spirits breeze over him (ṣāfaḥat-hu 
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al-arwāḥ), his body becomes a dwelling place which he can alight in and 
depart from at will. He can visualize all species of noble forms, large and 
small (taṣawwara bi-anwāʿ al-ṣuwar ash-sharīfa fi as-ṣighari wa’l-kibar); he 
will delight with marvellous spirits; and he will reach the ultimate goal 
that he sought. He who ascends to the centre-point of meditation (markaz 
al-fikr), his passion (ʿishq) does not leave him until he descends from it.92 
If this passage is merely a Rāzīan pastiche of genuine accounts of Indic spiritual 
practice, it is certainly rendered all the more convincing by such unusual and 
ostensibly technically-sounding language such as markaz al-fikr (centre of 
meditation) and nūr al-fikr (light of meditation). The following traits of 
Ṭumṭum‘s idealized meditator resonate with the themes, raised in the 
introduction to al-Sirr, of asceticism and spiritual training which lead to 
perfection of the soul and its control over physical reality: withdrawal from 
bodily pleasure; veganism; and complete and unwavering focus on the object of 
intent. Any use of the physical senses must serve this meditative focus. The 
objects of physical perception must: (a) share an elemental congenereity with 
the object of intent; and (b) must be closely associated in the cognition of the 
meditator with that shared element. Now, assuming that this process of 
meditation (fikr) is non-discursive, the meditator‘s cognitive association of 
physical object with that shared element must arise from such a level of mastery 
of natural philosophy as to be instinctual and immediate. The complete 
realization of natural philosophical learning and meditative focus represents 
human perfection, whereby the soul, unshackled by the body, can roam 
wherever it wills; command men and nature; commune with numinous beings; 
                                                             
92 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.16.  
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and possess almost an occult knowledge of all forms and power over physical 
reality.  
This blend of asceticism, spiritual training, meditative focus and mastery of 
natural philosophy is precisely what characterizes the training of the Sabian 
adept who forges a talismanic idol in the account in al-Sirr 3:1. And the state of 
perfection attained by Ṭumṭum‘s meditator resembles that which is attained by 
the Sabian adept who completes the planetary ascent ritual, to whose command 
the celestial spheres yield.  But the additional virtue of the Sabian adept is that, 
since he is working not only with the four elements of the sublunary world, but 
also with the intricate web of planetary correspondences on which earthly 
phenomena are contingent, his soul represents the point at which celestial and 
terrestrial realities meet.  
Rāzī‘s inclusion of the Indian material, with its focus on meditative practice, 
represents an imaginative elaboration of the ‗active earthly psychic forces‘ 
employed by the talisman master to blend active celestial forces with sublunary, 
receptive elemental forces, the planetary correspondences (munāsabāt) of which 
are listed in such great detail in al-Sirr 2. To achieve this ability, these active 
psychic forces are trained using spiritual austerities, which will be the subject of 
chapter 6. Once trained to a sufficient degree, the adept is able to establish 
noetic connection with the celestial souls, the subject of chapter 7.  
2.5 Rāzī’s attitude to Sabianism 
 
How therefore are we to read al-Sirr? What is Rāzī‘s attitude to the astral magic 
of the Sabians he describes therein? Three possible theories present themselves. 
I assess them in what is in my view their order of increasing plausibility:  
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(i) Firstly, al-Sirr could be a heresiological work, the Sabians constituting 
merely a fictitious heresiological category, representing the follies of 
a popularized Avicennism.93 This would mean that the entire work 
was a kind of reductio ad absurdum deployed by a committed Ashʿarī 
theologian, such as the one that wrote Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl, with the 
purpose of showing that the logical implications of Avicennism, if 
pursued to their fullest extent, would lead to idolatry and the 
complete destabilization of the Islamic institution of prophethood. 
This seems unlikely. It seems even more implausible as such a 
hypothesis would have to explain the central role of the Barakātian 
doctrine of the perfect nature in this construct, a very un-Avicennan 
notion indeed. 
(ii) Secondly, it could be read as a thought experiment, envisioned with 
an encyclopedic, though disinterested, knowledge of talismans. This 
remarkable work of the imagination gave Rāzī, the sobre Ashʿarī 
theologian, the conceptual space in which to explore ideas, such as 
the doctrine of the perfect nature, in a non-committed way, with a 
view to integrating them into the future systemization of philosophy 
and theology of al-Maṭālib. This theory would leave unexplained why 
Rāzī would have devoted so much effort to the diligent 
summarization of Abū Maʿshar‘s astrology and the meticulous and 
precise description of talismans.  
(iii)  Thirdly, it could be a work of purely disinterested scholarly inquiry 
in which he was reporting, with the distance of a magisterial 
                                                             
93 Thusly has Michot characterized the Sabians as depicted by Shahrastānī in his al-Milal: see 
Michot, ‗L‘avicennisation de la sunna‘. See also Michot: ‗La Pandémie avicennienne‘.  
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observer, either historical or contemporary practices: after all, Rāzī 
also wrote works on physiognomy, medicine and astrology.94  
Moreover, in al-Tafsīr, he is evidently not content merely to condemn 
idolatry: he wants to theorize on why idolatrous men would ignore 
the self-evident truth, which could only be denied by a lunatic, that 
an idol wrought by their own hand can avail them nothing.  
There is a fourth possibility. It has been remarked that for most of al-Sirr, Rāzī 
adopts the tone of a neutral observer. Brief indeed is his ‗clarification‘ (bayyina) 
of the ‗weakness‘ (ḍuʿf) of Sabianism in al-Sirr 1:6, restricting himself to asserting 
God as the only Necessarily Existent Being, an agent possessed of volition, whose 
power (qudra) extends to all things. He refrains from assaulting its talismanic 
science per se, confining himself to attacking the assertion of any real agency 
outside of God‘s power (see chapter 10).95  It is with this neutral tone that he 
describes his work as a book which merely ‗compiles‘ (yajmaʿ) the information 
on astral magic which happens to have come his way.96 Indeed, in his concluding 
section (khātima), he refers to himself merely as:  
…the compiler of the book (jāmiʿ al-kitāb), the Imām and investigator (al-
muḥaqqiq) Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.97   
This impression of neutrality surely would support the third of the above 
theories. But this is no ordinary compilation, for it conceals a very serious 
                                                             
94 He wrote al-Ṭibb al-kabīr (on medicine) in 573/1177; Kitāb al-Firāsa (on physiognomy) in 
573/177; and the Ikhtiyārāt al-ʿAlā’iyya (on astrology) in between 585 and 590 (1189-1194): see 
Altaş, ‗Fahreddin er-Rāzī‘nin Eserlerinin Kronolojisi‘, p. 150-4. 
95 See chapter 10.  
96 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 2.  
97 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 164.  
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purpose: to engage with astral magic, understanding it on its own terms, whilst 
attempting to use all the intellectual tools at his disposal to explain its efficacy.   
Moreover, in his concluding section, this mask of neutrality slips. He speaks of 
the first philosophers (al-ḥukamā al-awwalūn) teaching their students a certain 
astral magical operation in order to gain wealth and the esteem of a ruler. But, 
he says with a tone of disdain, such an operation is performed merely for 
worldly need (mas’ala wa ḥāja). He, by way of contrast, is teaching something of 
far greater value: 
As for he who seeks knowledge and the perfect philosophy, then should 
he invoke his perfect nature (man ṭalaba al-ʿilm wa’l-falsafa al-tāmma fa-
ʿalayhi bi-daʿwat tibāʿihi al-tāmm).  The Imām, the investigator (al-
muḥaqqiq), Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Rāzī said: we have <now> made 
clear, in the treatise ‗On invoking the heavenly bodies‘ (fī maqālati daʿwati 
al-kawākib) <in> this book, the reality of the perfect nature (ḥaqīqat al-
ṭibāʿ al-tāmm).  So let the seeker of knowledge rely on this treatise to 
master how to know (fali-yastaʿin ṭālib al-ʿilm bi-tilka al-maqāla li-yaṣīra 
muḥīṭan bi-kayfiyyati al-ʿilm).98 
The last phrase is a little awkward in the Arabic and demands closer scrutiny. I 
turn to Tehran MS 6853 to resolve the issue. In fol. 274 b, the last phrase reads as 
follows: 
                                                             
98 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 164. In MS 6853 Tehran, fol. 274b, instead of ‗al-imām al-muḥaqqiq Fakhr al-dīn 
Muḥammad al-Rāzī’, we read: ‗mawlānā al-dāʿī ilā Allāh bi’l-ḥaqq raḍiya Allah ʿanhu wa ʿan aslāfihi’. 
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li-yaṣīra muḥīṭan bi-kayfiyyat al-ʿamal.99 
Although this metathesis from ʿilm (knowledge) to ʿamal (operation), or ʿamal to 
ʿilm is indeed an easy scribal error to make, it expresses a satisfying symmetry 
since performing the ʿamal leads to ‘ilm and the perfect philosophy. But of 
course, from the perspective of Arabic syntax, ʿamal is the more natural reading. 
This being the case, this counsel takes on an althogether different meaning:  
we have <now> made clear, in the treatise ‗On invoking the heavenly bodies‘ 
(fī maqālati daʿwat al-kawākib) <in> this book, the reality of the perfect nature 
(ḥaqīqat al-ṭibāʿ al-tāmm).  So let the seeker of knowledge rely on this treatise 
to master how to perform the operation (fali-yastaʿin ṭālib al-ʿilm bi-tilka al-
maqāla li-yaṣīra muḥīṭan bi-kayfiyyat al-ʿamal). 
Here an ambiguity arises. What is this operation? Is it the invocation of the 
perfect nature, or is it in fact the ‗invocation of the planets‘, or the planetary 
ascent ritual, which is the central focus of al-Sirr?  The method of invoking the 
perfect nature is described at the end of al-Sirr, 4:1. After describing it, Rāzī says: 
It is necessary for whoever would plunge deeply into invoking the 
heavenly bodies (daʿwat al-kawākib), to exert great effort in order to 
know which heavenly body it [i.e. the perfect nature] is (yajib ʿalā man 
yakhūḍ fī ʿilm daʿwat al-kawākib an yajtahid ḥattā yaʿrif anna dkālika al-
kawkab ayy al-kawākib huwa).100 
                                                             
99 The concluding section is missing in all the witnesses to al-Sirr which I have viewed in the 
Bodleian, apart from MS Marsh 212 which, in fol. 91a, gives the same reading as that which is to 
be found in Tehran MS 6853.  
100 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 113-4.  The Cairo lithograph reads ‗bi-khuṣūṣ’ which must be an error. I prefer 
the reading of Tehran, MS 6853, fol. 141 a, which reads ‗yakhūḍ‘; the word ‗ʿilm‘is missing.  
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So al-Sirr 4:1 establishes the noetic connection with the perfect nature as a 
necessary precondition for the operation (ʿamal) of invoking the heavenly 
bodies, described in the following chapter al-Sirr 4:2. Moreover, Rāzī commences 
his description of the ritual of the planetary ascent with the words: ‗fī kayfiyyat 
al-ʿamal’. The case for this ʿamal, which Rāzī is encouraging the king to perform, 
being the ritual of planetary ascent is indeed strong.101 
So just as the first philosophers taught their students astral magic to gain wealth 
and standing, so Rāzī was advising his potential royal patron to perform a ritual 
of far greater significance, which would lead to his attainment of the perfect 
philosophy and his mastery over the planets which govern generation and 
corruption in the sublunary world. 
All three of the aforementioned theories on Rāzī‘s attitude to Sabianism seem 
utterly implausible in light of this evidence. We are forced to conclude the 
soundness of the fourth possible theory: Rāzī was advising the ‗king‘, as a seeker 
of knowledge (ṭālib al-ʿilm) in pursuit of the perfect philosophy, to invoke his 
perfect nature and to start the long ritual of planetary ascent. Of course it is still 
possible to assert that Rāzī was only counselling the king to gain knowledge of 
how to perform the ritual without actually performing it. But having prescribed 
for him the invocation of the perfect nature, I would argue that such an 
unnatural construction of the text would require compelling external 
justification.  I can see none.  
                                                             
101 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 114. I should point out that in the Cairo lithograph we read: fī kayfiyyat hādhihi 




The conclusion that Rāzī himself was a crypto-Sabian would appear ineluctable. 
It is in light of this conclusion that the rest of this thesis will precede, exploring 
as it does those philosophical arguments deployed by Rāzī in order to construct 
a model that could explain the efficacy of the Sabian approach as means of 
perfecting the soul.  Only in chapter 11 will I explore how this model was then 
integrated into the Islamic soteriology of al-Maṭālib.  
 
2.6 The Ritual of Planetary Ascent 
 
When Rāzī disavowed all that was opposed to the religion in the introduction to 
al-Sirr, perhaps it was the Venus and Mars stages of the ritual which he had in 
mind. Since this ritual is the central focus of the work, I shall provide a summary 
of it here, omitting the technical astrological instructions for when each stage is 
to be commenced. These will be provided in the full translations of its 
description and of its associated planetary invocations (daʿwa), which appear in 
appendices 3 and 4.  
The ritual of planetary ascent, described in al-Sirr 4:2, involves the subjugation 
of the planets (taskhīr al-kawākib), beginning with the moon, then seeking its aid 
in the subjugation of the next, one by one, until the subjugation of Saturn, the 
final stage, by which time all one's desires are attained. A necessary condition 
for attempting it is a stabilized connection with one‘s perfect nature.102 For the 
aspirant to be qualified to perform this ritual he must be born under the correct 
astrological conditions; he must have mastered knowledge of the stars; and he 
must begin each stage of the ritual with the prescribed astrological timing. He 
                                                             
102 See Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113-114.  
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must observe the correct requirements relating to place, clothing, food, fasts, 
sacrifices, and aromatics. Details of the appropriate aromatics to be burnt, the 
sacrifices to be made, and the prayers to be addressed to the planets are given in 
al-Sirr 4:4.103  
The central component in the aspirant‘s performance of each stage is the 
repetition of liturgical planetary prayers. These set the tone of the aspirant‘s 
mental and emotional attitude towards the planet which he addresses. Correct 
astrological timing for each stage usually means when the relevant planet is in a 
strong position astrologically, either in its house or in its exaltation, and is free 
of malefic aspects. Given that they are rational conscious beings, possessed of 
free will, the planets will be more favourably disposed to answering the needs of 
its devotee when it is in a felicitous state; when it is malefically afflicted and 
weak in its position, then the planets are like men burdened by their own 
suffering and grief, and unlikely to listen to the petitions of their devotees.104 
Each stage of the ritual, except for the Sun, is performed at night. There now 
follows a brief overview of the ritual. In the co-ordination of timing, space, 
bodily orientation, diet, emotional attitude and the stimulation of the senses 
through aromatics, visions, music and prayer, the brandishing of cultic objects 
and ingestion of cultic foods, the aim of each stage is to establish a powerful 
noetic connection with the planet invoked.  
The Moon 
                                                             
103 Rāzī, al-Sirr , pp. 122-7.  
104 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 123. 
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The ritual to subjugate (taskhīr) the Moon (taskhīr) lasts a year and it is described 
month by month. It is commenced at a time when the Moon is in its weakest 
position astrologically.  
The aspirant is to prepare himself mentally for the ritual by fasting three days 
before commencement; he should reduce his food intake such that his purity 
becomes manifest; he should ingest and give in charity meat and organs in 
correspondence with the Moon; he should harm no animal; he should avoid 
gazing on corpses; and he should avoid all impure substances; he should shave 
his head; and his diet should comprise moist things.  
A prayer is repeated. By the six month he has conditioned himself such that he 
becomes like a lover of the moon, distraught and tearful when he does not see it. 
During the seventh and eighth months, his shadow increases in length. ‗Abu 
Maʿshar‘ reports that when he performed this ritual, his shadow extended to 
1,000 cubits. In the ninth and tenth months, the moon's light exceeds that of the 
sun and he cannot bear looking at it directly. The aspirant is cautioned not to 
look directly at the moon, however hard it may be during this period lest he be 
blinded. In the eleventh month he sees in his sleep every night the lunar sphere, 
the sun, the moon and the planets, all of which apprise him of matters 
(unspecified).  
By the twelfth month, his heart finds peace and joy. He becomes indifferent to 
kings and princes and between sleep and wakefulness he sees true portents and 
he sees what will happen each day in advance, even though it may be in a 
distant land. When he sees all these signs and the solar year is complete, then at 
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that point he will know that his goal has been achieved and the moon has been 
subjugated  
 On the thirteenth month the aspirant seeks the utmost that can be attained by 
the power of the moon. Under specific lunar configurations, he is to stand, 
wearing certain attire, sewn with certain jewels, carrying an iron bracelet; he is 
to gaze upon the moon with his left eye. He receives knowledge of Shari‘ah, 
religion, higher knowledge, arithmetic, engineering, geography, waters, 
agriculture, education of children, knowledge of how to repel the harm of liars 
and slanderers; how to repel the harm of forgetfulness, cowardice; he is to seek 
strength in opinion and the power to turn enemies into slaves and friends into 
kings and to bring happiness to any person whom he so chooses. The aspirant 
can make requests to the Moon depending on which planet it is applying to; he 
is to change his garment appropriately. Each of these lunar applications to the 
different planets prepares the aspirant for the succeeding stages in the 
ascension ritual. The cultic props that he uses depending on the planet to which 
the Moon is applying prefigure the props which are used in the later rituals. 
Thus when the Moon applies to Saturn, he should carry a bone in his hand; 
during the lunar application to Jupiter he is to carry a rosary; when it applies to 
Mars he brandishes a naked sword. It is fitting that the Moon ritual introduces 
him to all the planets since it is the fastest moving planet, the closest to the 
Earth, and the one which blends the rays of all the other planets before they 
reach the sublunary sphere.  
Rāzī then provides further information on how the Moon can be used once it has 
been subjugated. For the destruction of enemies, the aspirant is advised to await 
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the Moon‘s configuration with a certain planet in the eighth house: the planet 
determines the kind of death the aspirant‘s enemy will suffer. To prolong life, 
the aid of the moon and Jupiter and his associated fixed stars is sought.  
Mercury   
Mercury's aid is sought for all matters pertaining to the intellect, language, 
philosophy, mathematics, and occult knowledge. Before proceeding to his 
subjugation, these things must first be sought from the Moon thrice, in a 
diffident manner; when they are not forthcoming, leave must be requested from 
the Moon to approach Mercury. He is to brandish a golden sceptre. A 
description of appropriate clothing jewellery, food with which to break his fast 
is provided. 
Venus   
When the Moon is approaching conjunction with Mercury, ideally there being 
just seven degrees between them, the aspirant thrice seeks from the Moon and 
Mercury what is under the sway of Venus: women, mothers, young people, 
siblings, riches, entertainment, things which gladden the heart, jewellery, 
lovers, alcohol, marriage, and expertise in magic. Then the aspirant asks leave 
from the Moon and Mercury to seek these things from Venus. He is to wear 
green clothes, certain jewels and perfumes. He is to prepare a drinking session 
with beardless boys, and male and female singers. The session is to be held in a 
place opposite the point where Venus rises; he is to recline on green cushions; 
they are to eat hearts; he should position himself at a place where he can see the 
rising of Venus. Thus should the session be, for three days: they should engage 
in nothing but drinking wine, homosexual acts and fornication for three nights; 
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then on the third night, when Venus rises he should recite the poetry, in Arabic 
and Farsi. He is to make devoted obeisance for eventually his approach will be 
accepted and the sign of this will be that the beardless boys and women will 
approach him sexually without being bidden. He is then to ask of Venus those 
things which fall under her sway. 
The Sun   
The aspirant is to seek out the gold palaces of kings; he should wear gold silk, 
precious rubies, a gold crown, gold rings with red rubies. He is to fast, restrict 
the amount he eats and spend generously in charity to feed predatory beasts 
associated with the sun, such as lions, and tigers. When the sun reaches the first 
degree of Aries, he stands in praise of the sun, extolling the power that he gives 
to kings, the light that he gives to the Moon. He is to continue this practice at 
certain times of the day and night for a period of six months. By the end of this 
period, certain signs that his obsequies have been accepted will become 
manifest. His animal and bodily powers will be enhanced as will be his intellect. 
With the completion of a year, he is to ask the Sun for those things which fall 
under its sway such as the animal soul, the intellect, light, power and rulership, 
high standing, gold and buried treasure.  
Mars  
The process of Mars's subjugation should begin when it is in Capricorn, the sign 
of its exaltation; none of the planets which have already been subjugated should 
be in quartile conjunction or in opposition. Mars should not be in a position that 
is malefic in relation to Saturn at the beginning of the operation; the Sun's aid 
should be sought in the subjugation of Mars which cannot be in conjunction 
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with Venus as she is hostile to Mars. When these conditions are fulfilled, then 
Mars can be safely invoked. The magician is to wear copper and brass rings, red 
wool and a blood red qalansūwa , to carry a drawn sword in the right hand and in 
the left the severed head of a man. The sword must be stained with the blood of 
the severed head. The severed head must not be that of a Turk. He is to eat of 
the head (yajʿalu ghidha'ahu min al-ra's) and give others of it to eat. The magician 
is to stand silently before Mars saying naught, and he will be shown great things 
from which he should not take fright. Then for the number of days during which 
he was disturbed by these 'great things' he is to prostrate with his face in the 
dust. He is then to stand and praise Mars with full force and gusto (no specific 
formulae are given here) and he is to seek the protection of the Sun from the 
harm that mars can inflict. He is to seek from Mars the destruction of countries 
and enemies. 
Jupiter   
The aspirant is to seek the aid of Mars in Jupiter's subjugation. He should wear 
the colours and rings associated with Jupiter and have in his possession the 
Qur'ān, Islamic prayers and the Divine Names; he is to fast and reduce his 
consumption of food until, in less than one month, he will attain his goal. He is 
to ask Jupiter for riches, generosity, a balanced constitution, justice, leadership, 
truthfulness, love, faithfulness to oaths, love of good things and hatred for the 
bad.  
Saturn  
Saturn should be in one of its houses or in dignity, Capricorn being the most 
appropriate. The more planets that are aligned in a particular relationship the 
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better. The magician is to wear a woven green silk conical hat and a fine black 
silk shirt; he is to hold in his hand a bone; and distribute in charity the meat of 
the right leg and the intestines. In Saturn's subjugation he is to seek the aid of 
Mercury. He is to persist in his service (fī khidmatihi) for two and a half years, 
after which he will be given power and other benefits which he will know once 




Part Two: Sabian Doctrines and the Talismanic Craft  
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In discussing the eight doctrines of the Sabians as presented in al-Sirr 4:1, which 
constitute the justification for astrolatry, we shall examine what philosophical 
arguments Rāzī chose to engineer in order to explain the efficacy of their 
practice. The eight doctrines immediately precede Rāzī‘s presentation of the 
planetary ascent ritual in al-Sirr 4:2. Of these doctrines, three are absolutely 
essential to the structure of the justification. They are: (1) the celestial spheres 
possess rational souls; (2) these souls understand the universal and the 
particular; and (3) they are the causes of all sublunary change. The remaining 
doctrines provide the rationale behind the practice of idol worship itself: the 
celestial spheres, being the proximate causes of all sublunary change and 
perceptive of it, are consequently deserving of human worship; and on account 
of the regular absence of the planets from human vision, their idols can serve as 
the foci for veneration.  
The three essential doctrines are supported by arguments which are Avicennan. 
The propositions that the celestial spheres possess rational souls and that they 
are cognizant of universals and particulars is justified by arguments adapted 
from the third namaṭ of Avicenna‘s Ishārāt. He complements these three core 
doctrines with those which derive their respective proofs from an argument 
formulated by Abu‘l Barakāt al-Bahgdādī, in his Kitāb al-Muʿtabar, to justify the 
Sabian doctrine of the perfect nature. In constructing the eight doctrines of the 
Sabians, Rāzī adapts Abu‘l Barakāt‘s proof for the perfect nature and 
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superimposes it onto the Avicennan core structure of the philosophical 
justification for astrolatry. The resultant composite defines the challenge that 
Rāzī has set himself: to reconcile elements foreign to his publicly professed 
classical Ashʿarism, which possess the potential to serve a later systematization 
of philosophical and theological thought which was subsequently realized in al-
Maṭālib. 
The three core arguments which constitute the Avicennan core structure 
presuppose the existence of the supracelestial intellects, which are not 
investigated in al-Sirr. But when we examine, in light of Rāzī‘s commentary, the 
original arguments in al-Ishārāt from which they are adapted, we will discover 
that celestial motion is driven by the desire of the spheres to imitate the 
intellects. This will provide the basis for my contention that the planetary 
ascent ritual represents a human attempt at mimesis of the celestial spheres: by 
co-ordinating his soul with the cosmos, he realizes the perfection of the souls 
which move the heavens. 
Before considering the eight doctrines of the Sabians in detail, I shall deal with a 
few preliminary matters. Firstly I shall discuss the context of the eight doctrines 
in al-Sirr; secondly I shall present Rāzī‘s tripartite heresiological categorization 
of the Sabians to whom these doctrines are attributed; and thirdly I shall 
summarize their content. In the course of their detailed examination, I shall 
focus on two of the three core doctrines and their sources in al-Ishārāt.105 
Moreover, I shall explore the ways in which Abu‘l-Barakāt‘s proof for the perfect 
nature is adapted in two different ways: either to supplement the primary 
                                                             
105 The proof for the spheres being the proximate causes of sublunary change is the same as the 
proof for the efficacy of talismans which we find in al-Sirr 1:1. It is more appropriate to examine 
this proof in chapter 4.  
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Avicennan proof for a particular proposition; or as a proof in its own right 
justifying the original Barakātian doctrine. The first five doctrines, which 
establish the celestial souls as objects of veneration, merit individual analysis. 
The last three, which focus on the implications of this belief for Sabianism, I will 
conveniently treat as a unit under the title ―Sabianism‖.  
 
3.2 Three Sabian sub-sects 
 
Before we discuss the three theologically distinct groups into which Rāzī divides 
them, it would be helpful to consider an overview of what Rāzī has already said 
about the Sabians‘ occult belief and practice. In al-Sirr 1, Rāzī introduces the 
proof deployed by the philosophers and the Sabians that the planetary 
movements are the proximate causes of change in the sublunary world; and that 
the ability to predict their configurations makes possible the casting of a 
talisman as a means of directing their influence for a particular end. It is only in 
al-Sirr 3, having presented the necessary astrological knowledge in al-Sirr 2, that 
Rāzī describes in detail the practical craft of casting a talisman. Rāzī delays the 
presentation of Sabian cosmological doctrines and their proofs until al-Sirr 4:1, 
which provides the philosophical justification for the belief that the heavenly 
bodies are governed by celestial rational souls which are: possessed of volition; 
aware of the changes they cause in the sublunary world; and responsive to 
human communication. This is the theoretical foundation of the long planetary 
ritual that is the main focus of the work as a whole.   
Now, Rāzī‘s characterization of the three mutually exclusive Sabian theologies 
at the beginning of al-Sirr 4:1 forms an introduction to his treatment of the eight 
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doctrines shared by them all. Whilst all believe the celestial spheres and the 
heavenly bodies are living, rational beings governing change in the sublunary 
world, they differ concerning their ontological status. He says: 
The Sabians believe that these spheres and planets are living and 
rational, governing the World of Generation and Corruption. Then they 
differed <concerning this belief>, maintaining three different doctrines. 
(1) The first doctrine is that these bodies are necessarily existent by 
virtue of their essences, their needing no originating principle and that 
rather it is they who produce the effect of the existence of this world (al-
mu’aththir fī wujūd hādhā al-ʿālam). Their doctrine is false since each body 
is a composite, whether in actuality or in potential (imā bi’l-fiʿl aw bi’l-
quwwa) and for its realization each composite depends on the realization 
of each one of the parts <which constitute> the composite <which> are 
distinct from it. (yaftaqir taḥaqququ-hu ilā taḥaqquq kulli wāḥid min ajzā’i al-
murakkabi ghayra-hu). So each body depends on something other than it 
and each thing which is dependent on another is <only> possible in its 
essence (mumkin li-dhāti-hi). (2) The second doctrine is that the spheres 
and the planets are <only> essentially possible <in their> existence 
(mumkina al-wujūd li-dhawāti-hā), but <they are> necessarily existent by 
way of the necessitating action of a pre-eternal producer of effects (bi-
ījāb mu’aththir azalī), just as the Sun produces illumination. These are the 
Sabians and the philosophers. (3) The third doctrine maintains that they 
occur by way of the action of an agent possessed of volition (fāʿil 
mukhtār), namely the Most Supreme God, and that that god created these 
planets, investing each with a special power, and delegating them with 
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the authority to govern this world. They say this does not diminish from 
the majesty of God – exalted is His splendour – for what imperfection is 
there for a king to possess obedient slaves. Then He delegated to each of 
them the government of a specific kingdom and rule over a specific 
clime. In general, despite their differing doctrines, they claimed the 
spheres and the planets have specific attributes.106  
The first category of Rāzī‘s Sabians is unreservedly polytheistic, asserting the 
reality of the heavenly bodies as gods, each being characterized by necessary 
existence.  The second maintains an emanationist model of reality in which the 
heavenly bodies are possessed of necessary existence only insofar as it is 
necessitated by the relationship which links them to the Eternal Producer of 
Effects, in the same way that solar rays are emanations of the Sun to which they 
are ontologically posterior. Believing God to be necessitating by His essence 
(mūjib bi’l-dhāt) the Sabians of this second category have a distinctly Avicennan 
hue to their theology. By way of contrast with the Necessary being of this 
second group, the Necessary being of the third group of Sabians is a creator God, 
possessed of choice and volition, who delegates to the heavenly bodies control 
of generation and corruption in the sublunary sphere.  
The Sabians, presented here in an ascending hierarchy that begins with an 
unrepentant polytheism and ends with a theology closest in resemblance to 
Rāzī‘s own confessional commitment, are thus far from being a theologically 
homogenous group. Of these three, it is significant that it is the second group, 
distinguished from the other two with the designation of ‗the Sabians and the 
Philosophers‘, which embraces a distinctly Avicennan theory of cosmogenesis 
                                                             
106 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 110.  
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by way of emanation from the one Necessarily Existent.107  If the first group 
comprises an unapologetic polytheism, the second comprises a form of popular 
Avicennism. But what is common to all of them is the belief that events in this 
world are determined by the heavenly bodies.  
 
3.3 Summary of the Eight Doctrines  
 
The eight doctrines which comprise the philosophical justification for Sabian 
idolatrous astrolatry can be summarized as follows.108 (1) No fewer than three 
proofs are invoked to establish the first proposition, on which the entire 
argument relies, namely that the celestial spheres are living rational beings. (2) 
That the connection of the celestial soul with its sphere is to be located in its 
planet, thus explaining the focus of Sabian veneration, forms the second 
proposition. The third and fourth propositions establish the spheres as: (3) 
cognizant of the universals and the particulars; and (4) as the proximate causes 
of generation and corruption in the sublunary world: thus they are the worthy 
objects of veneration for the aspirant who would gain the kind of knowledge 
and power extolled in al-Sirr‘s general introduction of al-Sirr. (5) The fifth 
proposition states that the heavenly bodies (al-kawākib) are either, according to 
the philosophers, simple spheres or, according to the Kasdanian Sabians, 
theriomorphic bodies which are the archetypes of sublunary animals.109 (6) The 
sixth proposition, namely that the celestial souls are the proximate causes of 
                                                             
107 It is the belief of this second group that most closely corresponds to the definition of 
talismans in al-Sirr 1:1. 
108 Although Rāzī asserts that the eight doctrines are common to all three categories of Sabian, it 
is only the second category which seems to be explicitly linked to the activity of philosophy.  
109 The loose use of the term kawākib allows Rāzī to construct a hypothetical controversy on their 
shape: see discussion in section 3.4.  
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human rational souls, perceive their worship, and are responsive to their acts of 
communication, justifies astrolatrous Sabian ritual.110 (7) The veneration of 
planetary idols, fashioned in order to provide the focus of worship when the 
heavenly bodies are absent from human sight, is rationalized by the seventh 
proposition. (8) The eighth proposition is that the perfect nature – the personal 
celestial spirit - from which the existence of the individual human soul derives, 
plays a necessary tutelary role, by way of inspiring intuitions, in the education 
of the aspirant who would invoke and address the planets.111 The Barakātian 
proof for the perfect nature stands on its own terms – instead of acting as a 
supplementary proof for a separate doctrine - when adduced to establish the 
eighth; however, it also features as an additional proof for the first doctrine, 
complementing the primary Avicennan proof, and is also deployed to 
substantiate the sixth doctrine that the celestial souls are particularly sensitive 
to our communications and acts of veneration.  I shall therefore explore these 
propositions in detail, in the order in which they appear in al-Sirr, examining 
where appropriate their Avicennan and Barakātian sources.  
  
3.4 Analysis of the Eight Sabian Doctrines 
 
3.4.1 Celestial Spheres and Planets (al-aflāk wa’l-kawākib) as living, 
rational beings  
 
As we have already mentioned, three separate proofs are adduced to establish 
that the celestial spheres and planets are living, rational beings, possessed of 
                                                             
110 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113.  
111 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  pp.110-114.  
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volition. This of course is a necessary condition of their receptivity to human 
communication, by which they can be persuaded to act or not to act. On this 
premise the entire Sabian approach, in its three theologically distinct varieties, 
rests. I shall now examine all three in the order that they appear in al-Sirr.    
 
3.4.1 (a) Argument from the circular nature of celestial motion 
 
al-Sirr 
Rāzī‘s Sabians privilege a distinctly Avicennan argument, based on the 
observation of the circular motion of the celestial spheres and planets, to 
establish their most important doctrine. Its simple syllogistic structure reasons 
as follows: (1) the movement of every moving body is either: natural, coerced or 
volitional (ṭabīʿiyya aw qasriyya aw irādiyya); (2) circular celestial movement can 
neither be natural nor coerced; (3) therefore, celestial motion must be 
volitional. The necessary corollary of this conclusion, which is left unsaid as it 
hardly requires explicit articulation, is that in order to possess volition, the 
celestial spheres and planets must have souls.112 Each of the two supporting 
premises on which the argument rests is substantiated by its own separate 
argument.  
Turning to the first premise, the very corporeity of any mobile under 
examination, whether it be sublunary or supralunar, determines that only those 
three logical possibilities mentioned can explain its motion. In justifying that 
                                                             
112 ‗The first proof [i.e. that the celestial spheres and planets are living, rational beings] is that 
the spheres are moving. The movement of every moving thing is either: natural, coerced or 
volitional. Since the movements of the spheres and the planets are neither natural nor coerced, 
then they must be volitional.‘ Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 110. 
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this is indeed an exhaustive list of all logical explanations (bayān al-ḥaṣar) for 
bodily motion, Rāzī‘s Sabians argue that:  
 …this is because the movements of these spheres are caused either by 
reason of: (1) their corporeity (li-nafsi jismiyatihā); or (2) by reason of 
something superadded to that corporeity (li-shay’in mawjūdin fī tilka al-
jismīya); or (3) by reason of something external to it (li-shay’in khārij 
ʿanhā).113  
They rule out the first of these major disjuncts on the ground that, were motion 
to arise purely as a result of corporeity, then all bodies would manifest the kind 
of circular movement by which the celestial spheres are characterized: since 
they clearly do not, mere corporeity cannot be the cause of celestial circular 
motion.114 Major disjunct (3) admits of two subsidiary minor disjuncts, for were 
there an external cause of circular celestial motion, then it must either be: (a) a 
body or bodily (jism aw jismānī); or (b) neither a body nor bodily. In eliminating 
the first of these, Rāzī‘s Sabians affirm the second minor disjunct (3)(b), and in 
so doing, they are compelled to affirm major disjunct (2), namely that celestial 
motion is caused by reason of something superadded to celestial corporeity. To 
eliminate the possibility contained in minor disjunct (3)(a), they reason that 
were it true, namely that the external cause of circular celestial motion is a body 
or bodily (jism aw jismānī): 
…then the particularization (ikhtiṣāṣ) of that external <entity>, out of all 
other bodies, with this power to influence (mu’aththiriyya) <the celestial 
                                                             
113 Rāzī, al-Sirr , p. 110. 
114 ‗We only say the <motion> cannot <arise> due to its corporeity because were it so then all 
bodies would participate in this movement‘. Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 110. 
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sphere> must arise by reason of some other external <entity>, thus 
necessitating a regressus ad infinitum (al-tasalsul).115  
Minor disjunct 3(a) can therefore be safely dismissed as an explanatory cause of 
celestial motion, leaving 3(b), namely that it is caused by an external entity 
which is neither a body nor bodily. Were such an external entity to exist, then 
its influence would extend equally to all bodies; this being the case, the celestial 
sphere or planet would therefore require some other cause by reason of which it 
becomes the unique recipient of the influence of that external entity and thus 
driven to circular motion: the cause of its unique receptivity to the influence of 
the external, non-corporeal entity is precisely the subject of major disjunct (2) – 
‗something superadded‘ to the planet or celestial sphere. Thus they argue that 
were the external entity which acts as the cause of celestial motion: 
…neither a body nor bodily then its relationship would extend to all 
bodies equally (yakūn nisbatuhu ilā jamīʿ al-ajsām ʿalā al-sawiyya) and were 
this <influenced> body not particularized by something by reason of 
which it became more appropriate for the receiving of the specific 
influence from it, then a selective determination (tarjīḥ) of a possible 
would have occurred without anything to have caused that selective 
determination (la kāna dhālika tarjīḥan li’l-mumkin min ghayr murajjiḥ) – 
and that is impossible. If that body were particularized by something by 
reason of which it became more appropriate for the receiving of that 
influence from a separated <intellect> (mufāraq) then that would 
constitute an admission that the specific body only became 
particularized with <its> specific movement by reason of the power 
                                                             
115 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 110. 
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superadded to it (quwwa mawjūda fīhi)) and that is what is meant (by the 
second abovementioned major disjunct).116  
Thus it is established that circular celestial motion is caused by a power 
‗superadded‘ to the corporeity of the planet or celestial sphere. All that remains 
now to be determined is whether this superadded power is natural, coerced, or 
volitional. The answer to this question provides the proof for the second 
premise on which rests the argument for the living, rational nature of the 
celestial spheres from their circular motion. The proposition that the 
superadded power is coerced would require the kind of invalid argument of 
infinite regress which we already encountered when Rāzī‘s Sabians reasoned 
that the direct cause of celestial motion could not be an external body. Only two 
possibilities remain, and what determines which of them is true is the fact that: 
…either this power has awareness (shuʿūr) of that which arises from it, thus 
being volitional (irādiyya) or it does not, and so is natural.117 
Two separate arguments relying on the circularity of celestial motion are 
deployed to invalidate the assertion that the power superadded to the celestial 
sphere is natural:  
…the first is that were this the case, then the point from which the 
sphere moved [i.e. the terminus a quo] would have been fled from 
naturally (mahrūban ʿanhā bi’l-ṭabʿ) and that which is fled from naturally 
cannot <also> be naturally sought (maṭlūban bi’l-tabʿ). And so if the 
celestial motion were natural then it would be impossible for it to move 
                                                             
116 Rāzī, al-Sirr , p. 110. This very passage was discussed by Jon McGinnis in his lecture ‗For every 
action…‘. 
117 Rāzī, al-Sirr , p. 110. 
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naturally (bi’l-ṭabʿ) towards that which it moves towards naturally; the 
converse (al-tālī) is <also> false because each point towards which the 
sphere moves, the sphere moves towards it by means of a movement 
away from it, gaining in distance from it even as it moves towards it: 
thus the <sphere‘s> movement is not natural.118  
Visualizing the celestial sphere moving against an absolutely stationary 
background which contains a fixed point of reference would assist our 
understanding of this argument. At any given time the planet, as it moves with 
the rotational motion of its sphere, like the gemstone in the bezel of a ring, is 
either moving towards or away from the point of fixed reference. Were such 
motion natural, then that fixed point of reference, in relation to the planet, 
would be at the same time both a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem. This 
would lead to a contradiction, since as a point of reference for natural motion, 
no point can be both.  The second reason why celestial motion cannot be natural 
is that: 
…nature (al-ṭabīʿa) moves towards everything which is naturally sought 
(maṭlūban bi’l-tabʿ) by way of the shortest distance and there is no aspect 
of circular movement (al-ḥaraka al-mustadīra) which is like that. So, 
circular movement is not natural. So since these two disjuncts <that 
either celestial motion is natural or coerced> have been proven false, it 
becomes established that they are volitional and thus that the spheres 
are living beings (ḥayawānāt).119 
Thus do Rāzī‘s Sabians prove the existence of the celestial souls that are 
superadded to the corporeal spheres which they govern. But in so doing, they 
                                                             
118 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 111. 
119 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 111. 
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must posit the existence of entities beyond space and time, separated (mufāraq) 
from corporeity, which provide the motive influence (mu’aththirīya) that the 
celestial souls direct in particular to their own spheres. These are none other 
than Avicenna‘s separated intellects, whom as we shall presently discover, the 
celestial souls in their perpetual motion, attempt to imitate in the pursuit of 
their own perfection.   
 
Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt 
The argument of Rāzī‘s Sabians that circular celestial motion is volitional is 
derived from the twenty-sixth chapter of the third namaṭ of Avicenna‘s al-Ishārāt 
wa’l-Tanbīhāt:  
The movements of the body that has in its nature a propensity for 
circular <motion> are among the movements of the soul and not those of 
nature; otherwise, with the same movement, such a body would 
naturally turn away from what it naturally turns toward, and with its 
movement it would naturally seek a certain position in the place where it 
naturally leaves this position and runs away from it. But it is impossible 
that that which is naturally sought (al-maṭlūb bi’l-ṭabʿ) is naturally 
abandoned, or that that from which one naturally runs away (mahrūban 
ʿan-hu bi’l-ṭabʿ) is that which is naturally intended. Rather, this may 
happen in the volition due to conceiving a certain purpose that requires 
a diversity of disposition. Thus it has become clear that the movement of 
such a body is animated and voluntary.120 
                                                             
120 Avicenna quoted in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 321. Commenting on this chapter, Rāzī says: 
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Avicenna does not in this passage provide an explicit argument against external 
coercion as a cause for celestial motion. Naturally, such an assertion would lead 
to a regressus ad infinitum; but in his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, Rāzī adds to this the fact 
that, having disproved that celestial motion can be natural:  
…it is also impossible to be coerced because coercion is the opposite of 
naturalness and if naturalness has no role here then so is it impossible 
for coercion. Since these two disjuncts are proven false it thus becomes 
established that the movement is volitional.121 
But the argument that the fixed point of reference in relation to the celestial 
sphere cannot be both the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of circular 
celestial movement could also be deployed against the assertion that such 
movement is volitional. Distinguishing the volitional explanation from the 
natural explanation, Avicenna says:  
                                                                                                                                                                      
‗When he [i.e. Avicenna] spoke of the soulish powers which move elemental bodies, he wanted to 
speak of soulish powers (al-quwā al-nafsāniyya) which move the celestial bodies (al-ajrām al-
falakiyya) and before that he spoke of the fact that the movements of the spheres are soulish and 
volitional. The evidence for this is that their movements are by their nature circular (mustadīra 
bi’l-ṭabʿ) and anything that is like this is soulish. As for the fact that their movements are 
circular, this is obvious. By saying ‗by their nature‘ (bi’l-tabʿ), he wanted to exclude the etheric 
sphere (kurra al-athir) since its circular movement is not by reason of its nature. As for the fact 
that the movement of each thing which, by its nature (bi’l-tabʿ), moves with a circular motion is 
soulish, this is because this movement is either: natural, coerced or volitional (immā an yakūn 
ṭabīʿiyya aw qasriyya aw irādiyya). That it can be natural (ṭabīʿiyya) is false because, suppose there 
were a <fixed> point on such a body, as soon as the mobile (al-mutaḥarrik) reaches <the point> it 
would leave it; and its act of leaving the point is also in essence the act of moving towards it. So 
were this movement natural, then that <point> which is sought by reason of its nature (al-maṭlūb 
bi’l-ṭabʿ) is also that which is left by reason of its nature (matrūk bi’l-ṭabʿ), and that which is left 
by reason of its nature (matrūk bi’l-ṭabʿ) is also sought by reason of its nature (al-maṭlūb bi’l-ṭabʿ). 
And since that is false, the assertion that <the movement> is natural is proved false.‘  Rāzī, Sharḥ 
al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 321-2. 
 
121 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 322.  
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…rather, this may happen in the volition due to conceiving a certain 
purpose that requires a diversity of disposition. Thus it has become clear 
that the movement of such a body is animated and voluntary.122 
Expanding on Avicenna‘s rather condensed response to this objection, Rāzī 
explains:  
…it cannot be said <that> if it were volitional then this same problem 
would also arise, because we say that is <indeed> possible (jā’iz) for 
volitional movement because if the aim of the volitionally moving mobile 
(gharaḍ al-mutaḥarrik bi’l-irāda) were something that could not find 
completion (amr lā yatimm) other than with circular motion, then that 
which is sought at one time becomes that which is abandoned at another 
(ṣara al-maṭlūb fī waqt matrūkan fī waqt ākhar) since its being sought or 
being abandoned (maṭlūbiyyatuhu wa matrūkiyyatuhu) is accidental, not 
essential (bi’l-ʿarḍ lā bi’l-dhāt) and the thing which is essentially sought 
(al-maṭlūb bi’l-dhāt) is but <that> other aim (wa innamā al-maṭlūb bi’l-dhāt 
dhālika al-gharaḍ al-ākhar).123 
Thus with volitional movement, any fixed point of reference becomes either 
sought or abandoned according to the volition of the celestial soul, the ultimate 
aim of which – ‗the thing which is essentially sought‘ - cannot be fulfilled other 
than by means of perpetual circular movement.    
 
4.4.1 (b) Argument from the existence of the human rational soul 
 
                                                             
122 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 321. 
123 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 321-2.  
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Having proved the existence of the celestial souls by adducing the Avicennan 
argument from the circularity of celestial motion, Rāzī‘s Sabians supplement it 
with an argument from the existence of the human rational soul. This proof is 
adapted, almost verbatim in parts, from a proof developed by Abu‘l-Barakāt al-
Baghdādī in his Kitāb al-Muʿtabar, which seeks to demonstrate that the origin of 
the human rational soul is a celestial spirit (rūḥ falakī). We shall therefore 
discuss this proof and doctrine firstly as it appears in al-Sirr, and secondly as it 
appears in al-Muʿtabar.  
 
The Perfect Nature in al-Sirr 
Rāzī‘s adaptation of Abū‘l Barakāt‘s proof that the causes of the human rational 
souls must be the celestial souls rests on three premises: (1) the causes of human 
rational souls must be souls; (2) human rational souls are the noblest and most 
perfect of all elemental souls; (3) the cause is always superior to its effect. Rāzī‘s 
Sabians feel no need to substantiate premises (2) and (3). But they justify the 
first with the following proof: 
 …rational souls are neither bodies (ajsām) nor do they need bodies. 
However, for their actions, they are dependent (muftaqira) on bodily tools 
(ālāt jismānīya) and the effect (al-maʿlūl) necessarily resembles, suits and 
corresponds with its cause (wa’l-maʿlūl lā budda wa an yushbiha al-ʿillata wa 
yulā’ima-hā wa yunāsiba-hā). So the causes (ʿilal) of these souls must exist 
in accordance with this <same> characteristic (ṣifa). By this I mean they 
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are neither bodies, nor in their essences are they needful of bodies. So it 
is established that the causes of these human souls are <also> souls.124  
The human rational soul is such that it is: (a) non-corporeal; and (b) reliant on a 
body in order to act. Since the nature of an effect necessarily resembles the 
nature of its cause, the cause of the human rational soul must also be: (a) non-
corporeal: and (b) reliant on a body in order to act. So having established that 
members of a certain class of soul must be the cause of human souls, they reason 
that the former: 
…are either elemental souls (nufūs ʿunṣurīya) or they are heavenly souls 
(nufūs samāwīya).  They cannot be elemental souls for the noblest and 
most perfect of the elemental souls are human souls and the nobler 
cannot be an effect (maʿlūl) of the baser. So it follows that they are the 
effects (maʿlūla) of celestial souls (nufūs falakīya). Thus it becomes 
established that the planets and the spheres possess (li’l-kawākib wa’l-
aflāk) knowing, perceiving souls (nufūsʿālima mudrika) which are the 
causes of human souls.125  
Both the celestial and the human soul are rational: the differentia between the 
two is that the latter requires an elemental body to act. A corollary of this, 
which Rāzī‘s Sabians do not explicitly state but which the reader is entitled to 
infer, is that were the latter to transcend its reliance on the elemental body, and 
came to act through a celestial body, then it would have ceased in essence being 
human, having transformed in essence into a celestial soul.  
                                                             
124 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.111.  
125 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.111. 
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At this point, having projected onto the Sabians this second proof for the 
existence of the celestial souls, Rāzī no longer needs to follow the trajectory of 
the original argument formulated by Abu‘l-Barakāt which was to prove that the 
cause of the human soul is a celestial soul, called the perfect nature (al-ṭibāʿ al-
tāmm), which plays the role of an inspiring tutelary spirit which can perfect 
human knowledge and power. It is a doctrine which lies at the heart of Sabian 
belief, and anticipates the subject of the eighth and last of the doctrines which 
Rāzī attributes to them. So, following Abu‘l-Barakāt, Rāzī‘s Sabians reason that 
since the cause must be stronger and nobler (aqwā wa-ashraf) than its effect it 
follows of necessity that the heavenly souls are stronger and nobler than human 
rational souls. And since human souls are the effects of the celestial, the former, 
in their own very mortal sublunary existence, resemble the latter in profound 
ways. Rāzī‘s Sabians reflect that: 
….just as the celestial bodies are greater and loftier, their substances 
simpler and more powerful, their colours – which are their lights – 
nobler and more radiant, similarly their souls must also be more perfect 
in knowledge, in power and in all the attributes of nobility and loftiness. 
So the substances of these human souls resemble the substances of the 
heavenly souls in the same way that the effect resembles the cause, the 
actions of the effect resemble the actions of the cause. So just as the 
planets first rise, their power increasing until they reach the apogee, 
then decline hour by hour until they set, so in the same way you observe 
the growth of children, then the power of youth, then then the subtle 
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spread of weakness in middle age, which finally ends in old age, then 
death which no treatment can avert and no medicine cure.126     
Thus during the course of its earthly life, the human soul, consciously or 
otherwise, is engaged in a kind of mimesis of celestial motion. The Sabians of al-
Sirr deploy the concept of the perfect nature to account for what they regard as 
the essential variation that exists between human souls: 
Human souls are numerous and also differ in substance: there are some 
souls which are evil by nature whilst others are good. Such is the case 
with respect to intelligence, acumen, beauty and generosity. Each species 
must have a separate cause. Since there is a similarity between the cause 
and the effect and that one thing cannot resemble two different things, 
then for each group of these human souls is a heavenly soul which is its 
cause, bringing it into existence.127 
Thus humans of a certain moral character and intellectual acumen constitute a 
species of human, each member of which derives his or her existence from the 
same celestial soul, and naturally displays an inclination towards other souls 
who hail from the same origin:  
Between the human souls which share the attention of the same celestial 
soul, there exists a love and an affection which they do not share with 
others, like that which exists between brothers. The heavenly soul takes 
care of their strengthening, their development and their defence.128  
                                                             
126 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, al-Sirr, p. 111.  
127 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.111. 
128 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.111. 
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Of significance for our examination of the Rāzī‘s attitude to the Sabian doctrines 
which he only purports to be reporting, is his attempt at this point to co-
ordinate Sabian doctrine with Islamic belief, finding confirmation for it from the 
Prophet. Concerning the celestial origin of the human soul he observes:  
The philosopers (al-ḥukamā’) of old called it ‗the perfect pature‘, in 
allusion to which the Prophet – God‘s peace and blessings be upon him – 
said: ‗In His possession are souls who are like enlisted soldiers: those who 
have <already> come to know each other are in harmony with each 
other; those who are ignorant of each other fall into difference.‘129  
The relationship between this celestial soul and its human effects is compared to 
the relationship between father and child:  
The loving care which these celestial souls show human souls is like the 
loving care that a father shows to his children. He is the one who guides 
a man in his sleep to his best interests; when he is awake, he guides him 
in his thoughts towards his goal; he is the one who casts into the human 
heart notions which benefit. He is called the Perfect Nature since the 
cause is higher, more powerful and more perfect in its nature.130 
Rāzī reports the Sabians as asserting: 
 Of the things which prove the soundness of what we have said are <our> 
repeated experiences (tajārib) of the astral laws for they point to what we 
have said concerning the causes of souls.131  
                                                             
129 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 111. 
130 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 111. 
131 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 111-112. 
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Thus for Rāzī‘s Sabians, the truth of the doctrine of the perfect nature, 
established as it is by reason, is corroborated by repeated experience.  
 
The Perfect Nature according to Abū’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī 
This will now be an appropriate point for a brief excursus to examine Abū‘l-
Barakāt al-Baghdadi‘s treatment of the Perfect Nature: this will reveal the 
extent to which Rāzī relies on this account to formulate his proof for the Sabian 
doctrine. For Abū‘l-Barakāt, each human soul belongs to an astral spirit which is 
the cause of the human soul‘s very existence; the astral spirit watches over the 
human soul‘s welfare and inspires it with every good thought. The differences 
between these higher astral spirits account for the differences in the natures of 
their human correlatives in the sublunary world. 132    
Abū‘l-Barakāt discusses the Perfect Nature in the twentieth chapter of the 
second volume of his Kitab al-Mu’tabar. 133  He reasons that since effects are more 
amenable to definition than their causes the latter are therefore defined by the 
former. Knowledge of a thing is more perfect (atamm) when its cause is defined. 
The cause – or causes – of human souls are either more mysterious (akhfā) than 
human souls vis-à-vis their existence and their nature as causes, or their 
existence is apparent whilst their nature as causes remains mysterious. He 
dismisses the possibility that the causes of human souls can be bodies, since 
bodies in their own essence, and insofar as they are bodies, cannot act as 
efficient causes. Rather, they act as material causes for things existent in primal 
                                                             
132 Al-Zarkan, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī wa ara’ahu, pp. 482-3.  
133 Abū‘l-Barakāt, Kitab al-Mu’tabar, 2, pp.  388-393.  See Davidson Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on 
Intellect pp. 154-161. On Abū‘l Barakāt‘s thought, see Pines, Studies in Abuʼl-Barakāt Al-Baghdādī; 




matter. He also rejects the possibility that the causes of human souls can be 
accidents because a cause must be more perfect (atamm) in its existence than its 
effect. Moreover, he rejects the possibility that the proximate efficient causes of 
human souls can be the holy substances (al-jawāhir al-qudsiyya) which have no 
connection with bodies. 134    
The human soul resembles its cause and everything within the human soul 
derives essentially from the cause. Both the human soul and its cause are non-
bodily essences, although the existence of the human soul‘s cause is prior and 
more perfect (atamm). Everything in the sublunary world, whether it be a soul, 
an action, a state or an event has its equivalent in the heavens; and all that is in 
the heavens has its equivalent in that which is above the heavens, beyond the 
dimension of space. Just as human souls rely on bodies in order to act, so the 
causes of human souls, when they act, are attached to bodies which are nobler 
than those of their human equivalents. 135   
After excluding the possibility that the causes of human souls can be of the 
elemental world, Abū‘l-Barakāt looks for their cause amongst the stars and their 
spirits: 
whose bodies are greater and loftier, whose substances are simpler and 
more powerful, and whose colours – which are their lights – are nobler 
and more resplendent.136   
Despite their movement and their shifting positions, their attributes remain 
stable, their essences unchanged. By means of their perpetual cyclical motions, 
                                                             
134 Abū‘l-Barakāt, al-Mu’tabar, p. 388. 
135 Abū‘l-Barakāt, al-Mu’tabar, p. 389. 
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causation connects the world of contingent time to the world of time without 
beginning. Similarly, human souls in their substances endure. The human soul 
manifests in the body like a rising star; it grows in strength and power inside its 
body; its strength augments then diminishes like a setting star. In a similar way, 
says Abu‘l-Barakat:  
…we observe the growth of children, the strength of youth, the approach 
of the middle age, the weakness of dotage, and then the inevitability of 
death which no treatment can avert and no medicine cure.137   
The differences in size, nature, movement and light of the stars are reflected in 
the differences that obtain in their human counterparts in the sublunary world. 
Moreover the amities and enmities that exist between humans are mere 
reflections of those that exist between the stars. Abū‘l-Barakāt deploys the fact 
that profound differences exist between the natures of men to confute the 
notion that the cause of human souls can be but one, namely the Active 
Intellect. 138 Thus each star governs a number of human souls, each of which 
shares in the nature of its star which: 
 watches over it, guides it, supports it, helps it win victories, brings it 
strength and aid, chases away from it harm and protects it and it is called 
the Perfect Nature (al-ṭiba al-tāmm). 139  
Some, says Abu‘l-Barakat, call the Perfect Nature an angel, ‗which has the same 
relation to the human soul as the father has with his son, and which is the 
                                                             
137 Abū‘l-Barakāt, al-Mu’tabar,  p. 390. 
138 Abū‘l-Barakāt, al-Mu’tabar,  p. 391. 
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proximate cause that is known to us.‘ 140   Abū‘l-Barakātcalls it ‗the real father‘141  
and asserts that: 
This angelic spirit shows compassion for the individual that relates to it and 
cares for it in the same way that a father does with his child….from it derive 
the dreams, which a man sees in his sleep, which bring him news, give him 
reminders, glad tidings, warnings, instructions and knowledge.142  
Now, we return to the main central focus of this section, namely the additional 
proof, which argues for a celestial origin of the human rational soul, which the 
Sabians adduce to supplement the Avicennan proof for the existence of the 
celestial souls. For the purpose of complementing this primary Avicennan proof 
in constructing Sabian doctrine, Rāzī need only adduce the introductory section 
to the Barakātian proof for the perfect nature. Nevertheless, Rāzī proceeds to 
adduce the entire proof, which is superfluous to this specific aim. His purpose 
cannot therefore be merely restricted to adducing an additional proof to 
supplement the Avicennan argument for the existence of celestial rational souls: 
it must extend beyond this. It is my contention that his purpose is to integrate 
as fully as possible the Barakātian doctrine of the perfect nature into the 
Avicennan structure of the Sabian philosophical justification for astrolatry.   
 
4.4.1 (c) Argument from the nobility of life and its place in the cosmic 
hierarchy 
 
                                                             
140 Abū‘l-Barakāt, al-Mu’tabar,  p. 391. 
141 Abū‘l-Barakāt, al-Mu’tabar,  p. 391. 
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The third argument adduced by Rāzī‘s Sabians to prove the existence of celestial 
souls invokes the principle that life is inherently noble. Since divine wisdom has 
determined that the superior rank in the cosmic chain of being is nobler than 
the inferior, it is more deserving of a nobler form of life. Therefore the 
supralunar world must possess superior forms of life to that which are to be 
found in the sublunary world, the apex of which is represented by the human 
rational soul:  
The third proof is that the celestial bodies are nobler than the base 
composite bodies <of this world> (al-ajrām al-falakīya ashraf min hādhihi al-
ajrām al-murakkaba al-khasīsa). Life is nobler (ashraf) than lifelessness (al-
jamādiyya). How then could it be appropriate for the Divine Wisdom (al-
ḥikma al-ilāhiyya) and Perfect Generosity (al-jūd al-tāmm) to give the base 
that which is noble whilst withholding it from the noble?143  
Applying this principle to the elements, they reason that fire, being the most 
subtle and the furthest removed from dense, lifeless earth, is the very source of 
life, producing the heat of the innate disposition (al-ḥarāra al-ghazīriyya) on 
which life depends. It shares the same genus (jins) as heavenly fire, by virtue of 
its inherent balance, in contrast with the humoral fire which has a tendency 
towards imbalance and entropy.  
Also we witness that those things which are opposed (muḍādda) to life 
are coldness, dryness and density and these are the properties of pure 
earth. As for water, since it is more subtle than earth, it is closer to the 
nature of life. As for air, since it is more subtle than water, it is the soul 
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and the nourishment of life. As for heat it is the source and spring of life: 
heavenly heat is of the same genus as the heat of the innate disposition 
(al-ḥarāra al-samāwīya min jins al-ḥarāra al-ghazīriyya) by virtue of its 
balance (iʿtidāl).144   
Now, given that fire and the heat which it produces are the source of life; and 
since according to Galen the aeric sphere, which girdles the earth, contains a 
plenitude of spirits; it is even more apt that the fiery sphere should teem with 
life, for its fire is balanced, gentle and inert (muʿtadila hādiya sākina); a fortiori, 
since the heavenly bodies are nobler and more subtle than even the fiery 
sphere, then the spirits which they contain must be more numerous and nobler 
(akthar wa ashraf). It is noteworthy that at this point, Rāzī is keen to interject 
into the Sabian line of reasoning his observation that it is in fact in complete 
conformity with the Islamic revelation:       
…for this reason, the Prophet – may God‘s peace and blessings be upon 
him – said: ‗heaven creaks and it is right that it should do so: there is not 
even the space of a hand‘s width in it in which an angel is not standing, 
bowing or prostrating.‘ So how close is the proof of the sages to the 
revelation of the prophets!145 
The three objections to this Sabian argument which Rāzī subsequently lists are 
therefore objections to a prophetically revealed truth. They are: (1) the path of 
the heavenly bodies is regular (ʿalā nahj wāḥid) – were they living beings then 
their paths would be diverse; (2) since the fire of the sun is so intense, the solar 
                                                             
144 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.112.  
145 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.112. See chapter 11 for Rāzī‘s qualified reconciliation between the Sabian 
perspective and Islam.  
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sphere, despite being nobler and more subtle, cannot sustain life; (3) life cannot 
be sustained without a ―special structure‖ (binya makhṣūṣa), such as man‘s 
humoral balance (mizāj); the celestial spheres lack the kind of structure which 
can sustain life.146   
The rebuttal of the first objection has two grounds. Firstly, when an agent 
possessed of choice makes the best choice in any given situation, no discrepancy 
arises between the agent and nature.147 And secondly, those who raise this 
objection are asked:  
 … do you not believe that the mover <of the spheres> is God – exalted is 
He – and He is a choosing agent and that as such He moves them in one 
way without change? So then your belief that the action of the choosing 
agent must change is proven false.148 
In rebuttal of the second objection, no concession is made that a producer of 
heat must itself be hot. Moreover, even if this concession were made, certain life 
forms, such as the ostrich and salamander nevertheless thrive in such intense 
heat. The third objection is rebutted with the same response since the substance 
of its argument is much the same as that of the second.149  
This third argument demonstrating the reality of the celestial rational soul is 
less a logical, more of a rhetorical, proof, which appears in Rāzī‘s al-Mabāḥith al-
mashriqiyya, another exploration of Avicennan thought. The argument asserts 
that since causes are superior to their effects, and closer to perfection, the 
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147 ‗The first aspect is what Ptolemy mentioned namely, that when the choosing agent seeks the 
best then there is no difference between (the choosing agent) and nature (al-mukhtār idhā ṭalaba 
al-afḍal lam yabqa bayna-hu wa bayna al-ṭabīʿa farq)‘ (Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p.112). 
148 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 112. 
149 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 112. 
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celestial spheres, being the causes of sublunary rational and sensate souls must 
be possessed of a superior form of rationality and perception:  
…how can base bodies be uniquely characterized by life, perception (idrāk) 
and rationality (al-nuṭq) whilst the noble luminous bodies are deprived <of 
such attributes> despite the fact that they are the causes of such perception 
and rationality occuring in this <sublunary> world? And it is plain that the 
cause (al-sabab) is more deserving of every <form of> perfection than its 
effect (al-musabbab).150 
Now since the celestial spheres are alive, it follows that the entire cosmos is 
alive – indeed it is one living creature, a reality which is not threatened by the 
fact that the four sublunary elements are inanimate, since their portion of 
existence within the greater cosmic whole is but a mere jot.151 
Following a somewhat similar trajectory to that of the second proof in al-Sirr for 
the existence of the celestial souls, which infers the rationally ensouled nature 
of the spheres from the fact that they are the most likely causes of human souls, 
this third proof in al-Sirr reasons from the inherent nobility of life, and the fact 
                                                             
150 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 2, p. 102. It is curious that Rāzī should refer to the celestial spheres (aflāk) as 
the causes of rational human souls – this account of anthropogenesis bears remarkable 
resemblance to the Barakātian thesis of the perfect nature which we have just encountered.  
151  ‗And if it is established that the celestial spheres are alive, then it is correct to make the 
general statement that the entire cosmos is an animal (al-ʿālam kulluhu ḥayawān) <a proposition 
which> is not undermined by the fact that the four elements are not alive – for their portion is 
but small because in comparison to the celestial spheres, the sum total of all the four elements is 
almost imperceptible. The <rules> of analogy would require that the sum <of all four elements> 
in <its relation to> the sphere of Saturn be compared to that of a point in a circle. So then how 
would the analogy stand in relation to that which is above the sphere of Saturn? And it is plain 
that were there a small pearl in a man‘s intestines, this would not represent an impediment to it 
being said that this indicated that the body is alive, even though the ratio of the pearl to the 
body of the man is greater than the ratio of the four elements to the sum of the heavens. Indeed 
in the body of an animal are many bodies which are neither alive nor sensate (ghayr ḥayya wa lā 
hassāsa) such as the humors (akhlāṭ), the bones and more else besides. So if there is no 
impediment <to saying> that, then so <it can be said here>: indeed it is more apt.‘ Rāzī, al-




of human rational life, that those beings superior to man in the cosmic 
hierarchy must be possessed of life. In contrast with the first proof, inferences 
about the celestial world in these last two proofs are drawn from observations 
about the sublunary world.  
3.4.2 The planet is where the celestial soul and body meets  
 
Being the focal point at which the celestial rational-bodily soul complex 
interfaces with the body of the sphere, the planet represents the co-ordinating 
centre of celestial activity, under the direction of which celestial spirits act on 
specific parts of the sphere. The analogy of the planet‘s relationship with the 
sphere is as the relationship of the heart to the human body. Rāzī accounts for 
this second doctrine of the Sabians concerning the celestial spheres as follows:  
The second attribute is that the wise have said the sphere is like the 
totality of the <human> body (jumlatu al-badn) whilst the planet is like 
the heart. And just as the primary connection (al-taʿalluq al-awwal) of the 
soul is with the heart, and then by means of the heart, to the rest of the 
body, so too the primary connection of the celestial spirits (al-arwāḥ al-
falakiyya) is with the planet, and then by means of the planet, to all of the 
sphere. Just as the human soul then divides up into many different 
powers (quwā kathīra), each one of which is connected to one of the 
organs/limbs of the body, so the celestial soul divides up into many 
powers, each one of which has a special connection with a specific part of 
the sphere.152 
                                                             
152 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113. Compare al-Maṭālib 7, On Higher and Lower Spirits, p. 8: ‗…as for the spirits 
which govern the celestial bodies, then the most apparent (al-aẓhar) is that the spheres for them 
are like the bodies, the planets are like the hearts, and the lines of rays which emanate from the 
bodies (ajrām) of the planets (al-kawākib) flow in the manner of subtle luminescent bodies (ajsām) 
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The nature of these celestial spirits is ambiguous: on the one hand they could 
act as the purely natural pneuma of Galenic physiology which possesses no 
volition of its own; on the other hand, they could each indeed be possessed of 
individual volition, each instance of which works entirely in concert with the 
rest of the celestial host. But in the context of Sabian astrolatry, the planet 
serves as the most appropriate focus for veneration of the celestial sphere as a 
whole.     
 




That they perceive both the universal and the particular constitutes an 
argument that the celestial spheres have rational souls and are the necessary 
mediators between Rāzī‘s Sabians and the supracelestial world. Once again this 
is an inference drawn from the repeated observation of the celestial circular 
motion. Given that the planets are living volitional beings, their particular 
movements must be performed as a result of conscious choice; from this Rāzī‘s 
Sabians infer that they must also be capable of apprehending particular 
knowledge items.  
…they say that the spheres and the planets are perceptive (mudrika) of 
the particulars and the general. As for the assertion that they perceive 
the particulars, it is because they perform particular acts by way of will 
                                                                                                                                                                      
which emanate from the heart and brain to reach the rest of the organs (aʿḍā’). Moreover, just as 
there is for each body <but> one soul, from which emanates to every part of the body a power 
that governs it….‘  
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(irāda) and whatever acts thus is cognizant of particulars (ʿālim bi’l-
juzīyāt).153 
Their knowledge of the universals (kulliyyāt) which derive from the 
supracelestial world is inferred from the perpetual nature of their circular 
motion, since: 
 …their movements must have a purpose (gharaḍ) for pointless activity 
(al-ʿabath) cannot continue in perpetuity, nor indeed could it endure for 
most of the time. Moreover that purpose cannot be particular because if 
its realization were impossible (in kāna mumtaniʿ al-ḥuṣūl) then it would 
no longer be an eternal purpose; and if its realization were possible then 
it would be necessary for the <movement of the> sphere to cease once 
the purpose has been realized (wajaba wuqūf al-falak ʿinda ḥuṣūl gharaḍihi) 
and that is impossible. That its purpose is particular has been proven to 
be false: so it becomes established that its purpose is general. Everything 
that has a purpose must be cognizant of it: thus it is established that <the 
spheres and the planets> perceive the general and the particular.154  
The argument which demonstrates that the celestial souls perceive universals 
thus rests on two premises, each with its own supporting proof: (1) perpetual 
celestial motion has a purpose; (2) the purpose of that motion is universal. The 
implied third premise of course is that everything which pursues by its activity 
a universal purpose must also be able to perceive the universal.  
 
The first premise is established by the following simple syllogism: celestial 
motion is perpetual; no activity that is perpetual can be without purpose; 
                                                             
153 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.112.  
154 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.112. 
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therefore celestial motion must have a purpose.155 The second premise rests on 
eliminating the possibility that the object of celestial motion can be the 
particular, thus leaving the universal object as the sole remaining explanation. 
Thus if the object of such motion is particular, its realization would be either: (a) 
impossible; or (b) possible. If impossible, then we would be forced to conclude 
that perpetual celestial motion has no realizable object; this being the case, it 
cannot properly be said to have purpose: so it must constitute pointless activity 
(ʿabath). This conclusion leads to a contradiction of previously established 
premise (1). Therefore, if the object of celestial motion is particular, its 
realization must be possible. But, were it indeed possible, then once it were 
realized, celestial motion would cease: this leads to a contradiction of the 
proposition, contained in premise (1), that celestial motion is perpetual. Thus, 
the object of celestial motion cannot be particular. So it must be universal.  
 
In summary, the ability of the celestial souls to perceive both universals and 
particulars is inferred from the fact of their perpetual motion. Insofar as the 
motions of their spheres occur in space and time, they are particular; and since 
they perform them with volition, it can be inferred that they also perceive them; 
thus they are able to perceive the particular. And since their motion is 
perpetual, their purpose cannot be said to be realizable in a particular way for 
once realized, they would then cease, contradicting the initial premise that their 
motion is indeed perpetual. Their purpose must therefore be universal. Just as 
Rāzī‘s Sabians inferred from the circularity of celestial motion that the spheres 
must be living and rational, possessed of choice and volition, so they infer from 
                                                             
155 That celestial motion is perpetual (dā’im) is assumed by Rāzī‘s Sabians: he does not attribute to 
them any supporting argument establishing this proposition.  
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the perpetual nature of celestial motion that the spheres perceive the universal 
as well as the particular. This being the case the Sabian adept, once he has 
achieved noetic connection with the celestial souls, is theoretically able to 
receive understanding of both kinds of knowledge.   
 
Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt  
 
This Sabian argument for the celestial soul‘s perception of the universal and 
particular is an adapted version of a more involved proof, which was advanced 
by Avicenna in the third namaṭ of his al-Ishārāt,156  that the celestial spheres are 
possessed of rational souls. He reasons that, since movement is never an aim in 
of itself, the purpose of celestial motion must be other than mere movement for 
its own sake. This must be the universal realization of an infinite series of 
configurations. Each individual configuration is particular; but the realization of 
an infinite series of configurations is a universal aim.  Therefore, the celestial 
soul which governs the motion of its sphere, perceiving both the universal and 
the particular, must indeed be rational, possessed of universal volition. 
Avicenna says:   
By volition, the movement of the first body is not for the sake of 
movement itself because it (movement) is not of the sensible perfections 
(al-kamālāt al-ḥissiyya), nor of the intellectual perfections (al-kamālāt al-
ʿaqliyya). It [i.e. movement] is only pursued for <an aim> other than it 
(innamā tuṭlab li-ghayri-hā). Nothing is more befitting to <this movement> 
than <celestial> configuration (laysa al-awlā lahā illā al-wadʿ) <which> is 
                                                             
156 See chapters 27-29, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 322-327. 
120 
 
not a determined but rather a hypothetical existent (laysa bi-muʿayyan 
mawjūd bal farḍī). Nor does <this movement> stop at the determined 
hypothetical <configuration> but rather at the determined universal 
<one> (muʿayyan kullī). So this <movement> is an intellectual volition 
(tilka irāda kulliyya).157 
In his commentary to this passage, Rāzī refers to what is subsequently identified 
as the celestial rational soul as the Possessor of Universal Volition (ṣāḥib al-ra’y 
al-kullī).  He explains that, according to Avicenna, the aim (maqṣūd) of the sphere 
in its movement cannot be for its own sake:  
…because the quiddity (māhiyya) of movement is that it is a first perfection 
(kamāl awwal) so it is a means for the second perfection (wasīla al-kamāl al-
thānī). And since its quiddity is that it is a means for something else, it 
cannot be a purpose in of itself (istaḥāla an yakūn hiya nafs al-maṭlūb). Thus it 
becomes established that the aim of the sphere in its movement is 
something other than movement.158  
This aim is the realization of something which exists only in potential (bi’l-
quwwa), namely the actualization of the celestial configurations:  
So the purpose of <celestial> movement is to actualize the configurations 
(istikhrāj al-awḍāʿ ilā al-fi’l); the aim is not a specific individual configuration 
(waḍʿ muʿayyan shakṣ) otherwise once it were arrived at, then it would stop. 
Rather the aim is a determined universal configuration (waḍʿ muʿayyan 
kullī).159 
                                                             
157 Avicenna, quoted in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 323.  
158 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 324. 
159 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 324. 
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Of course, being determined (muʿayyan) seems in apparent contradiction to 
being universal (kullī).  Rāzī understands Avicenna‘s response to such an 
objection in the following terms: 
Being determined (muʿayyan) does not contradict (lā yunāfī) its being 
universal because each one of these individual determined 
<configurations> is determined and shares in being determined (fa-hiya 
mushārika fī muʿayyaniyya) but they are distinct <from each other> by 
means of their own specificity (mumāyiza bi-khuṣūṣiyātiha) and that which 
they share is other than that by <reason of> which they are distinct (mā 
bihi al-ishtirāk ghayr mā bihi al-imtiyāz). So the specific, insofar as it is 
absolutely determined (muṭlaq al-muʿayyan), is something universal. This 
is what he [i.e. Avicenna] asserted in the introduction when he said that 
if an idea is predicable on many then it is universal whether it be specific 
to an individual or not. Thus is it established that the aim of this 
movement is something universal and this demands a universal 
intention (qaṣd kullī) and the universal intention is known as intellectual 
volition. Thus is it established that the movements of the spheres have a 
principle, namely the Possessor of Universal Volition.160 
Avicenna is confronted by an obvious dilemma. Observing the eternal nature of 
celestial motion,161 he must maintain that its object is universal, since if its 
object were particular, then its realization would entail the immediate cessation 
of such movement. And yet at the same time, the configurations to which it 
gives rise are particular. He attempts to reconcile these seemingly contrary 
                                                             




positions by observing that the celestial configurations all share in being 
determined (muʿayyana) and are thus universal, whilst at the same time being 
distinguished from one another by their own specificities.  
The supracelestial intellect is an abstracted substance independent in its 
essence from the sphere with respect to all of its perfections (jawhar mujarrad 
ghanī bi-dhātihi fī jamīʿ kamālātihi ʿan al-falak). But not so the celestial rational 
soul: for whilst it is also abstracted from the body of the sphere, the former 
nevertheless has a relationship with the latter which is analogous to the 
relationship between our souls and our bodies. The perfections of the celestial 
rational soul are not independent of the sphere which it governs, the perpetual 
motion of which pursues a universal aim (gharaḍ kullī), driven by a universal 
intention (qaṣd kullī), and subject to universal perception (idrāk kullī). The 
possessor of such universal intention and perception cannot be bodily: it must 
be an abstracted substance. But this substance cannot be the intellect since, says 
Rāzī interpreting Avicenna:  
…everything whose aim is an action must be in need of that action in 
order to attain perfection […] and everything that seeks perfection is not 
an abstracted intellect but rather is a soul. Thus, in this way, is 
established the assertion <of the reality> of the rational celestial soul (al-
nafs al-nāṭiqa al-falakiyya).162 
 
In governing the eternal motion of the sphere the celestial rational soul realizes 
its own perfection. The attempt to seek perfection by means of motion is 
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characteristic of souls rather than intellects. It is for this reason that Avicenna 
posits the existence of the celestial rational soul.163   
That the sphere possesses a bodily soul, which is the means by which the 
‗universal opinion‘ of the celestial rational soul becomes particularized in 
specific celestial movement, is an inference drawn by Avicenna from the fact 
that: 
A specific particular thing (shay’ makhṣūṣ juz’iyy) cannot arise from a 
universal opinion for <such a universal opinion cannot> become specified 
(lā yatakhaṣṣaṣ) with <one> particular rather than another, unless <that 
be> by reason of a specifier (mukhaṣṣiṣ) that is necessarily linked to it (illā 
bi-sabab mukhaṣṣiṣ lā maḥālata yaqtarinu bihi) – not by itself alone.164  
 
Explaining this statement, Rāzī comments: 
…the relationship of the universal to all particulars is one such that no one 
particular is more fitting than another to issue from the universal. So either 
a universal arises, which is absurd, or nothing arises from it, and that is 
what is meant. So it is established that no particular arises from a universal 
opinion but that particular must issue from a particular volition, and the 
possessor of particular volition is a bodily power (quwwa jismāniyya). Thus is 
it established that the sphere has a bodily soul.165   
 
The rational-bodily celestial soul complex thus provides the means by which 
influence from the supracelestial intellect, which exists beyond space and time, 
                                                             
163 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 325-6. 
164 Avicenna, in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 326; Inati, Physics and Metaphysics, p. 113.  
165 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt p. 327. 
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can flow to the sublunary world. Being both abstracted but nevertheless 
connected with the body of the sphere, the celestial rational soul perceives both 
universals and particulars, translating the former into particular instantiations 
in the sublunary world by governing the celestial bodily soul, which affects the 
movement of the sphere, in the attempt to realize an infinite series of 
configurations. For Avicenna, the reality of the celestial rational souls is a 
mystery which is:  
…veiled from all except those who have perfected the divine wisdom 
(ḍarban min al-naẓar mastūran illā ʿalā al-rāsikhīn fī al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya).166  
Janus-faced, the rational-bodily celestial soul complex at once receives the 
universal abstractions of the supracelestial realm and translates them into 
motion.167  
3.4.4 Celestial spheres as the causes and perceivers of sublunary change  
 
It has previously been mentioned that the proof that celestial motion is the 
principle of sublunary change was adduced in the first treatise as a means of 
justifying the efficacy of talismans. When this proposition is considered in light 
of: (1) the Avicennan proof which deduces the volitional nature of celestial 
motion from the circularity of its movements; and (2) the principle that any 
agent which acts with volition must be cognizant of the effects of its actions, it 
                                                             
166 Avicenna, quoted in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 325. 
167 Rāzī expresses doubts about Avicenna‘s solution to the seeming paradox of the celestial 
sphere‘s motion. He observes: ‗…so insofar as it performs particular acts and then abandons 
them, it must be a body and insofar as it yearns to imitate the intellect then it is abstracted 
(mujarrada). So there is no escape from this philosophical impasse (ʿuqda) unless it be asserted 
that: [(1]) these particular acts have no need of particular perceptions; or [(2)] that an abstracted 
substance can be possessed of particular perceptions; or [(3)] that a bodily power can perceive 
abstracted things; or [(4)] that the purpose of moving the sphere is not yearning for imitation. 
Regarding whichever of these positions they adopted, they left their own distinct doctrinal 
school and definitive statement.‘ Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.329.  
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follows that the planets must be cognizant of all events which occur in this 
world:  
…you already know the aforementioned proof at the beginning of this book 
that the proximate principles of coming to be of events which come to be 
(al-mabādi’ al-qarība li-ḥudūth al-ḥawādith) in the World of Generation and 
Corruption must be the movements of the spheres and the applications of 
the planets; and you already know that they perform their acts by volition 
(bi’l-irāda) and that anything which acts with volition is cognizant of its 
action. Therefore these planets are cognizant of all contingent events which 
occur in this world, whether they be natural, coerced or by choice (sawā’an 
kānat ṭabīʿiyya, qasriyya aw ikhtiyāriyya).168 
Of course, this account of celestial causation of all sublunary events and 
perception thereof gives rise to the intractable aporia of how to reconcile 
determinism with human agency and free will. For if the planets are cognizant 
of all sublunary events, as effects produced by their own circular motion, 
including those which are the result of the individual choice of sublunary 
agents, then a seeming contradiction would appear to have arisen.169 Be that as 
it may, the fact that the planets are cognizant of all sublunary change justifies 
the Sabian belief that some form of noetic connection with them would provide 
knowledge of the unseen world.  
3.4.5 The Shape of the Planets 
 
                                                             
168 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 112.  
169 See Kukkonen, ‗Causality and Cosmology‘.  
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Theological differences aside, the fifth doctrine attributed by Rāzī to the Sabians 
represents the only point of contention between the distinct categories of 
Sabian: specifically, between the philosophizing Sabians and the Chaldean sages 
(al-ḥukamā al-kasdāniyūn). The former are committed to the doctrine that the 
planets are spheres on two grounds. The first is an empirical proof: they appear 
circular. The second reasons that since: (1) the planetary bodies are simplexes, 
as opposed to the complexes of terrestrial bodies composed of the four 
elements; and (2) all simple bodies are circular, they conclude the planets must 
be circular: 
The Philosophers adduced two proofs that they are spheres (kurrāt); the 
first is that we observe them as spherical (mustadīra); the second is that 
they are simple and the shape of anything that is simple is spherical 
(wa’l-basīṭa shaklu-hā al-kurra).170 
Their Chaldean counterparts refused to concede their belief in the 
theriomorphic shape of the planets to such philosophizing. They countered that 
a triangle or a square, for instance, might appear as a sphere when viewed at a 
vast distance.171  Furthermore, they resisted the assertion that the planets were 
simplexes, the acceptance of which would demand that they disavow their 
theriomorphic belief. They are reported as saying:  
…we do not concede that they are simple <bodies> so why could not one 
of their parts be of one nature and another part of another nature, 
                                                             
170 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113.  
171 References to shapes might not merely be for the sake of illustration but reflect something 
more meanginful such as the shapes of the Sabian temples on earth. See al-Maṭālib 7, p. 394 for 
the shapes of the Greek planetary temples before the time of Alexander: Saturn‘s was a hexagon; 
Jupiter‘s a triangle; Mars‘ a rectangle; the Sun‘s a square; Venus‘s a triangle containing a square; 
Mercury a triangle containing a rectangle; the Moon‘s an octagon. 
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except that one part, with its nature and essence, would have to be 
cohere with another part <of a different nature> in such a way as to 
prevent dissolution and disintegration (al-inḥilāl wa’l-infikāk).172   
This belief was the natural conclusion of their understanding of the causal 
relationship between the planets and their sublunary effects. For they 
maintained that the form of the planets:  
…was that of animals which are to be found in this world, adducing as 
evidence that which we have already demonstrated, <namel>) that the 
effect must resemble its cause, and be congeneric and similar (al-maʿlūl lā 
budda wa-an yakūna mulā’iman li-ʿillatihi mujānisan lahā wa mushābihan).173   
Thus the nature of the causal relationship is one of similarity (mushābaha) and 
‗congenereity‘ (mujānasa) between the superior cause and the inferior effect. 
Once this is established: 
 …it follows that the bodies of the higher world must be the real causes of 
those in the lower world, sharing with them a resemblance in both shape 
and form. And when we consider that the cause must be more powerful 
than the effect, it naturally follows that those animals which are in the 
Higher World are nobler and more perfect in form than the animals of 
this Lower World, their matter being different from the matter of 
creatures of the lower world for those shapes and forms are 
concomitants of their essences (lawāzim dhawātihā). And when we 
consider that the cause must be more powerful than the effect, it 
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173 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113. 
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naturally follows that the animals in the higher world perpetually 
endure, preserved from change (mumtaniʿa al-taghayyur).174  
Thus the sages of the Chaldean Sabians infer the theriomorphic shape of the 
heavenly bodies (al-kawākib) on the a priori assumptions that: (1) that they are 
the causes of corresponding theriomorphic forms in the sublunary world; and 
(2) a resemblance necessarily exists between the cause and its effect. Vast 
distance explains why our limited sense perception erroneously apprehends 
their shape as spherical. They maintained a belief in the simple and naïve 
correspondence between the animals of the sublunary world and the divine 
entities that populated the supralunar, understanding almost literally the 
Hermetic dictum ‗as above so below‘. Indeed their simple identification of 
causality with congenereity between sublunary phenomena and their celestial 
principles provided the simplest account necessary to account for the efficacy of 
their occult practices which sought to influence the outcome of celestial action 
in this world by bringing together, in ritual, objects of planetary 
correspondence appropriate to the desired result.  
3.4.6 Sabian worship 
 
Building on the propositions that the celestial souls are perceptive of sublunary 
events and that they are the causal origin of human souls, Rāzī‘s Sabians aver 
that they pay particular heed to human acts of devotion: 
…the celestial souls are the causes, the real fathers and the perfect nature 
(al-ṭibāʿ al-tāmm) of earthly souls and their senses are far more powerful 
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than ours and since the cause must be more perfect than the effect then 
it is not unlikely that they regard with favour things in this world, for 
they hear the supplications of humans (duʿā al-bashar), see their 
adoration (tubṣir taḍurruʿahum), smell the fragrance of their ritual 
subfumigations and incense; nor is it unlikely that they, their spirits and 
their helpers have special names (asmā makhṣūṣa); nor is it unlikely that 
they appear before the one who serves and adores them (tatajallā li-man 
yakhdumuhā wa yatadarraʿū ilayhā) to reveal their names and those of 
their adjutants (aʿwān) to the one  who calls in supplication.175 
With the intimate relationship between human and celestial souls established, 
the Sabians can now speak of how the former might communicate with the 
latter through acts of devotion, for which they might be rewarded with 
revelatory experiences and occult knowledge of the names of planetary spirits 
which facilitate the fulfilment of their sublunary needs. Seeing that the 
heavenly bodies were held to be both the proximate causes of sublunary change, 
and the very causes of human souls, the Sabians took them as ‗proximate gods of 
this world‘, to whom they directed their worship: 
…Know that the Sabians, professing this set of beliefs which we have just 
explained, based their religion on these principles, claiming that the 
planets were the proximate gods of this world (hādhihi al-kawākib hiya al-
āliha al-qarība li-hādhā al-ʿālam); thus it naturally follows that it is 
necessary that the people of this lower world devote themselves to their 
worship and entreaty them with incense and sacrifices (fa-lā jarama 
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wajaba ʿalā ahl al-ʿālam al-asfal an yashtaghilū bi-ʿibādatihā wa al-tadarrūʿ 
ilayhā bi’l-dukhn wa’l-qurbānāt).176   
Since the heavenly bodies would regularly disappear from sight, they could not 
serve as constant foci for worship. Therefore planetary idols came to serve this 
purpose: 
…and since they knew that the planets disappear from sight, it was 
natural for them to fashion statues and idols (tamāthīl wa aṣnām) <of 
them>, devoting themselves to the veneration of the planets (wa 
ishtaghalū taʿẓīman li-tilka al-kawākib). This is the religion of idolatry (dīn 
ʿabdat al-awthān).177 
Knowledge of how to invoke and address the stars is imparted by a man‘s 
perfect nature, often when he is in a hypnagogic state. Thus, since an 
individual‘s close and conscious relationship with his perfect nature is crucial 
for his occult education and training, it becomes necessary for him to identify to 
which planet it belongs:   
…the Chaldeans have said that each man has a celestial soul (nafs 
falakiyya) - the Perfect Nature (al-ṭibāʿa at-tāmma) which is in respect of 
him like a father who is kind and caring towards his child; it inspires in 
him that which is of benefit to him; it summons to his memory that 
which he has forgotten; it brings him to that which he seeks in his mind; 
and it shows him in his sleep that which is useful to him. It thus behoves 
the man who concerns himself with the knowledge of how to invoke the 
                                                             
176 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113. 
177 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113. It is at this point that Rāzī makes a brief interjection in order to argue for 
the correct Islamic theological grounds on which this kind of astrolatrous idolatry is to be 
refuted. We shall discuss this in chapter 10.  
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planets (ʿilm daʿwat al-kawākib) to exert himself such that he finds out 
which planet it is.178  
The phrase ‗…such that he finds out which planet it is‘ might mislead the reader 
into thinking that an individual‘s perfect nature is the celestial soul of the 
planet itself. This would lead to the somewhat absurd conclusion that the almost 
limitless range of human character types might be reducible to just seven. To 
avoid this misunderstanding, the phrase would require construction in light of 
the earlier discussion of the perfect nature, which proposed that:  
…the planets and the spheres possess knowing, perceiving souls (li’l-
kawākib wa’l-aflāk nufūsʿālima mudrika) which are the causes of human 
souls.179 
And as we have already learnt from Rāzī‘s Sabians, the celestial spheres possess 
a plenitude of rational souls. Thus for example the sphere of Mercury possesses 
a countless number of souls, each of which can act as the causal origin for 
innumerable individual human souls. Thus to establish a stabilized connection 
with his perfect nature, the practitioner of the Sabian religion would firstly be 
required to identify which sphere it is from which his soul derives. A twofold 
empirical method is applied: (1) identifying which planet possesses the 
strongest domination over his rising sign; and (2) inferring the planetary sphere 
by observation of his actions and moral character: 
Sometimes they deduce it by means of the cause indicating the effect 
(yastadillu ʿalā dhālika bi’l-ʿilla ʿalā al-maʿlūl) which <method involves> 
looking at the ascendant sign at the time of birth <of the man in 
question> so that the planet with the strongest domination over his 
                                                             
178 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 113-4. 
179 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 111. 
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rising sign (aqwā al-kawākib istiʿlā’an ʿalā ṭāliʿihi) becomes known. 
Sometimes it is deduced by means of the effect indicating the cause such 
that by knowing the actions and moral character of the man, the most 
appropriate star can be deduced. Both methods are relied on, so that by 
means of an inductive analysis of its conditions <which indicate that> 
that is such-and-such a planet (al-kawkab al-fulānī), his perfect nature 
becomes known.180 
Failing this twofold method, the practitioner can seek the revelation of the 
perfect nature through ascesis and fixed meditation, whereby all cognitive 
activities are directed to this one aim:  
If he is unable to find out his perfect nature by this method, then let him 
discipline himself; pursue great lengths in severing all bodily ties; and 
immerse his meditation (fikr), his heart, his thought (khāṭir) and his 
imagination (al-khayāl) in the magnification (taʿẓīm) of the perfect 
nature for it will inevitably appear to him. After that let him avail 
himself of its mediation with respect to whatever he will and desires.181 
Once the perfect nature has been revealed to the practitioner, he is to devote 
himself to it for it will be the swiftest in response to his invocation and will 
mediate between him and benevolently disposed planets, such as Saturn, which 
would be benevolently disposed towards a Martian celestial soul or Jupiter 
towards a Venusian:  
So let him occupy himself in its invocation and service for 
communication with it [i.e. the perfect nature] will be the easiest and it 
will answer his supplication more swiftly […]; then let him avail himself 
                                                             
180 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.114. 
181 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.114. 
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of its mediation with planets that are benevolently disposed to him (al-
kawākib al-sādiqa lahu), whilst avoiding those planets which are hostile 
(al-kawākib al-muʿādiya lahu), until the point that his position in that has 
become consolidated (ḥattā yaqwī lahu amruhu fī dhālika).182  
Whilst the empirical twofold method might be instructive in identifying to 
which planetary sphere any individual‘s perfect nature might belong, it would 
appear that the latter method of ascesis and meditation would be necessary in 
order to induce a revelatory experience of the particular celestial soul which 
acts as his perfect nature. Be that as it may, since connection with the perfect 
nature is absolutely essential to the practitioner‘s ability to address the other 
celestial spheres, it becomes apparent that it would also be crucial for any 
successful attempt at the planetary ascent ritual.183  
3.5 The Purpose of Celestial Motion  
 
Previously we observed that the first Sabian proof for the existence of the 
rational celestial souls which argued from the circularity of celestial motion, 
relies on the positing of the supracelestial intellects, which are separated and 
abstracted from matter. This is now the appropriate juncture at which to 
explore their relationship with the celestial souls. In doing so it will be shown 
that the purpose of the eternal motion of the latter is the attempt to imitate the 
former, in the pursuit of perfection.  
                                                             
182 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 114. 
183 This construction of the two methods as complementary rather than as alternatives, however, 
is undermined by the phrase ‗…If he is unable to find out his perfect nature by this method‘, 
which would support reading them as alternatives. If this latter reading is indeed the correct 
one, then of course it leaves the question unanswered as to how the twofold empirical method 
can identify an individual celestial spirit as the perfect nature as opposed to merely the 
planetary sphere to which it belongs.  
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With this aim in mind, we return to the sixth namaṭ of al-Ishārāt. In the eleventh 
chapter, Avicenna asserts that celestial motion must be driven by the kind of 
motive (dāʿin) which is possessed by a soul rather than an intellect. Moreover, 
this motive can neither be desiderative nor irascible (shahwānī aw ghaḍabī).184  
The reason for this, explains Rāzī, is that such motives only drive the actions of 
bodies which undergo ‗increase and decrease‘, or change and transformation 
either for the better or for the worse: it would be absurd to attribute such 
change to the eternal and unchanging celestial spheres. Moreover, if the object 
of celestial desire or anger were attainable, then eternal celestial motion would 
cease on its realization, which is impossible; whilst if it were unattainable, then 
eternal celestial motion would just simply be an absurd act of folly.185  
Dismissing both desiderative and irascible motives as valid accounts for celestial 
motion, Avicenna asserts that it must resemble our own motions which are 
driven by the practical intellect. Moreover: 
It is unavoidable that this soul‘s movement is directed toward a beloved 
(maʿshūq) and chosen object (mukhtār) in order to attain either: (1) the 
essence of this object; (2) (one) of its states; or (3) something that 
imitates these two things.186 
On the same grounds that he dismissed the desiderative and irascible motives as 
accounts for celestial motion, he eliminates the first two disjuncts, leaving only 
the need for imitation (mushābaha) of the beloved as the sole remaining 
explanation. Interpreting the intentions of Avicenna, Rāzī comments: 
                                                             
184 Avicenna, in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 445.  
185 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 446. 
186 Avicenna in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 446; Inati, Physics and Metaphysics, p. 148.   
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…the aim (al-maṭlūb) is the attainment of imitation (taḥṣil al-mushābaha) of 
an attribute (ṣifa) which does not emerge into actuality in its entirety (lā 
yakhruju ilā al-fiʿl bi-tamāmihā), but rather in the successive <realization> of 
its parts throughout eternity (ʿalā al-dawām).187 
The celestial soul cannot perfectly imitate the attribute of the supracelestial 
intellect, thereby bringing it into actuality, other than in a way that is gradual, 
stretched out over eternity.  Avicenna explains the nature of this imitation 
thusly: 
…that which yearns (al-mutashawwiq) imitates things in actuality – 
inasmuch as such things are free from potentiality – such that the good 
flows from it, as the good flows inasmuch as the resemblance is to the 
exalted and not inasmuch as it is a flow over the lower object.188  
Rāzī writes in elucidation: 
…the celestial sphere, which we have supposed yearns for the realization 
of perfection, comes to imitate at that point, those things which are in 
actuality, namely the abstracted intellects, in two respects. One is in 
their abstraction from the nature of possibility and potential; the second 
is in their emanation of good things (fayḍān al-khayrāt) on that which is 
below them, which does not mean that the goal (maqṣūd) of the former is 
the emanation of good things on lower beings (al-sāfilāt). For we have 
explained that the higher does nothing for the sake of the lower. Rather 
the aim is imitation of the intellect insofar as it is a principle for the 
                                                             
187 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 447. 
188 Avicenna in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 447; see Inati, Physics and Metaphysics, p. 149.   
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emanation of good things, on that which is below it, without seeking or 
desiring <to do so>.189  
Perpetual circular motion is thus the way in which the celestial spheres attempt 
to realize in their own selves the perfection of the intellects. By such motion 
they raise in themselves the supracelestial attribute (ṣifa) from the inferior 
ontological orders of mere possibility (imkān) and potential (quwwa) to the 
superior ontological order of actual realization. The extent to which they 
achieve this is the extent to which they realize the perfection of abstraction 
(tajarrud). And the measure of their realization of the attribute is the measure to 
which they gratuitously effuse goodness on that which is beneath them in the 
hierarchy of being. But since, it should be noted, beings of a higher ontological 
order do not act for the sake of beings of lower orders, this effusion of goodness,  
is not the aim of celestial motion but merely its concomitant. Avicenna 
identifies the principle of this effusion with: 
…the celestial configurations (aḥwāl al-waḍʿ) which are the emanational 
dispositions; that which is in potential in them flows in actual <realized 
existence> through that which is possible by way of successive 
realization.190  
The seeming obscurity of this philosophical allusion is illumined by Rāzī‘s 
commentary: 
                                                             
189 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 447-8. 
190 ‗…innamā yajrī mā bi’l-quwwa fīhā majrā al-fi’l bi-mā yumkin min al-taʿāqub’, Avicenna, in Rāzī, 
Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.445; Inati translates as follows: ‗Whatever is in potentiality in the heavens 
follows the same course, just as that of the actual inasmuch as this is possible by succession‘ 
(Inati, Physics and Metaphysics p. 149).   
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…the means by which the celestial sphere realizes its imitation of the 
intellect is naught but the bringing from potential into actual realization 
the <rotation> of the aions and the celestial configurations (istikhrāj al-
ayūn wa’l-awḍāʿ).191 
The celestial soul is thus motivated by a yearning for the supracelestial intellect 
which is its beloved (maʿshūq); this gives rise to the need of the former to 
imitate the attributes of the latter. Since the celestial soul is a rational-bodily 
complex, governing the body of a celestial sphere, in a way that is analogous to 
the human soul‘s command of its own body, it attempts to imitate the 
supracelestial attributes by translating its apprehension of them into the eternal 
motion of the sphere. In this way the transcendent, supracelestial realm 
becomes manifest within space and time through celestial motion. The aim of 
this celestial motion is mimesis.  
According to Avicenna, so subtle is the nature of supracelestial mimesis that the 
faculties of man, who is mired in the corporeal ‗world of exile‘ (ʿālam al-ghurba), 
are simply incapable of perceiving its reality. He goes on to reason that if a 
moving entity (muḥarrik) perpetually engages in mimesis, then it follows that 
such activity would exert an effect on its body in much the same way that our 
bodies are effected by the passions (infiʿālāt) of our souls.192  
Rāzī sees in Avicenna‘s account of the relationship between the supracelestial 
intellect and the celestial soul an implicit pedagogy. This he foregrounds in his 
commentary, comparing it to the situation in which:  
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192 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 453-4.  
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…a student, when he desires to imitate his teacher <with respect> to 
some of his perfections so that he might realize some of those 
perfections renewably (ʿalā al-tajaddud), displays within his body specific 
passions (infiʿālāt makhṣūṣa); in general bodily passions for the most part 
are subject to the passions of the soul. Thus it is not remote that bodily 




In the foregoing discussion, we have seen how the Eight Sabian Doctrines are 
justified using Avicennan and Barakātian arguments. To prove that the celestial 
spheres possess rational souls which perceive the universal and particular and 
which drive motion that is the cause of sublunary change, Rāzī, in theorizing on 
the Sabian creed, need only have relied on Avicennan arguments. As such, 
philosophically the Sabians would have been a purely ‗Avicennan‘. Were the 
Sabians intended as an anti-Avicennan construct, then this would have been 
then he need not have introduced the Barakātian doctrine of the perfect nature, 
the celestial causal origin of the human soul. The Avicennan theory of celestial 
noetics is designed precisely to provide a rational account of communication 
between human and celestial souls.  Rāzī must have been motivated by another 
need which was, I contend, a need to integrate the Sabian doctrine of the perfect 
nature into a theoretical model which can account for the individual‘s 
communication with the celestial spirits by means of the perfect nature‘s 
intercession. It is an attempt at a philosophical justification for the belief that 
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each human soul has the potential to establish a special connection with his 
celestial causal origin which can therefore act, by means of revelatory visions 
and inspired intuitions, as a personal hierophant providing instruction in the 
mysteries of the planets and how to address them.   
Having examined the Eight Sabian Doctrines in light of the Avicennan and 
Barakātian sources from which they were adapted; and after exploring those 
implied ideas, such as the supracelestial intellects, on which they are predicated; 
we are now in a better position to theorize on the purpose of the planetary 
ascent ritual and its role in the soul‘s perfection, drawing the following 
conclusions: 
1. The relationship between the intellect and the celestial soul is analogous 
to that which exists  between the teacher and student whereby the 
former stands in relation to the latter as a model to be imitated;  
2. The yearning of the celestial soul to actualize the perfection of the 
intellect is translated within space and time into the motion of its sphere 
– as such celestial motion represents the mimesis of the supracelestial 
intellects; 
3. An unintended corollary of this mimesis through motion is that the 
celestial sphere transmits to the sublunary realm, by way of emanation, 
all manner of good (khayrāt) which are traces from the supracelestial 
realm;  
4. Both the celestial and the human soul are rational: the differentia 
between the two is that the latter requires an elemental body to act. 
Thus if the latter were to transcend its reliance on the elemental body, 
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and came to act through a celestial body, then it would have ceased in 
essence being human, having transformed in essence into a celestial 
soul: the lesser rational soul would thereby have transcended its own 
limitations to become the greater rational soul. It is my contention that 
this is what is intended by Rāzī in his introduction to al-Sirr, where he 
reports that the masters of the occult knowledge all concur that it:    
…guides you to the mysteries of the Higher and Lower Worlds; indeed 
it transforms you such that you become a witness unto the Spiritual 
Beings (mushāhid li’l-rūḥāniyāt), their interlocutor – indeed one of their 
company and one of their like.194 
5. Reasoning analogically from celestial motion, understood as mimesis of 
the intellects, the planetary ascent ritual, whereby the adept with his 
entire body and soul, attempts a mimesis of the celestial spheres, the aim 
of which is to transcend the ontological rank of humanity and become 
like them; 
6. For the Sabians, the celestial souls are proximate gods (āliha qarība): to 
become like them is thus to become a god; 
7. Such an apotheosis represents the return of the individual human soul to 
its causal origin, the perfect nature, itself a celestial soul;  
8. It is the perfect nature which initiates the human soul into the mysteries 
of the planetary ascent, and acts as the psychopomp guiding it to its 
apotheosis.   
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Having gained an overview of the cosmological and astrological beliefs that 
inform it, we are now better equipped to understand the Sabian talismanic craft. 
The definition is introduced by the word ―qālū‖ (they said). Precisely who 
―they‖ are is not stated, but they can be presumed to be the ―masters of this 
knowledge‖ (āṣḥāb hādhā al-ʿilm) who extolled the virtue of occult knowledge 
and power in the introduction.195 As we have already seen, the purpose of the 
talisman, as stated in the definition, is: 
…the blending of heavenly active forces with elemental passive forces, 
for the sake of being empowered (li-ajli al-tamakkun min) to make 
manifest that which runs contrary to <the divinely mandated> 
convention of nature (al-ʿāda) <which determines the usual sequence of 
cause and effect> or to prevent from occurring that which is consonant 
with it (li-iẓhār mā yukhālif al-ʿāda aw li’l-manʿ min mā yuwāfiqu-hā).196 
The ensuing detailed investigation (taḥqīq) of the metaphysical principles which 
underlie the working of the talisman is structured around two premises. The 
first asserts the reality of heavenly forces which actively determine the 
generation and corruption of phenomena in the sublunary world – these 
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heavenly forces of course are the planets and their spheres; the second 
proposition is that for such celestial agency to act with any efficacy in this 
regard, their influence must be received by appropriately disposed sublunary 
conditions. It is the first premise which receives the most detailed proof, the 
final conclusion of which is that whilst sublunary phenomena are ultimately 
caused by the pre-eternal necessarily existent, its influence is mediated through 
the celestial motion by which the ‗active heavenly forces‘ are characterized. The 
ontological gap in the causal chain which leads from the Pre-Eternal, 
Necessarily Existent by virtue of His essence to temporally originated sublunary 
phenomena is thus filled by the celestial spheres which are the pre-eternal and 
necessarily existent effects of the former, and the proximate causes of the 
generation and corruption of the latter.  
The proof is a highly reworked and condensed adaptation of the first part of an 
argument for the eternity of the world, found in the first chapter of book nine of 
the Metaphysics of Avicenna‘s al-Shifā. Here, Avicenna argues for the existence of 
motion, deriving from the Creator (al-khāliq), which neither has beginning in 
time, nor end: namely that of the celestial spheres.  The problem to which this is 
the solution is highlighted by Avicenna when he considers how temporally 
generated sublunary phenomena can ultimately be caused by the Necessarily 
Existent despite the fact that: 
…the Existent Necessary in Himself is a necessary existent in all His 
aspects and that it is impossible for a state which did not exist previously 
to commence for Him. With <this>, it became evident to you that the 
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cause in <terms of> itself necessitates the effect, so that, if it is 
permanent, it necessitates the effect permanently.197 
 The most curious and significant aspect of the proof as it is reworked in al-Sirr is 
that, in the course of demonstrating its final conclusion, it proceeds by 
exploring and eliminating all other seemingly possible logical disjuncts  except 
one: the possibility that all that occurs as a result of the pre-eternal, necessarily 
existent, in fact occurs within time. This of course would be entirely compatible 
with belief in God as an agent possessed of volition who creates in time – the 
God of Rāzī. But now let us turn briefly to Avicenna‘s argument in 9:1 of the 
Metaphysics in order to understand the philosophical concerns which inform the 
account of talismans in al-Sirr.  
4.2 Avicenna’s Metaphysics 9:1 
 
The aim of Metaphysics 9 is to prove the existence of motion which has no 
beginning in time. This motion is that which drives the celestial spheres and is 
the principle for the generation and corruption of sublunary phenomena in 
time. And since the heavens are the product of the divine emanative process, it 
is a proof which accounts for the Necessarily Existent as the ultimate 
metaphysical principle of sublunary reality, whilst preserving the following two 
crucial principles: firstly, being necessarily existent in all his aspects, the 
Existent Necessary in himself cannot undergo change: thus he cannot change 
from a state in which he is not creating to one in which he is. Secondly, a cause – 
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since it is a cause – necessitates its effect in a way that is synectic: by its own 
essence without any temporal delay.198 
Now, since it is characterized by matter, and temporally originated, Avicenna 
argues that the terrestrial phenomenon comes into being as an effect in time 
either: (a) because its cause comes into existence, in which case, no time can 
intervene between the generation of the effect and the coming into being of its 
immediate efficient cause; or (b) because its immediate efficient cause has 
become close to the receptive cause in which the phenomenon is generated. As 
for (a), the reason that there can be no delay between the coming into being of 
the cause and the generation of the effect is that the necessity of another 
temporally originated being other than the cause would necessarily follow. And 
so, argues Avicenna: 
That originated thing would then become the proximate cause. If the 
matter is repetitively prolonged in this manner, then there would 
necessarily ensue causes and temporal events coming all at once that are 
infinite and would necessarily occur simultaneously. But this is 
something for which we have known the principle dictating its 
refutation. It thus remains that the temporal causes do not <come about> 
all at once.199 
With (a) eliminated in this way, Avicenna affirms that the principles which 
govern the generation of sublunary phenomena are determined by the 
alternating proximity and distance of immediate efficient causes (ʿilal fāʿiliyya) 
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to and from receptive causes (ʿilal qābiliyya). This can only come about through 
motion. This motion must be continuous, for if at any point it reached a moment 
of stasis, then another cause would be required for its resumption, leading to an 
infinite chain of regress. This being the case, it must be circular. This 
continuous, circular, pre-eternal motion of the celestial spheres, consists of an 
endless series of contiguous movements, originated in time, which act as the 
proximate efficient causes of terrestrial change. Being both pre-eternal, and 
consisting of individual movements, celestial motion provides the necessary 
ontological link between the eternal, beginning-less Necessarily Existent and 
the generation and corruption of innumerable sublunary phenomena.200  
4.3 Theory of Talismans in al-Sirr 
 
4.3.1 Proof of the heavenly forces 
 
Now if celestial motion is the proximate efficient cause of sublunary 
phenomena, the talismanic craft represents the means by which such influence 
might be directed in order to act on terrestrial forces to bring about change in 
accordance with the practitioner‘s own objective. So now let us turn to the proof 
for the first premise of the account of talismans in al-Sirr: the positive 
affirmation of active heavenly forces as principles of sublunary change. It relies 
on the demonstration of three propositions: 
(1) The ultimate cause of temporal sublunary phenomena must be the Pre-
Eternal, Necessarily Existent; 
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(2) That to which the Pre-Eternal, Necessarily Existent gives rise is 
necessarily ordered ontologically in pre-eternity; 
(3) Pre-eternal celestial motion mediates between the Pre-Eternal, 
Necessarily Existent and the generation and corruption of sublunary 
phenomena. 
We shall now explore the demonstration of each of these three propositions, the 
last of which is dependent on the previous two.   
4.3.1 (a) The ultimate cause of temporal sublunary phenomena must be the 
Pre-Eternal, Necessarily Existent 
 
This proof begins by exploring whether the causes of ‗temporally originated 
phenomena (ḥawādith) in this elemental world‘ are themselves temporally 
originated or pre-eternal (qadīma). The first disjunct can of course be eliminated 
on the grounds that if they are themselves: 
 …temporally originated then they would need yet other causes, thus 
giving rise to an argumentum ad infinitum (tasalsul) and that is absurd, 
because an influencing cause (al-sabab al-mu’aththir) must exist together 
with that which is caused (al-musabbab), so if that which influences the 
existence of each temporally originated phenomenon is yet another 
temporally originated phenomenon, and so on without end, then it 
would be necessary for those causes and effects which have no end to 
occur in one instant (dafʿatan wāhidatan).201 
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elemental world in terms of ‗causes‘ (asbāb). When we encounter the heavily adapted version of 
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The Avicennan account of causation demands that the effect necessarily arises 
simultaneously with the existence of its complete and sufficient cause.202 
This being the case, the entire chain of originated causes and effects must spring 
into existence in one instant. But the sum total of the members of this 
hypothetically endless chain must ultimately end in that which, being not 
merely possible as they are, but rather necessarily existent, stands outside of the 
aggregate which they form. And since this chain finds its end in the necessarily 
existent, it cannot therefore be held to be endless without contradiction. So 
referring to the set of temporally originated causes and effects, it is reasoned 
that:  
… <their> aggregate (al-majmūʿ) is possible and temporally originated 
both as a whole and in terms of every one of its parts; and every possible 
is originated (muḥdath) and every possible has a cause which is different 
from it. And so that aggregate, in its entirety, and in each one of its parts, 
needs a cause. And that thing which is different from the aggregate of 
possible things and from each part of that aggregate is, inevitably, not a 
possible. And so it <must be affirmed> that all possibles end with the 
necessarily existent, and the assertion of an endless chain is proved false 
(baṭula al-qawl bi’l-tasalsul).203  
5.3.1 (b) That to which the Pre-Eternal, Necessarily Existent gives rise is 
necessarily ordered ontologically in pre-eternity 
 
                                                             
202 McGinnis, Avicenna, p. 199. For a full discussion of Avicenna‘s position that every cause 
coexists with its effect, see the Metaphysics of the Healing, Book 6, Chapter 2, pp. 201-5.  
203 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 7. 
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Having established that all possible and originated things end with a necessarily 
existent eternal cause, the question is posed whether everything which arises as 
a result of the influence of this eternal <cause> occurs: (1) pre-eternally (fī‘l-
azal) or (2) within time. Included within the latter of these two logical disjuncts 
are positions opposed to the doctrine of the eternity of the world, and thus 
closer to an Ashʿarī perspective:   
…included in this disjunction (yadkhulu fī hādhā al-taqsīm) is the position 
of the one who asserts that a <given> originated phenomenon was only 
created (khuliqa) at this time because its creation (khalq) then was more 
fitting (aṣlaḥ) than its creation at another time; or because its creation 
was dependent on the arrival of a specific time, either actual or supposed 
(muḥaqqaq aw muqaddar). And so for all these positions it is true that 
everything which arises as a result of the influence <of this eternal 
cause> does not occur pre-eternally (fī’l-azal).204  
As was mentioned previously, this latter logical disjunct is not subjected to 
analysis and then either elimination or affirmation, at the very least, as a 
possibility: it is simply ignored. So assuming the truth of the former disjunct as 
it does, the argument then proceeds to prove that all that arises as a result of 
the influence of the necessarily existent -- which, as will subsequently be 
revealed include the celestial spheres -- must necessarily be ordered after it 
ontologically in pre-eternity (wajib al-tartīb fī al-azl). This simply must be the 
case, because the only logical alternatives to this would be either: (1) an 
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impossible ontological ordering (mumtaniʿ al-tartīb); or (2) merely a possible 
ontological ordering (mumkin al-tartīb).205 
Of course, the first of these two alternatives can be summarily dismissed. For 
were such ontological ordering of all that arises from the necessarily existent 
impossible, then it must follow that the necessarily existent gives rise to 
nothing and produces no influence at all (laysa bi-mu’aththir aṣlan). This would 
lead to an absurd contradiction of the original postulation that it does indeed 
produce an influence.  
Less straightforward is the task of disproving that the ontological ordering of all 
that arises from the necessarily existent is merely possible, involving as it does 
the elimination of three hypothetical alternatives to the way in which such 
possible ontological ordering could be realized: (2a) the necessarily existent is 
sometimes the source of an effect and sometimes not; (2b) everything which 
should arise from the influence (mu’aththiriyya) of the necessarily existent does 
not in fact occur; and (2c) the necessarily existent changes from being an 
influencer from which no occurrent arises to one from which occurrents do 
arise. Reductiones ad absurdum are deployed to dismiss all three of these 
hypothetical realizations of possible ontological ordering.  
Thus, if 2(a) were correct:  
…the distinction between the time during which the influencer becomes 
in actuality a source for the effect (maṣdar li’l-athar) from the time during 
which it does not proceed thusly either depends: (2(a)(i)) on the 
                                                             
205 ‗So if we say that everything which arises as a result of the influence <of this eternal cause> 
occurs pre-eternally (fī’l-azal) it would follow that the effect would necessarily be ordered after it 
<ontologically> because the effect (athar), were it not so <necessarily> ordered, then either such 
ordering (tartīb) would be impossible (mumtaniʿ) or possible.‘ Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 7. 
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superimposition of an additional attribute on it (inḍimām qayd ilayhi) or 
(2(a)(ii)) it does not so depend.206  
Both disjuncts are invalid. 2(a)(i) is eliminated by the following reductio ad 
absurdum: before the superimposition of the additional attribute the influencer 
would not be complete in its influencing capacity, thus contradicting the 
original postulation that the influencer is indeed an influencer. Its companion 
disjunct 2(a)(ii) is eliminated on the ground that it offends ‗the principle of 
inferring the the preponderator from possibility‘, since if it were accepted as 
true then it must be assumed that the actual existence of the possible has ‗been 
made preponderant without anything at all to cause such preponderance‘ (fa-
qad tarajjaḥa al-mumkin min ghayr al-murajjiḥ).207 
 (2b) is immediately discounted on account of the contradiction to which it 
immediately gives rise:  
If we were to say that everything which should arise due to influence 
(mu’aththiriyya) does not in fact occur, then if that cause were to endure 
forever (in istamarra dhālika al-sabab abadan) then it must be that it would 
never become that which produces influence (mu’aththir) – but we have 
just postulated that it is in fact a producer of influence pre-eternally (fī 
al-azal). This is a contradiction.208 
The hypothetical situation of (2c) posits that, from a situation in which nothing 
arises from the influence of the necessarily existent, as in (2b), it undergoes 
change such that occurrents do indeed arise.  
                                                             
206 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 8.  
207 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 7.  
208 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 7-8.  
151 
 
Such change could only occur in the necessarily existent due to a superimposed 
attribute (qayd). The question therefore arises: was the superimposition of this 
attribute due to a cause or not? If not:     
…then a possible would have <in actuality> happened without an 
influencer (fa-qad waqaʿa al-mumkin lā ʿan mu’aththir.)209 
This would lead to yet another contradiction. So, assuming that this change in 
the necessarily existent were indeed due to a cause, then the inquiry would be 
trapped in a chain of infinite regress which: 
…would arise either from the aggregate of causes and effects which 
would exist in one instant – and that is what we have <already> refuted – 
or it would arise in such a way that each member <of the set of causes 
and effects> would be preceded by another, without <ever reaching> a 
beginning.210 
And so having assumed that, with no explicit justification, the occurrent to 
which the pre-eternal necessarily existent gives rise occurs also pre-eternally, 
the inquiry, eliminating impossible and possible ontological ordering by means 
of the reductiones ad absurdum we have encountered, reaches the conclusion that 
this process must be one of necessary ontological ordering.  
5.3.1 (c) Pre-eternal celestial motion mediates between the Pre-Eternal, 
Necessarily Existent and the generation and corruption of sublunary 
phenomena  
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210 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 8. 
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Thus far, the argument has sought to demonstrate two propositions: (a) the 
ultimate cause of temporal sublunary phenomena must be the Pre-Eternal, 
Necessarily Existent; and (b) that to which the Pre-Eternal, Necessarily Existent 
gives rise is necessarily ordered ontologically in pre-eternity. Now taken as 
proven, the argument seeks to deploy these two propositions to account for how 
the influence of the Pre-Eternal, Necessarily Existent, as the ultimate source of 
sublunary phenomena, can be mediated. For this purpose, it assumes that the: 
 …eternal, essentially necessary, producer of influence (al-mu’aththir al-
qadīm al-wājib li-dhātihi) is also essentially emanative (fayyāḍ ayḍan li-
dhātihi).211 
This being the case, a mechanism is required to account for how the unchanging 
simplex that is the Necessarily Existent acts as the ultimate emanative principle 
which produces the successive generation and corruption of innumerable 
sublunary phenomena. The solution, of course, is to be found in celestial motion, 
the process of which constitutes an endless series of individual, contiguous, 
temporally originated, planetary movements, such that:    
… each originated phenomenon [i.e. planetary movement] is preceded by 
another such that the cessation of the prior (inqiḍā’ al-mutaqaddim) is a 
condition for the emanation of the posterior (sharṭ li-fayaḍān al-
muta’akhkhir).212  
Motion, it is averred, provides the best paradigm for how the cessation of one 
temporally originated phenomenon would be a condition for the generation of 
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the next. Two different examples are adduced to illustrate how this might be the 
case, the one representative of natural motion, the other of motion driven by 
continuous volition. The former is illustrated by:  
… the clod of earth (madarat) which is thrown upwards <and> returns to 
the earth by its own weight. So that which necessitates this movement 
from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem (min awwal al-masāfa ilā 
ākhirihā) is that weight. It only necessitates the movement of the body 
from the second point (al-ḥayz al-thānī) to the third point because the 
previous movement has caused it to reach the second point. So the 
occurrence of the first part of the movement and its cessation is a 
condition for the possibility that the weight becomes the cause of the 
movement of the body from the second point to the third. Such is the 
case with respect to all parts which constitute movement.213  
If the state of the earthen clod as it leaves the hand of the thrower and proceeds 
in its skyward ascent, and its state as it travels in its descent, are understood 
analogously as two distinct but contiguous, temporally originated, planetary 
movements, then the weight of the earthen clod is the natural, non-volitional 
cause of the latter, and the cessation of the first state is a pre-condition for the 
efficacy of the earthen clod in its consequent generation of the second state. The 
analogy is extended to human volitional movement. Thus:   
… he who wants to go and visit a friend of his, this volition is that which 
exerts an influence in moving the body from that place to that friend 
except that the influence of that volition in bringing about the second 
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step is preceded by the occurrence of the first step and its cessation: in 
this way each preceding step is a condition for the empowering (imkān) 
of the influence of that volition on the occurrence of the succeeding step, 
<following>  this way of ordering, until the final end of the distance.214  
Just as the cessation of the earthen clod‘s ascent is a pre-condition for the 
efficacy of its weight to produce the effect of its descent, so the cessation of a 
man‘s first step on his journey is a pre-condition for the efficacy of his volition 
to bring about the second step. For the continuous process of sublunary 
generation and corruption: ‗there must be an eternal, perpetual motion (ḥaraka 
sarmadiyya dā’ima) mediating between the first principle and these originated 
phenomena.‘215  
Motion, of course, not only characterizes bodies but also requires space. Thus, if 
this perpetual motion were rectilinear it would require infinite space (abʿād 
ghayr mutanāhiya), a logical consequence which Avicennan cosmology would 
find absurd.216 And so the argument is driven by the necessity to postulate the 
existence of: ‗…a body, the motion of which is circular, namely the sphere of the 
starless sphere (al-falak).‘217 Now, since it is a corporeal simplex, and:  
…the <geometrical> relations (nisab) which arise between similar parts are 
similar; and similar matters, in the completeness of their quiddity (fī tamām 
al-māhiya) cannot be causes of different matters,  
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215 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 8. 
216 ‗…it is impossible for this perpetual motion to be rectilinear (mustaqīma) for otherwise, the 
existence of infinite space would necessarily follow and that would be absurd‘. Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 8. 
217 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 8. 
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then its perpetual circular motion cannot by itself act as the cause of multiple 
and diverse sublunary effects.  Rather, they are caused by the complex web of 
geometrical relations, which forms as a result of the eternal rotation of the 
celestial spheres relative to each other, each of which contains a planet 
possessed of its own unique nature, moving at its own unique speed:  
…the bodies of the spheres <contain> different natures, and these bodies, 
by reason of <the fact that> their <geometrical> relations and 
configurations (tashakkulāt) differ such that it is possible that these 
configurations are the principles for the occurrence of diverse originated 
phenomena in this world. So those bodies, <which are possessed of> 
different natures, <and > which are fixed in the bodies of the celestial 
spheres, are the planets (al-kawākib). So it is established that the 
proximate principles of the coming to be of originated phenomena in the 
world of generation and corruption, are the planetary applications 
(ittiṣālāt al-kawākib).218 
At this point, Rāzī makes explicit the connection between the talismanic craft 
and astrolatry, commenting that it is on account of their belief in the planetary 
applications as principles of sublunary change, that:  
…the philosophers and the Sabians, have asserted the ilāhiyya of these 
planets, devoting themselves to their worship (ʿibāda), adopting for each 
one of them a specific temple and a particular idol (ṣanam muʿayyan), 
devoting themselves to their service.219  
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4.3.2 Passive receptive forces 
 
As was made clear in the initial definition for which this account is an 
elaboration, the talismanic craft works with both active heavenly forces and 
passive sublunary forces. The latter must be suitably disposed (mutahayyi’a) to 
receive, as the result of a particular planetary configuration (tashakkul gharīb), 
the kind of celestial form (hay’a) which corresponds to the talisman master‘s 
intended effect:   
Moreover, they held that the active principle is not enough for the 
occurrence of the effect. Rather, it is necessary for <passive> recipients 
(qawābil) to be present together with it; rather <all> conditions must be 
met, and obstacles removed. For perhaps an unusual <celestial> 
configuration (tashakkul gharīb) might occur <acting> on the matter of 
the Lower World which is most apt for the bringing about of unusual 
originated phenomena within the matter of the Lower World. So if 
sublunary matter is not suitably disposed (mutahayyi’a) for the reception 
of that form (hay’a) from the agents of influence of the Higher World, 
then that form (hay’a) would not come about.220 
Certain impediments or unfulfilled conditions may thwart the suitable 
disposition of sublunary matter. But the expertise of the talisman master allows 
him not only to predict that alignment of the celestial configuration most 
propitious for his intended goal, but also to prepare sublunary matter 
appropriate for the reception of that influence; to remove any impediments 
                                                             




thereof; and to set in place preparatory procedures (muʿiddāt) that will ensure 
the full realization of the desired astral emanation:  
Moreover, the elapsing of that suitable disposition (fawāt dhālika al-
tahayyu’) is sometimes on account of the <sublunary> matter being 
inhibited by encumbrances whilst at other times on account of the fact 
that certain conditions have not been met. But if we have been primed 
with foreknowledge (taqdima al-maʿrifa) of the nature of that 
configuration, the time of its occurrence, and the nature of those things 
which are to be considered in the generation of the sublunary matter 
which is receptive to that influence, then we would be able to prepare 
the matter to receive that influence; to hold in abeyance those 
encumbrances by which it would be inhibited; and to procure the 
equipment (taḥṣil al-muʿiddāt) for it such that the emanation reaches 
completion.221   
Thus the master of talismans has a consummate understanding of the 
fundamental nature of causality in the cosmos. This allows him to identify both 
the perfect agent (al-fāʿil al-tāmm), in the form of a celestial configuration, to 
facilitate his terrestrial objective, and the perfect sublunary circumstances for 
the reception of its influence: 
Since it is firmly established that when a perfect agent (al-fāʿil al-tāmm) 
meets a perfect passive recipient (al-munfaʿil al-tāmm) a perfect 
<resultant> action occurs, it is the master of talismans who knows – to 
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the furthest extent of human capability -  the active heavenly forces, 
their simple and composite aspects; it is he who knows that which 
corresponds to each sublunary recipient and knows the correct 
preparatory procedures to prepare (wa-yaʿrifu al-muʿiddat li-yuʿiddahā), 
and the encumbrances to avoid.222  
Recalling the initial definition of talisman, the account concludes that the man 
who has mastered this knowledge and craft: 
 … is able to generate that which breaches <the divinely mandated> 
convention of nature (al-ʿāda) to repel that which is consonant with it, by 
bringing the passive receiver into close proximity with the agent (yakūn 
al-insān mumkinan min istiḥdāth mā yakhruqu al-ʿāda wa-min dafʿi mā 
yuwāfiqu-hā bi-taqrīb al-munfaʿil min al-fāʿil). This is the meaning of the 
saying of Ptolemy that knowledge of the stars is from you and from 
them. This is the doctrine of the Sabians and the philosophers on the 
reality of talismans.223  
4.4 Al-Maṭālib 7 – On Talismans 
 
The account of talismans in al-Sirr is modified and adapted in the al-Maṭalib. But 
whilst, like the former, the latter concentrates on proving how heavenly active 
forces determine the generation and corruption of sublunary phenomena, it is 
nevertheless unconcerned with the discussion of the Necessarily Existent as the 
emanative source of those forces and as the ultimate cause of sublunary reality. 
Rather its point of departure is to ask what the proximate efficient cause of 
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change in the terrestrial world is. Thus it dismisses the possibility that this 
cause can be a pre-eternal, beginning-less existent (mawjūd qadīm azalī), for were 
this the case, then its efficient causal influence would either be: (1) dependent 
on a temporally originated condition, thus giving rise to an argument of infinite 
regress which merely begs the question; or (2) not so dependent, in which case, 
its effect would also be pre-eternal, which is obviously absurd. So the proximate 
efficient cause of change in the terrestrial world must also be temporally 
originated.224  
This of course would lead to a beginning-less, infinite sequence of temporally 
originated causes.225 There are two ways in which this could occur. Firstly, it 
could occur by way of an eternal spiritual existent, other than God, which 
perpetually moves from object of intellection to object of intellection. The 
generation of terrestrial phenomena are the result of the cognitive activity of a 
number of such spiritual entities whose existence is of such a sublime 
ontological order. So to bring about contra-natural effects in this world, it is 
their aid which must be enlisted.226 Secondly, it could occur by way of 
                                                             
224 Rāzī, Al-Maṭālib 7, p. 151.  
225 ‗This argument of infinite regress would occur on one of two grounds. One is that all causes 
and effects (jamīʿ al-asbāb wa’l-musabbabāt) would occur in one instant (dafʿatan wāhida) and we 
have already made clear in the demonstration of the Necessarily Existent by virtue of its essence 
that this is impossible. The other (ground) is that each one would be preceded by another, 
without beginning (lā ilā awwal) – and this is the unavoidable truth.‘ Rāzī, Al-Maṭālib 7, pp. 149-
150.  
226 ‗Two possibilities might explain these temporally originated phenomena. One is that there 
should occur in reality a spiritual existent (mawjūd rūḥānī) which perpetually moves from one 
object of intellection to another (yakūn dā’iman muntaqilan min maʿqūl ilā maʿqūl) and from 
perception to perception (min idrāk ilā idrāk), and (so) in accordance with those successive acts of 
perception and cohering acts of conceptualization (bi-ḥasab tilka al-idrākāt al-mutaʿāqiba wa’l-
taṣawwurāt al-mutalāṣiqa) temporally originated phenomena come to be in this world. The 
spiritual existent must be eternal, without beginning or end, everlasting (azalī abadī sarmadī); 
and it must be other than God. Since it is established that the Necessarily Existent by virtue of its 
essence is necessarily existent in every respect (min jamīʿ jihātihi) then it would be impossible for 
it to undergo change. So that which is possessed of these ever-changing perceptions must be 
something other than God – exalted is He. So it is established that it is necessary to maintain 
that the existence of lofty spirits (arwāḥ ʿāliya) which govern the conditions of this world; and in 
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everlasting, uninterrupted, circular corporeal motion, namely, that of the 
celestial spheres.227  
Since these two ways in which this infinite chain of originated causes can be 
conceived are not mutually exclusive, Rāzī reports that the philosophers found 
it more credible to combine them, maintaining that it is through the celestial 
sphere, being driven by a governing soul, the conscious subject of endless acts of 
eternal intellection, that infinite circular motion is realized:  
Then the philosophers said: It is more apt (al-awlā) to combine the first 
and second disjuncts, such that the substance of the celestial sphere is 
like the body, and the substance of that spirit is like the soul (jawhar al-
falak ka’l-badan wa jawhar dhālika al-rūḥ ka’l-nafs), and the perpetual, 
moving acts of intellection which belong to that spiritual substance (al-
taʿaqqulāt al-muntaqila al-dā’ima li-dhālika al-jawhar al-rūḥānī) necessitate 
the motions of these corporeal spheres (kurrāt jismāniyya), their sum total 
(majmūʿ) being the causes (asbāb) of the coming to be of temporally 
originated phenomena in this world. So is it established by way of this 
                                                                                                                                                                      
this way no attempt to bring in being contra-natural phenomenon (gharīb) can be successful 
except by seeking the aid of these spirits (al-istiʿāna bi-tilka al-arwāḥ)‘. Rāzī, Al-Maṭālib 7, p. 150. 
 
227 As for the second disjunct [i.e. explaning the generation of temporally originated 
phenomena], it is that there should occur an everlasting perpetual corporeal motion (ḥaraka 
jismāmiyya sarmadiyya dā’ima), free of beginning or interruption (mubarra’a ʿan al-mabda’ wa’l-
maqṭaʿ). So we say: this motion is either rectilinear or circular (mustaqīm aw mustadīr). The first 
disjunct is false because either this motion would extend without end (tamtadd ilā ghayr al-
nihāya) thus necessitating the existence of limitless dimensions without end – and that is absurd 
– or it would return <on itself> at which time there would occur between the end of the outgoing 
<motion> and the beginning of the returning <motion> a <moment> of stasis (sukūn). Since it is 
established that between the two motions there must be a <moment> of stasis, at which point, 
this motion is <no longer> perpetual, free of interruption, then so it is <also> established that 
every rectilinear motion is interrupted. So the motion must be circular. This demonstrates that 
the first proximate principle for the coming to be of temporally originated phenomena (al-
mabda’ al-awwal al-qarīb li-ḥudūth al-hawādith) in this world is the circular motion which obtains 





explanation that the coming to be of temporally originated phenomena 
in this world is contingent and dependent (manūṭ wa-marbūṭa) on circular 
celestial motion, free of interruption and change.228  
Like the account of talismans in al-Sirr, that in al-Maṭālib explains the 
incalculable variety which is to be found in sublunary reality in terms of the 
endlessly shifting geometric relations and applications between the planets, 
each of which, being centred in its own respective sphere, has a different nature 
and quiddity from its fellow heavenly wanderers:  
…the celestial bodies are simplexes (basā’iṭ) and the postulated parts of a 
simple sphere (al-ajzā al-muftaraḍa fī al-kurra al-basīṭa) are homogeneous 
in both nature and quiddity (mutashābiha bi’l-ṭabʿ wa’l-māhiyya); and 
causes which share similarity in nature and quiddity do not yield aught 
but knowledge items which resemble each other (maʿlūmāt mutamāthila). 
And so the temporally originated phenomena of this world would 
necessarily be the same (mutasāwiya) and that is false. Since this is false, 
there must, in the celestial bodies, occur bodies which are different in 
nature and quiddity – and those entities must be mobile such that, on 
account of their different motions, different <geometrical> relations 
arise; and those different <geometrical> relations are principles for the 
coming to be of the different temporally originated phenomena in the 
world of generation and corruption. And it is known that these different 
bodies which are bound by the substances of the celestial spheres 
(markūza fī jawāhir al-aflāk) are naught but the planets (al-kawākib). Thus 
                                                             





is it established with what we have mentioned: that the principles of the 
temporally originated phenomena which come to be in this world are 
naught but the different planetary applications (al-ittiṣālāt al-kawkabiyya 
al-mukhtalifa).229  
 To briefly sum up the account in al-Maṭālib, its explanation of talismans is 
largely dependent on that which is to be found in al-Sirr. However, its most 
important difference is its emphasis on the the ensouled nature of the celestial 
spheres and planets on whose ever-shifting geometric relations sublunary 
reality depends. Whilst this is a doctrine which the philosophers and Sabians, as 
they are represented in al-Sirr, espouse, it is not integrated into the account of 
talismans but is introduced only later when describing their general beliefs.230 
Furthermore, the explanation of talismans in al-Maṭālib omits the account in al-
Sirr, illustrated by the examples of the earthen clod‘s ascent and descent after it 
has been thrown in the air, and of the man walking to visit his friend, of how 
                                                             
229 Rāzī, Al-Maṭālib, 7, p. 151. Rāzī reports that this rational demonstration for active heavenly 
forces is supplemented by a rhetorical proof which infers the efficacy of the planets in causing 
sublunary phenomena from the observable fact that the sun determines the seasons and the 
alternation of the night and the day. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that knowledge 
of the stars has been maintained by human culture since time immemorial:  
‗As for the second proof –which is the rhetorical proof – it is that they said: ‗we have mentioned 
many instances which show that the conditions <which obtain> in this world are dependent on 
the conditions of the Sun in the quality of its motion within the Zodiacal belt <minṭaqa al-burūj> 
for it is for this reason that the Sun sometimes becomes northerly and sometimes southerly and 
it is on account of this variation that the seasons occur; and it is by reason of them that 
conditions in this world vary. Moreover, it is by reason of the rising and the setting of the sun in 
the space of a day that the conditions of this world vary. This is inductive reasoning is strong 
and a full explanation of the dependence (istinād) of the conditions of this world on the motions 
of the planets. This explanation finds corroboration in another, which is that since the 
beginning of time (min qadīm al-dahr) people assiduously applied themselves to knowledge of the 
stars and relied on them. For you observe that for every <field of> knowledge there is an 
inception and a man who is the first to penetrate it deeply, except <however> for metaphysics 
(al-ʿilm al-ilāhī) and knowledge of the stars. For you will never find <a single period in> history 
except that you see these two <fields> of knowledge existed before it. So were this knowledge 
false, then it would have been impossible for all the peoples of the world (ahl al-dunyā) 
universally to have applied themselves assiduously to this (field of) knowledge, relying on its 
authority, from time immemorial (min al-dahr al-dāhir) up until this day. These considerations 
provide clear explanations of the truth of this knowledge and God knows best‘ (Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, 
p. 152).  
230 Their beliefs are epitomized in eight doctrines which are treated in al-Sirr 4:1.  
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celestial motion can act as a cause of originated phenomena. To understand the 
significance of these two illustrations in configuring how celestial causation 
operates, we must turn to Rāzī‘s al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya.  
 
4.5 Al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya 
 
The account of heavenly active forces in the general explanation of talismans in 
al-Sirr also appears in modified form in Rāzī‘s al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya, in a 
chapter entitled: ‗On circular motion as the cause of the coming to be of 
temporally originated phenomena.‘231 But whilst their respective proofs 
establishing celestial motion as the proximate efficient cause of sublunary 
phenomena, display the same structure, the account in al-Mabāḥith exhibits 
certain elaborations which will enrich our understanding of the explanation in 
al-Sirr. 
So, having eliminated as logically possible the pre-eternal nature of the 
proximate efficient causes of sublunary phenomena, the account in al-Mabāḥith 
asserts that, like their terrestrial effects, they too must be originated in time.232 
As such, an infinite chain of temporally originated causes and effects would thus 
ensue. Since the sum total of such an infinite chain could not occur in one 
                                                             
231 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith 1, pp. 627-629. 
232 ‗The proximate causes of temporally originated phenomena (ḥawādith) must be temporally 
originated (ḥāditha) since if they were pre-eternal (qadīma) then their pre-eternity would be a 
necessary consequence of the pre-eternity of their causes. For if the causes  <of the temporally 
originated phenomena>  existed whilst they were non-existent, then by virtue of the existence 
of the causes, the existence of the effects (al-musabbabāt) would <merely> be possible (mumkina); 
so their existence, when they are brought into being, would require an extra cause – and <so 
their causes> would not then be causes. This is a contradiction. A fully detailed explanation of 
this point has already been presented to you in the Chapter on Causes (bāb al-ʿilal). Thus it is 
established that the proximate cause of originated phenomena is <itself> originated‘ (Rāzī, al-
Mabāḥith, 1, p. 627.)  
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instant, it must be concluded that its occurrence proceeds sequentially, whereby 
each individual member of the chain is the effect of that which precedes it and 
the cause of that by which it is succeeded.233 
Therefore, reasons the account in al-Mabāḥith, this infinite sequence of 
temporally originated phenomena, which act as the proximate efficient causes 
of sublunary originated phenomena, must occur either as:  
(1) disconnected instants of existence (ḥawādith mutafāṣila āniya al-wujūd) 
or (2) <as part of> a temporal continuum of existence (zamāniyya al-
wujūd).234  
Not only does the account find absurd the assertion of a continuous succession 
of disconnected, non-contiguous instants (tatālī al-ānāt) to which the acceptance 
of the first of these logical disjuncts would give rise, but it also dismisses the 
proposition on the grounds that it entails an impossible contradiction since:  
… assuming such a continuous succession of instants, each instant would 
be disconnected <from the others> so the preceding <instant> would not 
necessarily end with the succeeding <instant> and so it would not be a 
cause for <the latter> - but it was indeed posited to be thus.235  
Thus with elimination of the first of these logical disjuncts, the second, 
understood as entailing a continuous temporal flow, is affirmed. And so if the 
temporally originated causes of sublunary events occurred: 
                                                             
233 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 627.  
234 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 627. 
235 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 627. 
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…as a continuous temporal flow (zamāniyya sayyāla), then this would be 
motion. Thus is it established that originated phenomena do not come 
into being except by <means of> motion.236  
The causal link between the temporally originated cause and the temporally 
originated sublunary effect is conceived of as a geometrical relationship 
between the former and the latter which, being geometric, is determined by 
space. And since the endless contiguous sequence of individual instances of the 
former determines continuity in the generation and corruption of instances of 
the latter, the constant flow of terrestrial reality is determined just as much by 
time. Thus:   
…if something were to occur in a body which did not hitherto exist, then 
between the cause (al-ʿilla) of that thing and the body <in which it has 
occurred> a relation (nisba) has arisen which did not previously exist. So, 
there must be a movement which necessitates <between the cause and 
the body a certain> proximity after <a certain> distance, or <a certain> 
distance after <a certain> proximity, or a juxtaposition or contiguity, by 
which is secured the continuity of originated phenomena (ittiṣāl al-
ḥawādith).237  
A temporally originated instance of motion brings about the geometric 
relationship between efficient cause and recipient cause appropriate to a certain 
effect in the latter. This geometric relationship is determined by the distance of 
the former from the latter, and its position in relation to it.  
                                                             
236 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 628. 




The account in al-Mabāḥith goes further than al-Sirr in elaborating on the nature 
of the temporally originated efficient cause which generates sublunary 
phenomena:   
…the cause (al-ʿilla) can either be a preparatory cause (muʿidda) or one 
which exerts an influence (mu’aththira). When a preparatory cause, it can 
precede the effect (maʿlūl) because it is not exerting an influence on the 
effect; rather it brings the effect into proximity <to its cause> such that it 
can issue from the cause (tuqarribu al-maʿlūl ilā ḥaythu yumkinu ṣudūruhu 
ʿan al-ʿilla). When <acting as a cause which> exerts an influence then it 
must be linked to the effect (yajib muqāranatuhā li’l-athar).238  
There are two types of efficient cause, the one preparatory (muʿidda), the other 
influential (mu’aththira). To bring about a certain effect, the former ‗prepares‘ 
the material, or the receptive cause, to receive the influence (ta’thīr) of the 
latter. The distinction between the two kinds of efficient cause is that between 
the essentially ordered – or metaphysical efficient – cause, and the temporally 
ordered – or natural efficient cause. The former bestows forms by way of 
emanation on a material substrate which has been appropriately prepared by 
means of motion and change produced by natural efficient causes, to give 
specific existence to species forms.239 
When the influencing metaphysical cause exists together with a suitably 
receptive material substrate, the effect must occur, without any delay. This is to 
be contrasted with the relation that exists between a temporally ordered, 
preparatory cause and its effect, such as the dependence of offspring on the 
                                                             
238 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 628. 
239 Avicenna, Jon McGinnis, p. 193.  
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existence of its parents: ‗essentially ordered causes must exist simultaneously 
with their effect, whereas temporally ordered causes need not.‘240  
To illustrate the difference between the two kinds of efficient cause, the account 
in al-Mabāḥith deploys the same two examples we have already encountered in 
al-Sirr to explain how motion, whether natural or volitional, enables efficient 
causality. In al-Mabāḥith, the example adduced to illustrate how this might work 
with natural motion replaces the clod of earth with ‗the weighty object.‘241  And 
instead of visiting a friend as he does in al-Sirr, the pedestrian man in the 
Mabāḥith, who illustrates how volitional motion enables efficient causality, is 
engaged in the more pious activity of pilgrimage.  
Brief consideration of these two examples will yield a degree of insight into the 
nature of the causal complex which generates an effect according to the 
Avicennan model which Rāzī is presenting. Turning to the example of the 
weighty object, it is the transition between its initial ascent and subsequent 
descent which commands our attention.242 The effect of the descent is the 
product of two efficient causes, the one preparatory, namely the completion of 
the ascending motion, and the other which is influential (mu’aththir), namely the 
weight of the object. The completion of the ascending motion is a necessary 
prior condition for the efficacy of the object‘s weight to exert its influence to 
produce the descending motion:    
                                                             
240 Avicenna, Jon McGinnis, p. 193. 
241 ‗A paradigm for that in natural motion is that the weighty object (al-thaqīl), by reason of its 
ipseity (fī huwiyyatihi), does not reach the furthest point of <a given> distance (ḥadd min ḥudūd al-
masāfa) except that that completion <of the distance> becomes a cause (sabab) for its 
preparedness (istiʿdāduhu) to move from it to another point.‘ Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 628.  
242 The fact that the weighty object – or the clod of earth in al-Sirr – was initially propelled into 
the air by a volitional act is irrelevant, since the purpose of the example is to focus attention on 
the natural motion that determines the object‘s subsequent trajectory.  
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That which exerts the influence <to produce> that <second> movement is 
in reality <its> weight. But were it not for the mobile‘s completion of the 
preceding movement up to that point, then the <second> movement 
would have been impossible. Since, before the completion <of the first 
movement> to that point, it would have been impossible for the weight 
<of the mobile> to move it from there. But when it moved to that point 
the weight became such that it could move <the mobile> from that point. 
Movement from that point would have been impossible to have issued 
forth <as an effect> from that object of weight, being distant from the 
cause. Then when issuing forth <as an effect> became possible, it came to 
be close <to its cause>, and that proximity after distance only occurred 
on account of the previous movement and that is what we mean when 
we say movement brings causes into proximity to their effects.243 
Motion conveys causes to their effects, as Avicenna asserts in the Metaphysics:  
…the principles of generation depend on the proximity or remoteness of 
causes, and this is by means of motion. Therefore, motion is preceded by 
motion, <the latter> motion conveying the causes to this motion. The two 
<motions> are, hence, like two contiguous <things>.244  
As for volitional motion, as exemplified by the pilgrim on the road to Mecca, the 
completion of each preceding step is the preparatory cause for each succeeding 
step, the metaphysical influential cause of which is the particular, renewed 
instance of the pilgrim‘s intent, his universal volition being the metaphysical 
cause of the entire aggregate of steps taken along the pilgrimage route: 
                                                             
243 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 628. 
244 Avicenna, Metaphysics, p. 301 (my adaptation of Marmura‘s translation).   
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And its paradigm in volitional movement is that he who wishes to go on 
ḥajj, then <his> universal volition (irāda kulliyya) is a cause (sabab) for the 
coming to be of particular, ordered acts of volition (sabab li-ḥuduth irādāt 
juziyya mutarattiba), each one of which has been brought into proximity 
with the other. For he does not reach the final point in the journey 
except that its completion at that point is a cause (sabab) for a particular 
intention (qaṣd) to arise from him such that he moves from that point to 
the point which succeeds it. And the influencing cause <which produces> 
the existence of those particular intentions, which follow one after the 
other, and which exert influence on particular successive movements is 
the universal  intention which links all such originated events.245 
So whilst in the example of natural motion, the preparatory efficient cause (al-
muʿidd) is the completion of the weighty object‘s ascent, in volitional motion, 
the preparatory cause of any but the initial step is the completion of the 
preceding step; and the influential cause (al-mu’aththir) in the case of the former 
is the weight of the object, whilst in the case of the latter the influential cause of 
each step is a particular ordered act of volition.  
Having established motion as the paradigmatic model for change, and 
introduced the distinction between preparatory and influential efficient 
causality, the account in al-Mabāḥith can now explain just how circular motion 
acts as the cause which produces temporally generated phenomena: 
So once you know this, then we say: these originated phenomena have a 
pre-eternal cause which has no beginning (sabab qadīm azalī), namely the 
                                                             
245 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 628-629.  
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Giver of Forms (al-wāhib li’l-ṣuwar). But its emanation depends on matter 
becoming prepared for the reception of that emanation (fayḍuhu 
mawqūfun ʿalā ṣayrūratu al-mādda mustaʿiddatan li-qabūl dhālika al-fayḍ); 
and that <state of> preparedness (dhālika al-istiʿdād), having previously 
not existed, only comes to be by means of motions and changes such that 
each preceding <phenomenon> acts as a cause (ʿilla) allowing matter to 
become prepared for the reception of the succeeding <phenomenon> 
(innamā yakūnu bi-wāsiṭati al-ḥarakāt wa’l-taghayyurāt ḥattā yakūna kullu 
sābiqin ʿillatan li-an tastaʿidd al-mādda li-qabūl al-lāḥiq).246  
Successive planetary motions, which pursue their perpetual, circular courses, 
prepare sublunary material substrates such that they become receptive to 
substantial forms: these are bestowed by the Giver of Forms. Without this initial 
preparation by planetary motion, no form emanated by the Giver of Forms could 
come to inhere in a material substrate and give rise to a new sublunary 
phenomenon.247  
4.6 Conclusion  
 
The similarity between the account of talismans in al-Sirr, the equivalent in al-
Maṭālib, and the explanation of celestial causation of temporally originated 
phenomena in al-Mabāḥith, reveals a striking continuity of thought. The 
philosophers and Sabians as depicted in al-Maṭālib deemed it more credible to 
                                                             
246 Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 629. For the Giver of Forms, see Jannsens, ‗The Notions of Wāhib al-
Ṣuwar‘.  
247 ‗So if nothing can come to be except by means of motion which brings the cause into 
proximity to the effect - and this motion is also originated – then it must be preceded by another 
motion. So motion with no beginning must exist. Rectilinear motion has a beginning, so <it> 
must be circular motion‘.  Rāzī, al-Mabāḥith, 1, p. 629.  
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integrate, in the notion of ensouled celestial motion, the two possible 
explanations of how an infinite chain of originated causes of sublunary 
phenomena can occur, namely: the one that attributes their generation to the 
perpetual acts of intellection performed by spiritual beings; and the other which 
attributes it to eternal circular motion.  This is reflected in al-Mabāḥith and al-
Sirr with the examples of the walking man and the air-bound earthen clod, as 
illustrations of how causation through celestial motion operates. As for the 
presentation of these two examples in the latter work, we find concealed in the 
philosophical subtext a theory of celestial causation which is given explicit 
treatment only in al-Mabāḥith which divides efficient celestial causes between 
the preparatory (muʿidda) and the metaphysically influential (mu’aththira): the 
former prepares the sublunary material substrate to receive the form emanated 
by the latter, namely the Giver of Forms (al-wāhib li’l-ṣuwar). No such mention of 
the Giver of Forms is made in al-Sirr, where it is replaced by the starless 
sphere.248 Nevertheless, its use of the two examples of the walking man and the 
air-bound clod of earth indicates an implicit acknowledgement of the 
distinction between preparatory and metaphysical efficient causes.  
However, as analogies illustrating celestial causation of sublunary phenomena, 
these two examples exhibit a structural flaw, an appreciation of which would 
afford us greater precision in problematizing the difficulties which Rāzī faced in 
constructing a coherent account of celestial forces and talismanic efficacy.  The 
process of sublunary generation and corruption involves two kinds of 
temporally originated phenomena: individual planetary motion and the 
corresponding sublunary effect. The analogies in the Mabāḥith and al-Sirr only 
                                                             
248 Al-Sirr 3:1 does mention, however, al-muʿṭī al-muṭlaq – the Absolute Giver, the nature of which 
we shall explore in the next chapter.  
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account for how the completion of one individual planetary motion can act as 
the preparatory cause of the next. Moreover, in both examples, the 
metaphysical cause of the succeeding phenomenon, of either planetary or 
pedestrian motion, is something which inheres in the very body that is the 
object of its influence. In other words, the same body is both the object and the 
substrate of preparatory and metaphysical efficient causes. While they might be 
successful as illustrations of self-perpetuating motion, the analogies lack the 
structure which integrates reference to the sublunary phenomenal effect, let 
alone the role of the practitioner of the Sabian talismanic craft whose ritualized 
actions can manipulate the celestial-sublunary nexus of causation.   
Al-Sirr describes the talisman as:  ‗the blending of <dynamically> active celestial 
forces with passive elemental forces‘, and identifies as planetary configurations 
as ‗the principles for the occurrence of diverse originated phenomena in this 
world.‘ It would appear they are their preparatory causes, preparing a sublunary 
material substrate to receive a new form from the metaphysical influential 
cause which, in this cosmological model, is not the Avicennan Giver of Forms 
but the starless sphere. This being the case, what is the role of the talismanic 
practitioner? For a clear answer, we must remind ourselves of Rāzī‘s Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt where he comments: 
Know that celestial forces do not affect preternatural events without the 
bringing together of passive receptive elemental forces (al-quwā al-
ʿunṣuriyya al-qābila) with earthly psychic forces (al-quwā al-nafsāniya al-
arḍiyya al-fāʿiliyya) and this is the talisman.249 
                                                             




Both the celestial movements, and the preparations and psychic activity of the 
talismanic practitioner, act as causes, the former heavenly, the latter earthly, 
which prepare the sublunary material substrate of the talisman to receive a 
form from the starless sphere, the metaphysical cause of change.  
One last observation must be made before we conclude. Reference to the 
talisman as ‗blending‘ (tamzīj) would seem to suggest that the referent of the 
word talisman is a special kind of process. But as we shall now discover from al-
Sirr 3:1, the referent for the word is a physical object, specifically a planetary 
idol or a ring, cast at the correct astrological time, for the purpose of serving the 
practitioner‘s objective of causing remotely a specific effect in the sublunary 
world. Moreover, how the talisman, whether it is a process or a physical object, 
facilitates this objective remains unclear. These questions will now inform our 
analysis of al-Sirr 3:1, which provides both further theory and practical 
instructions for the talismanic process, and of the concluding passage of al-Sirr 
1:4, which describes a talismanic ritual involving a planetary idol and a dramatic 




Chapter 5: Making Talismans 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The foregoing exploration of the general theory of celestial causation and the 
talismanic craft, attributed in al-Sirr to the philosophers and Sabians, identifies 
three key problems in its account. Firstly, the account asserts: ‗…that the 
proximate principles of the coming-to-be of originated phenomena in the world 
of generation and corruption, are the planetary applications (ittiṣālāt al-
kawākib).‘250 Yet it is unclear how the planetary applications are to be 
understood in the context of its assumed division of efficient celestial causes 
between the preparatory (muʿidda) and the influential (mu’aththira). Secondly, 
how these planetary applications affect sublunary change remains unclear. And 
thirdly, whether the referent of the term talisman is a process, an object, or 
indeed both, is ambiguous.  We shall now discover that, although it provides 
more information relating to the practicalities of the talismanic craft, al-Sirr 3:1 
adds yet further layers of complication and inconsistency to this rather 
problematic and incomplete theory.251 
 
5.2 Tamzīj: the blending of celestial influence 
 
                                                             
250 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 8. 
251 The description of how to forge a talismanic statue in al-Sirr 3:1 reappears in modified form in 
al-Maṭālib 8, pp. 179-180. Shahrastānī uses the word talisman primarily to refer to the astral ritual 
as a whole rather than the ring or idol which is manufactured as the physical product of the 
process. Talisman for him is thus primarily a process word. Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa’l-niḥal, pp. 
308-309.  
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The practical instructions for the forging of talismans in al-Sirr 3:1 treat the 
talisman as an object – a statue or a ring – rather than as a process. Thus far, we 
have explored the reality of the active heavenly and receptive terrestrial forces 
which the talismanic craft blends. However, neither al-Sirr nor al-Maṭālib 
provide a clear account of the precise nature of their ‗blending‘ (tamzīj) which is 
so definitive of the craft. We must therefore work with the few allusions which 
they do supply. In this section, we shall discuss both this process and the four 
heavenly bodies, the influences of which are blended within a talisman.  
Two of those bodies, namely Mercury and an ancillary planet which, we shall 
discover, is the Moon, facilitate the process of blending. The other two bodies 
are a fixed star, and the operative planet (kawkab al-ḥāja) appropriate for the 
intended goal of the operation, such as Mars for an aggressive objective, Venus 
for an amorous aim.252 Rāzī says: 
…they have agreed that a talisman is not complete with just a fixed star 
alone. <Acting> on a complete talisman are one fixed star and three co-
operating planets (sayyārāt mutaʿāwina) by reason of which the four 
natures occur. One of the planets must be Mercury, for these operations 
are firmly bound up with it (hādhihi al-aʿmāl mutaʿallaqa bihā taʿalluqan 
shadīdan). It is more apt (al-awlā) for the fixed star to be in the mid-
heaven (wasṭ al-samā’) and Mercury in the Fourth.253  
                                                             
252 See next section for a discussion of which planets would be appropriate for different kinds of 
operations. The fixed stars are discussed in al-Sirr 2:12 (pp. 59-61). The debate as to whether the 
fixed stars or the wandering planets exert the geater influence in the sublunary world is 
discussed on p. 58. This discussion reappears in an expanded version in al-Maṭālib 8, p. 157 and 
pp. 168-169.   
253 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.95.  
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Why Mercury is important for this process only becomes clear in al-Maṭālib 
where, reproducing the relevant passage from al-Sirr with slight adaptation, Rāzī 
writes:  
…they have agreed that a talisman cannot be struck with a fixed star 
alone. Rather they have said it is only complete with a fixed star and 
three planets (sayyārāt), so that the four natures (al-ṭabā’iʿ al-arbaʿa) 
occur therein. One of the planets must be Mercury, for its nature is 
mixed (ṭabīʿatuhu mumtazija) and facilitates the mixture of the natures 
and gives power to the mixture (tufīd imtizāj tilka al-tabā’iʿ wa-tufīd quwwa 
dhālika al-imtizāj). They said it is more apt if the fixed star is in the mid 
heaven and Mercury in the fourth <house>.254  
Mercury, being of a ―mixed nature‖ which facilitates the ―blending‖ (imtizāj) of 
the natures (ṭabā’īʿ) of the other heavenly bodies, is thus crucial to the 
talismanic craft which then blends them with elemental passive forces. Just as 
crucial is the role of the Moon:    
… the moon‘s motions are swift, its changes (taghayyurāt) many; as for 
the other planets, their motions are <but> slow. The transformations 
<which occur> in this world are many; and so the attribution of the 
                                                             
254 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 189. Summarizing Abu Maʿshar, Rāzī reports that those engaged in deep 
investigation asserted that whilst the essences of the celestial bodies are ‗free of‘ (mubarra’a) the 
<four> qualities, they exert on the sublunary world the effects of heat, coldness, dryness and 
moistness by way of choice, since they are rational and living, possessed of volition (aḥyā nāṭiqa 
mukhtāra). (See al-Sirr, p. 43).   
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transformations of this world to <the cause of> the motions of the moon 
is more apt (istinād taghayyurāt hādhā al-ʿālam ilā ḥarakāt al-qamar awlā).255  
Moreover:  
Because of its swift motions, the Moon blends the lights of some planets 
with the lights of the others and so it is beyond dispute that these ways 
of blending <planetary lights> are the principles behind the occurrence 
of contingent events in this world. So the Moon is the most proximate 
cause of change.256  
Not only does the al-Maṭālib reinforce the connection in al-Sirr between motion 
and blending, but it also amplifies the association between heavenly forces and 
light: 
…because of the swiftness of the moon‘s motion, the lights of the planets 
are blended with the others (tamtazij anwār al-kawākib baʿḍuhā bi’l-baʿḍ), 
and in accordance with these blends, the states of the effects (āthār) 
which occur in this world differ.257 
The talisman is thus the locus of where heavenly lights, facilitated by the mixed 
nature of Mercury and the swift motion of the Moon, are blended. 
5.3 The operative planet 
 
                                                             
255 Rāzī,  al-Sirr, p. 25. The phrase ‗ilā ḥarakāt al-qamar awlā‘ is missing in the Cairo lithograph but 
present in Oxford, Bodeleian, MS Marsh 125, f. 21v and Oxford, Bodleian, MS Selden Superius 66 
f. 28v.  
256 Inna al-qamar bi-sabab surʿati harakātihi yumazzij anwār baʿḍ al-kawākib bi-anwār al-bāqī wa lā 
shakka anna imtizājātihā mabādi’ li-ḥudūth al-hawādith fī hādhā al-ʿālam fa-kāna al-qamar huwa al-
mabda’ al-qarīb. Present in MS Marsh 125, f.21v and MS Selden Superius f.28v, but missing from 
Cairo lithograph, where it should appear midway p. 25, l. 25.   
257 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 170 
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The theoretical passage of al-Sirr 3:1 glosses over the issue of what the operative 
planet (kawkab al-ḥājja) most effective for any given operation should be, 
reserving such detailed information for the following two chapters which treat 
respectively the talismans of Abū Dhātis and selections from Kitāb Yawāqīt al-
Mawāqīt.258  So for a succinct overview of the kind of thing that is intended, we 
turn (once again) to the al-Maṭālib:  
Know that each one of the actions sought in astral magic (al-siḥr al-
nujūmī) must be connected with a specific planet (lā budda wa an yakūn 
muḍāfan ilā kawkab muʿayyin). Thus sowing division and hatred (al-farqa 
wa’l-bughḍ) is to be connected to Saturn. So perform <the operation> (fa-
iʿmal) when Saturn is in one of its signs, <namely> Capricorn or Aquarius 
- Aquarius being stronger - or when in trine or sextile aspect with them; 
and <when> the Moon is applying to Saturn in any one of these positions, 
or in conjunction; […] the ascendant sign (ṭāliʿ) should be one of the two 
signs of Saturn whilst Saturn is in it <at the same time>.259  
Saturn is thus the operative planet required for the forging of any talisman by 
which is intended the sowing of division and hatred. For it to be effective, 
Saturn must either be in one if its signs or be favourably aspecting them. Ideally, 
Saturn should be in one of these signs as it, namely the sign, ascends from the 
horizon. Moreover, to effectively facilitate the process of blending the influence 
of the operative planet within the talisman, the Moon, being the most 
proximate celestial cause of terrestrial change, and acting as the ancillary 
planet, should either be applying to Saturn or conjunct.    
                                                             
258 For the Talismans of Abūdhāṭīs al-Bābilī, see al-Sirr 3:2, pp. 96-104; for selections from Kitāb 
Yawāqīt al-Mawāqīt, see see al-Sirr, 3:3, pp. 105-9.  
259 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, pp. 187-8.  
179 
 
The objectives of securing a living or high esteem are best achieved, mutatis 
mutandis, under the equivalent conditions appropriate to Jupiter acting as the 
operative planet, with the Moon in application or conjunction, the rising sign 
being one of the signs of Jupiter, or of its exaltation. The same principles apply 
with respect to Mars if the objective is to gain domination over someone; to 
Venus if the aim is to inflame love. It follows then that talismanic operations 
which are intended to ignite a consuming and obsessive passion (al-tahyījāt), 
being both aggressive and amatory, involve both Mars and Venus, when they 
are in conjunction with each other, and the Moon is in conjunction with both of 
them, or in strong aspect with them. Being associated with all things hidden, 
intellectual and psychological (nafsānī), Mercury is the operative planet 
appropriate for the uncovering of buried treasure; attracting the favour of a 
scholar; or inflicting psychological – as opposed to bodily – harm. Crucially, for 
all these talismanic operations, the Moon must either be applying to or conjunct 
with the operative planet.260 
So returning to al-Sirr 3:1, the influences of the four heavenly bodies involved in 
the process of forging a talisman are referred to as ʿaṭāyā, or ―gifts,‖ the power 
of which vary in accordance with a number of factors. Explains Rāzī: 
                                                             
260 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 188. Al-Maṭālib organizes far more information than al-Sirr concerning the 
most appropriate position of the Moon when casting a talisman. The Moon should be free of 
malefics; it should be clear of being eclipsed by a margin of twelve degrees in either direction, 
for the ancients used to call the eclipse of the Moon the 'Moon's death'; it should not be in 
opposition to the Sun; it should not be in quartile aspect with the Sun, nor should it be halfway 
towards quartile aspect (ʿalā al-anṣāf) for quartile aspect is a relationship which is halfway 
towards opposition; it should neither be in the first nor the last degrees of the signs;  it should 
not be in opposition to Saturn, or in conjunction or in quartile or the halfway points of the 
quartile aspect, since it is a malefic planet and weakens the operation; it should not be with the 
Head and Tail of the Dragon, because they are nodes. Of the two, the Tail is the more malevolent; 
it should neither be in opposition to Mercury nor in conjunction; it is disliked for the Moon to be 
in Libra or in Scorpio for in these signs the two luminaries are in detriment; it should not be in 




One <such factor> is proximity to and distance from the Absolute Giver 
(al-muʿṭī al-muṭlaq) <by which> I mean the starless sphere (al-falak ghayr 
al-kawākib). So whatever is closer to it, the greater its power in giving (fa-
mā kāna aqrab kāna aqwā ʿalā al-ʿaṭāyā). The second <factor relates> to size 
(al-kibar wa’l-ṣighar), for the largest <sphere> is more giving. The third 
relates to speed <al-baṭī’ wa’l-sarīʿ>, for the slower it is, the more giving it 
is; and the higher perfects (mukammil) that which is below it.261 
Since the starless – or tropical – sphere marks the boundary between the 
celestial and the supracelestial realms, it serves as the interface between the 
pure forms of the intellects and the celestial souls which receive them. Thus, for 
example, its relative proximity to the tropical sphere; the slow speed of its 
rotation; and its size, confers on the sphere of Saturn a particularly powerful 
influence.  
5.4 Images of the Planetary Degrees 
 
Consideration of the starless sphere – the absolute giver – is necessary to 
determine in which degree of the zodiac the operative planet should be when 
rising on the eastern horizon at the moment when the molten metal of the 
talisman is poured into its mould.  Rāzī discusses the degrees in detail in al-Sirr 
2:14, entitled ‗On the images of the degrees (darajāt) of the planets (fī ṣuwar 
darajāt al-kawākib)‘. It is to this chapter that we shall make a brief digression 
before we return to al-Sirr 3:1. 
                                                             
261 Rāzī, Al-Sirr, p. 95. Compare, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 189. The passage from al-Sirr 3:1 then proceeds to 
state: ‗…the gifts of the planets are like things which bring perfection and the Absolute Giver is 
the Sun (inna ʿaṭāyā al-kawākib yakūn ka’l-mukammilāt wa’l-muʿṭī al-muṭlaq huwa al-shams)‘. This 




 For his information on the images of the degrees, Rāzī relies on two versions of 
a work written by a certain Ṭumṭum al-Hindi.262 He describes how associated 
with each degree (daraja) of the starless sphere (al-falak) is an image, knowledge 
of which is the privilege of an elite few.263  The chapter lists the thirty degrees of 
each sign together with the name of each degree‘s adjutant (ʿawn) and a 
description of: the effect that each can be called upon to exert in the sublunary 
world; its image; and the subfumigation used in its invocation.264 The effects of 
each of the degrees range widely and include such actions as killing one‘s 
enemies; increasing harvest yield; causing the milk of mothers to cease flowing; 
and inflicting a plague. The images are both theriomorphic and 
anthropomorphic. Deciding on the particular effect he wishes to bring about, 
the practitioner is to select the appropriate degree and deduce, considering a 
                                                             
262 See al-Sirr, p. 81, for Rāzī‘s discussion of the various works on which he relied. He provides 
two differing lists of descriptions of images: the first is on pp. 71-81; the second on pp. 81-86. The 
reason for these two different lists is that, he asserts, he was relying on two versions of the 
work. Unfortunately, he lacked the drive (lā maṭmaʿa) to analyse the versions and arrive at an 
informed opinion as to which was the more reliable. He points out that there are versions of the 
images of the degrees other than those described in the Ṭumṭum literature (al-ṭumṭumiyyāt). 
Three versions were related by Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Sinjarī in his Kitāb al-
Jāmiʿ al-Shāhī; another in the book Tinkūlūshā the Minor; and another version related by Abū 
Dhāṭīs in his Risāla fī al-ṭilsamāt (see al-Sirr, p. 81). A version of Ṭumṭum, on which Rāzī may or 
may not have relied, is presumably extant in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ar. 2595, 
fol. 59r: ‗the Book of Ṭumṭum al-Hindī on the knowledge of the degrees of the sphere and their 
images and talismans‘. (see F. Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrittums, p. 96, referred to by 
Burnett commenting on the reference to a certain ‗Tomtom‘ in Adelard of Bath‘s translation of 
Tābit, Liber Prestigiorum Thebedis, in Tābit Ibn Qurra the Ḥarrānian on talismans and the spirits of the 
planets p. 25.) The fullest account of the images of the degrees in the Latin tradition is to be 
found in a work originally produced for the library of Alfonso X of Castille. Unfortunately MS 
Vatican, Reg. lat. 1283a only treats of a third of the images, from Taurus to Leo inclusive. For a 
full study of this manuscript see: Alfonso X, Astromagia. A digital version of the manuscript can 
be viewed via the following link: http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Reg.lat.1283.pt.A. In relation to 
the use of the word Babylon to refer to Baghdad  in astrological texts, Burnett comments: ‗Bar 
Hebraeus calls Baghdad Babylon in his Syriac writings […] and the consistent mention of 
‗Babylon‘ as the capital city in works of astrology suggests that the ancient city at least was a 
symbol of the medieval one‘. (Burnett, ‗Thābit Ibn Qurra‘, fn. 4, p. 15).  
263 ‗…looking down in any <given> degree from the starless sphere (al-falak) is such-and-such 
(yaṭṭaliʿu fī al-daraja al-fulāniyya min al-falak kadhā wa-kadhā). It is a mysterious allusion (ramz), its 
aim being that none should attain its knowledge except he who is possessed of complete 
understanding and an excellent natural talent (qarīḥa jayyida)‘. (Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 70) Each image 
would appear to encode a mystery which none can decipher except the wise.  
264 Compare al-Maṭālib 7, p. 388, where Rāzī reports that the Masters of the Talismans averred 




number of factors, including the term and decan in which it falls, which of the 
seven planets is associated with it in particular. He is then to draw the image of 
the degree and a zodiacal and a planetary diagram; then he is to perform the 
appropriate suffumigation and invoke the name of the spirit.265  
 Although it is not explicitly stated, the obvious intention is that the correct 
timing for the procedure is determined when the relevant planet enters the 
zodiacal degree of choice when it is in the ascendant.  
 
5.5 Forging the talisman 
 
The basic operation that Rāzī describes in al-Sirr 3:1, is the talismanic statue or a 
homunculus. His most probable source for this is Thābit Ibn Qurra‘s book on 
talismans which survives in two different Latin versions.266  
                                                             
265 Rāzī reports on the authority of Abū Dhāṭīs the Babylonian: ‗If you want to perform an 
operation in accordance with this book, then should you act <in pursuit> of the need which you 
desire. So search for it within these degrees (darajāt). If you find the degree and know its 
subfumigation and the name of the adjutant (al-ʿawn) by which it is particularised, then 
determine which of the seven planets is specific to it, by <establishing> for example the lord of 
the term (ṣāḥib al-ḥadd) of which that degree is a part; the decan (al-wajh); the triplicity; and the 
dodecatemorion (al-ithnā ʿashariyya); the exaltation (al-sharaf) and the sign (al-bayt). When you 
know the lord of the degree, then seek the day of that planet and the planet which is lord of that 
day (ṣāḥib min dhālika al-yawm). And if that planet is feminine (unthā) then perform your action 
in the night that is specific to it, in the specific hour. Then produce an image of the degree on 
paper and write its name in Sanskrit (hindiyya) beneath it; and draw a mandala (bi khaṭṭihi bi-
sikkīn) and write on it the names of the twelve zodiacal signs and the seven planets and their 
images in Sanskrit. When you have done this, you then begin to perform the subfumigations of 
that degree and you invoke (daʿawta) the lord of that degree by his name and you ask him to 
fulfil your need for he will indeed do so in the swiftest time. If it is delayed for three days, then 
repeat the operation three times such that nine days are completed, performing this operation 
at the beginning of each <block of> three days for that would be the furthest extent to which it 
would be delayed (fa-innahā ghāyat al-ta’khīr). Be wary lest you err in finding out the degree and 
its lord, for if you make a mistake, then this operation would avail you naught. Know this, for it 
is a most beneficial introduction (muqaddima) to this kind <of practice>. Know that knowledge of 
the natures of the degrees, together with a full understanding (iḥāṭa) of this introduction is 
mighty indeed.‘ Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 71.  
266 The translations by Adelard of Bath and John of Seville and Limia are described and analysed 
by Burnett in ‗Tābit Ibn Qurra the Ḥarrānian‘. Unlike the account in al-Sirr, Thābit‘s work 
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To ensure successful tamzīj, the weights and measures of the elements which are 
constitutive of the metal from which the talisman is to be forged, must balance 
the celestial forces acting on it at the moment that it is cast:  
It is necessary to know the weights and measures of the four elements in 
the raw material in the lower world (awzān ṭabā’iʿ al-mādda al-sufliyya wa 
maqādīrihā) in accordance with the planetary forces (bi-ḥasab quwā al-
kawākib) so that the recipient balances the active agent (ḥattā yakūn al-
qābil muwāziyan li’l-fāʿil).267  
Rāzī unfortunately declines to expound on the alchemy required to ascertain 
the correct measure of the metal to be used such that the four elements 
contained therein balance the celestial forces acting on it. Nor does he explain 
precisely how planetary forces are to be measured, calculated and quantified. Be 
that as it may, the principle which determines the general timing for the forging 
of a talisman is nevertheless clear. Each talismanic objective is characterised by 
one of the four elements and so the talisman must be forged in the season 
appropriate to that element. Moreover, if the objective is characterized by an 
extreme of the element by which it is characterised, then mid-season would be 
the most appropriate time for the casting of the talisman:  
It is necessary to observe appropriate timing (yajib riʿāyatu al-zamān al-
munāsib) for if the aim of the talisman is to bring about an effect 
connected to heat and dryness, then <the time of its casting> should be 
selected for the summer. So if the heat and dryness <of the action> are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
describes in detail the necessary astrological conditions for the carving out of each part of 
homunculus in its mould into which the molten metal is eventually poured.  
267 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 95.  
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extreme (fī al-ghāya) then <the time of its casting> should be selected for 
mid-summer (al-qayẓ); if <they are not extreme>, then either at the 
beginning or end of the summer season. The same reasoning applies by 
way of analogy to the other seasons (wa-qis ʿalayhi sā’ir al-fuṣūl).268  
When the general timing is decided, the specific moment is to be selected in 
light of the following considerations:  
…if you wish to make a talisman, then ensure that: the operative planet 
(kawkab al-ḥāja) is in the cardine of the ascendant (fī watad al-ṭāliʿ) at the 
beginning <of the process> of making the talisman; the rest of the planets 
assisting (al-kawākib al-muʿāwina) in the operation are in the three 
remaining cardines; and anything which might cause corruption to the 
ascendant planet is cadent (wa asqiṭ ʿan al-kawkab alladhī fī al-ṭāliʿ mā 
yufsiduhu). If the operative planet (kawkab al-ḥāja) enters its term (ḥadd), 
its decan (wajh), and its triplicity (muthallath) and the rest of its shares 
(sā’ir ḥuẓūẓihi), then the operation will be more complete (atamm).269  
For any given objective, the correct astrological circumstances for casting the 
talismanic statue must be carefully selected and will be rare indeed. Ideally, the 
operative planet will be in the cardine of the ascendant; the appropriate fixed 
star in the mid-heaven:270 Mercury, preferably in the fourth house, and the 
                                                             
268 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 95. See al-Maṭālib 8, p. 196 for Rāzī‘s classification of all such procedures under 
the four elements.  
269 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.96. Compare al-Maṭālib 8, p. 189: ‗…if you wish to make a talisman, then ensure 
that: the operative planet (kawkab al-ḥāja) is in the cardine of the ascendant (fī watad al-ṭāliʿ) at 
the beginning <of the process> of making the talisman; and the rest of the planets assisting (al-
kawākib al-muʿāwina) in the operation are in the three remaining cardines. If it occurs (in ittafaqa) 
that the operative planet (kawkab al-ḥāja) enters its term (ḥadd), its decan (wajh), and its triplicity 
(muthallath) and the rest of its shares (sā’ir ḥuẓūẓihi), then the operation will be more perfect 
(akmal).  
270 The closer the fixed star is to zenith, the more powerful its effect (Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 58).  
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Moon, other than in opposition to the Sun or Saturn, in the remaining cardine. 
Yet further precision of timing is demanded by the requirement, as previously 
discussed, that the practitioner waits for the operative planet to be in the 
appropriate degree of the zodiac as it rises above the eastern horizon.271 When 
the perfect moment arrives, the operator, who has already carved the mould 
into the correct form, pours into it the metal appropriate to the operative 
planet. The casting of a talisman is a solitary activity, for no-one else should be 
in the operator‘s company. As he pours the metal into the mould, he is to 
perform those subfumigations which correspond with the operative planet. 
Alternatively, instead of casting a talismanic statue, he can forge a ring, the 
stone of which should correspond to the operative planet.272  
Whilst performing this operation, the practitioner should maintain complete 
mental focus on his objective:  
Let your heart and your mind be entirely submerged in that goal (wa’l-
yakun qalbuka wa-khāṭiruka mustaghriqan fī dhālika al-maṭlūb), and if you 
                                                             
271 Space does not allow for a close analysis of the planetary degrees and their images, treated in 
al-Sirr 2:14, pp. 70-86.  
272 ‗he who wants to cast talismans should consider the aim for which he wants to strike a 
talisman. If it is for one of the aims which the Sun indicates, or one of the aims signified by the 
other planets as we have already mentioned, then let him seek a time in which that planet 
enters one of the degrees appropriate for that aim, which should also be the ascendant degree. 
Then he should take at that moment a statue (timthāl) of the kind appropriate to that planet, 
<wrought> of one of the seven metals (al-ajsād al-sabʿa) which we detailed earlier. He should 
exert his utmost in its construction, in the most correct and most perfect way possible, but 
without exceeding, in this action, the time during which the planet is in that degree which 
corresponds to the horizon of the ascendant. The way to do this is to have the crucible (ālat al-
tafrīgh wa idhābatu al-jasad) before you, and when the appropriate time arrives, empty it into the 
mould (al-qālab) which has been prepared for it if it is something which is needed <for making> 
the statue in particular, such as the things which a man needs to have around him such that 
they are present. When making it, let him be alone in the place, there being no one else with 
him; and let him burn aromatics, specific to the planet; and let him exert his utmost to ensure 
that the rest of the planets, which are assisting the operative planet (kawkab al-ḥāja), are in the 
cardine of the ascendant, or aspecting it, and that the hostile planets should be cadent from it. 
And if your operation is <to forge> a ring, then its stone (faṣṣ) should be of the substance (jawhar) 
of that planet, and from that which has a specific occult power in attaining that goal‘. Rāzī, al-
Sirr, p. 96.  
186 
 
utter at that time its name and description then would its <success> be 
more sure. For the starless sphere assumes a form in accordance with the 
intention (fa-inna al-falak yatashakkalu bi-ḥasab al-niyya).273 
Crucial to the success of the operation is the ability of the practitioner to 
maintain a fixed, one-pointed concentration on his goal. Rāzī leaves 
unexplained the mysterious assertion that the starless sphere – or the Absolute 
Giver - assumes a form in accordance with the intention.  
As an illustration of such an operation, Rāzī furnishes his account with the 
example of a Saturnine talisman, the aim of which is to bring harm to an 
intended target:   
And if you want to create a talisman to cause affliction to a man or to 
cause him illness, then seek out the entering of Saturn into one of the 
degrees which indicate that, and you should have taken a statue 
resembling a man, and at that moment you should undertake to cause 
harm to one of its limbs/organs and a place on its body, for when you do 
this the limb/organ of that man would be corrupted.274  
So the practitioner is required, not only to forge the anthropomorphic 
talismanic statue at the precise astrological moment, but also to perform on the 
statue a ritualized mimesis of the effect he intends to bring about in his target. 
This is summarized neatly in al-Sirr 1:5: 
Know that the more these acts are performed in concert, the stronger 
their effect. This is dependent on knowledge of the planets, the zodiacal 
                                                             
273 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 96. 
274 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 96.  
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signs, the mansions of the moon, and the natures of the degrees. The 
planet corresponding to the magical operation is sought, whilst the rest 
of the assisting planets should be making strong applications. Then 
everything which is corresponding to that planet including tastes, 
colours and so forth are to be gathered. Then a doll in the image of the 
man <who is being targeted> is fashioned from a material that is 
corresponding to the planet; then you smear the organ that you want 
affected by this operation with a potion sympathetic to the operation; 
then you wrap it and place it inside the image and smear it with potions 
corresponding to that aim, then suffumigate it with corresponding 
aromatics and perform the astral ritual (tunajjim) with respect to the 




In the terms of the model of celestial causation which emerged from our 
previous discussion of the general physics of talismans, it would appear that the 
mu’aththira – or metaphysical influential cause – which acts on the talisman to 
give it its power is that degree of the starless sphere which is in the ascendant at 
the point when the metal is poured into its mould. At this moment, the four 
planets which ideally would be occupying the four cardines, and moreover the 
                                                             
275 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 19. Compare al-Maṭālib 8, pp. 182-3: ‗When you have cast the statue and want to 
inflict an illness on the target's brain, then you daub the inside of the statue's head with opium 
and mandrake. If you want to afflict him with heat, daub the place of his heart with hot, burning 
paint, or write a spell (ʿazīma) on a metal sheet and throw it onto fire, or write the spell on paper 
and throw it into a vial. When you perform these actions with your heart completely focused, 
and you strengthen the phantasm (al-khayāl) in your mind, and you visualize the effect on the 
organ of that man, and when the strong celestial influences and the magician's strong psychic 
power concentrate their action on the passive object in the lower world, then the desired effect 
will be attained.‘  
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actions of the practitioner and his mental focus, act as causes which prepare the 
material substrate of the molten metal to receive its potency from the degree of 
the starless sphere.   
 But, leaving several questions unanswered, the foregoing account falls short of 
providing a full explanatory model for how the talisman works. These 
unanswered questions relate to the three ontological levels which the craft co-
ordinates: the supralunar; the talismanic; and the psychological.  
On the supralunar level, it is by now apparent that, in the thought of Rāzī‘s 
Sabians and talisman masters, the starless sphere, as the Absolute Giver, is the 
first principle of sublunary change – the equivalent of Avicenna‘s dator 
formarum. This notion is initially suggested in al-Sirr 1:5 where Rāzī reports: 
Of the <foundational> premises of this knowledge is that the Masters of 
Talismans are in agreement that each form in this world has its celestial 
archetype (kull sūra fī hādhā al-ʿālam fa-lahā mithāl fī al-falak) and that the 
earthly forms (al-ṣuwar al-suflīya muṭīʿa li’l-ṣuwar al-ʿalawīya) are subject to 
heavenly forms: serpents to Draco; scorpions to Scorpio; predatory animals to 
Leo and so on.276 
However the relationship between the images associated with the Zodiacal signs 
here mentioned and those of the three hundred and sixty degrees of the entire 
starless sphere is ambiguous. Just as unclear is how the relevant degree of the 
                                                             
276 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.18. The fact that Thābit asserts the same in his work on talismans provides at 
least circumstantial evidence that Rāzī enjoyed access either to his work on talismans or works 
which relied on it. In Adelard of Bath‘s version, Thābit attributes to Ptolemy the belief that: 
‗…the images of this composite world obey the images on the firmament—no doubt meaning by 
this that the images of individuals suffering corruption and regeneration under the lunar circle 
obey the images on the celestial circle. For example: an individual lion obeys the zodiacal Leo, 
and also an individual scorpion or serpent obeys the celestial Scorpius or Serpent.‘ (See Burnett 
‗Art of Talismans‘).  
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starless sphere influences the effect rendered by the operative planet at the 
moment when the talisman is forged. Furthermore, the account leaves the 
reader uncertain of the following issues: the ontological status of the images 
which ‗look down‖ from the degrees of the starless sphere; the quiddity of the 
‗gifts‘ (ʿaṭāyā) of the ‗lesser‘ planetary ‗givers‘ and their relationship to light; the 
meaning of Mercury‘s ‗blending‘ of the natures of the planets and the Moon‘s 
blending of their lights.     
On the level of the physical talisman itself, the method by which the four 
elements, which constitute the metal from which it is forged, are to be 
calculated and balanced against the celestial forces which act on it at the 
moment of its creation, is not delineated.Furthermore, the actual form of the 
talismanic statue, or image with which the talismanic ring is engraved, remains 
obscure. So for instance, the talismans of Abū Dhāṭīs in al-Sirr 3:2, are said to: ‗be 
based on the images of the degrees.‘277 The first of these is a talisman to gain 
status and reputation and to command the awe of men. Its operative planet is 
the Sun, which must be in the ascendant degree at the moment when the 
talisman – this time a ring – is forged. Any one of twenty-five separate degrees, 
unevenly distributed across all the signs, except Virgo, Sagittarius and Aquarius, 
can serve as the appropriate ascendant degree. Each of these degrees of course, 
has its own individual image, as described in al-Sirr 2:16. Nevertheless, Abū 
Dhāṭīs instructs that the ring is to be engraved with the following image: a man, 
seated on a throne, wearing a crown, around which is entwined a serpent; his 
right hand holds a spear and the index finger of his left hand is placed over his 
                                                             
277 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 96.  
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mouth.278 Thus the relationship between the image of the enthroned man and 
the images of the twenty-five different degrees which can potentially serve as 
the ascendant is obscure.279  
Moving to the ontological level of the psychological, the relationship between 
operator‘s soul and the talisman and their agency in ensuring the success of the 
operation is obscure. The practitioner is required to sustain simultaneously a 
firm connection with the spirit of the operative planet together with complete 
focus on the objective of his ritual. Intense and sustained mental concentration 
would seem to be just as important as the appropriate celestial configuration 
and the diligent crafting of the talismanic homunculus which represents the 
locus where macrocosm and microcosm meet:  
he who would apply himself to this craft ought not to omit anything that 
relates to the senses, thought (fikr), imagination (khayāl), activity of the 
estimative faculty (wahm), intellect and soul except that he makes it 
connect (ya’alliqhu) either to the spirit of the heavenly body the aid of which 
he is invoking in his act, or to that which has a connection to that heavenly 
body. The stronger the connection, the more complete is the realization of 
the goal.  Know that just as it is necessary for he who would apply himself to 
these acts to make all his powers of perception connect (taʿlīq) to the 
celestial spirit, so it is also necessary to connect the estimative faculty 
(taʿalluq al-wahm) to the effect that he wishes to bring about.280 
                                                             
278 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 96-7. The resemblance of this description to the Hindu deity Siva supports the 
notion of an Indic provenance.   
279 A full analysis of the images of the degrees is a desideratum which might help to substantiate 
or indeed refute their purported Indian provenance.  
280 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 16-17. Rāzī says in the al-Maṭālib:  
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Rāzī continues in explanation:  
For instance, if he wishes to strike a man with obsessive ardour (tahyīj) or 
to afflict him with an illness, then he should fashion a statue (timthāl) 
which he makes to correspond with the man (yuʿarriḍu-hu dhālika al-
inṣan) and makes his estimative faculty connect with it (yuʿalliq wahma-hu 
ʿalayhi) and on the limb which he specially wants to effect by this 
operation. If he wants to strike a man with obsessive ardour (tahyīj) then 
he heats up the limb of that statue with heat in actuality such as fire; or if 
he wishes to kill him, then he should he plunge needles into its limbs and 
wrap it up in a scrap of shroud and place it in an old cemetery; if he 
wants to afflict him with paralysis then he should smear it with cold 
potions and drugs and suffumigate it with potions that cause extreme 
coldness or cast it somewhere filthy and remote. These actions are 
required because when you bring together the raw materials which 
receive the special influence of the planet from which a certain effect is 
sought, and you bind your heart and estimative faculty to it, then the 
influence of that planet will inevitably flow towards that person.281 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‗There are those who object to this kind of action (the talismanic craft) saying it is mere idle play 
(ʿabath) <affording> no benefit. Rather, appropriate celestial correspondences (al-munāsabāt al-
nujūmiyya) and the psychic activity of the estimative faculty (al-awhām al-nafsāniyya) are all 
that is required. Jābir Ibn ʿAbdullah bin Ḥayyān said: 'This objection is mistaken because the 
coming to be of this form at the time of the planet's rising proceeds in the same way as the birth 
of a child at the time of a planet's rising. For just as the power of the rising planet and the 
<power of> the rising degree suffuses that child (tasrī quwwatu al-kawkab al-ṭāliʿ wa’l-daraja al-
ṭāliʿa fī dhālika al-mawlūd), so in the same way they both suffuse that carved image and cast 
statue. Know that when that idol (ṣanm) is being cast into its mould (al-qālab); and when the 
carving is being done to that stone, the practitioner (al-ʿāmil) must wear attire corresponding to 
that planet, gathering around him all the effects appropriate to that planet, uttering praises 
appropriate to the planet, his heart being present to all the effects appropriate to the planet. 
When this happens, the desired effect will be strong.‘ Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, pp. 180-181.  
281 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 17. That Rāzī is now speaking of plunging a needle into a statue would suggest 
that it is not made from metal.   
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Once the practitioner‘s soul is firmly bound with that of the operative planet, 
whilst simultaneously focusing on the target of his operation, ritualized action 
ensures that the special influence of the former flows to the latter in accordance 
with his intention. It is the practitioner‘s will which intervenes in the general 
emanation of the planet‘s influence and directs it to a specific end: 
The furthest reach of investigation reveals that it is established that here 
is a general principle that emanation flows to all forms such that 
receptive matter does not receive certain forms to the exclusion of other 
forms without something which makes that eventuality more 
preponderant (illā li-murajjiḥ). Since all elemental bodies are receptive to 
all forms which resist being substituted for each other (al-mutaḍāda li’l-
badl), the emanation of these forms from the First Emanating Principle is 
no more apt than others. If, however, the talismanic practitioner‘s 
psychic connection with the celestial spirits is strong, then a specific 
emanation will preponderate, and God knows best.282 
All three ontological levels of the supralunar, the talismanic, and the 
psychological thus act in consort. Whilst the practitioner is sedulous in choosing 
the correct celestial configuration; in balancing the forces of the heavenly 
bodies with the elements of the raw material that makes the talisman; in 
performing the correct suffumigations and the correct ritualized action, the 
success of the operation lies in the mysterious connection which he establishes 
with the spirit of the operative planet by means of his estimative faculty (al-
wahm). Thus to understand what the Sabian heresiological category means for 
Rāzī, not only must we understand the cosmology and celestial causation that 
                                                             
282 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 17.  
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informs it, but we must also attempt to construct the theory of cognition and 













It will be recalled from chapter 1 that according to the Avicennan naturalistic 
theory the prophet exerts occult power by means of an internal sense called the 
estimative faculty (al-wahm). Whilst all humans possess this faculty, the 
prophet‘s is innately powerful. In al-Maṭālib 8, Rāzī objects that whilst this 
explanation in merely probable (muḥtamal), it does not commend itself over and 
above a range of other equally as plausible explanations. This being the case, the 
Avicennists have effectively relativized the prophetic ability. One such plausible 
account is that ordinary humans might train the estimative faculty using 
spiritual techniques in order to strengthen its occult power. This is the purpose 
of Sabian spiritual discipline and the focus of this chapter.  
Entitled ‗On magic based on the purification of the soul and the connecting of 
the estimative faculty (taʿlīq al-wahm)‘, al-Sirr 1:4 represents the psychological 
core of the theory of occult practice proposed by Rāzī.283 It reveals that the 
purpose of the spiritual discipline required by magical training is to establish 
and consolidate a firm connection with the celestial spirits (al-arwāḥ al-
falakiyya); it is by means of this connection that the adept may realize the occult 
power with which only a few souls have innately been imbued. Spiritual 
austerities purify the soul (taṣfiyat al-nafs) of its preoccupations with corporeal 
                                                             
283 I shall henceforth refer to al-Sirr 1:4 as ‗The Psychology of al-Sirr‘.  
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being, allowing the estimative faculty (al-wahm), the most important of the 
internal faculties, which mediates between the corporeal and immaterial 
worlds, to facilitate connection with the celestial spirits. No explanation of the 
nature of this mysterious faculty is provided: such knowledge is assumed of the 
reader. 
 
Al-Sirr 1:4 consists of five sections: 
(1) Ten proofs that the soul‘s estimative faculty can affect the physical 
world; 
(2) A discussion on the soul innately possessed of occult power; 
(3) On the acquisition of occult power which is not innately possessed: 
(a) On the astrological natal conditions of the one who would acquire 
occult power; 
(b) On the spiritual austerities and disposition of soul required for 
the acquisition of occult power: 
(i) Asceticism; 
(ii) Purging of superfluous thoughts and humoural excesses; 
(iii) Vegan diet and reduction of food intake to the barest 
minimum; 
(iv) Fortification of the brain with fragrance, colour and 
music; 
(v) Abjuring all sensory objects of desire; 
(vi) Sabian idolatry and connection with the celestial spirit by 
means of the estimative faculty; 
(4) On the soul that has perfected occult power; 
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(5) On operative magic. 
 
In summary the argument proceeds as follows. Section (1) adduces ten proofs to 
establish the fact that the soul, and in particular its estimative faculty, can exert 
a powerful effect on the corporeal world. This conclusion then provides the 
basis on which to surmise that if the power of some souls whose occult power to 
act on the corporeal world is weak, then logic admits the possibility of souls 
whose occult power is strong. Now, this power is either innate, or it can be 
acquired. The ensuing discussion in section (2) as to whether or not innate 
occult power is a function of the soul‘s quiddity or humoral temperament 
distracts little from the broad structure of the general argument which proceeds 
to section (3) and the main purpose of the chapter: the discussion of how the 
soul might acquire occult power. This method is encapsulated in the title of al-
Sirr 1:4:  ‗the purification of the soul and the connecting of the estimative 
faculty‘ (taṣfiyat al-nafs wa-taʿlīq al-wahm) to the celestial spirits. Both the 
physical aspects of the soul‘s purification, as well as the ascetic disposition it is 
required to adopt, facilitate but one aim: to strip the soul of all which could 
distract it from establishing a connection with the celestial spirits. It is by means 
of this connection that occult power is acquired. If the soul‘s powers are divided 
between numerous tasks, its success at performing them will be diluted: if they 
are all focused on but one aim, the likelihood of its realization would be greatly 
enhanced. The soul‘s preoccupation with digestion is an example of just such a 
dilution. The adept is therefore required to adopt an uncompromisingly ascetic 
attitude and thus sharpen his ambition (himma) for the spiritual world, enabling 
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him to develop the strength of mental focus (al-tafakkur) by which is achieved 
the very aim of magical training, namely connection with the celestial spirits.   
 
Section (3)(b)(vi) merits particular attention. It introduces the estimative faculty 
as crucial for the establishment of this connection. And since the soul is subject 
to the senses, the planetary idol (ṣanam) becomes a necessary tool in this 
process: once the senses connect with the idol, they are followed by the 
imagination and estimative faculty. The soul is then drawn, by means of the idol, 
to the celestial spirit. With consistent practice, the connection becomes a 
stabilized disposition (malaka) of the adept‘s soul and he reaches a level close in 
rank to the soul innately possessed of occult power. Section (4), which describes 
the semi-divine powers of the one who has fully developed his occult power, 
represents the dramatic denouement of al-Sirr 1:4. For he who has yet to achieve 
this perfection, section (5) provides instructions on how, having stabilized his 
connection with the celestial spirits, the adept might produce transitive magic, 
by connecting his estimative faculty to the outcome that he desires.   
 
6.2 The Internal Senses: al-Ishārāt 3:9 
 
In constructing his theory of Sabian magic, Rāzī consistently highlights the 
crucial roles played by the estimative faculty and the imagination in al-Sirr. 
However he omits a description of their nature and activity which is essential to 
our understanding of his theory. His allusions to the internal faculties draw on 
the psychology of Avicenna and so it is al-Ishārāt 3:9 and Rāzī‘s commentary 
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thereon that we shall consult for a particularly succinct statement concerning 
them. 
 
Avicenna‘s account of perception is deeply informed by Aristotelian 
hylomorphism whereby either the forms of sense data or mental objects are 
impressed (inṭabaʿa) or inscribed (irtasama) by agent faculties into receptive 
faculties. He begins his account of the internal faculties with the common sense 
(al-hiss al-mushtarak) since its sphere of activity is the closest to the external 
senses, and its existence is the most evident and the least controversial. The 
common sense receives sensible data or forms (ṣuwar) from the five external 
senses and combines them to form an integrated experience of extra-mental 
reality. Sometimes, however, this activity can produce an experience which 
does not strictly accord with the extra-mental reality from which the sense data 
derive. Thus a raindrop as it falls appears as a straight line; a dot painted on a 
rapidly rotating circle itself appears to the observer as a circle, on account of the 
rapidity of its circular motion. Neither the line of the raindrop, nor the circle of 
the rotating dot, is a visual experience produced by the vision, a faculty in which 
only the form of that which directly presents itself to it is represented (al-baṣr 
innamā tartasimu fīhi ṣūra al-muqābil).284 Rather it is produced by the common 
sense which combines sense data that it receives and apprehends them (tajtamiʿ 
al-maḥsūsāt wa-tudriku-hā), generating the perception to which the soul 
(mushāhada).  
 
                                                             
284 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 248.   
200 
 
 Rāzī expounds on Avicenna‘s account of the common sense in the following 
way. He says the two examples of the rain drop and the rotating point illustrate 
the activity of the common sense which integrates the forms of sense data 
received by the external senses (al-quwwa allatī tajtamiʿ fīhā ṣuwar al-mahsūsāt bi’l-
hawāss al-khamsa). In the case of these two examples, the observer experiences 
the perception (mushāhada) of forms which describe a descending line and a 
rotating circle respectively. They are not in themselves sensible forms since 
neither exists in actuality in the extra-mental world. The question therefore 
arises as to where these forms come to be imprinted: the locus of their 
imprinting cannot be the external sense faculty of the vision, which only 
perceives objects which do in fact exist in the extra-mental world; nor can it be 
the substance of the soul which, being non-corporeal, cannot serve as the locus 
of corporeal forms. Their locus must therefore be an internal corporeal faculty: 
the common sense. This sense ‗sees‘ the ‗shape of a line‘ (shakl al-khaṭṭ) because 
the raindrop, when at point1, leaves the imprint of its form, having been 
received by the external sense faculty of the vision, in the common sense; but 
before this imprint can vanish from the common sense, the raindrop leaves yet 
another imprint of its form when it has reached point2; these forms are 
combined in the common sense which, as a result of this combination, perceives 
a continuous line between these two points.285  Working in concert with the 
common sense is a second faculty, the sensible memory (al-khayāl), which 
Avicenna also names the representational power (al-muṣawwira): this faculty 
acts as a storage facility which retains the images of sense data.286  
                                                             
285 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 248.   
286 Literally ‗al-khayāl‘ means ‗the imagination‘. However, for the sake of clarity, I shall translate 
it as ‗the sensible memory‘ since in Avicenna‘s psychology it refers to the faculty which stores 




Whilst the common sense receives and apprehends sense data (ṣuwar) from the 
external senses, a third faculty called the estimative faculty (al-wahm), which is 
also possessed by higher animals, receives and apprehends a fundamentally 
different percept: the ‗intention‘ (maʿnā). This percept is non-sensible but 
inheres in sensible objects. An example of such a percept is that which the sheep 
apprehends from the wolf, or that which the ram apprehends from the ewe. 
Thus, with the first example, whilst the sheep perceives the wolf‘s snarl and 
bared teeth with its external senses, which convey these data to the common 
sense, it is with the estimative faculty that the sheep perceives the wolf‘s 
predatory intentions. Such intentions are conveyed for storage in a fourth 
separate faculty called al-dhākira – or the estimative memory.287 
 
Since it has the closest interaction with the external senses, the common sense 
is located at the front of the brain; the sensible memory is situated in the 
interior cavity (al-baṭn al-muqaddam); and whilst the locus of estimative faculty is 
to be found further to the back of the brain in the middle cavity (al-tajwīf al-
awsaṭ), it employs the entire brain as its instrument (ālatu-hā al-dimāgh kullu-hu). 
The estimative faculty is served by a fifth faculty, the locus of which is the front 
part of the middle cavity. Its activity involves splitting apart and recombining 
forms taken from the common sense and intentions perceived by the estimative 
                                                                                                                                                                      
When the soul recollects a physical form, it draws on al-khayāl – the sensible memory, which is 
not to be confused with the faculty of the mutakhayyila, a word deriving from the same root as 
khayāl. The mutakhayyila actively draws on forms stored in the sensible memory (al-khayāl) and 
can compose (tarkīb) them to produce a fantastical image such as a winged horse. Since this 
activity is much closer to how we conceive of ‗the imagination‘, I shall reserve this word to 
translate al-mutakhayyila. The reader, however, must note the following: both Avicenna and Rāzī, 
confusingly, often use the word al-khayal to refer to the imagination. I shall draw the reader‘s 
attention to this fact whenever this occurs.            
287 ‗Dhākira’ literally means ‗the memory‘. I shall translate it as ‗the estimative memory‘ to avoid 
any confusion with the ‗sensible memory‘.  
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faculty. Moreover, it combines forms with intentions as well as separating the 
former from the latter (turakkib ayḍan al-ṣuwar bi’l-maʿānī wa-tufaṣṣilu-hā ʿan-hā). 
Thus Avicenna describes this power as ‘mutaṣarrifa‘ – or ‗acting without 
restriction‘ – on the two different kinds of percepts which the soul perceives 
and stores. Its activity takes place in one of three modes: (1) autonomously; (2) 
under the control of the estimative faculty; (3) under the direction of the 
intellect. Strictly speaking, since it inheres in a physical substrate, the 
immaterial intellect cannot act directly upon it. Thus the imagination can only 
directly serve the estimative faculty. When it does so, then according to Rāzī‘s 
commentary to Ishārāt 3:9, it is called the imagination (al-mutakhayyila). 
However, it can also serve the intellect (al-ʿaql), but only – and this is crucial – 
through the mediation of its immediate master, the estimative faculty. When 
serving the intellect thus, it is called the cogitative faculty (al-mufakkira). The 
close relationship between the estimative faculty and the imagination is 
reflected by the fact that they share the middle cavity of the brain. 288   
 
On the basis of Rāzī‘s commentary to al-Ishārāt 3:9, the attribution of the 
cogitative and imaginative modalities of the mutaṣarrifa to its control, either by 
                                                             
288 According to Lane’s Lexicon, ṭaṣarrafa means:  (1) ―to be employed in more than one way‖; (2) 
being synonymous with taqallaba, ―he acted in whatsoever way he pleased, according to his own 
judgement or discretion or free will, or as a free agent‖. This first meaning reflects the dual use 
of this faculty as al-mutakhayyila and al-mufakkira. When employed neither by the estimative 
faculty alone nor by the intellect through the estimative faculty‘s mediation, it acts as a free 
agent, combining forms with other forms and intentions according to its own will. As we shall 
notice in the second part of this chapter, neither Avicenna nor Rāzī offer any speculation as to 
what determines the course of its activity when it acts autonomously. For the sake of clarity and 
precision, when I wish to discuss this faculty neutrally, neither as the imagination nor the 
cogitative to the faculty, I shall refer to it as the mutaṣarrifa. It should be borne in mind that 





the estimative faculty or by the intellect (by means of the estimative faculty), 
seems straightforward. However Rāzī‘s commentary to Ishārāt 10:14, where he 
suggests the cogitative faculty can operate in service of either one or the other, 
gives us reason to be cautious of such an overhasty conclusion. Discussing the 
two obstacles which prevent the imagination from impressing the forms of 
dreams and visions in the common sense, Rāzī says:  
the second obstacle relates to the agent [i.e. the imagination which 
impresses the dream into the common sense] for when the intellect or 
the estimation uses the cogitative faculty, which becomes preoccupied 
with the service of one of them, it is not free to perform its own special 
actions.289  
It would appear therefore that the estimative faculty also engages in cogitative 
activity using the mutaṣarrifa. What the objects of its cogitation are we shall 
discuss in the next section.  
 
But to conclude our overview of the internal senses, Deborah Black identifies 
three epistemological principles by which Avicenna adduces these five internal 
faculties: 
(i) Being percepts of a fundamentally different nature, sensible forms 
(ṣuwar) and intentions (maʿānī) require different faculties to be 
perceived; 
(ii)  The same faculty cannot be both active (manipulating percepts in 
some way) and passive (receiving percepts as impressions); 
                                                             
289 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 647.  
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(iii) The same faculty cannot be both receptive and retentive, receiving 
the impressions of percepts as well as retaining them, since the 
former activity requires a malleable substrate whilst the latter 
activity requires a more stable substrate.290 
It is in mindfulness of rules (i) and (iii), points out Black, that Avicenna posits 
two pairs of receptive-retentive faculties: the common sense and the sensible 
memory to receive and retain sensible forms respectively; and the estimative 
faculty and the estimative memory to receive and retain intentions. Rule (ii) 
gives rise to the need for the imagination as a separate faculty which acts on 
percepts, dividing and reuniting sensible forms and intentions in different 
combinations. It never ceases from action. So when it is neither serving the 
estimative faculty alone, nor the intellect by way of the estimative faculty‘s 
direction, it continues its activity autonomously.  
 
6.3 The Estimative Faculty 
 
Having gained this overview of the five internal senses, I shall now explore 
further the estimative faculty and its close relationship with the imagination in 
order to present a deeper understanding of their role in Rāzī‘s conceptualization 
of Sabian worship and their use of idols in establishing noetic connection with 
the celestial spirits. 
                                                             




The relationship between the estimation and its percepts is modelled in close 
analogy to the external senses and sense data.291 The estimation is the analogue 
of reason in the animal soul.292 Its percepts are: 
…non-sense-perceptible ‗intentions‘ which exist in particular sense-
perceptible objects; like the faculty existing in sheep judging that this 
wolf is something to flee from and that this child is something to have 
affection for. It is likely that this faculty is also responsible for 
combining and separating the forms <stored in the faculty> of the 
imagination.293 
This passage reveals four aspects of the nature of the estimative faculty‘s 
percepts or ‗intentions.‘ Firstly, they cannot be perceived by the external senses. 
Secondly, they are particular. Thirdly, they inhere in sense-perceptible objects. 
Fourthly, their existence is independent of the estimative faculty perceiving 
them. The passage also reveals three aspects of the estimative faculty. Firstly, it 
is the faculty which perceives ‗intentions‘. Secondly, the estimative faculty 
reacts to them in some way. And thirdly, the estimative faculty separates and 
combines them with forms stored in the sensible memory. 
In al-Shifā, Avicenna includes in his category of intentions, together with non-
sensible percepts such as the hostility of wolves, ostensibly sensible percepts 
associated with a form, such as the sweetness of yellow honey when it is ‗seen‘ 
as being sweet rather than being judged as such by means of direct taste.294 In 
                                                             
291 Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West. 
292 For a general exploration of this point see Black, ‗Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna‘.  
293 Avicenna, De Anima, (Arabic Text), p. 45, line 6, translated in Hasse Avicenna’s De Anima in the 
Latin West. What is here translated as ‗imagination‘, I would render ‗sensible memory‘.  
294  ‗Then we may judge concerning the sensibles through intentions which we do not sense, 
which are either not sensibles in their natures at all, or which are sensibles, but we do not sense 
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this case, the sweetness of the honey is perceived neither by the external sense 
of vision, nor by the external sense most appropriate to apprehending 
sweetness, namely the sense of taste. Rather, Black argues, given its inclusion as 
an intention, the sweetness of the honey is being perceived other than as a 
sensible percept.  
In other circumstances of course, such as when I lick my finger having dipped it 
into the honey pot, the sweetness of the honey would be a sensible form, not an 
intention. Whilst some objects of perception, such as the hostility of wolves, will 
always be intentions, the status of others as such will depend on the nature of 
the perception between subject and object.  
What, therefore, does Avicenna imagine is the link between wolfish hostility and 
honey-sweetness in the context we have discussed? Black argues that the link is 
in memory. If in the past the perceiver has tasted something sweet that is 
yellow, he may come to associate yellow things with honey. Similarly, the dog 
repeatedly beaten by the stick will come to fear the stick. Having previously 
been repeatedly thrashed by a stick, the dog‘s estimation draws on the 
estimative memory (dhikr), evokes the intentions stored from those previous 
beatings and combines them with the form of a new stick.  Black says: ‗images 
must be associated with the intentions that make them icons295 of particular, 
concrete individuals.‘296  
                                                                                                                                                                      
them at the time of the judgement. . . . As for those which are sensibles, we see, for example, 
something yellow, and we judge that it is honey and sweet. For the sense does not convey this to 
it at this moment, though it is of the genus of the sensible, even if the judgement itself does not 
take place through anything sensible at all. . . .‘ Healing: Psychology, 4.1, p. 166; Van Riet, Vol. 2, 
pp. 6–7, quoted and translated in Black in Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna.   
295 Black‘s use of the word ‗icon‘, drawing on Aristotle‘s use of the Greek word ‗eikon‘ in his De 
Memoria 1.450a22–451a14, is particularly significant for the purpose of understanding how Rāzī 
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Since the estimative memory and the sensible memory are retentive and thus 
passive in nature, a third faculty is required to make links actively between 
immediately perceived intentions and those stored from previous experiences. 
This faculty is the imagination, acting under the control of the estimative 
faculty. But this would appear to defy the principle previously stated that 
activity and passivity cannot obtain in the same faculty. Mercurial in nature, the 
estimative faculty seems to be playing both active and passive roles in the 
process of cognition.  
This apparent contradiction can perhaps be resolved by examining more closely 
the principle which the estimative faculty apparently offends. The principle 
maintains that an internal sense faculty cannot be both active in relation to its 
sense objects (somehow manipulating them) and passive in relation to them (i.e. 
being impressed upon by their percepts). The apparent contradictory role of the 
estimative faculty can thus be resolved in one of two ways. One way is to modify 
this principle with the qualification that an internal sense faculty cannot act 
both actively and passively in any one given moment. Thus it may alternate 
between active and passive modes of behaviour in different moments. A second 
way to resolve the contradiction is to maintain that whilst an internal sense 
faculty cannot both receive impressions from percepts passively as well as 
manipulate them actively, it is not precluded from the ability to receive 
percepts whilst at the same time actively to manipulate a second internal 
faculty, such as the imagination, which acts on those percepts directly, linking 
them to similar percepts stored in the estimative memory. A third way is to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
portrays the use of idols as talismans in astral magic. (See Black, ‗Estimation (Wahm) in 
Avicenna‘ p.228) 
296 Black, ‗Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna‘, p.227. 
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maintain that whilst the estimative faculty cannot act on any intention it is 
receiving in the present time, it can act on those which have already been 
stored in the memory (dhikr). This third approach, however, leaves the 
imagination redundant. Of these possible approaches, it is the second which fits 
most congruently within Avicenna‘s structure of the internal sense faculties.  
The estimative faculty does not only perceive intentions but it also reacts to 
them. As Hasse points out, this becomes clear in a passage from Avicenna‘s De 
Anima concerning the estimation‘s reactions to the past and the future: 
Sometimes in the course of remembering, some grief, anger and sorrow 
arises which resembles the state <of the soul> at the time when the 
<remembered> thing was present; for the only reason of grief, anger and 
sorrow about the past is the imprinting of this form in the interior of the 
senses. If the form returns, it produces this <disposition> or something 
similar. Wishes and expectation also produce this. Expectation is 
different from wishing because expectation is the imagination of 
something with the judgement or opinion that it probably will happen, 
while wishing is the imagination of something and desire for it and the 
judgement that joy will ensue if it takes place. Fear is the opposite of 
expectation in the way of contradiction; despair is it absence. These are 
all judgements of estimation.297 
                                                             
297 Hasse, ‗Avicenna‘s De Anima in the Latin West‘, p. 133 translating Avicenna‘s De Anima, IV, 3, 
ed.Rahman, p. 187. Whether or not the estimative faculty‘s reaction to an intention amounts to a 
‗judgement‘ must be treated with caution. In his study of the estimative faculty in Avicenna‘s 
psychology, Robert E. Hall observes: ‗Judging (along with other words from the base form ḥ-k-m) 
is greatly overused by Avicenna in connection with the wahm. The meaning shifts from 
‗discriminating‘ or ‗distinguishing‘ to making judgements about what to do or what to believe, 
that is, to‘―directing‘ or ‗controlling‘. As a term in a language of analysis it has little value unless 
it is clearly qualified each time.‘ Robert E. Hall, ‗the Wahm in Avicenna‘s Psychology‘. 
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Sorrow, for example, about a past event, is the result of a judgement that the 
estimation produces when it links a retained form stored with a stored 
intention. A similar process occurs when an actual object is perceived in present 
time, such as when the sheep encounters the wolf.298  
Thus not only does the estimative faculty perceive intentions, but it also 
combines them with forms to create the perception of an integrated experience. 
For Avicenna, it is the governing critical faculty in the animal soul.299 The 
reactions or judgements which it produces such as fear or desire provide the 
impulse which harnesses the body and propels it into action. Moreover it can 
harness the imagination (al-fikr or al-quwwa al-mufakkira) to produce composite 
images without references to external images. 300 We have already encountered 
in the illustration of the dog and the stick an example of the estimative faculty 
directing the imagination which draws on the estimative memory (dhikr) and 
the sensible memory (khayal), to combine form with intention, which induces 
the estimation to produce a judgement that results in the dog‘s fear and hence 
aversion to the stick. This is a process which takes place within the animal soul 
of a dog. It is a process which also takes place within the human. But within the 
human, the estimative faculty can also harness the imagination to create 
fictional images, such as a phoenix: ‗creative imagination, then, presents us with 
an activity of human estimation which opens up the possibility of interaction 
between estimation and intellect, even if its results are merely vain ideas‘.301 In 
such a role, the estimative faculty functions as a kind of mediator between the 
intellect and the world of sensibles. 
                                                             
298 Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West, p. 134.  
299 Black, ‗Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna‘, p. 227. 
300 Black, ‗Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna‘, p. 227. 
301 Black, ‗Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna‘, p. 227. 
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Such is the degree of agency with which the estimative faculty operates in the 
human soul, that it can even override the intellect and deny the intelligibles it 
perceives. Whilst the estimative faculty‘s percepts are not essentially material, 
they are nevertheless inherent in sensible objects. Whilst it perceives non-
material objects, as governor of the animal soul, it possesses a physical 
substrate. Insofar as this is the case, the estimative faculty only understands 
things to the extent that they are rooted in a material reality. Thus it applies its 
judgement to non-sensible matters in the same way that it applies it to matters 
which have a sensible reality, giving rise to false propositions. Unlike the 
intellect, the estimative faculty is not possessed of self-awareness, and is thus 
incapable of realizing its own limitation and restraining itself from leading the 
soul into error.302 Indeed such is the strength of the estimative faculty, that it 
can impel the soul to accept judgements that the intellect knows to be false, 
such as the judgement of the uncleanliness of honey on account of its 
resemblance to yellow bile. It is awareness of this reality that induces Rāzī, 
when describing the reasoning that underlies idolatry and astral magic in al-Sirr, 
to state: ‗The soul has been created obedient to the activities of the estimative 
faculty‘. This is a striking statement which underscores the central role played 
by the estimative faculty in the process of cognition. 
 Indeed its range of activity does not cease there. As Robert E. Hall observes, it is 
by means of the agent estimative faculty (al-wahm al-ʿāmil) that the thaumaturgy 
                                                             
302 Black points out that, according to Avicenna, for many the estimation overrides the intellect 
in its insistence that a thing must occupy space and have position, inducing them to apply the 
same assumption to God, thus leading them to anthropomorphism. Thus did Avicenna explain 
the widespread and persistent phenomenon of materialism in human culture. (Black, 
‗Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna‘, p. 228). See Adamson, ‗Fakhr al-Dīn On Place‘ on Rāzī, and his 




of prophets, saints and sorcerers is performed. The emotional responses with 
which it reacts to certain stimuli can produce heat and cooling effects within 
the body as well as the expansion of the sexual organ due to the perception of a 
form generated by the imagination. Medical healing is accomplished when the 
form of health is transmitted directly from the estimative faculty of the 
physician to the patient. Furthermore, notes Hall: 
a powerful soul can go beyond its own body and through direct action 
establish new forms in the external corporeal world (in the natural, sub-
lunar realm), that is to say, act directly on other bodies; in this 
connection Avicenna mentions the ‗evil eye‘ and the ‗operant wahm‘. In 
acting on the natural world in supernatural ways, such a soul must 
operate in accordance with the intelligible structure of the world (bi-
ḥasab al-wājib al-ʿaqlī); it acts directly as soul, however without following 
the processes of Aristotelian science, where bodies that change must be 
in contact and act and be acted upon through the primary natural 
qualities of hot and cold, moist and dry. The production of miraculous 
actions as a distance by Prophets (and certain others) involves the whole 
soul qua practical (i.e., the conative moving powers in the animal level of 
the soul; al-quwwa al-ḥayawāniyya al-muḥarrika al-ijmāʿiyya); these, as we 
have seen, are under the direction of the wahm, here the operant wahm.303 
We have seen therefore that the estimation is a faculty of the soul that mediates 
between the sensible world and the world of the intellect. Although it has a 
physical substrate in the middle cavity, which it shares with the mutaṣarrifa, the 
                                                             
303 Hall, ‗the Wahm in Avicenna‘s Psychology’, p. 544. See Avicenna‘s al-Shifā: Nafs, IV.4, p. 200 
line 11-p. 201 line 9.  
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entire physical brain represents its field of operation. It commands the 
mutaṣarrifa in both its cogitative as well as its imaginative activities and thus 
effectively governs the animal soul. Whilst the objects of its perception are not 
essentially material, they nevertheless inhere in sensible objects. Under its 
direction, the imagination can construct fantastical images without reference to 
anything extra-mental. And whilst it lacks the self-awareness of the intellect, 
and often extends its judgements into areas it cannot possibly understand, it 
plays a crucial role in delivering the sensible world to the intellect for analysis. 
Finally, its activity is not restricted to cognition but extends to direct action on 
the corporeal world.  
 
6.4 Ten proofs of the soul’s occult power to affect the physical world 
 
With this knowledge of the internal senses, we are now better equipped to 
understand Rāzī‘s construction of Sabian magic. The purpose of the opening 
passage of the Psychology of al-Sirr is to establish the hypothetical reality of the 
human soul possessed of occult power insofar as such a reality cannot be denied 
or dismissed as impossible (lā yabʿud). This proposition rests on two premises: 
(1) the soul‘s estimative faculty can affect the physical world; and (2) if it were 
admitted that there are souls whose power to affect the physical world is weak 
then the reverse, namely the existence of souls whose power to affect the 
physical world is strong, remains at the least a logical possibility. In this section 
I shall present the first of these premises in detail; the second requires no 
213 
 
further examination other than the observation which I shall make at the 
conclusion of this section.  
The first premise is supported by ten observations which carry a number of 
implications which require attention. The soul‘s occult power is grounded in 
two processes: ‗the purification of the soul and the connection304 of the activities 
of the estimative faculty305 (taṣfiyat al-nafs wa-taʿlīq al-awhām)‘. The ten 
observations adduced to support the reality of the occult power that lies in 
potential in the soul‘s estimative faculty emphasize the second of these two 
processes.306 Here they are in summary:   
 
(i) When an archer wants to shoot an arrow at a specific target, he will be 
unable to do so unless he focuses his heart (jamaʿa al-qalb): then will he 
strike his target (tajrī al-iṣāba).  
(ii) When the mountain goat wants to descend from lofty peaks then it 
forms an intention to reach a smaller peak (ʿamadat ilā qillat al-jabal), the 
height of which is but two or three miles; it then mentally focuses on a 
safe landing (tafakkarat fī al-salāma fikran ṣaḥīhan); and then it hurls itself 
towards the small peak, landing safely on its horns. Were it not for its 
visualization of safety (law lā taṣawwuru-hā li’l-salāma) then it would 
perish. 307  
                                                             
304 Connection is my translation of taʿlīq which is a doubly transitive verb meaning ‗to make 
something attach or connect with something else‘; its second direct object (which is not 
mentioned in this case) is governed by the preposition ʿalā. For the efficacy of magical ritual, 
therefore, that to which the estimative faculty is made to connect is of crucial importance.   
305 wahm can refer both to the estimative faculty itself as well as its activity; it plural awhām, used 
here refers to the faculties activities.  
306 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 11-12.  
307Being deprived of an intellect, the faculty with which the mountain goat visualizes the non-
material, particular object of safety must be its estimative faculty. The mountain-goat engages in 
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(iii) Both reason and scripture (al-ʿaql wa’l-naql) concur that the Evil Eye 
is a reality, and this can only be due to psychic influence (ta’thīr nafsānī).  
(iv) Walking over a bridge near the ground would not constitute any 
difficulty; however, if it were situated on high ground, an man‘s with 
imagination of falling (takhayyul al-suqūṭ) might send him over the edge. 
(v) If imaginative visualizations can act as the causes (asbāb) for the 
powers in the limbs to become principles for action, having merely 
existed as principles in potentiality, then it is not impossible for them to 
act directly on other bodies.  
(vi) Experience and reason (al-tajriba wa’l-qiyās) testify that visualizations 
can be principles for the generation of qualities in bodies (mabādi’ li-
ḥudūth al-kayfiyāt fī al-abdān): for example, intense anger can give rise to 
very intense heat.308  
(vii) There is consensus that the one suffering from a nose bleed (al-
marʿūf) should be prevented from looking at red objects and the epileptic 
should be prevented from looking at excessively bright or rotating 
objects, for fear of inducing a seizure.  
(viii) When a hen imitates a rooster in its cry and aggressiveness, its legs 
grow spurs like that of a rooster and this shows that bodily conditions 
are subject to psychic conditions (al-aḥwāl al-nafsāniya).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
a form of ‗tafakkur‘ or thought; this must be produced by al-mutaṣṣarifa, directed by the 
estimative faculty the governing faculty in the animal soul. Of course, the mountain goat has no 
intellect, so I refer to the faculty which produces its ‗thought‘ with the neutral label ‗al-
mutaṣarrifa‘.   
308 The humorous illustrative example that Rāzī adduces is as follows: ‗It has been related that a 
king was once afflicted by hemiplegia, the treatment of which the physicians were incapable. So 
one astute individual of their number unexpectedly assailed him with violent verbal abuse; his 
anger inflamed, the king leapt from the place where he was lying to strike his abuser and so the 
blockages were flushed away (fa indafaʿat al-mawād) on account of the heat of anger and so this 
strong illness ceased‘, Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 12.  
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(ix) Variety in visualization exerts an effect on the body. Because of their 
proximity to humans, domestic animals have greater sensitivity than 
wild animals and have a wider imagniational range. As a result, there is, 
apparently, greater physical variety amongst species of domestic 
animals.    
 (x) A man‘s voice and demeanour change in accordance with his mood 
and visualizations (taṣawwurātu-hu al-nafsāniya).   
From these ten illustrations, four themes emerge which anticipate subsequent 
discussions on the soul‘s purification and the process of making the estimative 
faculty connect with an intended goal. They will remain centrally important to 
the psychology of al-Sirr. Firstly, the illustrations of the archer aiming at his 
target in (i), and the mountain goat focusing on a safe landing in (ii), underscore 
the fact that the measure of the soul‘s ability to divest itself of all distractions 
other than its aim, is the measure of its ability to achieve that aim which, in 
both cases, involves changing physical external reality. As we shall discover 
later in this chapter, purification divests the soul of those character traits and 
humoral imbalances which distract it from focusing on its purpose. Secondly the 
soul‘s potential to affect the physical world extends not just to the body which it 
inhabits, as illustrated in (vi), (viii), (ix) and (x), but also to external bodies as 
indicated by (v) and (iii). Thirdly the soul‘s activities of visualization (taṣawwur), 
mental focus (tafakkur), and imagining (takhayyul) are crucial to the exercise of 
its occult power as illustrated by (ii), (iv), (ix) and (x): all three of these cognate 
activities are generated by the imagination closely directed by the estimative 
faculty. And fourthly, intense emotion, as exemplified by the fear of the man 
walking over the chasm in (iv), and the rage of the verbally abused king in (vi), 
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greatly magnify occult power and the effect of the soul‘s visualization and 
imagination. Circumstances can be manipulated such that intense emotion can 
be generated in order to bring about the desired result, as in the case of the 
enterprising physician curing the king‘s hemiplegia by means of verbal abuse. 
This is of crucial significance for the arrangement of the planetary rituals of al-
Sirr.  
The fourth illustration of the man walking over the wooden bridge suspended 
over a deep chasm derives from Avicenna‘s al-Shifa.309 It demonstrates the extent 
to which the soul is subject to the external senses.  It raises an interesting 
question which goes to the heart of his conception of the estimative faculty‘s 
cognitive process. The assessment of peril by the estimative faculty, leading to 
its reaction – or judgement - of fear, derives initially from its perception of the 
danger inherent in the situation. What role does the intention play in this 
process? It would appear that the estimative faculty extracts the intention of 
peril from the sensory data that the common sense receives, in much the same 
way that the sheep extracts the intention of danger from the hungry wolf. Both 
of these examples seem to illustrate an instinctual response to a situation, as 
opposed to the reaction of the dog which has learnt through painful experience 
to be wary of the man wielding the stick. Thus, having extracted the intention of 
peril from the situation, the estimative faculty of our weak-kneed bridge walker 
judges the danger accordingly, giving rise to fear, prompting his imagination to 
generate the vertiginous feeling of falling which ultimately translates into 
reality. 
 
                                                             
309 See Avicenna, De Anima, p. 200, lines 1-4.  
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The illustration is also to be found in al-Ishārāt 10:26 where Avicenna says:  
the estimative imagining of the man walking across a tree stump which 
traverses empty space (wahm al-māshī ʿalā jadhiʿ maʿrūḍ fawq faḍā) affects 
his loss of footing in a way that a similar estimative imagining does not, 
were the tree stump resting on firm ground.310  
The estimative imagining of falling is occasioned by the walker‘s vertiginous 
awareness of his circumstances and the fear thereby induced. That the 
immediate cause of the man‘s loss of footing is his imagination of falling 
(takhayyul al-suqūṭ) is made more explicit in Rāzī‘s version of this illustration in 
al-Sirr. Reading each version of the illustration in light of the other underscores 
the close link between the estimative faculty (al-wahm) and the imagination (al-
takhayyul).  Avicenna adduces this example in Ishārāt 10:26 in order to illustrate 
his assertion that: 
the disposition of belief which is consolidated (in the soul), and whatever 
corollaries arise from it, can flow to the body despite the fact that (the 
soul) is separate from it in essence.311 
Commenting on this passage in his commentary to the Ishārāt, Rāzī says: 
psychic dispositions (al-hay’āt al-nafsānīya) can act as the principle causes 
for the coming to be of things which come to be in bodies (mabādi li-
ḥudūth al-ḥawādith fī al-abdān) despite the fact that souls are separate 
from them (maʿa kawn al-nufūs mubāyina lahā).312  
Avicenna, explains Rāzī, supports this assertion with four arguments. The first 
three are of concern to us here:  
                                                             
310 Avicenna, in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 657.  
311 Avicenna, in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.657. 
312 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.658. 
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the first is that a man can walk on a plank of wood (khashaba) which has 
been placed on the ground but were this plank of wood placed on the 
edge of a wall then his foot would not be so sure (lamma tamakkana min al-
mashī ʿalayhā) and this is for no other reason than that the estimative 
imagination of falling necessitates falling (tawahhum al-suqūṭ yūjib al-
suqūṭ). The second is that the humoral balances (amzija) of men change 
according to changes within their psychic states, with respect to anger, 
grief, fear and joy: that is known self-evidently (maʿlūm bi’l-ḍurūra). The 
third is that the intense focus of the estimative faculty (at-tawahhum al-
shadīd) on illness or health may cause that very state; this is known by 
way of both anecdote and induction (al-ikhtibār wa’l-istiqrā).313 
The ability of intense emotional states such as ‗anger, grief, fear and joy‘ to 
transform the humoral balance, and thus of the soul to transform the physical 
world is once again highlighted, resonating with the illustration of the king‘s 
rage in al-Sirr.  
This is anticipated in al-Ishārāt 10:6 which discusses the ability of the man 
possessed of gnosis (ʿārif) to perform acts with a power which far exceeds 
normal human capacity. Avicenna reasons in the following way: in a state of 
emotional equilibrium, an individual will have a limited power to act; when 
overcome by certain emotional states such as fear or grief, this power to act is 
reduced to one tenth of its usual capacity; when overcome by other states such 
as joy or rage, his usual capacity to act is greatly magnified. Concerning this 
passage, Rāzī comments: 
                                                             
313 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 658. 
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The upshot of this reasoning is that we see <the soul‘s> power varying in 
strength and weakness in accordance with the variation in psychic states 
(aḥwāl nafsānīya). So it is not impossible for he who is possessed of gnosis 
to have a state of soul that is the cause of the intensification of his power 
to the extent that he can perform an act which breaches the usual course 
of events (khāriq li’l-ʿāda). This reasoning is similar to what they say in 
order to prove saintly power (quwwa qudsiyya), which is that we see 
people‘s states of understanding vary: there are those who are average; 
those who are above average; and those who are below. Therefore since 
we see the furthest extreme of deficiency (al-nuqṣān) ends with those 
who have no understanding except but a little, then it is not impossible 
(lā yustabʿad) that the opposite extreme of extraordinary <capacity> (al-
ziyāda) ends with those who are able to perform supernatural feats.314  
Four issues of note emerge from this commentary. Firstly, while Avicenna 
merely alludes to acts performed with an extraordinary capacity, Rāzī explicitly 
identifies them acts which breach the usual course of events (khāriq li’l-ʿāda). 
Secondly, Rāzī couches his commentary on this passage in the language of 
deficiency (al-nuqṣān) and extraordinary capacity (al-ziyāda); this resonates very 
deliberately with the language of human perfection with which he expresses his 
ideas concerning prophethood and sainthood that appear in his discussion of 
prophethood al-Maṭālib. Thirdly, by contrasting the deficiency of understanding 
of those at one end of the human spectrum with the extraordinary capacity of 
those who are able to perform supernatural feats at the other extreme, Rāzī 
highlights the close connection between knowledge and power that is 
                                                             




emphasized in the introduction to al-Sirr. And fourthly, he ends his commentary 
on this passage by citing the (albeit inconclusive) proof for the logical possibility 
of saintly power which reasons that if the existence of one extreme of human 
ignorance were admitted, then the existence of its opposite cannot be dismissed. 
Rāzī deploys the very same proof to close the opening section of the psychology 
of al-Sirr in order to establish the reality of the soul possessed of occult power as 
the main subject of the chapter‘s inquiry. Treating the ability of the soul to 
affect change in the corporeal world, he says:       
…we observe that these effects differ in their strength and weakness. For, 
just as we see that this kind of influence can be weak in one man, it is not 
impossible (lā yabʿud) that there can be a man in whom this kind of 
influence is powerful such that he is capable of performing that which 
others are powerless to perform.315 
 
 
6.5 Innate Occult Power 
 
Having grounded the soul‘s occult power (quwwat al-nafs ʿalā al-ityān bi’l-fiʿl al-
khāriq li’l-ʿāda) in the processes of purification and the focusing of the estimative 
power, Rāzī examines the logical possibilities that such power can either be 
innate (naẓariyya) or acquired (kasbiyya). Before he expounds on acquired occult 
power, the main focus of the Psychology of al-Sirr, he presents two alternative 
philosophical positions to explain the reality of the soul innately possessed of 
occult power: the first proposes that the human soul is a self-subsisting 
                                                             
315 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 12 
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substance; the second, that the soul is identical to the humoral temperament. If 
this first position were accepted, then the logical possibility of a soul which 
differs from all other souls, by virtue of its self-subsisting substance, must be 
accepted; such a soul can be characterized by a unique power which enables it to 
perform feats which are beyond the abilities of other human souls. This is the 
position which Rāzī himself adopts: 
The supporting proof establishing its in-born nature rests on a premise, 
namely whether it is a self-subsisting substance (jawhar qā’im bi-dhāti-hi) 
or merely equivalent to the unique humoral temperament (ʿibāra ʿan 
hādhā al-mizāj al-makhṣūṣ). If we accept the first disjunct then it is not 
impossible (lā yamtaniʿ) that one man‘s soul can differ in quiddity from 
all other souls; furthermore, by virtue of its unique quiddity (al-māhiya al-
makhṣūṣa), it is characterized by a power (qudra) which does not obtain in 
other souls; so it follows that this soul is able to perform acts of which 
others are incapable. Such is the case were we to aver that human souls 
differ in their quiddity - which is the truth.316  
The second position by way of contrast maintains that: human souls are in fact 
equal and one in their quiddity; the soul is identical to the humoural 
temperament; the differences between souls arise from variations in their 
humoural temperaments; and the power to perform supernatural acts derives 
from a unique humoural temperament. Rāzī says:    
If we were to say that they are one in their quiddity then there can be no 
doubt that they differ on account of their bodily tools (al-ālāt al-badaniya) 
and the accidents of their souls (al-aʿrāḍ al-nafsāniya). So it is not unlikely 
                                                             
316 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 12-13.  
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(lā yabʿud) that some souls (baʿḍ al-anfus) can be especially characterized 
by a special humoral temperament (mizāj makhṣūṣ) which functions as its 
tool for the performance of acts which breach the usual course of events 
(al-afʿāl al-khāriqa li’l-ʿāda) or that some psychic accidents, by which they 
are specially characterized, empower them to perform these breaches 
(al-khawāriq); for when the light of the unseen world becomes manifest to 
these souls (idhā tajallā li-tilka al-nufūs nūr ʿālam al-ghayb), they become 
empowered to perform that which other souls cannot perform. […] If we 
assert that the soul is naught but this special humoural temperament 
then there is no doubt that humoral temperaments vary. So it is not 
unlikely (lā yabʿud) that there can be a wondrous humoral temperament 
which empowers the one possessed of it to perform that which others 
cannot perform. So it is established from what we have mentioned that 
that cannot be deemed unlikely (lā istibʿāda fī dhālika).317 
Thus on the basis of two competing philosophical positions on the nature of the 
human soul, Rāzī constructs two alternative theories to explain the nature of 
the soul innately possessed of occult power. Whilst he clearly indicates his 
preference for the first over the second, he provides no refutation of the latter. 
This is because his main purpose is to construct a theory of magic which 
explains how occult power might be acquired. The internal coherence of the 
theory which he constructs is unaffected by which particular doctrine on the 
soul is to be preferred. The existence of the soul innately possessed of occult 
power is couched in hypothetical language: neither argument represents proofs 
                                                             
317 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 13. 
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of the actual but rather the possible existence of such souls. Only empirical 
proof could sustain the positive assertion of their actual existence:   
As for the definite assertion of its reality it is something that cannot be 
known unless it is witnessed (amā al-jazm bi-wuqūʿihi fa-min ma lā yuʿraf 
illā bi’l-mushāhada). All this discussion applies in the case of when the 
soul‘s power to breach (natural law) is innate (fiṭriyya).318  
This minor and limited digression into the nature of the soul arises from the 
need to place the subsequent discussion on the nature of the soul‘s acquisition 
of occult power within a broader philosophical framework. A brief outline of 
that framework, as presented in al-Maṭālib, would serve to contextualize this 
short discussion in al-Sirr.319 Here he lists three general positions which identify 
the nature of self320 as: (1) the body; (2) an accident which inheres in the body 
(ʿaraḍ sārī fī jism); (3) an abstracted substance (jawhar mujarrad). Since for Rāzī it 
is self-evident (ḍurūrī) that the soul is a substance (jawhar) as opposed to an 
accident (ʿaraḍ), he immediately eliminates the second of these three 
disjuncts.321  The two remaining disjuncts reflect the two competing 
philosophical positions on the nature of the human soul which are presented in 
al-Sirr. In al-Maṭālib, Rāzī divides the first of the two remaining disjuncts into two 
competing positions, which alternatively identify the self with: (1a) the body or; 
(1b) a body within the body (jism mushābik li’l-badn). The first of these, (1a), is the 
position adopted by the mutakallimūn and the majority of people (jumhūr al-nās); 
                                                             
318 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 13. 
319 Rāzī, al-Maṭalib 7, pp. 33-138.  
320 Literally the anā, or the ―I‖.  
321 Rāzī, al-Maṭalib 7, pp. 37-8.  
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the second, (1b) comprises eight competing positions, each of which 
respectively identifies the self as:  
(i) The four humours (al-akhlāṭ al-arbaʿā); 
(ii) The blood; 
(iii) The subtle blood produced in the left side of the heart; 
(iv) The spirit (rūḥ) which rises from the heart to the brain; 
(v) An indivisible part of the heart; 
(vi) A subtle, luminous, lofty body (jism nūrānī ʿalawī khafīf) which has a 
completely different quiddity (māhiya) from the physical body; 
(vii) A part of the physical body that endures throughout a lifespan; 
(viii) The chief organs which do not endure after death.322   
In al-Sirr, the eight competing positions of (1b) are reduced to just one, the 
temperament (mizāj), which is equivalent to the first of these eight, namely the 
four humours. Moreover, the conventional position of (1a) adopted by the 
mutakallimūn, namely that the self is equivalent to the body, does not feature in 
al-Sirr as a viable account of the soul innately possessed of occult power, 
discussion of which is expedited by confining the reader‘s attention to the 
simple dichotomy of the soul as a self-subsisting substance or as equivalent to a 
special temperament.  
In a related passage in the al-Ishārāt, of which Rāzī must have been mindful 
when writing this passage in al-Sirr, Ibn Sīnā asserts that the soul‘s occult power 
derives from its temperament (mizāj).323 Such power can arise from the 
temperament in one of three ways: (1) it can be primordial (aṣlī), characterizing 
                                                             
322 Rāzī, al-Maṭalib 7, pp. 37-8. 
323 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2 , p. 660.  
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the soul from its very incipience; (2) it can occur to the soul at a later stage in its 
career, through no effort of its own; and (3) it can be acquired. Commenting on 
this passage, Rāzī observes that since Avicenna asserts that human souls are 
equal in their quiddity (mutasāwiya fī tammām al-māhiya)324  then special occult 
power must arise in a way that is not essential (dhātī) but accidental (ʿaraḍī): it is 
for this reason that Avicenna identifies occult power with the soul‘s 
temperament. Expounding on the third way in which occult power obtains in 
the soul, Rāzī says:  
The third is that this power obtains by way of acquisition and exertion in 
spiritual discipline and purification of the soul (al-kasb wa’l-ijtihād fī al-
riyāḍa wa taṣfiya al-nafs), just as it obtains in the pious friends of God.325 
This leads us now to examine the main focus of the Psychology of al-Sirr: the 
acquisition of occult power. Rāzī‘s polemical strategy is to amplify, using 
Avicennan psychology, the ability of ordinary human souls to develop the level 
of occult power only displayed by prophets.  
 
6.6 Acquired Occult Power 
 
Replicating the dichotomy between souls innately possessed of occult power 
and those who possess such power by way of acquisition, the conditions which 
must be fulfilled in the case of the latter are similarly divided between those 
                                                             
324 Rāzī grumbles that in none of his works does Avicenna provide any proof for this position, 
which lies in contrast to the position that the soul is a self-subsisting substance which may 
therefore differ in its quiddity from other human souls, as highlighted in al-Sirr (Rāzī Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt, 2, p.660).  
325 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 661.   
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which are in-born (ghayr muktasab)326 and those which can be fulfilled by means 
of the aspirant‘s exertion. Those conditions which are in-born relate to the 
astrological conditions which obtain at the moment of his birth:  these 
determine his potential for success in this endeavour. The second category of 
conditions, by way of contrast, can be fulfilled by the aspirant‘s efforts: they 
relate to the observance of the correct spiritual austerities that enable the soul 
to connect with the celestial spirits which empower him to perform magic. They 
divide into those which relate to the management of the physical body and 
those which relate to the disposition that the adept is required to inculcate 
within his soul. In both content and arrangement, this section prefigures Rāzī‘s 
commentary on Ishārāt 9:8 which treats of the conditions for successful spiritual 
purification, dividing them into those which are in-born (ghayr muktasab) and 
those which can be fulfilled by means of spiritual exertion; this latter category is 
similarly divided between the management of the body and the disposition 
which the spiritual aspirant is encouraged to foster in his soul.327 
I shall now turn to how al-Sirr treats the acquisition of occult power, discussing 
those conditions for magical self-realization which the adept can attempt to 
fulfil by means of his own exertion. I shall divide them between: (1) the spiritual 
                                                             
326 Literally meaning ‗that which cannot be acquired‘.  
327 In al-Ishārāt 9:8, Avicenna says: ‗The (knower) needs spiritual discipline (riyāḍa): this spiritual 
discipline is aimed at three goals. The first is to remove from the path of choice that which is 
other than the Truth; the second is to make the commanding soul obedient to the tranquil soul 
(al-nafs al-muṭma’inna) so that the imaginative and estimative faculties are drawn towards 
estimative activities (al-tawahhumāt) that correspond to the state of sanctity (al-amr al-qudsī), 
avoiding those imaginative activities which correspond to the lowly state (al-amr al-suflī); the 
third is to make the innermost essence subtly sensitive to mindful receptivity  (talṭīf al-sirr li’l-
tannabuh). Genuine asceticism assists (the realization) of the first. A number of matters assist in 
(the realization of) the second: worship mediated by contemplation (al-ʿibāda al-mashfūʿa bi-
l’fikra), tunes which are used on the faculties of the soul which have been composed to 
accompany discourse (kalām) such as are appealing to the imaginative faculty (al-awhām); such 
didactic discourse is to be uttered by someone who is pure, whose turn of phrase is eloquent, 
whose tune is sweet, containing the best guidance. <The realization of the third> is assisted by 
subtle thought,  pure love, the state of which is determined by the qualities of the beloved, not 
by the rule of the appetite‘. (Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 605).  
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austerities which relate to the physical management of the body, highlighting 
close affinities with Rāzī‘s commentary on Ishārāt 9:8; and (2) the disposition of 
the soul which the adept is required to nurture.328   
 
6.7  On the means by which occult power is acquired 
 
The fulfilment of those conditions relating to the management of the body and 
those relating to the soul‘s disposition serves but one aim: to remove all 
distractions which may arrest the soul‘s attention so that it can focus on 
connection with the celestial spirits. Before examining the required disposition 
of the soul, I shall examine the physical austerities prescribed for the adept.   
6.7.1 Physical austerities 
 
The adept is required to carefully monitor the quality of his diet. An imbalanced 
diet would impair his ability to connect with the celestial spirits for a number of 
reasons: if any one of the four humours gained preponderance in the body, the 
nature of his thoughts and imaginings would adopt the hue of the dominant 
humour and thus resist focusing on the connection he is trying to achieve:  
 Just as he must purify his heart from base, superfluous thoughts (kamā 
wajaba ʿalayhi tanqīya al-qalb ʿan fuḍūl al-afkār al-radīya) he must also 
purify his body from base superfluous humours (fuḍūl al-akhlāṭ al-radīya). 
For, if he is dominated by one of the four humours, then his imaginings 
                                                             
328 Since my analysis divides them into the physical and the mental, I shall not deal with these 
conditions in the order that they appear in al-Sirr.    
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and thoughts (takhayyulātu-hu wa-tafakkurātu-hu) will accord with that 
humour, and the purpose will not be fulfilled.329 
Whilst humoral imbalance thwarts the soul‘s noetic connection, the celestial 
spirits are averse to connection with a human soul that has been nourished on 
food derived from anything that possesses a spirit: strict veganism therefore 
becomes a necessity during the period in which the adept is attempting noetic 
connection.330 On account of their propensity to ‗corrupt‘ the brain, the Sabians, 
according to Rāzī, avoided all smoked foods and beans.331 Similarly, they avoided 
excessive eating which, being inevitably accompanied by excessive drinking, 
produces noxious vapours which confuse and debilitate the brain. Of course, 
such an understanding of the effect of nourishment on the body demands 
medical expertise. Rāzī remarks:  
And so from this it becomes apparent that the practitioner of this craft 
must possess knowledge of medicine and he must also use everything 
which fortifies the brain and heart and which purifies them from stain 
and dirt.332  
This strict diet is understood as purifying the brain and heart, which is 
necessary for the soul‘s purification. The adept is also required to reduce his 
amount of consumption since the soul‘s preoccupation with digestion diverts its 
attention away from employing the higher faculties:  
Careful attention must be paid to one‘s diet with respect to both quantity 
and quality. As for quantity, this involves its reduction for preoccupation 
with eating  is a great distraction preventing the soul from engaging in 
                                                             
329 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 14 
330 Why the celestial souls should disdain the non-vegan is not explained.  
331 This is reminiscent of the Pythagorean prohibition against beans.  
332 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 14.   
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any other task for seldom is a man capable of perception and movement, 
let alone thought (fikr) and remembrance of God (dhikr)  after excessive 
eating.  This is the case because the soul cannot combine management of 
eating, with perception and movement, and so it relinquishes 
management of perception and movement so that it is able to manage 
the digestive process which prevents it from managing perception and 
movement despite the fact that the soul is very familiar with both – so 
what would you suppose would happen with respect to thought and 
focusing on the World of the Unseen (inṣirāf ilā ʿālam al-ghayb) when the 
soul is unfamiliar with that?333 
Digestion therefore distracts the soul from engaging its higher faculties; thus, if 
the adept trained his soul to subsist on the barest minimum it needed to survive, 
the aim of connecting with the celestial intellects would be facilitated. 
The ability to subsist on but little nourishment is viewed by Avicenna as one of 
the characteristics of those possessed of divine gnosis (ʿārifīn). In his Ishārāt he 
provides a naturalistic account of how this is possible.334 He observes how fear 
can lead to the collapse of a man‘s desire; cause the malfunctioning of his 
digestion; and render void his ability to perform actions of which he is 
otherwise entirely capable. This represents evidence that the soul‘s state can 
affect the body. Commenting on this reasoning, Rāzī says: 
If such is the case, then it is not impossible (fa-lā imtināʿa) that the 
immersion of the gnostic‘s soul in the love of God the exalted, and its 
complete release from corporeal ties can be a cause for the descent into 
                                                             
333 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 14.   
334 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 782 -786. 
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the <bodily> natural powers (al-quwā al-ṭabīʿiyya) dispositions 
appropriate to that disposition, with the result that the <natural powers> 
do not engage in the dissolution of original nourishment (al-ajzā al-aṣlīya) 
and hunger does not arise.335   
In his commentary to al-Ishārāt 10:4, Rāzī explains that when the bodily powers 
are disciplined by the rational soul the former become attracted to the latter; 
when this attraction becomes powerful, they no longer engage in their usual 
activity of digestion. Since physical nourishment is not dissolved by the bodily 
powers, which have been drawn towards the rational soul, the one possessed of 
gnosis can survive on but little food.336  
The importance of reducing consumption explains the forty days‘ fast to 
establish this noetic connection which Rāzī attributes to the Sabians. He reports: 
They said it is necessary that, at the beginning <of the period> of fasting 
they break their fast with <an amount> similar to that which they are 
accustomed to eating; then they should reduce it each night, regularly 
and in increments, bit by bit, until finally by the end they break their fast 
on the barest minimum needed to stay alive. As for the quality, they have 
said that it is necessary to avoid eating anything that derives from 
something possessed of a spirit; indeed the food must consist of seeds, 
olive oil, and if not then of sesame oil and if they want to mix these seeds 
with herbs which people traditionally cook with these seeds, then there 
is no problem with that. Once the forty days have been completed in this 
way then their souls have become pure, and their spirits immaculate; 
                                                             
335 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 784. 
336 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 633-5.  
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they become master of the occult sciences (ghawāmiḍ al-ʿulūm); and they 
are empowered to strike healthy bodies with disease and the reverse.337  
Strict diet and fasting thus purifies the human soul, releasing it from bodily 
preoccupations to connect with the celestial spirits from which it receives two 
things: occult knowledge and power.  
 
6.7.2 Fortification of the brain and the heart: al-Sirr 
 
The effect of such a dramatic reduction in food intake would no doubt be 
debilitating, causing deficiencies in the heart and the brain: this imbalance 
would thus thwart connection with the celestial spirits just as much as the 
excessive consumption of food. Rāzī lists three means of correcting this 
imbalance and fortifying the soul, which are available to the adept observing 
this spiritual regimen. The first involves:  
fortifying <the soul> by means of perfume. For fragrant scent greatly 
fortifies the heart and mind in such a way that the soul is not required to 
manage it in the same way that it is required to manage eating, so the 
fortification occurs without distraction.338  
The second stratagem involves the use of ‗mple, bright joyful visuals‘ (al-
mubṣarāt al-basīṭa al-muḍī’a al-bahija) that uplift the spirit. They must not 
however be so attractive as to distract the soul from its focus. They must 
therefore be simple in their arrangement and cannot involve intricate patterns:  
                                                             
337 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.14.   
338 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.14.   
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they must be simple. For, were the wall of a house painted with intricate 
patterns of many colours then souls would be distracted by their 
contemplation and would be cut off from their objective. For this reason 
it is prohibited to place a man afflicted by delirium in a painted house.339 
They must employ bright colours which, deriving from light, provide the soul 
respite from its privations:  
 The second condition is that they must be bright and that is because by 
its very nature, light is beloved, whilst darkness is something which 
frightens the soul; for this reason, he who is struck by melancholia is 
always in a state of fear; when the soul sees light it relaxes (insharaḥat), is 
strengthened, and finds rest.340  
Moreover, they should be as joyful as they are bright: 
…since colours are of two types: illuminating and bright (mushriqa wa 
muḍī’a) like pure white, yellow, pink, and green; and dark (muẓlima) such 
as black, ambergris, and grey. Gazing on bright colours imbues the heart 
with joy and since the colour closest to light and simplicity is white, the 
Prophet, on whom be peace, said: ‗the best clothes are white‘.341  
But so that the use of a visual object does not defeat the purpose of fortifying 
the soul and maintaining its focus on the matter at hand, it is stipulated that: 
yearning for something else should not be consequent on gazing upon it 
for were that the case then the soul would be distracted with that 
                                                             
339 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 14-15.    
340 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 15.   
341 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 15.   
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consequence just as when the gaze falls upon the form of a beautiful 
human, the desire is stirred; or just as when the gaze falls upon gold and 
silver and fine clothes, then covetousness is stimulated.342  
The third stratagem involves: 
Fortifying the soul through music (samāʿ): this is because sound in itself 
cannot be described as pleasant or ugly. For, were any sound just to be 
extended just as it is, no pleasantness would there be in it: rather delight 
arises only when it moves from high to low (al-intiqāl min ḥādd ilā thaqīl) 
and vice versa. For pleasantness in reality arises from how it occurs to 
the soul when it compares some sounds to others; this pleasantness only 
arises when the soul is engaged and we have already explained that the 
human soul is innately disposed towards love of perception (majbūl ʿalā 
ḥubb al-idrāk). So when it hears comely sounds, the two phenomena 
occur to it and the attainment of that which is beloved is delightful. So it 
follows that music is a principle for the purification of the heart and 
brain. Know, moreover, that these matters only bring benefit in the 
course of spiritual discipline if <used> sparingly, like salt in food. Were 
they employed excessively such that the soul becomes distracted by 
them, then they would be an obstacle in the way of the goal. Thus is the 
discourse on how to abstract the soul and strip it away from its 
customary preoccupations (al-ma’lūfāt); and let that be a gradual, not an 
excessive, process or the soul will be unable to endure it.343  
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The description in al-Sirr of the methods for the soul‘s fortification during this 
period of fasting anticipates Rāzī‘s commentary on al-Ishārāt 9:8. The content 
however has been differently arranged. As in al-Sirr, Rāzī divides those 
requirements which must be fulfilled to ensure the success of spiritual discipline 
into those which cannot and those which can be secured by the aspirant‘s 
individual efforts.344 The requirements which fall into the latter category, as in 
al-Sirr, are further divided into those which relate to the physical regulation of 
the body and those which relate to the disposition which the aspirant must 
nurture in his soul. It is to the description of physical regulation that we now 
turn our attention. 
Physical regulation involves the ‗relinquishing of superfluities and the 
correction of necessary things (tark al-fuḍūl wa iṣlāḥ al-ḍurūriyāt)‘.345  The former 
entails the exercise of self-restraint towards the acquisition of objects of desire 
such as wealth, reputation, power and knowledge of the kind which does not 
avail the soul propinquity to God. The realization of this station (maqām) is 
difficult for such pleasures are immediately present whilst the pleasure of the 
intellect is not (ghā’ib); the former pleasures are familiar to us whilst the latter 
are unfamiliar; and the former, with which we are intimately familiar, must be 
sacrificed if the latter are to be realized.346  
                                                             
344 In contrast with the astrological conditions relating to the adept‘s natal chart, Rāzī‘s 
commentary on Ishārāt 9:8 stipulates that the aspirant‘s ‗soul is suitably receptive and suited to 
the task (mustaʿidda li-hadhā al-ḥadīth mulā’ima lahu) for were it not, then spiritual discipline 
would be of no avail because its effect is but to remove obstacles, to raise veils and curtains; the 
removal of obstacles does not suffice for the realization of the goal; rather there must be 
someone to receive who has the correct receptivity (qābil mustaʿidd). If the soul does not have 
the correct receptivity then spiritual discipline will not provide any felicity at all. It will, 
however, provide peace, for when bodily ties reduce and are weakened, the soul will not be 
tormented after it has left, craving the body.‘ Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 605-606. 
345 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.607.  
346 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.607 
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The ‗necessary things‘ which are to be corrected relate to those things which 
feed stimuli to the five external senses. He treats sensory objects in the 
following order: taste, sight, hearing, smell and touch. All are to be modified and 
controlled in the pursuit of the disciplining of the soul. The objects of taste (al-
madhūqāt) are given priority only insofar as the equilibrium of the body, and 
thus of the soul, is profoundly affected by the physical nourishment on which it 
depends: the state of the stomach often determines the soul‘s sensitivity or 
coarseness. The soul‘s preoccupation with the digestion of large amounts of food 
constitutes an impediment to its engagement with the intellectual world, ‗the 
original direction of prayer‘ (al-qibla al-aṣliyya). Conversely, if the stomach is 
empty for any length of time, the major organs become enfeebled and 
imbalanced; the soul becomes confused; thought agitated; and the intellect loses 
its equilibrium. With respect to nourishment therefore, a diet which comprises 
small portions of high quality food is recommended. The careful selection of 
high quality food targets the needs of the body‘s major organs, freeing the soul 
from the imbalances of malnourishment and the sloth of excessive 
consumption.347    
Objects of vision (al-mubṣarāt) are divided into colours and bodies and are 
discussed firstly in terms of the general effects they exert on the soul, and then 
specifically as visual foci of contemplation. Colours are divided into those which 
are bright (mushraq), a category which includes pure green, red, yellow and 
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white; and those which are dark (muẓlama) such as black and brown.348 Gazing at 
bright colours: 
…gives succour to the spirit; gladdens the heart; and delights the soul for 
light is the object of the spirit‘s love and desire. And gazing at dark 
colours disturbs the spirit and aggrieves the heart.349 
The adept (al-murīd) must therefore ensure his abode and his clothing are of 
those colours which fortify the spirit, compensating for the privations it must 
endure as a consequence of spiritual discipline. Complex patterns of variegated 
colours (nuqūsh daqīqa mukhtaliṭa) are to be avoided:  
…since the soul becomes preoccupied with their contemplation, and 
increases in exhaustion. It is for this reason that doctors prevent those 
struck by delirium (al-musarsamīn) from gazing at patterns (nuqūsh). 350   
As a general rule: 
when a colour is closest to simplicity and purity, then it is the most apt. 
And that (colour) is pure white. It is for this reason that the most beloved 
of garments to the Messenger of God was white.351  
Bodies are divided into those whose contemplation inculcates nothing but 
yearning for divine gnosis; and those whose contemplation, whilst according 
some advantage in the mystical pursuit often entail the unfortunate 
consequence of inflaming carnal desire (shahwa). Bodies which fall into the first 
category include scenes of natural beauty, contemplation of which fosters 
                                                             
348 Of course, these words could be read as mushriqa and muẓlima meaning ‗illuminating‘ and 
‗darkening‘ respectively.  
349 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.608.  
350 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.608. 
351 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.608. 
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wonder at the divine wisdom of their creation; the second category includes 
ships, palaces and servant-boys (ghilmān).352  
In relation to audible objects, Rāzī focuses on the capacity of poetry, when 
accompanied by music, to inflame the soul‘s ardour for the object of its love, 
isolating it from all other preoccupations. As for objects of olfaction, two 
observations are offered. Firstly, seeing that the quality of air is one of the six 
factors which influence change in the constitution of the body, the aspirant is 
advised to make his abode in the desert where the air is consistently clean and 
pure; and secondly, the use of fragrance (ṭīb) provides support for the major 
organs. Finally, Rāzī uses the sense category of touch to advocate the use of 
fasting as a means of curtailing carnal desire, marriage merely being a 
concession to those who find such a practice too arduous.353  
  
6.7.3 Disposition of the soul 
 
We return to the Psychology of al-Sirr. The physical regimen to which the adept 
must subject himself must be accompanied by an ascetic attitude which involves 
a:  
rejection of the material world as a refuge (for the soul), disavowing any 
desire for it and its pursuit (tark al-iltifāt ilayhā wa ilā ṭalabi-hā). For, once 
he abandons it, then the cares of the world and preoccupation with the 
joy to be found therein fall from his heart; at that point, his heart 
becomes pure and his spiritual ambition soars and his innermost being is 
                                                             
352 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 608. 
353 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 609-10.  
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voided of all but his goal (taʿlū himmatu-hu wa yakhlū sirru-hu ʿan kulli mā 
siwā hādhā al-maṭlūb); at that point he is able to focus mentally on 
anything he wants (yaqdir ʿalā al-tafakkur fī mā yurīdu-hu) and so reach his 
goal.354 
Denial of the world is less of a virtue, more of a practical measure, the adoption 
of which facilitates connection with the celestial spirits. Preoccupations (al-
shawāghil), whatever their nature, are impediments which frustrate this 
purpose. The most stubborn of these impediments are sensory objects, to which 
the soul before the age of forty is naturally attracted: 
the soul‘s predilection (ilf) for sensible objects is very strong because the 
intellectual faculty (al-quwwa al-ʿāqila) does not reach maturity until after 
the age of forty. Before that age, the soul is distracted by sensible things, 
is intent on them, making towards them; such obsession causes the 
generation of dispositions (kathrat al-muzāwala sabab li-ḥudūth al-malakāt). 
So it follows that the soul, on account of its excessive distraction by 
sensible objects, develops a disposition for sensible objects and for being 
attracted towards them. And since engagement with thought does not 
emerge unless sensible objects are abjured, then the measure of the 
soul‘s predilection for sensible objects and the delight it derives from 
them is <the measure of> its aversion to and dislike of thought. If such 
were the case then, right from the outset, with sensible objects present, 
it would be impossible for the soul to abjure them and direct its attention 
towards thought. So it follows that he who desires that the connection 
(ʿalāqa) between him and the Higher Spirits becomes firm then he must, 
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from the outset, flee from external distractions to the utmost of his 
capacity.355 
Furthermore, as was illustrated earlier by the example of the mountain goat 
casting itself down from a lofty peak, when the soul is focused on but one task, 
its ability to accomplish its goal is greatly enhanced: 
when one faculty (of the soul) is entirely employed in one task then it 
will no doubt be more powerful than if it were divided between 
numerous tasks for not every task, nor every part of a task, makes equal 
demands on the faculty.356 
Moreover, the soul never ceases from activity. Whether engaged by the 
intellect, or the estimative faculty, or neither, its cogitative or imaginative 
faculty is constantly at work, constructing and deconstructing arguments and 
images, travelling by way of all manner of mental associations in various 
directions.357 Were this activity harnessed in devotion to one task, it would be 
accomplished in the most complete way:  
God the Exalted created the rational soul such that it never ceases from 
activity. As for the theoretical faculty (al-quwwa al-naẓarīya), it is always 
cogitating on something and imagining something, either by way of 
composition or deconstruction (wa immā bi’l-tarkib wa immā bi’l-taḥlīl) 
such that it is said that man draws analogies by his very nature (al-insān 
qayās bi’l-ṭabʿ). As for the practical faculty, Man is seldom capable of 
                                                             
355 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.15.   
356 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.15.   
357 We shall explore the workings of the internal faculties of the soul later in chapter 7 and 
thereby make better sense of Rāzī‘s frequent allusion to the intellect, the estimative, the 
cogitative and imaginative faculties.  
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spending any extended period of time without doing something or 
making some movement such that if no particular task occurs to him, 
then he will play with his beard of move one of his limbs – all this 
because he is unable to remain (still) devoid of action: for this reason it is 
said that Man is by nature a doer. If he is thus, and then he devotes 
himself to one task and one action, then he will perform this action in 
the most complete way.358  
The man of complete mental focus is he who has reached the centre point of 
meditation (markaz al-fikr), described by Ṭumṭum, whose concentration allows 
him to commune with the celestial spirits and to control the elements in the 
sublunary world.359  
  
                                                             
358 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 15.   
359 See chapter 2. 
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The planetary ascent ritual of al-Sirr, which establishes noetic connection with 
the celestial souls, represents the perfection of human knowledge and power. 
Epistemologically, it is the perfection of the knowledge of particulars which are 
apprehended by the practical, as opposed to the theoretical, intellect: it 
illuminates the soul with knowledge of hidden things and future events. 
Practically, it is the consummate realization of the power to act throughout the 
sublunary world in ways which breach the customary course of events. Since al-
Sirr refrains from providing a convenient term with which to refer to the 
individual who has achieved such realization by way of the planetary ascent 
ritual I shall for the sake of convenience refer to him as the perfected man. The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore the intellectual background against which 
Rāzī has projected the image of the perfected Sabian adept possessed of 
complete occult knowledge and power.  
These two aspects of perfection, which we encountered in the introduction to 
al-Sirr, correspond very closely to the first and the last of the three properties 
which characterize Avicenna‘s theory of prophethood. As stated in his Aḥwāl al-
Nafs (‗States of the soul‘), these are: (1) imaginational prophethood by means of 
connection with the celestial souls; (2) the extraordinary ability to intuit, by 
means of connection with the Active Intellect, the middle terms of syllogisms; 
(3) the ability to perform acts which breach the natural course of events by 
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means of the muḥarrika or motive faculty. Prophets do not have a unique claim on 
these properties: any human can either possess any one of these properties 
innately or indeed develop them.360  
The Avicennan account of imaginational prophethood is central to Rāzī‘s 
construction of Sabian practice. Now, it should be borne in mind that this 
account is distinct and separate from that which explains the occult power that 
is wielded by prophets: the former is achieved by celestial soul noesis; the latter 
is achieved purely by means of a powerful estimative faculty (al-wahm). I shall 
argue that, observing the importance of the estimative faculty in the process of 
celestial soul noesis, Rāzī fuses the Avicennan accounts of imaginational 
prophethood and prophetic occult power to produce a new synthesis which 
explains how the Sabian might, through ritualized connection with the celestial 
soul, acquire both occult power and knowledge. This chapter will therefore 
examine: (1) Rāzī‘s understanding of the Avicennan theory of celestial soul 
noesis and the role of the estimative faculty; (2) the role of the estimative 
faculty in Sabian astral ritual; (3) the Avicennan background against which Rāzī 
projects his image of the Sabian perfected man.  
  
7.2 Context of Celestial Soul Noesis in al-Ishārāt 10 
 
                                                             
360 See Afifi al-Akiti‘s study of the reception of Avicenna‘s doctrine in the works of al-Ghazali, in 
‗The Three Properties of Prophethood‘. See also Marmura, ‗Avicenna‘s theory of prophecy‘ and 
‗Avicenna's Psychological Proof of Prophecy‘; Hasse, Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West; 
Rahman, Prophecy in Islam; Toufiq, ‗Nubuwwa‘, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition; Griffel, ‗al-
Ghazālī‘s concept of prophecy‘;  Morris, ‗The Philosopher-Prophet‘; Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna 
and Averroes;  Azadpur, Reason Unbound; Shihadeh, ‗Aspects of the Reception of Avicenna‘s 
Theory of Prophecy‘. 
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To gain a deeper insight into Rāzī‘s strategic synthesis of Avicennan ideas to 
produce his account of Sabian acquisition of occult knowledge and power, I shall 
turn to his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt and the account of celestial soul noesis. Given his 
reliance on namaṭ 3 of Avicenna‘s Ishārāt to construct Sabian cosmology, the 
close parallels between key passages in al-Sirr 1:4 and his commentary on namaṭ 
9 of al-Ishārāt; and Rāzī‘s reliance, in al-Maṭālib 8, on Ishārāt 10 for his summary 
of the Avicennan account of imaginational prophethood, I shall in the following 
sections turn to al-Ishārāt 10 to gain a deeper insight into the Avicennan 
background to the celestial noetics that is at the heart of Sabian practice.   
In al-Ishārāt 10 Avicenna asserts that there are four signs (āyāt) which indicate 
the station of one possessed of divine gnosis. These signs are displays of occult 
power for which he provides naturalistic explanations:  
The tenth namaṭ deals with the four ‗causes of preternatural acts‘ (asbāb 
al-khawāriq): (1) on the cause of being empowered to forsake 
nourishment for an extended period of time (sabab al-tamakkun min tark 
al-ghidhā muddatan madīda) (2) on the cause of being empowered to 
perform tremendous acts (sabab al-tamakkun min al-afʿāl al-shāqqa) (3) on 
the cause of being empowered to receive knowledge of the unseen world 
(sabab al-tamakkun min al-ikhbār ʿan al-ghuyūb) (4) on the cause of being 
empowered to act on the elements (sabab al-tamakkun min al-taṣṣaruf  fī al-
ʿanāṣir).361  
                                                             
361 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.631. 
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We have already examined the first two of these issues. Al-Ishārāt 10 devotes 
most attention to the third.362 In short, since events in the sublunary world are 
determined by the motions of the heavenly spheres, and since they are 
cognizant of themselves and their effects, they thus possess knowledge of past 
and future events in the sublunary world and all that is hidden therein (ikhbār 
ʿan al-ghayb). It is therefore by means of connection with the celestial souls that 
knowledge of the unseen world is gained. 
In his commentary, Rāzī breaks down Avicenna‘s exposition of the issue in the 
following way. After introducing the topic in chapters 7-8, he establishes the 
two premises on which his account of noesis rests: firstly, the assertion that the 
heavenly sphere possesses a rational soul which is perceptive of the effects of 
the celestial motions, namely the entirety of particulars in the sublunary world; 
and secondly that the human soul can connect with the celestial rational soul 
and thus be afforded occult knowledge. The first premise, the grounds of which 
have already been established in al-Ishārāt 3, is treated in chapter 9; the second 
premise, which entails a much more involved argument drawing on the 
presentation of the human soul‘s internal faculties in al-Ishārāt 3, is discussed in 
chapters 10-17. The noetic process itself is described in chapters 18-24.  
Avicenna embarks on the discussion by establishing the reality of occult and 
preternaturally prescient knowledge; that it can be derived from dreams; and 
that if it can be attained in the dream state, then there exists no obstacle 
precluding it from occurring during the waking state. Rāzī remarks that 
Avicenna‘s assertion that such knowledge can be received whilst in a dream 
state ‗is supported by experience and anecdotal evidence (al-tajriba wa’l-




tasāmuʿ).‘ Experience, asserts Rāzī interpreting Avicenna, teaches that a man 
can sometimes see something in his sleep which comes to pass in actuality, 
either literally in accordance with the dream or in accordance with some 
interpretation thereof. This he says is supported by the considerable weight of 
anecdotal evidence. Indeed, he says its occurrence during sleep is so frequent 
that its reality cannot be dismissed; and so if knowledge of unseen things is 
possible in sleep, then it is more apt (awlā) that it should occur in a waking 
state.363 Exercising his characteristic epistemological rigour, Rāzī comments that 
whilst the second premise cannot definitely be inferred (al-istdlāl bi’l-qaṭʿ) from 
the first it can at least be inferred to the extent that its possibility cannot be 
ruled out; indeed the assertion of its possibility is the more probable and apt (al-
akhlaq wa’l-aḥrā) inference that can be drawn.364 
 
7.3 Celestial Souls and their complete knowledge of sublunary phenomena  
 
And so we turn to Rāzī‘s exposition of the first of the premises on which 
Avicenna‘s account of noesis relies: that the heavenly spheres possess souls 
perceptive of all particulars in the sublunary world.365 Associated with each 
                                                             
363 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 474. 
364 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 639. 
365 Avicenna says: ‘You have learned earlier that particulars are engraved (manqūsha) in the 
intellectual world in a universal way. Then your attention was drawn to the fact that the 
celestial bodies have souls that possess particular perceptions (idrākāt juz’iyya) and particular 
wills (irādāt juz’iyya) which issue from a particular opinion (ra’y juz’ī). There is nothing that 
prevents these souls from conceiving the particular concomitants, which pertain to their 
particular movements, and from which arise the existing things in the elemental world. 
Furthermore, if that to which a certain kind of reflection alludes in a way that is veiled, except 
to those who are rooted in the august wisdom, is true <namely> that they [i.e. the celestial 
bodies] possess, after the separate intellects which function for them like principles, rational 
souls that are not imprinted in their matters but rather possess a certain relation to them, just 
246 
 
heavenly sphere is an ‗abstracted‘ (mujarrad) or ‗separated‘ (mufāraq) intellect 
(ʿaql), so called because it is abstracted and separated from space and time and 
thus can neither inhere in nor have any relation to a body. By way of contrast, 
the celestial sphere possesses a soul which acts as a bodily power, perceptive of 
particular phenomena which exist within space and time (li’l-falak nafsan hīya 
quwwa jismānīya wa-hīya mudrika li’l-juz’īyāt). This soul produces motion in the 
celestial sphere: it is the motions of the celestial spheres and the resultant 
geometrical relationships between the heavenly bodies which produce the 
myriad particular phenomena that we witness in the sublunary world. Knowing 
itself, the celestial bodily soul possesses knowledge of itself as a proximate cause 
of the celestial motion which is in turn the proximate cause of coming-into -
being in the sublunary world. Thus the celestial soul possesses knowledge of all 
that comes to be:  
the abstracted intellects possess knowledge of all particulars in a 
universal way because all particulars lead to them by means of a chain of 
dependency (muntahiya ilayhā salsala al-ḥāja) and knowledge of the cause 
necessarily entails knowledge of the effect; and we have demonstrated 
also that the celestial sphere possesses a soul, which is a bodily power 
which perceives particulars; and we have demonstrated that the things 
which come to be in this world depend on the movements of the spheres; 
                                                                                                                                                                      
as our souls have with regard to our bodies, and that by means of this relation, they <the 
celestial bodies> attain some real perfection – then the celestial bodies come to have an 
additional significance in this, such that they manifest a particular opinion and another 
universal one. You gather from what we have pointed out that particulars in the intelligible 
world possess an engraving (naqsh) in a universal manner but in the psychic world they possess 
an engraving in a particular manner, perceptive of time, or they possess both simultaneously‘. 
Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 639.  I have heavily adapted this translation from that of Inati to be 
found in Ibn Sina and Mysticism pp.95-6. Subsequent translations from al-Ishārāt 10 will be similar 
adaptations.   
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and we have demonstrated that the proximate cause of these movements 
is the (celestial) soul, and you already know that knowledge of the cause 
necessarily entails knowledge of the effect; and so it follows from all 
these premises that the celestial soul possesses knowledge of all that 
occurs in this world by way of particulars.366 
Whilst the abstracted intellect is beyond space and time, the celestial soul 
governs a bodily reality, namely the heavenly sphere; whilst the knowledge of 
the former comprises universals (kullīyāt),that of the former includes 
particulars. There would thus appear to be a gap in ‗the chain of dependency‘ 
that links particulars in the sublunary world with the abstracted intellect; this 
gap leaves unanswered how the universals of the abstracted intellect are 
transformed into the particulars of the celestial bodily soul. Avicenna fills this 
gap by positing the existence of the celestial rational soul which links the 
former with the latter. Being neither a body nor bodily in its essence the 
celestial rational soul nevertheless has a relation with the celestial sphere on 
account of which, explains Rāzī, the former: 
…receives renewed perfections (kamālāt mutajaddida) just as our own 
rational soul, though it is not a body nor is it bodily, has a certain 
relation with our bodies, by reason of which it is able to acquire 
intellectual perfections (kamālāt ʿaqliyya).367 
In completing the ‗chain of dependency‘ by positing a celestial rational soul, it is 
safe for Avicenna to conclude that: ―all particulars that occur in this world are 
                                                             
366 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 640.  
367 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.640. 
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known to the separated intellect (al-ʿaql al-mufāraq), the rational soul and the 
bodily soul.368 
As Rāzī points out, hylomorphism deeply informs Avicenna‘s account of 
knowledge in the celestial spheres. Thus, when Avicenna says particulars are 
‗engraved‘ (manqūsha) in the intelligible world, ‗engraving‘ denotes 
knowledge.369 As it receives knowledge from the abstracted intellect, being 
engraved with different universal objects of intellection, the celestial rational 
soul undergoes change; this change induces the celestial bodily soul, which is 
forever subject to the rational soul, to produce motion in the heavenly sphere. 
Rāzī expounds on Avicenna‘s theory in the following way:  
if <the sphere> has a soul which perceives particulars and another soul 
which perceives universals, and this rational soul undergoes change as it 
moves from one object of intellection to the next (mutaghayyira 
mutanaqqila min maʿqūl ilā maʿqūl) then the celestial motions would arise 
as a result of the combination of two opinions (ṣādira ʿan majmūʿ ra’yain), 
one being the universal opinion which belongs to the rational soul, and 
the other being particular which belongs to the celestial bodily soul; and 
so then these movements proceed in a manner that is analogous to 
human actions (tilka al-ḥarakāt ḥīna’idhin jāriyatun majrā al-afʿāl al-
insāniyya). For that which first begins with intellection (al-taʿaqqul) and 
then imagination (al-takhayyul) is nobler than that which begins in pure 
imagination.370  
                                                             
368 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.640. 
369 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p.640-1. 
370 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 641.   
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Rāzī here draws a close analogy between Avicenna‘s conceptions of the celestial 
rational-bodily soul complex and the human rational-animal soul complex. 
When the imagination in the human soul is not governed by the intellect, its 
activities either proceed autonomously, with no direction or purpose, or they 
proceed according to the direction of the estimative faculty, the governing 
faculty of the animal soul. What is produced therefore has limited 
epistemological value. Such a situation is to be contrasted with that of the 
rational human soul in which the estimative faculty directs the imagination in 
service of the intellect. Thus, when functioning as the rational soul, the human 
is in mimetic concord with the harmony that exists in the celestial rational-
bodily soul complex; when the estimative faculty usurps the government of the 
intellect, the contrary situation obtains. A significant implication of this analogy 
I would argue, which Rāzī leaves unsaid, is that if the former situation is 
analogous to the activity of the celestial rational-bodily soul complex, then it 
would appear that the celestial bodily soul is the analogue of the human soul as 
governed by the estimative faculty in service of the intellect. And just as the 
celestial bodily soul drives the motion of the heavenly sphere which is the 
proximate cause of particular phenomena in the sublunary world, so the 
estimative faculty of the human soul possessed of occult power can be the cause 
of change which runs contrary to the natural course of events in this world of 
generation and corruption.  
Since the celestial rational-bodily soul complex receives universals from the 
abstracted intellect, whilst simultaneously acting as the proximate cause of 
particulars in the sublunary world, its knowledge is both universal and 
particular and is possessed eternally, since its knowledge of its own essence is 
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eternal. Therefore, if the human rational soul were to connect with the celestial 
soul, then the former could be engraved by the latter with knowledge of future 
sublunary events: 
 rational souls can connect with those principles (al-nufūs al-nāṭiqa 
yumkinuhā al-ittiṣāl bi-tilka al-mabādi’); and since those principles have 
knowledge of all these particulars, then these (human) rational souls can 
be engraved with their knowledge such that they (come) to perceive that 
which will come to pass before they occur. So then, they gain command 
over knowledge of the unseen (ikhbār al-ghuyūb).371 
This reasoning, explains Rāzī, prepares the way for the second major premise on 
which Avicenna‘s account of noetic connection with the celestial souls relies: 
the fact that the human soul can connect with the celestial souls and thereby 
receive knowledge of the unseen world (ʿālam al-ghayb) by way of veridical 
dreams and waking visions.372  
7.4 The ability of the human soul to connect with the celestial souls 
 
Avicenna‘s naturalistic account of veridical dreams and waking visions is as 
sophisticated as it is nuanced, allowing as it does -- in the case of dreams -- for 
degrees of purity in the way in which they are experienced and retained. These 
degrees are determined by both the intensity of the original ―spiritual trace‖ 
                                                             
371 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 642. 
372 Avicenna succinctly states the second premise in the tenth chapter of al-Ishārāt 10: ‗Your soul 
can be engraved with the engraving of that [i.e. the intelligible] world in accordance with its 
receptiveness (istiʿdād) and the elimination of that which impedes. You have already learned 
this, so do not deny that some of the unseen can be engraved in your soul from that world. I 




(athar rūḥānī) which the human soul receives and the extent to which the 
imagination then proceeds to distort it. He also distinguishes them from normal 
dreams which his account explains as merely the product of the unfettered and 
unceasing activity of the autonomous mutaṣarrifa when acting as the 
imagination during sleep. Dreams are thus of two kinds: those which are solely 
the product of the imagination and those which are the result of connection 
with the celestial souls. In this section we shall discuss both in that order, and 
touch briefly on waking visions. But before we proceed, we must first examine 
two principles which govern the behaviour of the internal sense faculties in 
producing such cognitive phenomena which have no connection to the external 
senses. 
The first relates to the fact that the soul‘s preoccupation (ishtighāl) with one goal 
will prevent it from the effective pursuit of another; it is the psychological 
principle which explains the prescription in al-Sirr that, as a prerequisite of 
magical training and establishing connection with the celestial spirits, the adept 
must abjure all material desire and sensory distraction. 373 Commenting on 
Avicenna‘s discussion of this principle, Rāzī explains that the soul cannot be 
gripped by both the irascible and the appetitive powers at the same time. And if 
the soul requires the bodily power to perform some vigorous action, then it will 
                                                             
373Says Avicenna: ‗the powers of the soul are mutually attractive and mutually repellent. Thus 
when anger is roused, it distracts the soul from the appetite, and vice versa. If the internal 
sense devotes itself exclusively to perform its function, it distracts (the soul) from the external 
sense thus it hardly hears or sees, and vice versa. Hence, if the internal sense is drawn to the 
external sense, its instrument will make the intellect incline such that it disperses (inbaththa), 
falling short of the cogitative movement which it frequently needs as its instrument. Another 
thing will also happen which is that the soul will also be drawn to the side of the strong 
movement and it will abandon the acts that solely belong to it. If the soul has the power to 
control the internal sense under its management, the external senses will also be weakened 
and will not provide the soul with that with which it equips itself.‘ Avicenna in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt, 2, p. 643; also see Inati, Ibn Sina and Mysticism, pp. 96-97.  
252 
 
relinquish its activities in order to assist it.  Moreover, if the internal senses are 
preoccupied with stimuli received by the external senses, then the intellect will 
be unable to engage the mutaṣarrifa as the cogitative power (al-mufakkira). By 
way of contrast: 
…when the soul uses the internal senses, the external senses are 
bewildered, that is, they weaken. And so for this reason, when a man is 
immersed in the act of imagination or contemplation (takhayyul aw 
tafakkur), perhaps a strongly visible or audible phenomenon may present 
itself to him but, despite the fact that his external sense may be sound, 
he does not perceive it at all.374 
The second principle which governs the operation of the soul‘s internal senses 
in the production of such cognitive phenomena relates to the state of 
receptivity of the common sense. Sensory experience can be occasioned either 
by the perception of an external object or by an internal factor which bears no 
relation to any external object of perception. Avicenna enigmatically alludes to 
this latter type of engraving as occurring:  
…in the tablet [i.e. of the common sense] for a reason other than the 
sensible object – if this were possible.375  
Rāzī brings clarity to this enigmatic allusion in the following way: 
Know that forms which are imprinted in the common sense have four 
levels <in the way in which> they are sensed. The first is when external 
sensible objects come to be witnessed as soon as they are imprinted in 
                                                             
374 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 644.  
375 Avicenna in Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 644. See Inati Ibn Sina and Mysticism, p. 97. 
253 
 
the common sense; the second is when they continue to be sensed 
together with the sensible objects remaining in the external world; the 
third is when they continue to be sensed even after the external sensible 
object no longer remains; and the fourth is when they are sensed even 
though there is no sensible object in the external world. When you know 
this then we say: the examples of the descending line and the revolving 
point provide evidence of the first three of these levels. The fourth 
requires its own evidence.376  
We have already encountered Rāzī‘s explanation of Avicenna‘s examples of the 
raindrop and the dot painted on a rotating circle in our introductory discussion 
on the internal senses. The cause of engravings which fall into this fourth 
category is internal to the soul and requires a separate supporting proof, 
evidence for which Avicenna finds in the visual experiences of those struck by 
illness and bilious imbalance (al-marḍā wa’l-mamrūrīn). The cause of such 
engravings in the common sense, he reasons, must be internal. Moreover, just as 
forms from the common sense can be engraved in the imagination, so too can 
forms from the imagination be engraved in the common sense. 377  
 
Avicenna‘s supporting proof is compact: Rāzī expands it to reveal fully the 
structure of the argument which it implies. Those afflicted in this way see forms 
                                                             
376 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 644-645. 
377 ‗A group of ill and bilious people may witness sensible forms that are clear and present but 
that have no relation to an external sensible object. Thus, the engraving (intiqāsh) of these forms 
is due to an internal (bāṭin) cause or to a cause influencing an internal cause. The common sense 
may also be engraved upon (yantaqish) by forms that arise in the mine of the imagination and 
the estimation (al-ṣuwar al-ḥā’ila fī maʿdin al-takhayyul wa’l-tawahhum), just as these forms are also 
engraved in the mine of the imagination and estimation from the tablet of the common sense, in 
a manner similar to that between facing mirrors‘, Avicenna in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 645. 
Inati, Ibn Sina and Mysticism, p. 97. 
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which others do not see: therefore these forms must either be non-existent 
(maʿdūma) or existent (mawjūd). They cannot be non-existent because this would 
entail absolute negation, and that which is characterized by absolute negation 
can never be witnessed. Therefore, their existence must be affirmed. Now, this 
existence is either extra-mental or it is internal to the witness‘s soul. The fact 
that no-one else possessed of sound external senses witnesses these forms 
negates the first of these disjuncts; they cannot be extra-mental. Therefore their 
existence must be internal to the soul of the witness. This being the case, they 
must either exist in the rational soul or in a bodily faculty (quwwa jismānīya). The 
first disjunct is false because the rational soul cannot perceive particulars; nor 
can it be inscribed with the forms of sensible things (lā tartasimu fī-hā ṣuwar al-
maḥsūsāt). Therefore they must be inscribed (murtasima) in a bodily faculty 
capable of perceiving visible things. This bodily faculty cannot be the vision (al-
quwwa al-bāṣira) which only perceives that which exists externally. Moreover, 
these kinds of visual experiences are also reported by blind people. Thus are we 
led to the conclusion that it must be the common sense that perceives these 
forms; and since it is established that these forms do not occur to the common 
sense from the outside, their source must be internal. This source can therefore 
be one of two internal faculties: the sensible memory (al-khayāl) from which 
stored forms migrate to the common sense, where they are inscribed and 
witnessed; or the imagination (al-mutakhayyila) which composes forms which 
are inscribed in the common sense.378 
 
                                                             
378 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 645-6.  
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When inscribing the common sense thus, the mutaṣarrifa, operating as the 
imagination, acts autonomously, directed neither by the estimative faculty nor 
by the intellect by way of the estimative faculty‘s mediation. Two preoccupying 
factors (shāghilān) prevent the mutaṣarrifa qua imagination from operating in 
this way. Firstly, if the common sense is preoccupied (mashgūl) with forms 
which are presented to it from the external senses, it is unable to encompass 
(lam yattasiʿ) other forms, and the mutaṣarrifa qua imagination will not be able to 
inscribe the forms which it has composed. The second preoccupying factor 
merits close scrutiny. Avicenna describes it as: 
 …either internal <pertaining to> the intellect, or internal <pertaining to> 
the estimative faculty (ʿaqlī bāṭin aw wahmī bāṭin); it seizes control of the 
imagination (al-takhayyul), preventing it from acting autonomously on it 
<the common sense> with that which assists it [i.e. either the intellect or 
the estimative faculty]. And so it [i.e. the imagination], by yielding to its 
control, is preoccupied from <acting on> the common sense and it is not 
able to engrave in it, because the movement <of the imagination> is 
weak, since it is subject and is not subjected to (li’anna-hā tābiʿa lā 
matbūʿa). If one of the two preoccupying factors is at rest whilst the 
other remains, then it may be that <the latter> might be incapable of 
holding <it> under control, so the imagination prevails over the common 
sense in which it imprints (lawwaḥa) a form as something which is sensed 
and witnessed.379 
Rāzī comments on Avicenna‘s account of this second preoccupying factor as 
follows: 
                                                             
379 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 645-6.  
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As for the second obstacle, it relates to the agent: for when either the 
intellect or the estimative faculty employ the cogitative faculty (al-
mufakkira), and the cogitative faculty becomes preoccupied in the service 
of either one of them (wa ṣārat al-mufakkira mashghūlatan bi-khidmati 
aḥadi-himā) it is no longer free to perform its own particular actions (lam 
tatafarragh li-afʿāli nafsi-hā khāṣatan) and it is no longer able to compose, 
deconstruct and generate simulacra of forms. And when those forms do 
not exist, they cannot flow to the common sense.380  
It is curious that whilst Avicenna alludes to the control exerted either by the 
intellect or the estimative faculty on the imagination, Rāzī refers instead to the 
control exerted by either on the cogitative faculty. Rāzī may be entitled to do so 
since the imaginative and the cogitative faculties are merely different 
modalities of the same internal sense organ which, for the sake of clarity, is best 
referred to as the mutaṣarrifa. But he surely confuses these modalities when he 
explains that, under the control of either the intellect or the estimative faculty, 
the cogitative faculty is ‗no longer free to perform its own particular actions‘, 
namely composing, deconstructing, and generating simulacra of forms: such 
activity would normally be expected of the imagination. Be that as it may, 
Avicenna makes a very deliberate distinction between the control exerted by 
the intellect, and the control exerted by the estimative faculty, over the 
mutaṣarrifa in preventing it from engraving in the common sense.  
If however the imagination is free to act autonomously, whilst at the same time 
the common sense is free of preoccupation with forms received from the 
external senses, the former can act on the latter, inscribing forms which come 
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to be witnessed. This is the situation in which normal dreams occur. Explaining 
Avicenna‘s account of this process, Rāzī says that during sleep, since it is 
preoccupied with assisting the digestive power in the process of digestion, the 
rational soul does not engage the imagination: 
Know that there is no doubt that sleep is an obstacle for the external 
senses in the performance of their functions; it is also an obstacle for the 
rational soul in the performance of its functions. This is because when 
the rational soul is preoccupied with assisting the digestive power with 
processing nourishment, and because we have shown that when the 
<rational> soul is engaged with those functions over which it uniquely 
exercises control (al-aʿmāl allatī lahā bi’l-istibdād), whilst <at the same 
time> nature (al-ṭabīʿa) is engaged with digestion, then digestion will not 
be finished and completed. Indeed it will be deficient and weak. And so 
for this reason it is correct that the soul is drawn towards assisting 
nature when it is engaged in digestion. Furthermore, sleep is more 
similar to illness than to health.381 
Thus, with the release of the rational soul‘s grip, the imagination operates as an 
independent active faculty, working on the receptive faculty of the common 
sense which is undistracted by external stimuli:  
When you know this, then we say that during sleep, both the active 
<faculty> and receptive <faculty> are present to these simulacra (ḥaṣala 
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empowered to create simulacra (tashbiḥ) and so these simulacra are imprinted in the tablet of 




al-fāʿil li-hādhihi al-ashbāḥ wa’l-qābil lahā). As for the active faculty, it is 
because the soul is engaged in administering the body and assisting the 
digestive power, and so it is not free to administer the imaginative 
faculty (al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila); the imaginative faculty thus becomes 
autonomous (mustaqilla bi-nafsihā), empowered to create simulacra 
(tashbiḥ) and imprints (talwīḥ) in whatever way it so wills and desires, 
without any impediment. As for the receptive faculty, it is because the 
tablet of the common sense is free of the engravings (nuqūsh) which 
derive from the external senses. When the active and receptive faculties 
operate in a perfect and complete manner (matā ḥaṣala al-fāʿil wa’l-qābil 
bi’l-kamāl wa’l-tamām) then this activity (fiʿl) inevitably takes place. Thus 
it follows that these forms appear in sleep and become phenomena that 
are witnessed.382 
So far Avicenna has been speaking very generally about normal dreams, 
produced when the imagination is acting purely autonomously, having been 
released from the grip of the rational soul and freed to inscribe forms in the 
common sense which is undistracted by the impression of forms from the 
external senses. But in the case of dreams induced by contact with the celestial 
spheres, the soul must possess sufficient strength to retain the essence of what 
it perceives therein if it is to benefit from the experience. Were it to lack such 
strength then the imagination, acting autonomously, would begin to generate a 
series of images by way of imaginative association (muḥākā). Each image is 
connected with its predecessor by way of a certain resemblance: by the end of 
the process, an image is produced which bears no resemblance whatsoever to 
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the original. Rāzī expounds on Avicenna‘s account of imaginative association by 
saying: 
when the soul is strong, it is empowered to retain the essence of that 
which it perceives (qawiyat ʿalā ḥifẓ ʿayn mā adrakat-hu) and it does not 
move on from it to that which resembles it (mā yuḥākīhi). If the soul is 
weak, then it is too weak to retain perceptions (al-mudrakāt) and so it 
may travel from one thing to that which it imitates it and with which it 
shares similarities in certain aspects; and then <it may travel> from that 
to something which imitates it in turn; and so it may continue to travel 
from one thing to another which imitates it until it arrives at something 
which bears no relation to the first perception (al-mudrak al-awwal) in 
any respect. This phenomenon (maʿnā) only occurs when the imaginative 
faculty assumes control and the soul is too weak to reform and discipline 
it.383  
Not only does the strength of the soul, nurtured by spiritual discipline, fix the 
insight of the original image produced in a veridical dream, but it also enables 
the soul to administer the body without any loss of connection with the 
intellectual world (al-ʿālam al-ʿaqlī). Thus, says Rāzī, interpreting Avicenna:  
In general the strong soul suffices for both domains (wāfiya li-jānibayn), 
namely the domain of the intellect and the domain of the body (al-jānib 
al-ʿaqlī wa’l-jānib al-badanī), and the direction of its attention to one of 
these domains is no impediment to its attention being directed to the 
other. Moreover, if these souls, together with their power, have 
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undergone spiritual discipline (murtāḍa), then its ability to abjure things 
which negate spiritual discipline and to perform that which is 
sympathetic (yunāsib) to it is stronger.384  
For the average human soul, which falls short of the ranks of the prophets and 
those possessed of divine gnosis, the states of either sleep or illness afford 
fleeting opportunities in which it can find deliverance from the distraction of 
the imagination and connect with the ‗realm of sanctity‘ (jānib al-quds) by which 
it is engraved with forms; it then commands the imagination to engrave in the 
common sense imaginative forms which correspond to those objects of 
intellection: thus do they come to be witnessed in a particular, sensory way. 
Such a situation arises during sleep since the external senses are shut down, 
freeing the common sense to be engraved by the imagination; during illness or 
indeed vigorous movement, the pneuma of the imagination suffers dissolution 
and the imagination consequently becomes inert. With the imagination thus 
weakened, the rational soul is no longer burdened by the task of maintaining 
control of it, and it is attracted to the ‗realm of sanctity‘. Rāzī explains the 
process thus:  
When the imaginative faculty experiences weakness, either on account 
of an illness by which it has been struck, or due to the dissolution of the 
pneuma (taḥallul al-rūḥ) which serves as its tool, which occurs because of 
vigorous movement and activity, it <the imaginative faculty> inclines 
towards calmness and inertia; thus the rational soul is freed from its 
administration and disciplining to connect with the intellectual world 
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and there occurs to it something which derives from the intellectual 
souls (al-nufūs al-ʿaqliyya) and the holy realities (al-jalāyā al-
qudsiyya).When this happens the imaginative faculty is roused towards 
generating a simulacrum (tashbīḥ) of the universal meaning in a 
particular form.385 
We should note at this point that which Rāzī omits to state explicitly but which 
is clearly intended, namely that the ‗rational soul‘ here means the soul under 
the government of the practical intellect which, being immaterial, is unable to 
exert control over the material mutaṣarrifa qua imagination without the 
mediation of the estimative faculty. Having enjoyed some respite and recovered 
from the dissolution of its pneuma, the imagination returns to its habitual 
activity of generating and imprinting simulacra and, marshalled by the rational 
soul, it: 
…is roused to compose particular forms which correspond to that universal 
psychic meaning (al-maʿnā al-kullī al-nafsānī). And when these forms flow to 
the common sense they come to be witnessed.386 
However the soul which enjoys a stronger substance need not rely on the 
opportunities provided by sleep or illness in order to slip away to the 
intellectual realm. Rather, whilst awake it can simultaneously engage with both 
the higher world of the celestial souls and the lower world of its own body, such 
that management of the latter does not thwart connection with the former. It 
then marshals the imagination to compose forms which correspond to those 
intellections (taʿaqqulāt); these are then imprinted in the tablet of the common 
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sense to be witnessed in a sensory way (ṣārat mushāhadatan maḥsūsatan). At this 
point visual perception of form and aural perception of speech occur, even 
though these phenomena in of themselves have no extra-mental existence.387 
7.5 Image Association and the Modus Operandi of the Imagination 
 
The traces which the human soul receives from the celestial souls, whether 
during sleep or the waking state, must be translated by the imagination into 
particular forms which are imprinted in the common sense if they are to be 
witnessed as sensory experiences. Therefore the activity of the imagination to a 
large extent determines the degree to which the human soul can derive insight 
and benefit from what was in origin a pure celestial form. 
Avicenna provides a fuller description of the autonomous activity of the 
imagination in the twentieth chapter of al-Ishārāt 10.388 Its innate function 
(jibilla), comments Rāzī, is to move unceasingly from one meaning (maʿnā) to 
another on the principle of similarity or antithesis between the former and the 
latter. What he seems to be alluding to is a kind of free association of ideas or 
                                                             
387 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 652.  
388 ‗The imaginative faculty is constituted such that it imitates any succeeding intellective or 
temperamental disposition and moves quickly from one thing to its like or to its opposite – in 
general, to whatever derives from it by reason of a cause (bi’l-jumla ilā mā huwa min-hu bi-
sababin); without a doubt the specification <of that which is derived> has particular causes (asbāb 
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hā). If the imaginative faculty were not constituted with such a disposition (al-jibilla) then we 
would not possess that on which we can rely (nastaʿīnu bihi) with respect to: (1) the movement of 
thought, which searches for middle terms <of syllogisms> and whatever resembles them in a 
certain way, and (2) the recollection of things which have been forgotten; and (3) other benefits. 
This faculty is either roused to movement by each thing which occurs (kull sāniḥ) or it is placed 
under control (tuḍbaṭ). This control is exercised either by power of the soul‘s opposition <to the 
movement of the imaginative faculty> or by the intensity of the clarity of the form that is 
engraved in it such that it is received in a way that is intensely lucid and firmly represented: 
that deters its meandering and wavering, and holds in place the imagination (al-khayāl) such 
that it makes a representation as powerful as that which the external senses generate‘, 




images. Thus, when a certain image or idea is present to the imagination, it then 
generates a second within a presumably limited range of images or ideas that 
are either similar or antithetical to the original cognitive object. A third is then 
generated from the second, a fourth from the third, and so on, for however long 
the process lasts. Therefore, between each object of imaginative cognition and 
that which precedes it is a relationship either of similarity or antithesis. 
Avicenna does not speculate on what determines the nature of this relationship 
at each stage of image or idea production; nor indeed does he identify what 
drives the imagination to generate one particular cognitive object out of a range 
of possibilities, whether that range comprises possibilities which are similar or 
antithetical to its predecessor.  
This activity of association, which Avicenna calls muḥākāt, springs from the 
spontaneous nature (gharīza) of the mutaṣarrifa which is thus disposed in order 
to allow the cogitative process to hit on the middle terms of syllogisms and to 
recollect things stored in the memory.  The ‗movements‘ of this activity never 
cease unless impeded by one of two obstacles. As Rāzī explains:  
One is when the rational soul seizes control (istīlā) of it, impeding it from 
its movements (intiqālāt), and disciplining it (tathqīfihā). The second is 
when the forms which are engraved (munaqqasha) in it are powerful and 
clear (qawīya jalīya): then by reason of their clarity and power, they 
prevent <the imaginative faculty> from moving away from them to other 
forms: this is due to what you already know from of his explanation that 
bodily powers have no perception (shuʿūr) of dimly perceptible objects 
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(al-mudrakāt al-ḍaʿīfa) when they are perceiving powerfully perceptible 
objects (al-mudrakāt al-qawīya).389      
Having expounded on his idea of imaginative and cogitative association, 
Avicenna describes how this cognitive process might affect the degree to which 
a ‗spiritual trace' (athar rūḥānī) which occurs to the human soul from one of the 
celestial souls might be accurately retained. He envisages three general grades 
of intensity, each comprising varying degrees. The first grade comprises traces 
which are so weak that they leave no enduring impression. The second 
comprises those which are sufficiently strong as to stir the imagination which, 
however, continues in its movement to generate new images by way of 
association such that only the imagination‘s associated images, rather than the 
original trace, are retained. And the third grade comprises those traces of such 
intensity and power that they are clearly imprinted in the imagination and 
stored in the memory undefiled by the confusion of associated images.390  
Although the purity of the original ―spiritual trace‖ from the celestial souls is 
vitiated in the second of these grades, its original state can be recovered or 
reconstituted from the distortions of the imagination‘s associated images by 
means of interpretation (ta’wīl or taʿbīr). Avicenna says that a number of 
considerations would inform the hermeneutics of this process including those 
relating to the personal disposition of the recipient, time and custom. 
Unfortunately he does not elaborate further – nor for that matter does Rāzī.391 
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7.6 Deliberate induction of noetic connection with the celestial souls 
 
So as we have explored, when received from the celestial realms during sleep, 
the ‗spiritual trace‘ is experienced as a veridical dream; when received during 
waking hours, it is experienced as a vision. This kind of noetic connection with 
the celestial souls can be established through very deliberate physical means 
which affect the internal sense faculties, rooted as they are in the physical 
substrate of the brain.392 As an example of such a practice, Avicenna provides an 
intriguing description of a Turkic divinatory procedure. When the tribe (qawm) 
requires knowledge from the supernal realm (taqdima maʿrifa) in order to make a 
certain decision, they consult their diviner. He launches himself into an intense 
sprint (faziʿa huwa ilā shaddi ḥathīth jiddan) during which he pants so heavily 
(yalhath) that he faints. In this state of delirium, his imagination is set to work 
(yukhayyal ilayhi) and those around him listen to what he utters, committing it to 
memory: then they decide their affairs accordingly. Physical procedures such as 
these cause bewilderment (ḥayra) to the common sense and bring a halt to the 
incessant movement of the imagination for as we have already learnt, intense 
physical movement can cause the dissolution of the imagination‘s pneuma, 
rendering the faculty inert and perfectly receptive to influxes from the unseen 
world, the supernal realm of the celestial souls. Moreover, the estimative faculty 
has already been primed for a particular purpose, namely the pressing concern 
that occupies the tribe. Says Avicenna: 
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some natures (ṭabā’iʿ) may have recourse to activities, on account of 
which, the <common> sense is bewildered and the imagination arrested, 
such that the faculty which is receptive to the unseen becomes primed 
for sound reception, and the estimative faculty <al-wahm> is directed 
towards a <particular> purpose which specifically determines its 
reception <of the unseen> (fa-yatakhaṣṣaṣ bi-dhālika qabūlu-hu).393 
Close scrutiny of this passage reveals a more detailed account of the noetic 
process. ‗The faculty which is receptive to the unseen‘ is the mutaṣarrifa qua 
imagination which, having been arrested is primed for reception from the 
unseen world. And yet, since it inheres in a physical substrate and belongs to the 
animal soul, the imagination cannot be the means by which the human soul 
directly interfaces with the celestial realm to receive from it the spiritual trace. 
That function, as Dimitri Gutas argues, could only be performed by the practical 
intellect.394  In contrast with the theoretical intellect which only apprehends 
universals, the practical intellect is capable of receiving from the celestial realm 
knowledge of particulars in the sublunary world: in performing this function, it 
is served by the estimative faculty and the imagination.395  The crucial role of the 
estimative faculty here has two aspects. Firstly, as has already been discussed, 
the intellect can only engage the imagination by means of the estimative 
faculty. And secondly, as is evident from this passage, the estimative faculty, 
mediating the transmission of the trace from the practical intellect to the 
imagination, somehow specifies it, thus determining the way in which it is 
received by the imagination. This specificity is determined by the purpose 
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394 Gutas, ‗Imagination and Transcendental Knowledge‘, p. 343.  
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(gharaḍ) with which the estimative faculty has been primed – in this case, the 
pressing issue with which the tribe is concerned. This process of noesis 
therefore proceeds along a hierarchy of different aspects of the soul: the 
practical intellect, having received the trace from the celestial soul, conveys it 
to the estimative faculty, the intent of which specifies it accordingly, before it is 
then conveyed to the imagination.  
Such physical means are employed to distract the common sense and stupefy 
the imagination, allowing the practical intellect to slip away to achieve noetic 
connection with the celestial souls. Other examples of such methods require the 
diviner, or scryer, to focus on a transparent or glittering object, or one with 
wavy patterns, so that his common sense and imagination might be bewildered. 
Like the diviner of the Turkic tribe, the raw data received by way of noetic 
connection is conveyed by means of inspired speech which he utters whilst in 
the grip of the experience. Those who attend him, who are usually the very ones 
who requested the act of divination in the first instance, record and retain what 
he utters:  
…those who seek to induce inspired speech (yastanṭiq) in such a manner 
by focusing (ta’ammul) either on something transparent which makes the 
vision tremble by means of its tremulous quality (bi-rajrajatihi); or on 
something which causes stupefaction on account of its transparency; or 
on such as that which causes distraction such as a patch of shiny black; 
or objects which glitter or which have a wavy pattern. All of that 
preoccupies the common sense with a kind of bewilderment and stirs the 
imagination (khayāl) in a way that occasions bewilderment as though it 
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were coerced, not natural. In the bewilderment <of the common sense 
and the imagination> is to be found the aforementioned opportunity <for 
the practical intellect> to slip away.396 
There appears to be however, a qualitative difference between the practice of 
the diviner of the Turkic tribe and those who rely on scrying. The function of 
the rapid sprint of the Turkic diviner is to induce a state of hyperventilation 
which dissolves the pneuma of the imagination, rendering it still and inert, 
whilst perplexing the common sense. Bewilderment, however, can be induced in 
the scryer, who being usually young and gullible, is easily led into a state of 
bewilderment through the power of suggestion: 
…(these means) are most effective in one whose nature is most prone to 
stupefaction and most suited to accepting dubious stories (al-aḥādīth al-
mukhtaliṭa) such as simple-minded youth. Sometimes this is facilitated by 
lengthy, confused speech (al-ishāb fī al-kalām al-mukhtalaṭ) and falsely 
suggesting the influence of jinn (al-īhām lli-masīs al-jinn) and everything 
<which involves> bewilderment and stupefaction. If the estimative 
faculty takes upon itself the pursuit of this aim, the <noetic> connection 
(ittiṣāl) would not take long to be established.397 
What Avicenna meant by ‗confused speech‘ (al-kalām al-mukhtalaṭ) is not clear; 
nor does Rāzī‘s commentary assist us. However if we consult al-Sirr, a clearer 
picture of what, at the very least, Rāzī thought Avicenna may have meant 
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emerges. Discussing the effect of reciting incantations in unknown languages 
during magical ritual, Rāzī says: 
…when the soul hears these incantations, whilst understanding or 
comprehending nothing of them, then is it overwhelmed by 
bewilderment and stupefaction; and on account of this bewilderment, its 
ties to the corporeal world are severed and its connection with the world 
of unseen is established.398 
In this passage from al-Sirr, Rāzī is manifestly drawing on chapter 23 of 
Avicenna‘s Ishārat 10, which continues:  
Sometimes the flash of the unseen (lamḥan al-ghayb) will take the form 
of a powerful belief (ẓann qawī); at other times it may resemble the 
speech of jinn or a call from someone absent (hutāf min ghā’ib); and at 
other times it may take the form of something absent <but which 
nevertheless> can be witnessed despite the fact that its distance from 
the vision would <normally> prevent it from being so witnessed.399 
The eventual form which the diviner‘s imagination inscribes in his common 
sense, to generate a direct witnessed experience, will be the product of the 
process of muḥakat, or imitation.  This will depend to a large degree on his 
culture, the context of his immediate surroundings, and his personal 
experiences and beliefs.400  
Avicenna‘s theory of cognition enables him to explain dreams and visions as the 
product of the individual imagination, informed by culture and belief, whilst 
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simultaneously affirming their extra-mental and ontologically independent 
cause. The veridical dream or vision is experienced irrespective of whether the 
recipient affirms or denies the reality of their celestial cause and regardless of 
his religion or confession.  From prophets and those possessed of divine gnosis, 
to diviners of Turkic tribes, to dull-witted and suggestible youths: noetic 
connection with the celestial souls can be established by all.   
What distinguishes prophets and those possessed of divine gnosis from the rest 
of humanity is that they need not rely on sleep or illness or physical techniques 
to attain this state: whilst awake they can engage with the realm of the celestial 
souls and the lower corporeal world of the internal sense faculties such that 
management of the latter does not thwart connection with the former. 
Possessed of mastery of his soul, the prophet or ʿārif can then marshal the 
imagination to compose forms which correspond to those traces left by the 
celestial souls, imprinting them on the common sense.  
Those outside their elite ranks must rely on physical means to cause the 
bewilderment of the common sense and the imagination, freeing the higher 
function of the soul, namely the practical intellect, to connect with the celestial 
souls. Since they are incapable of simultaneously engaging with the celestial 
realm and directing the faculties of the animal soul, they must rely on those 
around them to listen to and retain the purport of what they utter. Whilst the 
imagination plays the crucial role of imprinting forms in the common sense, 
produced in imitation of the spiritual trace which the practical intellect receives 
from the celestial soul, the estimative faculty, being primed with a particular 
purpose and intent, specifies the trace accordingly before transmitting it to the 
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imagination. Both the estimative faculty and the imagination are thus crucial to 
the noetic process. 
7.7 Correspondence and noetic connection  
 
We have yet to form, however, a clearer picture of how the noetic connection is 
established between the celestial and human rational souls. Dimitri Gutas 
identifies an early formulation in Avicenna‘s al-Mabda’ wa’l-Maʿād (Provenance 
and Destination). He translates the relevant passage as follows:  
As for the reason for the knowledge of <future> events (al-kā’ināt), it is 
the contact of the human soul with the souls of the celestial bodies which 
[…] know what happens in the world of the elements [...] For the most 
part, these <human> souls come into contact with them <the souls of the 
celestial spheres> by virtue precisely of a congeneric similarity 
(mujānasa) between them. The congeneric similarity is that thing (al-
maʿnā) which, there <in the heavens>, is close to the concerns of these 
<human souls>. So most of what is seen <by the human souls> of what is 
to be found there <in the heavens> is congeneric to the states of the 
bodies of these <human> souls or to the states of one who is close to 
these bodies. And although the contact <of the human souls with the 
celestial souls> is total, the majority of the influence they receive from 
them is for the most part close to just their <own> concerns. This contact 
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comes about on the part (min jiha) of the estimation and imagination (al-
khayāl) and through their use, and concerns particular things.401 
Gutas observes how the concept of congeneric similarity (mujānasa) in the 
Provenance and Destination is expressed in the Healing as a relation – or nisba -- 
between celestial and human souls. He says: 
…for this knowledge to be transmitted, there must come about a 
necessary relation or connection (nisba) between the source of this 
knowledge, the supernal world, and its recipient, the rational soul and 
the imagination as a unit, and also, since this knowledge manifests itself 
through the imagination, between the rational soul and the imagination. 
In other words, what in the Provenance and Destination had been a 
congeneric similarity between the upper world and the human soul here 
[i.e. in al-Shifā’] is expressed as a connection or relation between the 
two.402 
It is evident from al-Sirr that the occult munāsabāt of Sabian astral ritual are 
crucial in establishing the mujānasa between the operant‘s soul and the celestial 
soul that he invokes. The resulting noetic connection enables the reception of 
both knowledge of the unseen and power to affect change in the sublunary 
world. To understand how, we must explore in greater detail the central role of 
the estimative faculty in the occult ritual described in al-Sirr. This will be the 
task of the next section.  
                                                             
401 Gutas, ‗Imagination and Transcendental Knowledge‘, p. 339. As discussed earlier, Gutas later 
explains the roles of the estimation and the imagination in this process as being subordinate to 
the practical intellect which is that function of the human rational soul which makes the noetic 
contact.  
 
402 Gutas, ‗Imagination and Transcendental Knowledge in Avicenna‘, p. 348.  
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7.8 The Estimative Faculty and Sabian Astral Ritual 
 
Rāzī cites Ibn Waḥshīya who says the Sabian method of establishing noetic 
connection with the celestial spirits entails the worship of the idols of the Sun 
and Mercury:  
Of the concerns of the practitioner is to make firm his connection with 
the celestial spirits: this is the main aim (al-maqṣūd al-muhimm). Said Ibn 
Waḥshiyya may God have mercy on him: ―it is necessary, each morning 
of these forty days, to come and praise the idols of the Sun and Mercury 
(ṣanam al-shams wa ʿuṭārid); to pray to them, burning for them aromatics 
which are appropriate, devoting himself to them, calling on their 
assistance in the attainment of that <main> aim.403  
Ibn Waḥshīya is not a philosopher: he does not theorize about the contribution 
made by each of the soul‘s internal faculties to this noetic process. So drawing 
on Avicenna‘s psychology, Rāzī speculates about what must be going on and in 
so doing he formulates a theory on how astrolatrous idolatry works: 
And I say: this craft is not accomplished unless thought and the 
estimative faculty are made to connect with the spirit of the assisting 
heavenly body (taʿlīq al-fikr wa’l-wahm bi-rūḥ dhālika al-kawkab al-muʿīn) 
such that that becomes a stabilized disposition (milka mustaqarra). 
Moreover, we have explained that souls are created subservient to the 
activities of the estimative faculty, in most matters, subject to the senses 
(khuliqat al-nufūs muṭīʿatan li’l-awhām wa-tābiʿatan li’l-ḥawāss). So it is 
                                                             
403 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 16.  
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necessary to take statues for these celestial spirits (lā buddā min ittikhādh 
tamāthīl li-tilka al-arwāḥ al-falakiyya) and to place them before the eye so 
that the senses connect with them, followed by the imagination (al-
khayāl) and the estimative faculty (al-wahm) which is drawn powerfully 
towards it. For, the faculties act more powerfully when they act in 
concert (fa-inna al-quwā idhā taṭābaqat kānat aqwā ʿalā al-fiʿl).404 
The following justification for astrolatrous idolatry thus emerges from this 
account. The human soul connects with the celestial spirit by means of its 
estimative faculty. Since the estimative faculty only understands things to the 
extent that they are rooted in a material reality; and given that meteorological, 
diurnal and nocturnal conditions disqualify the planetary bodies as reliable foci 
for adoration, the Sabians wrought idols to facilitate the connection between 
the estimative faculty and the planetary spirit.  Consistent worship during the 
forty day period of fasting stabilizes this connection within the soul. So since 
the soul is subject to the senses; and since wherever they focus the imagination 
and estimative faculty follow, planetary idols and litanies in adoration of the 
heavenly bodies, become central to this worship. When the noetic connection 
becomes stabilized, special occult knowledge and power is acquired. It is for this 
reason that the Sabians:  
… took idols (aṣnām) for these heavenly bodies for every purpose that 
could be sought such as love, hate, sickness, health, ill-fortune and good-
luck. And they turned themselves in their worship and they occupied 
their eyes with gazing at those statues; their tongues with the recitation 
of incantations which comprised mention of their attributes and 
                                                             
404 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 16. 
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influence until the forms <of the statues> reached their souls twice; for a 
man cannot describe something with his tongue unless its meaning 
occurs to his mind; then when he expresses it with his tongue, that 
sound reaches his ear and the soul understands the meaning of that 
speech, so he perceives that object of description once more. So the 
remembrance of the tongue is preserved by two conceptualizations (al-
dhikr al-lisānī maḥfūẓan bi-taṣawwurayn) – one prior and one posterior – 
and so when it occurs that the senses are drawn in a concerted way to 
the spirits of those heavenly bodies, the soul becomes connected 
(taʿalluq)  with them and the soul, when it perseveres in these acts, 
reaches a level close in rank to that soul innately disposed towards this 
special occult power (al-nafs al-mafṭūra ʿalā hādhihi al-khāṣīya).405  
Sensual stimuli are co-ordinated to draw the estimative faculty and the 
imagination towards the celestial spirit. As we have already discovered, the 
imagination operates under the direction of the estimative faculty: the latter, 
having received the maʿānī or intentions of the celestial spirit, leads the former 
to create simulacra which embody the intentions of the spirit. With the 
completion of the forty day period of fasting and worship, the adept‘s soul 
becomes master of the occult sciences (ghawāmiḍ al-ʿulūm) and he is imbued 
with occult power.  
 
7.9 Sabian perfected man 
 
                                                             
405 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 16. 
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Al-Ishārāt 10 and the Aḥwāl represent attempts at a naturalistic account of how 
the properties of prophethood can be individually displayed, to varying degrees 
by ordinary humans, as well as prophets.406 It is in light of this attempt that the 
beliefs and practices of Rāzī‘s Sabians are to be understood. Imaginational 
‗prophecy‘ by means of celestial soul noesis can be exhibited by the Turkic 
shaman; piercing philosophical intuition (ḥads) can be displayed by a thinker 
like Avicenna himself; and occult power can be exerted by a man possessed of 
divine gnosis, a malevolent sorcerer or even the evil eye of an envious 
neighbour. Philosophical accomplishment is certainly present in the subtext of 
al-Sirr, the theoretical passages of which are presented as the thought either of 
‗the philosophers and the Sabians‘. Whilst the knowledge extolled in the 
introduction to al-Sirr pertains to particulars, the philosopher Sabians, as 
contrasted with their more earth-bound idolatrous co-religionists, are certainly 
not excluded from insight into the universals. 
So each of the three properties can be individually displayed by ordinary 
humans and severally displayed by great prophets. Crucial to the operation of 
the imaginational property is the estimative faculty which mediates between 
the practical intellect, which receives traces from the Celestial Souls, and the 
imagination. It is just as vital in the exercise of occult power. And just as the 
estimative faculty mediates between the immaterial intellect and the internal 
faculties, which are rooted in the material substrate of the brain, so the 
imaginational capacity bridges the intellectual and the occult-practical 
extraordinary capacities.  
                                                             
406 For the varying degrees to which philosophical intuition (ḥads) can be displayed, see ch. 14 of 




Nowhere in the Aḥwāl or in al-Ishārāt does Avicenna assert that only prophets 
might exhibit all three properties of extraordinary human capacity. Whilst the 
account in the Aḥwāl appears under the title ‗On establishing prophethood‘ (Fī 
ithbāt al-nubuwwa), it is by no means restricted to prophets. Indeed both the 
Aḥwāl and al-Ishārāt allude to non-prophetic figures who have attained such 
completion, whose occult power can extend throughout the sublunary world, 
exerting its authority on all physical phenomena. But whilst Avicenna attributes 
the occult-practical capacity to a power in the soul that is innate, it is the 
innovation of al-Sirr to extend the logic of Avicenna‘s psychology to suggest that 
noetic connection with the Celestial Souls has the potential not only to impart 
knowledge of the unseen but also to develop occult power in a soul which is not 
otherwise so innately disposed. Thus the man who has successfully completed 
the arduous ritual of planetary ascent described in al-Sirr, to whose command 
the very planets humbly submit, becomes the Sabian analogue of Avicenna‘s 
perfected man.  
7.9.1 Perfected Man in Avicenna’s al-Ishārāt 
 
Both Avicenna as he writes in al-Ishārāt and the Sabians as Rāzī presents them in 
al-Sirr agree that noetic connection with the celestial souls produces occult 
knowledge: since the souls of the heavenly bodies possess knowledge of 
themselves as causes of change in the sublunary world, connection with them 
will yield knowledge of future events and hidden things. But al-Sirr goes one 
step further in linking this form of noesis with the acquisition of both occult 
knowledge and power. It would not be an unnatural inference to draw:  if noetic 
connection with the Celestial Souls occasions the transference to a human 
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recipient their knowledge of themselves as the effective causes of sublunary 
phenomena, then why could it not also involve the transference of the power to 
cause change? Whilst Avicenna is cautious not to go this far, Rāzī‘s commentary 
on al-Ishārāt makes fleeting allusion to the fact that his theory might indeed 
allow for such an understanding. Having presented his theory of celestial soul 
noesis as an explanation of the ability of those possessed of gnosis to attain 
occult knowledge, Avicenna then moves on to examine their ability to produce 
effects which breach the customary course of events (khawāriq al-ʿādāt). He says: 
You may receive information about the knowers that runs almost 
contrary to custom, and then you begin to disbelieve. This is like saying a 
knower sought rain for people, hence they received rain; or sought 
recovery for them, hence they recovered; or wished them ill hence they 
were cast down, inflicted by earth tremors, or perished in another way. 
This is also like saying he wished them well, hence they were 
emancipated from diseases, murrain, torrential streams and floods; or a 
beast submits to some of them, or no bird flees from them, or other 
similar things occur that do not count as belonging to the kind of things 
that are clearly impossible. Stand still and do not rush into rejecting 
these things, for such things have causes in the mysteries of nature. 
Perhaps it will be possible for me to relate some of these matters to 
you.407 
The ability to cause rain, floods and earth tremors bears a close resemblance to 
the extraordinary capacities described by Ṭumṭum al-Hindī as reported in al-Sirr 
                                                             
407 Avicenna in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 656-7.   
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1:4. But, says Rāzī commenting on these extraordinary feats described by 
Avicenna: 
…they are all related to the ability to act on the elemental world 
(mutaʿalliqa bi’l-taṣṣaruf fī al-ʿālam al-ʿunṣurī) and he [i.e. Avicenna] 
mentions that their causes are known, without mentioning at all 
anything that relates to the celestial bodies because the ability to act on 
them by way of changing their courses is, according to him, impossible.408 
Of course, Rāzī here is clarifying the fact that the one possessed of such power 
acts directly on elemental reality without any need to control the planets, the 
proximate causes of change in the sublunary world. But perhaps in addition to 
this Rāzī, realizing the potential of Avicenna‘s theory of celestial soul noesis, 
expects Avicenna to make the link with occult power. And yet he holds back 
from doing so. Perhaps Rāzī‘s expectation was encouraged by Avicenna‘s 
commentary on the pseudo-Aristotelian Theologia:  
…It is not impossible that the celestial bodies should in some way be 
employed by souls other than their own. Especially when a soul has 
perfected its power within its own body, it may, when need or 
expediency so demand, employ, in its place, a higher and more noble 
body than its own.409 
Unfortunately, Avicenna does not explain how such a soul can ‗employ‘ the 
heavenly bodies without, as Rāzī observes, ‗acting on them by way of changing 
their courses‘. Another way perhaps is by completion of the planetary ascent 
                                                             
408 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 657.  
409 Aristū ʿinda al-Arab, (ed.) Badawi, p.72, translated and cited by Rahman Prophecy in Islam, p.85, 
fn. 75.  
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ritual, which accords the man thus perfected power over the sublunary world. 
In al-Ishārāt, Avicenna advises his reader:  
Do not think it far-fetched that some souls possess a fixed habit whose 
influence reaches beyond their bodies and, that due to their power, these 
souls operate as a kind of soul for the world.410  
The reasoning here is that if the human soul can affect its own physical body, 
then it can also affect other bodies; this gives rise, at least to the logical 
possibility, of a soul possessed of occult power of such magnitude that it can act 
directly on the entire world as though it were its own body.  
He goes on to say:  
Therefore do not deny that some souls have this power such that they act 
on bodies other than their own and that such bodies react to these souls as 
the bodies of these souls do. Again, do not deny that these souls extend 
their proper powers to the powers of other souls on which they act, 
especially if the former souls have sharpened their fixed habit by means of 
subjugating their bodily powers which belong to them. Thus they subjugate 
desire, anger or fear of other souls.411  
Rāzī comments thusly: 
It is not impossible that one soul (baʿḍ al-nufūs) can have a special occult 
property (khāṣṣiyya) by which it is enabled to act on the elemental reality of 
this world and the relationship of that soul to the totality of the elements of 
this world is as the relation of our souls in relation to our bodies; neither is 
                                                             
410 Avicenna, in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 657.  
411 Avicenna, in Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 657-8.  
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it impossible for the effects of that soul to extend to other souls such that 
they, by virtue of their connection with that soul (li’l-ttiṣāli-hā bihā),  become 
empowered to act in a similar way or in a way that approximates to it. If this 
is possible (muḥtamal) in the substance of the soul, then if it also receives 
spiritual discipline (riyāḍāt) by which I mean the breaking of the powers of 
desire and anger (quwwatay al-shahwa wa’l-ghaḍab) then there is no doubt 
that then they become even more powerful.412 
Rāzī thus represents Avicenna as asserting three serially connected possibilities: 
(1) the existence of a soul so powerful that it can act throughout elemental 
reality in the sublunary world; (2) by virtue of their connection with this soul 
possessed of such singular power, other souls can be empowered to perform 
feats which approximate to its own; (3) the power, which is accorded by such a 
connection, can be augmented in individual souls by means of spiritual 
discipline and the subjugation of the base passions.  
He detects in Avicenna‘s reasoning an allusion to the logical possibility of a 
number of human souls who possess occult power by virtue of their connection 
to one singular soul uniquely possessed of a semi-divine capacity to operate 
throughout nature. Such a soul, of course, need not be that of a prophet: after 
all, Avicenna in this section of Ishārāt 10 is discussing the power of those 
possessed of gnosis (ʿārifīn) to perform feats which contravene the natural 
course of events.  
In al-Maṭālib 8, Rāzī amplifies the first of these possibilities as one which was 
accepted by the philosophers, including presumably Avicenna. Summarizing 
                                                             
412 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 658. 
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‗the position of the philosophers on the reason by which prophets and saints 
can perform miracles and saintly wonders‘, Rāzī says:  
…the estimative faculty possessed by man can be so powerful that it can 
effect bodies […] the existence of a man who possesses this power 
perfectly is not impossible; so it follows that he would be able to act on 
prime matter in this world howsoever he wills and desires. 413 
We are reminded of course not only of Ṭumṭum al-Hindī‘s description in al-Sirr 
1:4 of the man whose complete meditative focus affords him control over all the 
elements of sublunary reality but also of the perfected man to whose command 
the planets humbly submit at his completion of the planetary ascent ritual.  
7.9.2 Perfected Man in Avicenna’s Aḥwāl al-Nafs 
 
In the thirteenth chapter of Avicenna‘s Aḥwāl al-Nafs (‗States of the Soul‘) 
entitled ‗On establishing prophethood‘, the imaginational property of 
prophethood is explained in light of the same cognitive theory of Celestial Soul 
Noesis that we encountered in the Ishārāt. The Aḥwāl makes it clear that: 
 …apprehension of intelligible forms (al-itiṣṣāl bi’l-ṣuwar al-ʿaqliyya) is by 
means of the individual‘s theoretical intellect (al-ʿaql al-naẓarī); forms 
which comprise speech are formulated by another power, namely the 
practical intellect, served in this capacity by the imagination. So 
particulars, <as received from> the higher psychic substances (al-jawāhir 
al-ʿāliya al-nafsāniyya), are apprehended by the power of the soul that is 
called the practical intellect. The soul apprehends universals by a power 
                                                             
413 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 137. 
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called the theoretical intellect, from the higher intellectual substances 
(al-jawāhir al-ʿāliya al-ʿāqlīya).414  
The three levels of power and clarity in the noetic experience which we read in 
al-Ishārāt also appear in the Aḥwāl, where they are explained in terms of the 
receptivity of the human soul to the transmission of particulars from the 
celestial souls and the strength of the human imagination to render these traces 
appropriately.415  But in the Aḥwāl, adding a fourth degree which is distinguished 
from the rest by a superlative propensity (tahayyu’) for noetic reception, 
Avicenna explicitly classifies all four as levels of prophethood.416  
For Avicenna, the revelation of a prophet, the veridical dream and the 
utterances of a Turkic shaman fall within the same cognitive category of 
prophetic experience. Thus, insofar as Avicenna‘s formulation of the 
imaginational property of extraordinary human capacity is concerned, the ilhām 
which the Sabian sages of al-Sirr receive when connected with the celestial souls 
must also fall within this same category. This is completely unacceptable for an 
Ashʿarī theologian. Very important paragraph 
In the following chapter of the Aḥwāl, having described the corresponding levels 
of intuition (ḥads) possessed by the theoretical intellect, ranging from the weak 
                                                             
414 Avicenna, Aḥwāl, p. 117.  
415 During our exploration of al-Ishārāt we learnt of three degrees to which a ‗spiritual trace‘ from 
the celestial souls might be received and retained by the human soul: (1) those traces which are 
so weak that they leave no enduring impression; those which are sufficiently strong as to stir 
the imagination which, however, continues in its movement to generate new images by way of 
association such that only the imagination‘s associated images, rather than the original trace, 
are retained;  and finally those traces of such intensity and power that they are clearly 
imprinted in the imagination and stored in the memory undefiled by the confusion of associated 
images. But in the Aḥwāl, a fourth degree is added, which is distinguished from the rest by a 
superlative propensity (tahayyu‘) for noetic reception. See Avicenna, Aḥwāl, p. 118 -9. 
416 Avicenna, Aḥwāl, p. 119.  
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to the powerful, Avicenna then moves onto the familiar argument which is that 
forms in the soul, such as those igniting anger or desire, exert an effect on the 
body and spur it to action; and that therefore:  
…we do not deny that there can be powers of the soul which exert a more 
powerful effect than our own such that their effect is not restricted to 
the matter of their own body but rather, if they will, they can produce in 
the matter of the world that which is visualized by the same means by 
which they act in their own soul; the principle of that is naught but 
producing movement or rest; coolness or heat; rigidity or suppleness; 
just as it produces in its own body. As a result of that clouds and winds, 
lightning and earthquakes are produced and waters and springs burst 
forth, and so on, in the world of men, by means of the will of that man 
(irāda hadhā al-insān).417   
Those who have perfected this occult-practical capacity ‗…can produce in the 
matter of the world that which is visualized by the same means by which they 
act in their own soul‘. With a fixed and one-pointed imaginative focus, they 
visualize the nature of the effect they intend to produce in terms of movement 
and quality. Such is the magnitude of their power that they are able to control 
metereological and geological phenomena. We are reminded of course of 
Ṭumṭum al-Hindī‘s meditator who ‗dispatches rain, lightning, thunder, lightning 
bolts and earthquakes‘ and ‗is in command of the Earth‘s elements‘. In contrast 
with al-Ishārāt, Avicenna in the Aḥwāl draws together all three properties of 
extraordinary human capacity in one individual: 
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…the most pre-eminent kind of human is he who  has (1) realized 
perfection in the intuition of the theoretical intellect, such that he is 
completely free of need of a human teacher; and (2) (has realized 
perfection)in his practical divinatory ability (fī kahānati-hi al-ʿamalīya) 
such that he witnesses the realm of the soul (al-ʿālam al-nafsānī) [i.e. the 
realm of the celestial souls] and that which therein relates to the states 
of the lower world, establishing them whilst awake so that the 
imagination completely performs its action for him to witness them in a 
specific way, as we have already explained and ; (3) the power of his soul 
exerts its effect throughout the natural world.418  
By reason of his perfection this individual moves freely throughout the three 
realms of Intellect, Soul and Physical Nature. As such he commands the sole 
rightful claim to sovereignty over the rest of humanity.  Avicenna describes 
such a person as: 
…the real king who, by virtue of his essence, deserves to rule […] if he 
links his soul (in nasaba nafsa-hu) to the realm of the intellect (ʿālam al-
ʿaql), he will be found to have achieved spontaneous noetic connection 
with it; if he links his soul to the realm of soul (ʿālam al-nafs) he will be 
found to be one of the inhabitants of that realm; if he links his soul to the 
realm of nature (ʿālam al-ṭabīʿa) [i.e. the sublunary world] then he will be 
able to effect it in whatever way he wills.419 
Moreover, those who follow him will, by virtue of that fact, gain rank and 
distinction amongst the rest of humanity: 
                                                             
418 Avicenna, Aḥwāl, p. 125.. 
419 Avicenna, Aḥwāl, p. 126.  
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…he who follows him also will be a great ruler (ra’īs kabīr), only of a lesser 
rank, and the rest will be the nobles and honoured men of humankind.420  
Just as we saw in al-Ishārāt, we here detect an allusion to a group of humans 
distinguished by their connection with the perfected man. 
The Avicennan perfected man, acquires supernal knowledge by means of 
celestial soul noesis; his estimative faculty is so powerful that it can extend 
across the sublunary world. He represents the conceptual background against 
which the Sabian adept, perfected through the long ritual of planetary ascent, 
has been projected. 
 
  
                                                             
420 Avicenna, Aḥwāl, p. 126. The theme of the philosopher-king, the ‗natural ruler of the world‘, 
possessed of occult power by virtue of his connection with the celestial souls, is pursued by 
Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī (d.1186) in the last chapter of his Partū Nāma (see 
The Book of Radiance).  
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The aspiring practitioner of the occult practices recorded in al-Sirr must have 
command of astrology, to ensure correct ritual timing, so that a congenereity 
might be established between his soul and that of the heavenly body whose aid 
he endeavours to attract. So crucial is this knowledge that its mastery is one of 
the twelve conditions which must be fulfilled if occult practice is to meet with 
success.421 I shall argue that, whilst ritual timing is crucial, the very practice of 
catarchic astrology, by the practitioner himself, is of commensurate importance 
in the establishment of human-celestial psychic congenereity; for just as the 
estimative faculty is the vital link between the human practical intellect and the 
mutaṣarrifa in producing noetic connection, so it is also the operative faculty in 
the practice of astrology. Such is the importance of astrology that, aside from 
the treatise on astral correspondences, Rāzī devotes two chapters in the first 
treatise to discussing the Sabian epistemological basis of astrology.422  It is my 
contention that his formulation of this epistemology draws on Avicenna‘s 
account of the ways in which the estimative faculty arrives at its conclusions 
about the extra-mental world. In this way I hope to show that the cognitive 
processes in which the estimative faculty engages during the activity of 
astrological practice play a vital role in Sabian occult ritual.  
8.2 Rāzī’s solution to the Epistemological Problem of Astrology 
 
                                                             




The empirical limitations which hinder certainty in the science of astrology are 
arranged by Rāzī systematically in al-Sirr. He begins by circumscribing its field of 
inquiry to what can be known empirically, to highlight the vast area which lies 
beyond the ken of observable reality. He then proceeds to introduce doubt into 
the field about which astrology does indeed make positive truth claims.  
He reasons therefore that the heavens contain bodies which are so small that 
they cannot be observed. Thus are we entirely unaware of their existence and of 
the influence they exert on the sublunary world. Even those heavenly bodies 
which we can detect with the eye, such as those which constitute the Milky 
Way, are so small that their natures (ṭabā’iʿ) cannot be ascertained. Moreover, 
the perpetual motions of the heavenly bodies, and the constant alteration of 
their configurations, resist any definite conclusions about their natures.423 
Furthermore, the precise effect of the heavenly bodies on sublunary phenomena 
cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty: 
…as for sublunary material, complete apprehension (al-wuqūf al-tāmm) of 
their natures is impossible since complete reception (al-qabūl al-tāmm) 
does not occur unless it be with the fulfilment of the conditions of 
quality, quantity, position and others; sublunary material is not stable in 
one state. Rather it is in a state of perpetual transformation and change 
though this may not be apparent to sense perception. Thus it becomes 
obvious from what we have mentioned that complete apprehension of 
the states of the active heavenly forces and the passive terrestrial forces 
does not occur in man. Were it to occur to anyone, then that individual 
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necessarily would know all the minutiae (tafāṣīl) of the past and the 
future and be able to cause wonders (umūr ʿajība).424  
Recalling the discussion on talismans in the previous chapter, Rāzī‘s attention 
here turns to the relationship between active heavenly and passive terrestrial 
forces and in doing so emphasizes the relationship between astrology, 
knowledge of sublunary materials, and the practical craft of striking talismans. 
Even terrestrial phenomena defy apprehension by sense perception which is 
sometimes incapable of discerning the inevitable changes and transformations 
to which they are subject. In general, the infinitely intricate complex of celestial 
and terrestrial factors which constitutes sublunary reality resists any attempt at 
complete human apprehension. However, in the remote event that a single 
exceptional individual were indeed able to grasp such a bewildering array of 
phenomena, then he would have the power to perform prodigies.  
In response to these epistemological doubts, Rāzī acknowledges their validity 
but rejects as unreasonable the impossible standards of empirical certainty 
which they implicitly demand:     
…what a fine saying it is that not everything which cannot be entirely 
perceived merits abandonment (mā lā yudrak kullu-hu lā yutrak kullu-hu) 
for although human intellects fall short of knowing the higher active 
forces and <their corresponding> lower, passive phenomena (al-munfaʿila 
al-sāfila), they are nevertheless capable of being apprised of some of their 
conditions.425  
                                                             
424 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.10.  
425 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.10.  
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The reasoning of Rāzī‘s putative critics of astrology asserts that if an object of 
empirical inquiry cannot be completely and entirely observed, then those 
observations of it which can be made are devoid of any epistemological value. A 
corollary of this assertion therefore is that if a field of inquiry is to yield a body 
of true knowledge, it must be founded on apodictic demonstration. Rāzī 
responds by appealing to a sense of pragmatism: although reliable empirical 
observation is limited, the knowledge which it yields should not be disdained 
but rather valued as the best that can be achieved within the narrow scope of 
human apprehension. In responding in this way, Rāzī attempts to redeem 
astrology, and by extension the craft of striking talismans, from the anathema of 
those who insist on apodictic demonstration as the sine qua non of any field of 
true knowledge. The means by which he does so demands close scrutiny as it 
represents an attempt to construct an epistemology of astrology: repeated 
observation (al-tajārib) 426 must be augmented by veridical intuition (ilhām ṣādiq). 
He says:          
Insofar as long-term repeated observation and veridical intuitions (al-tajārib 
al-mutaṭāwila wa’l-ilhāmāt al-ṣādiqa) are concerned, that portion (qadr) <of 
knowledge>, though it be paltry and insignificant in relation to everything 
in existence, is immense in relation to the capability and power of man. We 
are not <logically> compelled <to conclude> that, if we are incapable of 
mastering <a field of knowledge> entirely, that which we have mastered of 
it will bring no benefit; nor are we <logically> compelled to conclude from 
the absence of apodictic demonstration (burhān) its disqualification as a 
science (ʿilm). For a science based on apodictic demonstration (al-ʿilm al-
                                                             
426 In ‗The Empiricism if Avicenna‘, Gutas translates tajriba as ‗testing and proving‘. In the context 
of astrology it is best translated as ‗repeated observation‘.  
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burhānī) is more specific (akhaṣṣ) than a <general> science (ʿilm) and the fact 
that the specific science does not exist does not necessarily mean that the 
more general does not exist (lā yulzam min ʿadam al-akhaṣṣ ʿadam al-
aʿamm).427 
Thus fields of inquiry based on albeit limited empirical observations, rather than 
the certainties of apodictic demonstration, nevertheless contain real knowledge 
value. And where sense perception fails, intuition succeeds at least to some 
degree in bridging the epistemological gap which must be traversed if a 
particular field of inquiry is to be established as a true body of knowledge. Rāzī‘s 
allusion to the ‗non-existence‘ (ʿadam) of a ‗specific‘ apodictic basis to astrology 
mirrors the reference made by Abu Maʿshar in his al-Madkhal al-kabīr (Great 
Introduction) to the ‗existence‘ (wujūd) of astrology, as though it were 
independent of the astrologer‘s mind, awaiting discovery and exploration. 428 But 
whilst Abu Maʿshar restricts all forms of prognostication, including the 
professions of astrology, medicine and husbandry, to repeated observation (al-
tajārib), Rāzī supplements this method with that of veridical intuition. Taking 
his cue from Abu Maʿshar, Rāzī adopts as a useful illustrative comparison the 
example of medicine, a field of knowledge based on a similar epistemological 
foundation: 
So knowledge (maʿrifa) of drugs and medicines (adwiya wa-aghdhiya) 
occurs despite the fact that this knowledge (maʿrifa) is not based on 
demonstrative proof. Indeed this craft (ṣināʿa) is more deserving of 
attention than the craft of medicine because, though they might share in 
                                                             
427 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 10 
428 ‗fī wujūd ʿilm aḥkām al-nujūm’, Abu Maʿshar, Great Introduction, 2, p.6, cited by Burnett, article 
‗Doctors versus Astrologers‘. 
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not being based in logical demonstrative proof, this craft is distinguished 
from medicine on account of the fact that either it brings benefit or it 
brings no harm. But as for medicine, it can either bring benefit or it can 
harm, for potions when taken can bring harm just as they can benefit. 
Thus it is established that attention must be paid to this craft.429  
Being a body of practical knowledge grounded in observation medicine, like 
astrology, is referred to as a maʿrifa, a term which Rāzī seems to apply here in a 
technical sense to designate a form of knowledge which is more general (aʿamm) 
rather than the more specific (akhaṣṣ) form of knowledge which is based in 
apodicitic demonstration (ʿilm burhānī). It is with this distinction in mind that he 
refers to each of medicine, astrology, and the general subject matter of Al-Sirr, as 
a ṣināʿa or craft which is grounded in repeated observation and veridical 
intuition.  
This latter way of knowing is explored in further depth in the third chapter of 
the first treatise entitled ‗the method by which the conditions of the heavenly 
bodies are known.‘430  The generally held position (al-mashhūr) of those who 
would defend astrology restricts its means of inquiry to repeated observation 
(tajriba). However, astrology makes claims about phenomena, such as thousand 
year cycles and certain planetary conjunctions, which occur over such vast 
periods of time that they defy observation by any single individual.  
This position in my opinion is false, for observation requires repetition 
(tikrār) but in this case, such phenomena do not recur for a very long time 
                                                             
429 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 10. Compare Abu Maʿshar as observed by Brunett in ‗Doctors versus 
Astrologers‘, p. 107.  
430 Rāzī, al-Sirr, pp. 10-11.  
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(lā tafī al-aʿmāl bi-ḍabṭ tawārīkhi-hā) such as when they speak of thousands, 
conjunctions, and the precession of the equinoxes […] Rather the truth is 
that the method is repeated observation in some things and revelation and 
inspiration (waḥy wa’l-ilhāmāt) in the rest such as with respect to the 
images of the degrees, the thousands and the conjunctions (ṣuwar al-
darajāt wa’l-ulūf wa’l-qirānāt).431 
Rāzī‘s solution therefore is to ground astrology in the method of repeated 
observation for those phenomena which do in fact submit to such scrutiny, and 
in ‗revelation and intuition‘ (al-waḥy wa’l-ilhām) for those which do not. With the 
allusion to ‗images of the degrees‘ Rāzī segues into a discussion of more 
explicitly occult matters: the images, glyphs and incantations associated with 
the heavenly bodies. Since such data is also apprehended by means of intuition 
and revelation, the crucial role of noetic connection with the celestial souls in 
both astrology and occult practice is brought into sharp focus:   
Indeed there are no means to attain the images, unknown characters, 
and incantations (al-ṣuwar wa’l-ruqūm al-majhūla wa’l-riqā) which the 
masters of talismans prescribe except by means of inspiration. 
Tinkūlūshā claimed that many matters were revealed to him whilst he 
was sleeping in the temples of the heavenly bodies, having offered acts of 
obeisance and sacrifices. And it is related on the authority of Zawāyāy, 
the first man (sayyid al-bashar) that he saw in the World of the Two Poles 
(ʿālam al-quṭbayn) marvellous things the like of which do not exist in the 
World of the Centre (ʿālam al-markaz) and he claimed that he only came 
to know them because the Sun revealed them to him because Zawāyāy  
                                                             
431 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 11. 
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stood in praise of the Sun for forty-two days, day and night, extolling it 
in a way that none had done before, craving for propinquity to the Sun, 
until he saw in his sleep the idol of the Sun saying ―the God of gods is 
utterly free of need of you and anyone else so do not torment yourself‖. 
Know that the doctrine of these Sabians is that these heavenly bodies are 
living, intelligent and rational, capable of action; and they are agreed 
that each one of the spirits of these heavenly bodies (arwāḥ hādhihi al-
kawākib) can become manifest to man at any time and reveal to him 
these characters (ruqūm) and incantations (riqā): they are the names of 
these spirits and their adjutants (aʿwān). All their books contain this 
assertion. Moreover it is not unlikely that it be said that these 
incantations, which are unknown to us, <consist of> meaningful words 
(kalimāt maʿlūma), but they are uttered in languages which have in our 
day become archaic (mahjūra), for most of this knowledge is transmitted 
from the Kasdānians who lived in ancient times. As for now, these 
languages have become extinct and so it comes as no surprise that these 
words remain obscure (mubhama). We surmise that these words consist 
of praise of the heavenly bodies and the enumeration of their special 
occult properties (khawaṣṣ) and effects; so it is not a remote possibility (lā 
yabʿudu) that a man might enumerate the attributes of the heavenly 
bodies in the words of (a known language) which could stand in their 
place, according their (same) benefit. This is my opinion on this topic.432  
So Rāzī‘s solution in al-Sirr to the epistemological problem of astrology, and by 
extension to other crafts (ṣināʿāt) such as medicine and talisman making, is to 
                                                             
432 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 11. 
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navigate the field of inquiry using the methods of repeated observation and 
revelation.433  However in chapter three of the third treatise of al-Maṭalib 8, 
entitled ‗On the method by which is attained knowledge of the natures of the 
celestial bodies‘, the solution is developed and refined with the addition of a 
third approach to knowledge: analogical association (qiyās). Thus he says: 
Know that this method comprises three approaches (umūr): analogical 
association (qiyās), repeated observation (tajriba) and revelation (waḥy).434 
As the first of these approaches, analogical association begins a process that 
eventually leads to noetic connection with the celestial souls and the reception 
of data by means of revelation (waḥy).435 He explains the process of analogical 
association with an appropriately medical illustration, alluding to black bile, 
emphasizing the affinity between the two crafts:   
      As for analogical association it is that when they witness the darkness in 
the colour of Saturn, and this darkness corresponds to sawdā (black 
bile/melancholy), they conclude (ḥakamū ʿalayhi) that the nature of Saturn 
is cold and dry. And when they witness the redness in the colour of Mars – 
and this colour resembles the colour of fire - they conclude that its nature 
is fiery and dry.436 
If adopted as the sole approach to knowledge, analogical association is a weak 
means of proof and the conclusions to which it gives rise are unreliable. But as a 
                                                             
 
434 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 159.  
435 Rāzī does not in fact explicitly state that the celestial souls are the source of this revelation, 
but given his discussion of veridical dreams and knowledge of the unseen in al-Maṭālib 8 which 
draws from Namaṭ 10 of al-Ishārāt, we are on safe ground to make this assumption.  
436 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 159. 
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way of generating hypotheses which can be tested by repeated observation, 
analogical association can serve as a useful tool of inquiry:  
In our opinion (al-mukhtār ʿinda-nā), this method (al-ṭarīq) [i.e. analogical 
association] is weak indeed and cannot be relied upon. For it is established 
in the field of medicine, that inferring from specific colours the occurrence 
of certain natures (ṭabā’i) is the weakest form of diagnosis (aḍʿafu aqsām al-
dalā’il). Rather the truth is that whilst <reliance> on colour as evidence for a 
diagnosis is weak, when they add to it repeated observation (al-tajārib), and 
the repeated observation is consistent with the analogical association 
(muṭābaqa li-hādhā al-qiyās), then the knowledge (maʿrifa) of the natures 
which is generated is based on the application of the two approaches. So 
analogical association is the principle motor of intellects and ideas (al-
mabda’ al-muḥarrik li’l-ʿuqūl wa’l-khawāṭir), whilst repeated observation 
constitutes completion and perfection.437 
Despite being weak when adopted as the sole means of investigation, analogical 
association nevertheless plays an important role in its ability to stir motion 
within the soul in order to generate a working hypothesis. Since, strictly 
speaking, the rational soul is immaterial, the use of the word muḥarrik – or 
motor – to describe the activity of analogical association would imply that its 
locus is an internal organ with a physical substrate. Of course, as we have 
already learnt, this activity is characteristic of the mutaṣarrifa, when operating 
either qua the imagination or the cogitative faculty. We also know that it shares 
its seat in the substrate of the brain with the estimative faculty. The aim of the 
investigator is to establish a consistent correspondence (muṭābaqa) between the 
                                                             
437 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 159. 
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hypothesis, which has been generated by analogical association, and the data 
produced by repeated observation. The greater the number of repeated 
corroborating observations, the stronger the correspondence, and the stronger 
the supposition (ẓann qawīy) that the hypothesis is in fact correct:  
Know that the method of repeated observation is that when a certain 
kind of event (nawʿ min anwāʿ al-hawādith) occurs in this world, then a 
man engaged in such observation establishes knowledge of how the 
celestial configurations were by means of perfect and detailed 
examination (ʿalā sabīl al-istiqṣā wa’l-kamāl) and so, if the like of this event 
occurs a second time, then a third, a fourth and a fifth, and he establishes 
the celestial configurations are like the first, then there arises in his 
heart a strong supposition (ẓann qawīy) that that specific celestial 
configuration gives rise to the occurrence of that certain kind of event 
from among the events which take place in this world.438  
Once a hypothesis that a certain celestial configuration gives rise to a particular 
kind of terrestrial event is confirmed by repeated observation, the investigator 
can then move on to make inferences about the ‗nature‘ of that celestial 
configuration:  
The upshot (al-ḥaṣil) is that repeated observation involves the inference, 
from the coming to be of certain events in this world, of knowledge of 
the natures of the celestial configurations (maʿrifa ṭabā’iʿ al-awḍāʿ al-
falakiyya). So if these repeated observations are established, then after 
                                                             
438 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, pp. 159-160.  
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them he infers, from the arising of that specific celestial configuration, 
the occurrence of that kind of terrestrial event.439  
Astrology, like medicine, builds its knowledge on the accumulated observations, 
inferences and conclusions of generations throughout time. And just like the 
astral religion of the Sabians, described by Rāzī in his al-Tafsīr as the ‗oldest 
religion of mankind‘, the epistemological approach which characterizes 
astrology has overseen the incremental accumulation of human knowledge 
since time immemorial:    
Know that this <mode> of inference was held in esteem by the peoples of 
the earth since time immemorial until today. So he who wants to become 
an expert in this knowledge (ʿilm) then, each time he sees a certain kind 
of event in this world (nawʿ min al-ḥawādith fī hādhā al-ʿālam), he must 
engage in a detailed examination in order to know the celestial 
configuration which is associated with the coming to be of that event 
(ḥudūth dhālika al-ḥādith), and compare his observation (tajribatu-hu) with 
the sayings of the ancients (al-mutaqaddimīn). If he perseveres in this 
method for a prolonged period, and it so happens that his soul is suited 
to this knowledge (ʿilm) by virtue of his original disposition (fiṭra aṣliyya) 
then he will attain a mighty portion (mablaghan ʿaẓīman).440   
Since it is one of the most ancient fields of human knowledge, the investigator 
must compare, although not necessarily be bound by, the transmitted sayings of 
the ancients which preserve the intellectual tradition. Rāzī observes: 
Know that you never see a religion or sect except that most of its 
principles are based on transmission from predecessors (al-naql min al-
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440 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 160. 
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salaf). The like of this is therefore not unlikely with respect to this 
knowledge (ʿilm), and God knows best.441 
The third complementary approach to astrology is of course revelation and 
inspiration. Again, Tinkūlūshā and Dhawānāy are the sources cited for the 
illustration of this point. But whilst in al-Sirr the revelation is the result of a 
richly described process of purification and idolatrous solar worship, in the al-
Maṭālib the revelation is more soberly presented as being solely the product of 
purification:  
 As for the third method, it is the method of revelation and inspiration. 
This is also agreed upon by the masters of this knowledge.  Tinkūlūshā 
related that, when Dhawānāy, the father of mankind (sayyid al-bashar), 
had completed the purification of his soul and the training of his mind 
(taṣfiya al-nafs wa-riyāḍa al-dhihn), ineffable forms from the celestial world 
would become manifest to him. 
Thus in the al-Maṭālib the agency of celestial souls in the education of the human 
soul in the context of astrology is minimized. Nevertheless, for the reader who is 
familiar with al-Sirr, its shadow remains in the background.  
 
8.3 The Crafts and the Estimative Faculty 
 
Rāzī‘s formulation of the epistemology of the crafts such as astrology, medicine, 
and talisman making draws its inspiration from Avicenna‘s account in the al-
Shifā’ of how the estimative faculty experiences the extra-mental world and 
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reaches its conclusions concerning its phenomena.442 A brief consideration of 
this account would illuminate our understanding of how Rāzī adapted it to his 
theory of occult practice.  
 
Avicenna poses the question:  
How does the estimative faculty, without being associated with the 
intellect at the time of its estimative activity (ḥāla tawahhumi-hi), 
apprehend (yanāl) the maʿānī which are in sensible objects, when the 
external sense apprehends their form, without those maʿānī being 
sensed, and without many of <those maʿānī> bringing benefit or inflicting 
harm in that moment?443    
He identifies three ways of apprehension. The first is intuition (ilhāmāt) ‗which 
emanates on the all from divine mercy.‘444 Examples of the emanation of 
intuitions include the natural impulse (gharīza) of the baby to grab onto 
someone when made to stand upright or to shut its eye when something is 
brought close to it. Animals also share in this intuition, by means of which the 
sheep is wary of the wolf even though it may have never previously experienced 
one (min ghayr tajriba).445  
 
                                                             
442 See Avicenna’s De Anima, Nafs 4.3, 182.14-185.6. For my introduction to this important passage 
on the estimative faculty, I am grateful for the paper presented by Dimitri Gutas, Gothenburg, 
July 2016. His translation informs my own, which however differs significantly from his in key 
parts.   
443 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.183, ll.13-16. Gutas translates as follows: ‗How does the Estimation that 
was not accompanied by intellect at the moment that it is estimating attain the connotational 
attributes of sensibles as the senses are attaining their form, although none of those attributes 
was sensed and many of them were at that moment neither beneficial nor harmful?‘ Gutas 
translates the phrase ‗al-maʿānī allatī hiya fī al-maḥsūsāt‘ as ‗the connotational attributes of 
sensibles‘ as though it were a genitive construct; I render it as ‗the maʿānī which are in sensible 
objects‘.  
444 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.183, ll.17-18.  
445 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.183, ll.18-p.184. l.12 
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The second method of apprehension is ‗similar‘ to experience (tajriba):  
When an animal experiences pain or pleasure or is touched by some 
sensible benefit or harm associated with a sensible form, such that the 
form of the thing and the form of that which is associated with it are 
inscribed in the Form-bearing faculty; and the maʿnā of the relationship 
(al-nisba) between them and their judgment (al-ḥukm) are inscribed in the 
Recollection (al-dhikr); then the Recollection, through its essence and 
natural disposition (jibilla), apprehends that. So when this form appears 
to the Imagination (al-mutakhayyila) from the outside, it stirs in the 
Form-bearing faculty, together with the beneficial or harmful maʿānī 
associated with it, and in general the maʿnā which is in the Recollection, 
by way of tranference and mental presentation (ʿalā sabīl al-intiqāl wa’l-
istiʿrāḍ), which is in the nature of the imaginative faculty. And so the 
Estimative faculty senses all of that simultaneously, and sees (ra’ā) the 
maʿnā together with the form. This <occurs> in a manner which 
approximates to experience (tajriba). It is for this reason that dogs are 
frightened of stones and pieces of wood.446            
The third method resembles the analogical association involved in identifying 
the correspondence between Saturn and bile or melancholia: 
Other judgments may occur to the estimative faculty by means of 
identifying similarity (al-tashbīh) <between objects> whereby a thing may 
                                                             
446 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.184, ll.13-p.185. l.3. In the language of the De Anima of the al-Shifā’, the 
‗form-bearing faculty‘ (al-muṣawwira) denotes the memory which stores forms; the ‗recollection‘ 
(al-dhikr) denotes the memory which stores maʿānī. Concerning dogs being frightened of stones 
and pieces of wood, Gutas comments: ‗The text has literally, lumps or clods of earth or dry mud 
(madar) for stones. What is meant is that dogs are afraid of things lying around on the ground 
that people might throw at them. In certain localities, apparently where Avicenna was writing 
his work, or perhaps where he first observed this phenomenon, clods of dry mud or earth were 
something that one could find more easily on the street than stones.‘  
302 
 
have a form associated with an estimative maʿnā in some sensible 
particulars (fī baʿḍ al-maḥsūsāt) but which are not always associated with 
all of them; so with the presence of this form <the estimative faculty> 
turns its attention towards its maʿnā which could be different.447    
Since the estimative faculty is the governor of the animal soul, most of the 
examples with which Avicenna illustrates these three approaches relate to 
animal cognition. The intuitions (ilhāmāt) received by babies and animals have 
the quality of what moderns would understand as instinct, which are somehow 
neurologically hard-wired into the physical substrate of consciousness. For 
Avicenna, their source is divine and extra-mental. There is a qualitative 
difference between the nature of these intuitions, that determine the behaviour 
and actions of pre-toddling babies and wolf-wary sheep, and those that are 
received by Rāzī‘s astrologers which impart to them knowledge items pertaining 
to the celestial spheres, which lie beyond the ken of human sense perception.  
A parallel distinction can be discerned between Avicenna‘s account of the 
estimative faculty‘s way of processing quasi-experience (shay’un ka’l-tajriba)448 
and the ‗experiences‘ (al-tajarib), or repeated observations, of the astrologers. 
Avicenna‘s quasi-experiences are illustrated by the bitter lessons learnt by dogs 
fleeing the dry mud missiles of irritable passers-by. Gutas explains that such 
lessons are only quasi-experiences: 
…because in the logical and epistemological discussions of experience 
elsewhere he associates syllogism building with experience proper, 
something that can be accomplished only by the human rational soul.449  
                                                             
447 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.185, ll.4-6.  
448 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.184, l.13. 
449 See footnote 14 of handout which accompanied Gutas‘s ‗Estimation, the most crucial internal 
sense‘. For a fuller discussion of this point see Gutas, ‗Empiricism of Avicenna‘. 
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The ―experiences‖ - or repeated observations - of Rāzī‘s astrologers are, by way 
of contrast, very much part of an empirical inquiry. Avicenna himself 
distinguishes between the nature of estimative cognition in animals, and in 
humans operating on the level of the animal soul, and the cognition of the 
estimative faculty which is ennobled by its proximity to reason. He describes the 
nature of the estimative faculty in the former category as follows: 
The estimative faculty is the greatest judge in animals, judging by way of 
stimulation of the imaginative faculty (inbiʿāth takhayyulī) without this 
being subjected to verification. The like of this is what occurs to a man 
when he deems honey vile on account of its resemblance to yellow bile. 
For the estimative faculty judges that it [i.e. the honey] falls into the 
same category (fa-inna al-wahm yaḥkumu bi-annahu fī ḥukm dhālika) <as the 
yellow bile> and the soul follows the estimative faculty even though the 
intellect deems <its judgement> false. Animals, and those humans who 
resemble them, only follow this judgement of the estimative faculty 
which possesses no logical discrimination of its own.450      
But for one whose estimative cognition falls into the latter category: 
…there could occur to his senses and his faculties, on account of their 
proximity to reason (al-nuṭq), that which almost renders his internal 
faculties rational, in contrast with animals. So it is for this reason that he 
can apprehend from the benefits of composite sounds, colours, 
fragrances, and tastes, and from hope and desire, things which other 
animals cannot. Because it is as though the light of reason outpours and 
flows on these faculties; and the imagination which the man possesses 
                                                             
450 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.182, l.14 - p.183, l.2. 
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may have become subject to reason, whilst in animals it is subject to the 
estimative faculty. As a result he can derive benefit from it [i.e. in the 
pursuit of various branches] of knowledge, and his memory can bring 
benefit in such knowledge, just like the experiences (al-tajārib) which 
(are recalled) by the memory, and observations of particulars (al-arṣād al-
juz’iyya) and so forth.451   
Thus the estimative faculty of he who abjures the world of gross materiality, is 
more aligned with the immaterial intellect, and is able to apprehend ‗the maʿānī 
which are in sensible objects‘ as they truly are, without being led to erroneous 
conclusions by an undisciplined imagination which would have him believe that 
honey is as vile as yellow bile. In the context of occult ritual, the estimative 
faculty of the philosopher Sabian will enable him to relate all the maʿānī which 
inhere in the sensible objects of ritual, including ‗composite sounds, colours, 
fragrances, and tastes‘, to the celestial soul with which he strives to generate 
congenereity within his own soul---an ultimately noetic connection.   
  
                                                             
451 Avicenna’s De Anima, p.183, l.3-11. For an insightful analysis of Rāzī‘s restrained 
epistemological optimism concering the wahm, see Adamson, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī On Place‘.  
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Chapter 9: An Alternative Account of Astral Visions 
 
Thus far we have established how, just as Avicennism dominates Sabian 
cosmological doctrines, so Avicennan internal sense theory deeply informs the 
account which al-Sirr presents of how spiritual discipline and astral ritual 
facilitate noetic connection with the celestial souls, imbuing the practitioner 
with occult knowledge and power. But we have also seen how Rāzī includes 
alternative cosmological views within the Sabian heterogeneous construct. We 
will now examine his inclusion of an account of visions which is alternative to 
the Avicennan psychological analysis.452 
In section 3.4.5, we saw how in al-Sirr 4:1, Rāzī presents two competing theories 
on the shape of the heavenly bodies: one attributed to the philosophizing 
Sabians, who assert that they are simple spheres; the other attributed to the 
Chaldean Sabians who assert that they are theriomorphic. We learnt that the 
latter draw this inference from the a priori assumptions that: (1) the heavenly 
bodies are the causes of corresponding theriomorphic forms in the sublunary 
world; and (2) a resemblance necessarily exists between the cause and its effect. 
The Chaldean Sabians, in contrast with their philosophizing cousins, understood 
the causal relationship between the celestial principles and sublunary 
phenomena as one of congenereity between higher and lower, this being the 
simplest account necessary to account for the efficacy of their occult practices.  
When, in al-Sirr 1:5, Rāzī reports the opinion that the objects perceived in astral 
visions are extra-mental, its justification, expressed in a condensed form, 
represents a theory of the visionary experience that is opposed to the 




Avicennan account. Rāzī attributes it to the mysterious ‗masters of talismans‘ 
(aṣḥab al-ṭilasmāt).453 Observing the same Occamic principle that was applied by 
the Chaldean Sabians in al-Sirr 4:1, who applied the Hermetic dictum of  ‗as 
above so below‘ to justify their belief in the theriomorphic shape of the 
heavenly bodies, so the masters of the talismans prefer to assert the extra-
mental reality of the objects of their visionary perception over accepting 
Avicennan internal sense theory.   
Their basic a priori assumption is that: 
…each form in this world has its archetype in the starless sphere (kull 
sūra fī hādhā al-ʿālam fa-lahā mithāl fī al-falak) and that the earthly forms 
are subject to heavenly forms (al-ṣuwar al-suflīya muṭīʿa li’l-ṣuwar al-
ʿalawīya): serpents to Draco; scorpions to Scorpio; predatory animals to 
Leo and so on.454 
Now, on this assumption, they go on to consider the ontological status of the 
fantastical form which can be constructed in the imagination. Such a form 
cannot be characterized by absolute existential negation since the imagination 
can apprehend it, conferring on it such attributes as magnitude and extension. 
This would simply be impossible for that which is absolutely non-existent. They 
say:  
…the form which can be imagined, such as a man with a thousand heads, 
or a ruby as long as a farsang, can either be said to be absolutely non-
existent (maʿdūm maḥḍ) or to have existence. The first <disjunct> is false 
                                                             
453 Rāzī gives no further information on these talisman masters. They reappear in al-Maṭālib 7, 
pp. 387-95.   
454 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 18. 
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because our imagination (khayālunā) points towards it and bears witness 
to its magnitude (miqdār), length, width, distance and extension (maṣāḥa): 
absolute negation is not like this.455  
They then proceed to examine the issue of whether such a form exists: (1) 
within us (mawjūd fīnā); or (2) externally (fī’l-khārij). Reason would admit of only 
two possible modes of existence were the first limb of this disjunction correct. 
Either: (1a) it would exist in the mind as an abstracted substance (jawhar 
mujarrad); or (1b) it would exist in a bodily faculty, as a state inhering in a 
physical substrate such as the heart or brain. (1a) is eliminated for the reason 
that the imagined form (al-ṣūra al-mutakhayyala) is subject to division, the 
resultant parts being distinguishable from the other, and thus cannot be, at the 
same time, an abstracted substance; (1b) is dismissed for the simple reason that 
a large form, such as a man with a thousand heads, or a ruby as long as a farsang, 
cannot inhere in an internal sense like the common sense, rooted as it is in a 
physical substrate as small as the front ventricle.456  
 In rejecting the logical possibility that the imagined form can exist within us, 
they reject the Avicennan account that the astral vision is the creation of the 
imagination, albeit as a result of a trace (athar) received from a celestial soul. 
The object of this astral vision therefore can only exist extra-mentally, 
                                                             
455 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 18. 
456 The first <disjunct> is false because our imagination (khayālu-nā) points towards it and bears 
witness to its magnitude (miqdār), length, width, distance and extension (maṣāḥa): absolute 
negation is not like this. Thus it is established that it exists either within us or extra-mentally. 
This first <disjunct> is false because either it exists in its own self, which is an abstracted 
substance (jawhar mujarrad), or <it exists> in a bodily power, as a state in the heart or the brain: 
the first <disjunct> is false because the abstracted substance cannot be divided, one part being 
indistinguishable from the other: this imagined form (al-ṣūra al-mutakhayyila) is not thus. The 
second <disjunct> is also false because since one‘s entire body in respect of this imagined form is 
as the relation of the small to the large and large magnitude cannot inhere in a small substrate 
(yumnaʿ ḥulūlu-hu fī al-maḥall al-saghīr). Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 18. 
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independent of the observer (mawjūda fī’l-khārij ʿannā). And considering that, 
were it to exist in the lower world, then all would partake in the same cognitive 
experience of it – which is patently untrue -- it must follow that it exists outside 
of the mind in the higher world: 
…it either exists in the lower world – and this is false for otherwise 
anyone present with us would see would see it. So it becomes necessary 
to concede (fa-taʿayyana) that they exist in the higher world.457  
Rāzī‘s talisman masters refute the Avicennan analysis of their visionary 
experiences by deploying an argument which constitutes the reverse mirror 
image of Rāzī‘s own interpretation of Avicenna‘s account, in the tenth namaṭ of 
al-Ishārāt, of the cognitive experiences of people suffering from fevers. This 
interpretation, appearing in his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, represents an original 
argument, formulated by Rāzī, as an advocatus diaboli, to defend Avicenna‘s 
position. Although we have already encountered the argument, it is worth 
reminding ourselves of its structure in order to appreciate the talisman masters‘ 
mirror reversal.458   
Firstly, a logical disjunction is established by considering whether the forms 
apprehended during fevers are non-existent (maʿdūma) or existent (mawjūd). 
The first limb of this logical disjunction is eliminated on the ground that they 
cannot be non-existent because this would entail absolute negation, and that 
which is characterized by absolute negation can never be witnessed. This being 
the case, they must either exist extra-mentally or not. They cannot exist extra-
mentally, for were this the case, then everyone with sound external sense 
                                                             
457 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 18. 
458 See section 7.4.  
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faculties would perceive them. Their existence must therefore be entirely 
subjective.459  
Being subjective, they must either exist in the rational soul or in a bodily faculty 
(quwwa jismānīya). The former possibility can safely be ruled out because the 
rational soul cannot perceive particulars, and the forms of sensible things 
cannot be imprinted therein. So these forms must exist in a bodily faculty. Now 
this bodily faculty can either be an external sense faculty – namely the vision 
(al-quwwa al-bāṣira) – or an internal sense faculty – the common sense. Since it is 
possible for a blind man to perceive such forms, the power of vision can be 
eliminated as the bodily faculty in which these forms are imprinted. Thus are we 
led to the conclusion that it is the common sense, with its physical substrate in 
the brain, which is witness to these forms. The hallucination of the feverish 
man, which arises when the mutaṣarrifa qua imagination and the common sense 
stand opposite each other, is compared to the optical phenomenon which 
occurs when two mirrors are placed in opposition.460 
Both the novel argument, which Rāzī writes as advocatus diaboli, to support 
Avicenna‘s account of feverish hallucinations, and his talisman masters‘ defence 
of the extra-mental reality of the objects of their astral visions, begin by posing 
the question of whether or not the objects of these cognitive experiences have 
some manner of existence or if they are characterized by absolute negation. 
Both affirm that they must indeed have some manner of existence and proceed 
to consider their subjective or extra-mental reality. Of course, the Avicennan 
account affirms the former whilst the talisman masters affirm the latter. But 
                                                             
459 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 645.  
460 Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 645-6.  
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when examining their potentially subjective reality, both consider whether they 
are experienced as abstracted substances or as forms imprinted in a faculty 
which inheres in the physical substrate of the brain. Moreover, in drawing their 
respective conclusions of either purely subjective experience or cognition of an 
extra-mental reality, both then proceed to pose a further logical disjunction: 
whilst the former considers if the seat of the subjective experience is an internal 
or external sense faculty, the latter considers if the extra-mental object of 
cognition exists in the lower or higher worlds.  
So the talisman masters‘ reasoning is a mirror reversal of the advocatus diaboli 
argument which Rāzī adduces to elucidate the Avicennan account of feverish 
hallucinations. In rejecting the assertion that a perceptual object of large 
magnitude can inhere in the relatively small physical substrate of the brain, 
their reasoning entails an implicit polemic against the Avicennan internal sense 
theory which informs the psychological discussions in al-Sirr. Rāzī himself is 
sympathetic to their opposition to this theory which, together with the 
Avicennan intromission theory of optics, he criticizes in his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt.461 
The account of the talisman masters is discordant with the Avicennizing 
account of psychology by which much of al-Sirr is characterized. However this is 
entirely in keeping with the spirit of a work which represents less of an attempt 
at intellectual consistency and more of an intellectual exercise. The purpose of 
this activity is to produce a philosophical melange which will serve as a stimulus 
for future systematizing thought.  
  
                                                             
461 For these critiques, see his commentary on the third namaṭ of Avicenna‘s Ishārāt, in Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt, 2, pp. 216-264.  
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Part Four: Sabianism and Rāzī’s Alternative Soteriology  
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In his introduction to al-Sirr he disavows all that opposes the true faith.  Rāzī 
nevertheless devotes al-Sirr 1:6, to providing a ‗clarification‘ (bayyina) of the 
weakness (ḍuʿf) of the Sabian way in light of Ashʿarī insistence on God‘s power 
(qudra) extending to all things. He entitles the chapter: ‗A clarificationation of 
the weakness (ḍuʿf) of what we have related of the philosophers and the Sabians 
and an explanation of the correctness of the religion of Islam‘.462 The only other 
note of discord against Sabianism appears briefly in al-Sirr 4:1 which we have 
already examined. Of interest here is the nature and extent of Rāzī‘s dispute 
with the philosophers and Sabians.  
 As we discussed earlier, Rāzī identifies three theologically distinct categories of 
Sabian: pure polytheists; Avicennan emanationists; and those who believe in a 
creator God, possessed of choice.463 In this chapter I will make two observations. 
Firstly, the critique of Sabianism in al-Sirr 1:6 addresses only the first two of the 
three Sabian categories: on the third category, he is silent. This is because his 
real target appears to be Avicennan emanationism. Secondly, in the brief  
critique of Sabianism in al-Sirr 4:1, Rāzī concedes that belief in celestial 
causation as the divinely mandated custom of nature, does not offend against 
the fundamental belief in God‘s power (qudra) over all things. And thirdly, Rāzī 
expends considerable effort reconciling Sabian belief in an ensouled cosmos 
                                                             
 
463 See chapter 3.  
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with Islamic scripture. This should come as no surprise since as a people of the 
book, the Sabians were recipients of an originally pure revealed monotheistic 
faith. Thus it should be possible to imagine a form of their religion, and 
approach to their natural philosophy, which does not fundamentally conflict 
with Islam.    
 
10.2 Critique of the Sabians in al-Sirr 1:6 
 
The critique encapsulates the essence of Sabian error in the following terms:  
Know that the axis of their discourse (madār kalāmihim) <centres on> 
the eternity of the world and the existence of <a series of > temporally 
originated phenomena which has no first (ḥawādith lā awwala lahā). This 
doctrinal position is false <as a number> of arguments (wujūh) prove.464 
The target is clearly defined as those who believe in the eternity of the world 
and that the endless series of phenomena therein has no beginning: these are 
none other than the unrepentant polytheist Sabians and their Avicennan 
emanationist cousins. The critique proceeds in two stages: The first is to prove 
that all existents but the Necessarily Existent are merely possible (mumkin); the 
second is to prove that every existent that is merely possible is also originated 
in time. It therefore follows that: ‗...all existents except for the One are possible 
and temporally originated.‘465 Thus the two categories of Sabian, both 
heresiological conceits, provide the need for a critique which functions 
simultaneously as a positive proof for belief in the God of the Islamic 
                                                             
464 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.19.  
465 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p.19. 
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theologians, a choosing agent (fāʿil mukhtār), besides whom all existents are 
originated in time, the products, directly or indirectly, of His volitional acts.  
10.2.1 All existents except the Necessarily Existent, are merely possibles 
 
So the first stage of the argument, an elegantly condensed adaptation of 
Avicenna‘s proof for the absolute unity of the Necessarily Existent in the fourth 
namaṭ of his al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbīhāt, sets out to prove that all besides the 
Necessarily Existent is merely possible.466 It rests on two limbs: (1) the 
proposition that the Necessarily Existent must exist; and (2) that there can only 
be one Necessarily Existent.467 Rāzī does not dwell for too long on the first limb, 
impatient to present the three premises on which he hopes to demonstrate the 
second: (2)(i) necessity of existence (wujūb al-wujūd) is a positive attribute (ṣifa 
thubūtiyya); (2)(ii) the determinate existence of an entity (taʿayyun al-shay’) is an 
individuating specificity additional to its quiddity and a matter of positive 
affirmation (qayd zā’id ʿalā māhiyatihi wa huwa amr thubūtī); (2)(iii) that in which 
participation between two things occurs is distinct from that by which two 
things are distinguishable from each other.468 
Simply stated, (2)(i) asserts that the attribute of necessity of existence, like for 
instance that of sight, involves positive affirmation: this is to be contrasted with 
                                                             
466 Rāzī scrutinizes Avicenna‘s proof for the unity of the Necessarily Existent in his Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt  as the fourth issue (mas’ala) arising from the fourth namaṭ. (See Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, 
pp. 353-73.)  Whilst here in al-Sirr, Rāzī seems to endorse and adopt the proof, in the Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt, he is far more sceptical.  
467 Concerning the first limb, Rāzī simply says: ‗…this is something which we have already proved 
when we made it clear that all possibles must end with a necessarily existing existent‘. The 
second limb is expressed specifically in the following terms: ‗…the existence of two existents, 
each one of which is necessarily existent, is impossible‘. Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 19. 
468 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 19. For my translations of the terms taʿayyun, māhiyya, and qayd respectively as 
‗determinate existence‘, ‗quiddity‘ and ‗individuating specificity‘, see Shihadeh, ‗Avicenna‘s 





the example of blindness, a negative attribute, which entails the negation of its 
positive contrary. No existent can be positively affirmed by the contrary of 
existence – namely non-existence – for this, of course, would entail that thing‘s 
negation. So if necessity of existence cannot be non-existent, and thus a 
negative attribute, then it follows that it must be a positive attribute.469  
Now, according to (2)(ii), the individual existence of any existent requires 
determination by an attribute superimposed on its quiddity (qayd zā’id): it is this 
superimposed attribute that distinguishes it as an individual which is distinct 
from any other postulated individual entities which might share in its kind of 
existence. Moreover, following the logic of (2)(i), this superimposed attribute, 
asserting individual existence, is of course one that entails positive affirmation:  
the determinate existence of an entity (taʿayyun al-shay’) is an 
individuating specificity additional to its quiddity and a matter of 
                                                             
469 ‗…necessity of existence (wujūb al-wujūd) is a positive attribute (ṣifa thubūtiyya). Its proof is 
that necessity of existence is the positive affirmation of existence (ta’akkud al-wujūd) and the 
thing [i.e. existence] is not positively affirmed by its opposite (al-shay’ lā yata’akkadu bi-naqīḍihi). 
So necessity of existence cannot be non-existent (fa-wujūb al-wujūd yamtaniʿ an yakūna ʿadaman)‘ 
(Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 9).  In Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, Rāzī explains this Avicennan proof as having two limbs: ‗… 
the first is that necessity <of existence> is the contrary of impossibility <of existence> which is a 
matter of non-existence; and the contrary of non-existence is positive affirmation; so existence 
is a matter of positive actuality. The second is that necessity is an expression of the affirmation 
of existence. So if necessity is non-existent – and non-existence is the contrary of existence – 
then existence would be positively affirmed by that which negates and is contrary to it. And that 
is absurd.  (al-awwalu anna al-wujūb munāqiḍ li’l-imtināʿ alladhī huwa amr ʿadamī wa munāqiḍ al-
ʿadam thubūt, fa’l-wujūb amr thubūtī. Al-thānī wa huwa anna al-wujūb ʿibāra ʿan ta’akkud al-wujūd. Fa-
law kāna al-wujūb ʿadaman, wa’l-ʿadam munāqiḍ li’l-wujūd, la kāna al-wujūd muta’akkidan bi-munāfīhi 
wa munāqiḍihi wa huwa muḥāl). (Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 364). Rāzī is sceptical about Avicenna‘s 
designation of necessity of existence as a positive attribute. He asks: ‗…why is it not permissible 
that it be said that necessity is a negative description (waṣf salbī)? Supposing this were the case, 
then this proof becomes invalid.‘ (Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 364. See pp. 364-7 for Rāzī‘s proof that 
necessity of existence can be argued to be a negative attribute).  And of course, since a 
multiplicity of existents can be characterized by a negative attribute, Avicenna‘s failure to prove 
that necessity of existence is a positive attribute, constitutes his failure to prove that there can 
only be one necessarily existing existent. If this debate were transposed to the context of the 
Sabians of al-Sirr, it would mean that the Avicennizing Sabians would be unable to prove that the 
heavenly spheres only derive their existence from the process of emanation from the Eternal 
Producer of Effects: they would thus lack the rational proofs to defend their compromised 
philosophical monotheism and to resist the slide into the degenerate polytheism of their 




positive affirmation (qayd zā’id ʿalā māhiyatihi wa huwa amr thubūtī). As for 
it being an additional individuating specificity, it is because the concept 
(mafhūm) of أ does not preclude participation in its meaning (lā yamtaniʿ 
nafs taṣṣawūr maʿnāhu min al-sharika). Whilst the concept of ―this أ   " or 
―this أ" precludes participation in its meaning, ―this أ   ‖ includes <the 
concept of> أ. And so we can know that ―this  أ ‖ comprises an additional 
individuating specificity. As for the fact that it is a positive attribute, it is 
for the reason that this, since it is existent and its being this is a part of 
its being ―this -and a part of an <individual> existent cannot be non ,‖ أ 
existent, then we can know that it is a positive attribute.470   
So, if two individual existents both participate in a third, then that by which 
those two participating existents are mutually distinguishable must be other 
than that in which they both participate. This principle forms the substance of 
(2)(iii):  
…that in which participation between two things occurs is distinct from 
that by which two things are distinguishable from each other – this is an 
illuminating premise indeed (hādhihi muqaddima jaliyya).471  
With these three principles established, any speculation about the reality of two 
necessarily existing existents will be forced to blunder either into an infinite 
regress, or into an absurd contradiction. Since one necessary existent would be 
distinct from the other, each would be a composite, characterized both by 
necessary existence and by that which gives it its own individual existence. Each 
                                                             
470 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 19. For Rāzī‘s objections to Avicenna‘s argument that determinate existence is 
a positive attribute, see Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, pp. 367-371.  
471 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 19. 
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of these two constitutive parts would then be either necessarily existent or not. 
If they are both necessary, then again, whilst both would share in necessity, 
each must nevertheless be distinct in quiddity, and thus composite in of itself. 
The only way to resist the ensuing infinite regress would be to assert that a 
constitutive part of one of these necessarily existing existents, or indeed of a 
constitutive part thereof, is merely a possible. But this would only serve to 
divert the endlessly futile inquiry into the impasse of the absurd contradiction 
that, since a composite is dependent on its parts, a necessarily existing existent 
would be dependent on a possible and thus not necessary at all.  All existents, 
therefore, must only be possible except for the One Necessarily Existent.472  
Whilst the foregoing proof to establish that all besides the Necessarily Existent 
is merely possible relies on an Avicennan argument, to prove that all possibles 
are also originated in time, Rāzī resorts to one advanced in classical kalām.  
10.2.2 All possibles are originated in time 
 
Now since, reasons Rāzī, everything besides the Necessarily Existent is merely 
possible, and exists in a relationship of dependency on that which influences to 
                                                             
472 ‗…were we to postulate two existents, each one of which is necessary by its own essence (wājib 
li-dhātihi), then each would participate in necessity but be distinct (mutabāyinayn) in its 
determinate existence (al-taʿayyun), such that each one of them would be a composite of two 
parts. Moreover, those two parts <in turn> would either be necessary or not be necessary. If they 
are necessary, then they too would share in necessity but be distinct in quiddity (māhiyya): so 
each one of them would be a composite of <yet> two other parts, leading to an infinite regress. If 
they are not necessary then either or each one of them would be a possible. The composite is 
dependent on its parts and that which is dependent on a possible is even more so a possible (mā 
yakūnu muftaqiran ilā mumkin kāna awlā bi’l-imkān). And so that composite is a possible – but we 
have just postulated that it is necessary. This is a contradiction. Thus, with all that we have 
mentioned, it has been established that all existents are possible except the One.‘ Rāzī, al-Sirr, 
p.19. Summarizing, in his commentary to the Ishārāt, Avicenna‘s proof that there can only be 
one Necessarily Existent, Rāzī says: ‗…were we to postulate two things which are necessarily 
existent, each would differ from the other in its determinate existence (fī taʿayyunihi) but share 
with it in the necessity of its existence. That in which they share is distinct from that by which 
they differ (mā bihi al-ishtirāk mughāyiran li-mā bihi ail-ikhtilāf.) And so the essence (dhāt) of each 
one of them is a composite of the necessity in which it shares with the other, and of the 
determinate existence through which it is distinct from the other.‘ (Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, 2, p. 363).  
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produce the effect of its existence (mu’aththir), the question arises as to the 
nature of that dependency:   
… its dependence on that which influences <occurs> either: <1> in the 
state of its continued existence (ḥāla baqā’ihi); or  <2> in the state of its 
coming-to-be in time (ḥāla ḥudūthihi) ; or <3> in the state of its non-
existence (ḥāla ʿadamihi).473  
Rāzī eliminates the first of these logical disjuncts on the following ground: 
The first <disjunct> is false because a thing, in the state of its continued 
existence, is existent. So if, in the state of its continued existence, it 
depended on that which causes its existence, then the existent would, in the 
state of its existence, depend on he who makes it existent, and that would 
<amount to> the bringing about of that which is <already> occurrent 
(taḥṣīlan li’l-ḥāṣil) and that is absurd.474 
To say a possible is dependent on an influencer for its continued existence is an 
assertion that is empty and redundant. For its continued existence should be 
autonomous, its relationship to that which causes its existence being that of a 
building to its builder once it has been constructed. With this logical disjunct 
eliminated thusly, the temporal origination of all possibles necessarily follows, 
the absurdity of the third logical disjunct hardly requiring discussion:  
Thus is it established that it is in need of that which influences either in: <2> 
the state of its coming-to-be in time or <3> in the state of its non-existence. 
                                                             
473 ‗fa-iḥtiyājuhu ilā al-mu’aththir imā an yakūna ḥāla baqā’ihi aw ḥāla ḥudūthihi aw ḥāla ʿadamihi‘, 
Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 19. The phrase ‘aw ḥāla ḥudūthihi aw ḥāla ʿadamihi’ is missing from the Cairo 
lithograph but is present in all other witnesses. 
474 Al-Sirr, p. 20.  
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<On the basis> of either postulation, the definite conclusion (al-qatʿ) that 
every possible is originated in time necessarily follows. So is it established 
that all besides the Existent, the One, is originated in time.475  
The argument presented here establishes one of the primary precepts of 
classical kalām and was deployed most importantly in cosmological proofs for 
the existence of God as creator ex nihilo. Rāzī‘s critique of the Sabians, therefore, 
serves simultaneously as a positive proof for God as a choosing agent, the God of 
the Islamic theologians, as well as those Sabians about whom the polemic of this 
discussion remains conspicuously silent.476 With the proof that all possibles are 
originated in time, Rāzī reassures his readers that the polytheist Sabians and 
                                                             
475 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 20. Rāzī claims: ‗This is a proof which God has uniquely bestowed on us (hādhā 
burhān khaṣṣanā Allahu ta’ālā bihi) the like of it occurring to no-one before us. For their proof [i.e. 
that of the classical theologians] is based on motion and stillness and did not comprise aught but 
bodies and accidents: that everything besides God is originated in time cannot be established by 
this proof.‘  
 
476 For analysis of this proof, see Shihadeh, Doubts on Avicenna, pp. 86-88. It is worth mentioning 
that Rāzī appends to the main argument a couple of other supplementary proofs that all 
possibles are temporally originated.   The first argues that since the quiddity of motion, is the 
fact of being preceded by something prior, whilst the quiddity of beginning-less time is precisely 
the opposite, the simultaneous assertion of both attributes would entail an absurd contradiction: 
‗…the quiddity of motion (māhiyya al-ḥaraka) entails being preceded by something else (taqtaḍī al-
masbūqiyya bi’l-ghayr) because it is a term <denoting> movement from one thing to another (al-
intiqāl min amr ilā amr) and movement is preceded by that from which movement has been made. 
<But> the quiddity of beginning-less time (al-azal) is that it requires the negation of being 
preceded. So the simultaneous assertion of both motion and beginning-less time (al-jamʿ bayna 
al-ḥaraka wa’l-azal) is the simultaneous assertion of two contraries (jamʿ bayna al-naqīḍayn) and 
that is absurd.‘ Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 20.  
According to the second supplementary proof, a similarly absurd contradiction would arise from 
the assertion of possibles existing in beginning-less time, from the fact that since: (1) the 
aggregate of originated phenomena would be preceded by an aggregate of individual non-
existences; and (2) those individual non-existences, having no beginning, would be gathered 
together in beginning-less time, then their coming-to-be must also be held to occur in 
beginning-less time: ‗…each one of these temporally originated phenomena is preceded by non-
existence which has no beginning (masbūq bi-ʿadam lā awwala lahu). So there is an aggregate of 
non-existences (majmūʿ ʿadamāt) which have no beginning and those non-existences, in their 
totality, come together in beginning-less time (mujtamiʿa fī al-azal). And if the non-existence of 
their entirety occurs in beginning-less time, then it would be impossible for any <individual> 
one of them to occur in beginning-less time. Otherwise, the simultaneous assertion of two 




their Avicennizing cousins have been soundly refuted, and that the central 
doctrine of the true faith – belief in the volitional Creator God– is made clear: 
And so it is established […] that the world is originated in time and that 
temporally originated phenomena have a beginning. And since that is 
established, their primary doctrine (aṣl kalāmihim) is proven false; and if 
the primary doctrine is proven false then so too is that which they derive 
from it. And God is the source of guidance.477  
Unable to resist the inevitable slide into the polytheism of their idolatrous 
cousins, the Avicennizing Sabians of al-Sirr are guilty of the same error as al-
Ghazali‘s Avicennan opponents in the fourth issue of his Tahāfut.478  
As previously discussed, the erroneous belief that all to which the Necessarily 
Existent directly gives rise is necessarily ordered ontologically in beginning-less 
time is of central importance to the structure of Avicennizing Sabian cosmology. 
It represents the second premise on which relies their proof, in al-Sirr 1:1, for 
the role of active heavenly forces as the proximate causes of sublunary change. 
This belief resolves the apparent paradox of the ultimate dependence of 
sublunary generation and corruption on the changeless simplex that is the 
Necessarily Existent.479   
                                                             
477 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 20.  
478 Al-Ghazali decries what he sees as their contradiction in asserting both the eternity of the 
world and its dependence on a cause. He argues that, in asserting the eternity of the celestial 
spheres in beginning-less time, they have no grounds on which to assert their dependence on a 
cause, and thus no reason to reject the position of the materialist Dahriyya, who aver: that 
matter is eternal and without cause; that only accidents and forms originate in time; and that all 
chains of temporally originated causes and effects end in the circular motion of the celestial 
spheres. The Avicennizing Sabians of al-Sirr stand in the same relation to the polytheist Sabians, 
who uphold the belief in multiple necessarily existing existents, as do al-Ghazali‘s Avicennan 
opponents in relation to the Dahriyya. 
479 Of course the polytheist Sabians who believe in a multiplicity of necessarily existing existents 
are not confronted with such a dilemma.  
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As observed earlier, the supposed authors of the proof, when demonstrating this 
second premise, fail to address and eliminate the logical possibility that all to 
which the Necessarily Existent gives rise indeed occurs in time, by implication, 
as the result of the action of a volitional creator God. Thus, an alternative 
account of talismans – one that is compatible with Islamic theology – is left 
unexplored. This presumably would be the account of talismans preferred by 
the third group of Sabians, mentioned in al-Sirr 4:1.  These of course are the 
Sabians who believe the heavenly bodies:  
…occur by way of the action of an agent possessed of volition (fāʿil mukhtār), 
namely the Most Supreme God, and that that God created these planets, 
investing each with a special power, and delegating them with the authority 
to govern this world. They say this does not diminish from the majesty of 
God – exalted is His splendour – for what imperfection is there for a king to 
possess obedient slaves. Then He delegated to each of them the government 
of a specific kingdom and rule over a specific clime. In general, despite their 
differing doctrines, they claimed the spheres and the planets have specific 
attributes.480 
The endeavour to fortify the Islamic theological conception of God against 
attack also demands that attention is paid to the issue of the volitional creator 
God‘s qudra, or power over all things. This is the concern of the conclusion of al-
Sirr 4:1 which adopts the following line of reasoning. The critique of the Sabian 
belief in the planets as proximate gods (āliha qarība) deserving of devotion 
cannot rely on the condemnations uttered by the prophets. For the verification 
of their claim to prophethood rests on the fact that God makes manifest through 
                                                             
480 Rāzī, al-Sirr,  p. 110.  
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them miracles – extraordinary acts of which none other is capable except Him. 
But an act cannot be recognized as miraculous unless it is proven that only God 
– and not celestial motion – can be the author of such prodigies. Unless this is 
shown, an argument relying purely on the utterances of prophets would be 
circular and therefore invalid:  
Know that this <Sabian> doctrine is false but it cannot be refuted by 
means of reports from the prophets – upon whom be peace – concerning 
its falsehood. For the proof of prophethood hinges on (mutafarriʿa) on the 
fact that a miracle is an act of God – exalted is He! – and that can only be 
established if <belief in> the planets as governing the conditions of this 
world is proved false. So if we prove this doctrine false by means of the 
words of the prophets – upon whom be peace –  then a circular argument 
would have been advanced which is false (waqʿa al-dawr wa annahu 
bāṭilun).481 
So according to Rāzī in al-Sirr, to prove the world is originated in time, is to 
prove its dependency on God as the only real possessor of agency, whose power 
to influence must extend to all possibles. This being the case, the notion that the 
celestial spheres have any agency – let alone miraculous power - is proven false:  
Indeed this doctrine is proved false by our proving that the world has 
been brought into being in time (innamā yabṭulu hādhā al-madhhab bimā 
annā nuqīma al-dalāla ʿalā anna al-ʿālam muḥdath) and that the producer of 
influence (al-mu’aththir) on <this world> must be able (qādir); if He is able 
then His power must extend to all possible things (kull al-mumkināt); and 
                                                             
481 Rāzī,  al-Sirr,  p.113.  
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if His power extends to all possible things then He must be the creator of 
all possible things. Given all this, <belief in> the planets as gods which 
govern this world is proved false.482  
The logical consequence of this reasoning is that nothing occurs unless it is by 
God‘s power. So long as this belief is maintained, any apparent causal 
relationship between celestial configurations and terrestrial phenomena can 
only be understood as the divinely mandated custom (ʿāda) that has been 
established in this world: it provides no evidence whatsoever of any real agency 
other than God‘s. Once this is conceded, then any such apparent relationship in 
the cosmos between cause and effect that can be drawn from inductive 
reasoning about the observable cosmos, is a matter of correct or erroneous 
scientific conclusions, not of true faith or unbelief:  
However, when they professed that the <planetary> movements and 
applications are causes for the temporal coming-to-be of originated 
phenomena in this world <as they occur> in accordance with custom (asbāb 
li-ḥudūth al-ḥawādith fī hādhā al-ʿālam ʿalā majrā al-ʿāda), then this would 
neither be disbelief (kufr) nor misguidance (ḍalāla). However, induction 
becomes necessary for if we see reality thus [i.e. planetary movements as 
the causes of events] then we assent to it to that extent; otherwise we 
declare it untrue whilst <at the same time> averring that that untruth does 
not amount to unbelief (wa lākin yajib al-istiqrā’ fa-in ra’aynā anna al-amra 
                                                             
482 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113. 
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kadhālika sadaqnāhu ʿalā hādhā al-wajh wa illā kadhdhabnāhu maʿa al-qaṭʿ bi-
anna dhālika al-kadhb laysa bāb al-kufr).483 
So despite their shared belief in the volitional creator God of Islamic belief, even 
members of the third group of Sabians will be in error so long as they believe 
that the created heavenly bodies possess any sort of agency outside of God‘s 
power.  
10.3 Qualified reconciliation 
 
Now, were the universe simply a complex but inanimate system of interacting 
bodies in motion, held in place by God‘s power, then the matter could perhaps 
rest there. But all three categories of Sabian believe in the celestial spheres as 
living, rational beings. So indeed, in al-Sirr at least, does Rāzī. He argues that: 
…reason and revealed religion are in agreement that placed in authority to 
govern each separate species of temporally originated phenomenon in this 
world is a heavenly spirit and these spirits are called, in the language of 
revealed religion ‗angels‘ (al-ʿuqūl wa’l-sharāʿi mutaṭābiqaʿalā anna al-
mutawallā li-tadbīr kulli nawʿ min anwāʿ hādhā al-ʿālam rūḥ samāwī ʿalā ḥidda wa 
hādhihi al-arwāḥ hiya al-musammāt fī lisān al-sharʿ bi’l-malā’ika).484 
So from the perspective of reason (bi-ḥasab al-ʿuqūl), he argues that since 
rational proofs (al-dalā’il al-ʿaqliyya)  have established that: (a) the spirits of the 
higher world govern the lower world (al-ʿālam al-asfal); and (b) one single 
principle cannot act as the source of different effects (al-mabda’ al-wāḥid lā 
                                                             
483 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 113.  
484 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 109.  
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yakunu maṣdaran li-āthār mukhtalifa), it must follow that each one of these effects 
is dependent on  a celestial spirit.485  
This rational conclusion is one which, in Rāzī‘s opinion, revealed religion (al-
sharā’i) entirely concurs. He identifies the referents of a number of Qur‘ānic oath 
verses, the subjects of which are mysterious sound feminine plural nouns, with 
the angels of the celestial spheres. Of particular interest, is his identification of 
the nāziʿāt and the ṣāffāt as the angels of the sphere of Saturn; the zājirāt as the 
angels of the sphere of Mars; and the tāliyāt as the angels of the sphere of 
Jupiter.486    Rāzī then moves on to the numerous prophetic traditions which 
indicate that angels are entrusted with the management of the clouds; thunder; 
lightning; with the daily sustenance of men; with the care of mountains and the 
seas; and so on for all natural phenomena.487 
And so in the light of the overwhelming weight of scriptural evidence, this issue 
thus becomes one of agreement (mas’alatu wifāq) between the prophets and the 
sages (al-ḥukamā’). This being the case, Rāzī avers that:  
                                                             
485 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 109. Even if someone were to deny this principle, reason would demand that it 
should be conceded at the very least that one thing cannot be the source of effects which have 
opposing natures: ‗…as for he who maintains that one <thing> cannot give rise to aught but one, 
this is self-evident. As for he who does not maintain this, then there can be no doubt that he 
<should> deny that one principle can be the source of contrary acts such as the benefic and the 
malefic, masculinity and femininity, hot and cold.‘ Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 109. 
486 ‗wa’l-nazi’at gharqa wa’l-nashitati nashta‘ (Qur‘an 79:1); wa’l-saffat saffa‘ (Qur‘an 37:1); ‗fa’l-taliyat 
dhikra’ (Qur‘an 37:3). The ṣāffāt are identified as the angels of the sphere of Saturn on account of 
its ‗firmness and slow movement‘ (l-thibātihi wa buṭuwwi ḥarakatihi). The subjects of other 
mysterious Qurʿānic oaths, identified with angels are: ‗By the lashing gales! By heavy-laden 
clouds!‘ (al-dhariyat dharwa, fa’l-hamilati wiqran) (Qur‘an 51:1-2); and ‗By angels disbursing as 
commanded!‘ (fa’l-muqassimati amra) (Qur‘an 51:4). Amongst other verses interpreted in light of 
this doctrine, Rāzī adduces the following utterance attributed by the Qur‘ān to Solomon: ‗We 
have been taught the language of birds‘ (ʿullimna manṭiqa al-ṭayr) (Qur‘ān 27:16). In relation to 
this last verse, Rāzī says the intent is that Solomon‘s spirit connected with the spirit of Mercury 
because Mercury is connected with birds. (al-Sirr, p. 110).  Rāzī then moves on to the numerous 
prophetic traditions which indicate that angels are entrusted with the management of the 
clouds; thunder; lightning; with the daily sustenance of men; with the care of mountains and the 
seas; and so on for all natural phenomena. 
487 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 110.  
326 
 
… each <angel> has a specific name. And so it is not impossible (lā yamtaniʿ) 
that a man, if he calls on their names, seeking their aid, beseeching them, 
adjuring them by the names of their chiefs and those appointed in 
authority over them (wa yuqsim ʿalayhā bi-asmā’I ru’asā’ihā wa’l-mustawlīn 
alayhā), that they should respond to him and perform what he desires 
from them and that the practitioners of magic should exert themselves (an 
tujīb al-insān wa-tafʿal mā yaltamisu al-insān minhā).488  
The belief of the Sabians in an ensouled cosmos thronged by a plenitude of 
spirits, was confirmed by the Qur‘ān and Ḥadīth. In pursuing a science which 
identified the divinely mandated patterns of nature, by correlating celestial 
configurations with frequencies of sublunary events, the Sabians were not in 
manifest error. But inferring from such patterns that anything, animate or 
inanimate, within that cosmos, at any moment had any real agency independent 
of the divine fiat, the Sabians were gravely misguided. Rāzī never states 
explicitly that a Sabian science sanitized by Ashʿarī theology is not 
inconceivable. But it is an inference which he allows his readers to draw.  For in 
much the same way that a modern day Ashʿarī can concede the efficacy of a 
solar panel to run the green neon lighting of the mosque minaret, so a twelfth 
century Ashʿarī theologian, for instance, might concede the efficacy of a solar 
astral ritual to bring him fame, wealth, and royal patronage. A Sabian science of 
talismans could, theoretically, be reconciled with the Ashʿārī theological 
position that God is the only real sufficient cause for any event.  
  
                                                             
488 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 110. 
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We have seen that in al-Sirr, it is the individual‘s perfect nature which inspires, 
reveals veridical dreams and leads him in an ascent through the celestial 
spheres towards perfection and ontological transformation. This chapter will 
explore how, having committed himself  to this doctrine so early in his career 
when he wrote al-Sirr in 575/1179, Rāzī finally integrates this notion into the 
philosophical-theological synthesis of al-Maṭālib, which he completes in 
606/1209 soon before he dies. 
This chapter will show how Rāzī makes the doctrine of the perfect nature the 
cornerstone of his prophetology. In doing so, he rescues the Islamic belief in 
prophethood from the relativizing effect of Avicennism, affirms the unique 
status of the prophet, whilst at the same time providing the chance for the 
personal soteriology for a spiritual elite who, by means of connection with their 
own perfect natures, can complete their own epistemological ascent through 
the ontological hierarchy of reality to attain certainty in metaphysical truths 
and realize the perfect philosophy. And since the celestial spirits – or angels – 
which turn the spheres, are ontologically superior to man, the prophet is 
conceived of as somehow straddling the ranks of humanity and angelhood. He 
communes with the celestial angels; his visions and occult power are received 
by way of connection to his perfect nature; and the proof of his prophetic claim 
is his ability to perfect imperfect human souls (takmīl al-nāqiṣīn). The 
significance of the doctrine in al-Maṭālib is thus twofold:  firstly, it preserves the 
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prophet‘s essential uniqueness; and secondly, it provides the soteriological 
means by which the individual might realize his own perfection. Sabian and 
Islamic soteriologies converge into one. 
I shall proceed in the following way. Firstly, I shall show how Rāzī partly 
achieves his critique of the Avicennan theory of prophethood by adapting 
material from al-Sirr relating to the talismanic science (11.2). I shall then move 
on to outline Rāzī‘s conceptualization of the prophet as a figure which straddles 
humanity and celestial angelhood (11.3). This will be followed by an 
examination of how the perfect nature determines the upper limit to which the 
individual human soul can reach perfection. This will reveal the utility of the 
doctrine in preserving the unique status of the prophet which Rāzī believed the 
Avicennan naturalistic account of prophethood relativized (11.4). Then I shall 
turn to Rāzī‘s rational proof for the doctrine (11.5). Now, since its truth, being of 
a highly metaphysical nature, cannot be rationally demonstrated to the level of 
certainty, Rāzī asserts that it is only by spiritual discipline and direct visionary 
experience of the perfect nature that its reality can be known. This will be the 
focus of the following section (11.6).  This chapter will conclude with a final 
word on how the perfect nature is implicitly woven into the fabric of the 
epistemology of al-Maṭālib as a guide which leads the initiate in an 
epistemological ascent through the celestial spheres to attain certain 





11.2 The critique of the Avicennan theory of prophethood in al-Maṭālib 8 
 
In examining Rāzī‘s critique of the Avicennan theory of prophethood, I shall 
first consider its assault on Avicenna‘s treatment of its epistemological-
imaginational aspect, included in the conceptual category of theoretical 
capacity (al-quwwa al-naẓariyya). Then I shall examine its deconstruction of the 
Avicennan account of prophetic occult power, which forms part of practical 
capacity (al-quwwa al-ʿamaliyya). Understanding this critique will bring into 
focus the explanatory power and utility of the perfect nature doctrine in 
formulating not only an alternative account of prophethood but also in 
imagining a new soteriology.  
As we have already seen, Avicenna‘s account of the epistemological-
imaginational aspect of prophethood, is grounded in his theory of the internal 
senses, which explains how the human soul can connect with the celestial souls 
in order to derive knowledge of the unseen in the form of visions and veridical 
dreams. Whilst the forms he sees are the creation of his imagination, their cause 
is extra-mental, deriving from a celestial origin (see chapter 7).  
In al-Maṭālib 8, Rāzī critiques this theory, unfairly it must be said, by 
emphasizing the subjectivity of the prophetic visionary experience as conceived 
by the Avicennan account. He represents it as asserting that forms witnessed by 
prophets cannot have any extra-mental reality, for otherwise, all possessed of 
sound external senses would experience them: to assume this were not the case 
would give rise to an extreme form of scepticism concerning the reliability of 
the senses. Rāzī directs this argument back at the Avicennists, pointing out that 
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were the visual experience of a prophet purely subjective, then the general trust 
we place in our perception of sensory objects in the extra-mental world would 
collapse. Rather, he asserts that to affirm the extra-mental reality of the objects 
of our perception results in a far lesser degree of scepticism: for whilst we could 
concede that we do not perceive all that is in the extra-mental world, we can at 
least have confidence in the reality of what we do in fact perceive therein, 
rather than constantly struggling with the possibility of their purely imagined, 
subjective reality.489 
Instead, Rāzī insists that such perceptions are experienced in the rational soul, 
which is an absolute unity. Concurring with the talisman masters of al-Sirr 1:5, 
Rāzī asserts the extra-mental reality of prophetic visions.490 So to account for 
them, he invokes a doctrine to which all three Sabian groups in al-Sirr 4:1 
subscribe: the perfect nature. He says:  
So it is not impossible that that which sometimes gives it (i.e. the human 
soul) visions during sleep (yurīhā fī al-manāmāt tāratan), sometimes whilst 
awake, and which sometimes gives it inspirations (ilhāmāt), is that 
perfect nature. Nor is it impossible that that perfect nature is capable of 
taking on different forms, in the shape of a specific body.491 
Curiously, failing to address the issue of why, if the vision is external, others 
cannot see it, Rāzī chooses not to avail himself of the solution provided by the 
talisman masters of al-Sirr 1:5 which asserts that the object of the vision exists in 
the higher world: were this solution applied to Rāzī‘s account of prophethood, it 
                                                             
489 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, pp. 134-5. 
 
491 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 136. 
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would explain the unperfected souls surrounding the prophet cannot 
themselves share in his numinous experience (see chapter 9).  
Now, in al-Maṭālib 8.7.3, Rāzī targets for criticism the Avicennan account of 
prophetic occult power, presenting it as follows. 492 The human estimative 
faculty is capable of exerting an influence (ta’thīr) on bodies:  
…and since it is not remote (lā yabʿudu) that there should be a man whose 
soul is in perfect possession of such a faculty, so then it follows that he 
can be capable of acting on the matter of this world (hayūlā hādhā al-
ʿālam) however he so wishes or desires.493 
Such is a soul which can produce miracles and wonders. But, points out Rāzī, 
just as this account is only possible (muḥtamal), so there are other accounts 
which are equally as plausible in explaining such phenomena, such as the 
actions of angels and jinn, the celestial applications (al-ittiṣālāt al-falakiyya) and 
astral magical operations (aʿmāl al-kawākib).494 So if all such explanations are 
equally plausible, the Avicennists are required to provide a proof which 
substantiates their conviction in the unique power of the prophetic operative 
estimative faculty, eliminating competing accounts. Since they have failed in 
this, their insistence on their naturalistic account of the prophetic miracle is 
unjustified (tarjīḥ min ghayr murajjiḥ). Thus, to demonstrate at least the 
possibility (iḥtimāl) of other means by which such prodigies can be made 
manifest is to demonstrate the inability of the Avicennan theory to defend the 
unique nature of prophethood. Moreover, if the accounts of such means can be 
                                                             
492 The main divisions of al-Maṭālib are juz’ (or part), qism (division), and faṣl (chapter).   
493 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 137.  
494 Here, I construct  ‗aʿmāl‘ in the sense of astral magical operations. The alternative is to 
construct it as meaning ‗actions of the planets‘. 
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made even more plausible using Avicennan cosmology and psychology, then the 
inadequacy of the Avicennan account is rendered all the more apparent.495  
Rāzī set about this task with vigour in fī al-kalām fī al-siḥr, the third and last 
division of al-Maṭālib 8 Fī al-Nubuwwāt, where he listed no fewer than ten 
categories of siḥr, ranging from those which use entirely natural means, such as 
remarkable engineering feats (handasa) and the special properties of drugs and 
potions, to those which invoke the aid of the jinn and the celestial souls.496   One 
means by which he attempted to expose the weakness of the Avicennan account 
was to argue for the possibility that all humans have the potential to develop a 
strong operative estimative faculty. Thus when discussing ‗magic based on the 
power of the estimative faculty and the purification of the soul‘ (al-siḥr al-mabnī 
ʿalā quwwat al-wahm wa taṣfiyat al-nafs), he argued that: since rational souls are of 
the same genus as the celestial spirits, and are generated by them (al-nufūs al-
nāṭiqa min jins al-arwāḥ al-falakiya wa muwallada min-hā), it is inevitable that they 
too possess a certain power and effect. If the rational soul focuses on one aim, 
shutting out all other distractions, then its power becomes strong, its effect is 
intensified, and it can cause wondrous events to occur in this world. Moreover, 
when it is purified and engaged in spiritual discipline (riyāḍa), then it is drawn 
towards the celestial soul (al-rūḥ al-falakī), which is its perfect nature (al-ṭibāʿ al-
tāmm), its original father (abūhā al-aṣlī) from which issues a power that suffuses 
the essence (jawhar) of the soul.497    
Although not strictly Avicennan, combining as it does the Avicennan 
psychological concept of the estimative faculty with the Barakātian doctrine of 
                                                             
495 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 137. 
496 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, pp. 143-6.  
497 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 144.  
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the perfect nature, this account served Rāzī‘s immediate aim of providing an 
account equally as plausible (muḥtamal) as the Avicennan, thus exposing its 
implied relativizing of the prophetic prodigy. But it is by the systematic and 
scientific explanation of talismans, the raw data of which he had already 
presented in al-Sirr, that Rāzī established the inability of the Avicennans to 
defend the unique status of the prophet. Its theoretical account of talismans, 
used Avicennan cosmology in order to explain their efficacy. In doing so, its 
critique of Avicennism, by deploying its own arguments, was rendered all the 
more effective.  
Rāzī understood the prophet‘s unique ability to know the unseen and to wield 
occult power as two aspects of the perfected man in every age: the quṭb, or axis 
mundi.498 In his view the Avicennan naturalistic account of these prophetic 
abilities reduced them to the level of the internal sense faculties. Since any 
individual can share, to a greater or lesser degree, in these abilities, there is 
nothing essentially unique about the prophet. This destabilized the entire 
institution.  
The perfect nature doctrine is of particular interest as it was so important to the 
epistemology and ethical theory advanced in al-Maṭalib. In al-Maṭālib 8, having 
critiqued the Avicennan account of imaginational prophethood, Rāzī advanced 
his own: the prophetic vision, contra Avicenna, is a cognitive experience of an 
extra-mental reality. That reality is the prophet's own perfect nature which 
takes on various forms. Now, the perfect nature doctrine justified Rāzī‘s later 
ethical determinism, which held that no human soul can progress beyond the 
                                                             
498 In contrast with Avicenna‘s metaphysical proof from necessity, the proof with which Rāzī 
substantiates this claim is based on induction (istiqrā). Nevertheless, it is a proof which he subtly 
adapts from Avicenna‘s Ithbāt al-nubuwwāt. See Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, p. 140.  
334 
 
level of perfection of its perfect nature.499 This being the case, the prophet's 
perfect nature must derive from a celestial spirit that is the most perfect of all 
such spirits. His essential uniqueness amongst humanity is thus guaranteed - 
unlike the Avicennan prophet‘s.   
But the perfect nature doctrine also served another purpose: as we shall see, just 
as it discloses to the prophet his revelation, so it leads the philosophical and 
spiritual aspirant to the epistemological ascent to certainty in metaphysical 
truths.  
 
11.3 Prophethood in al-Maṭālib 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I argued that the development of Rāzī‘s 
teleological ethics of al-Maṭālib was facilitated by his formulation and adoption 
of three key interdependent doctrines: (1) the ontological superiority of the 
celestial angels over man; (2) the origin of the individual human soul in the 
perfect nature; (3) human perfection, conceived of as an epistemoligcal ascent 
through the celestial spheres towards angelomorphosis. These doctrines deeply 
inform Rāzī‘s later formulation of prophethood, which differed from the 
classical Ashʿarī perspective in significant ways.  
The considerable effort which Rāzī exerts, in al-Maṭālib 7 Fī al-arwāḥ al-ʿāliya wa’l-
sāfila (‗On the Higher and Lower Spirits‘), to formulate philosophical and 
scriptural proofs for the first of these doctrines, the superiority of the celestial 
                                                             
499 See Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, Chapter 3.  
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angels to man, need not detain us.500 It suffices to state that Rāzī presents their 
superiority in three aspects: their essence; their knowledge; and their power to 
act on the world of bodies. 
Rāzī assertion of celestial-angelic superiority reflects his shift away from an 
action-oriented ethical theory for which hardship and effort are the measure of 
superiority, to one that is framed in terms of ―character-oriented 
perfectionism,‖ for which the intrinsic worth of the agent‘s essence is the sole 
index of value.501 Thus, man is no longer superior by virtue of the hardship he 
endures in taming his baser soul and obeying God: the celestial angel is superior 
by virtue of its intrinsic impulse to submit to God‘s will and magnify His glory. 
So, it is the impulse towards angelomorphosis that drives man‘s desire for 
perfection. Being the apogee of human perfection, the prophet is a liminal 
figure who mediates the two levels of humanity and celestial-angelhood.  
Fī al-nubuwwāt consists of three main divisions, the first two are relevant to our 
present discussion. The first examines various philosophical positions which 
deny the institution of prophethood followed by a defence of the classical 
Ashʿarī test to verify a prophetic claim which is established by the occurrence of 
miracles at the hand of the claimant who, calling to the worship of the one God, 
publicly declares his prophetic mission. The miracle serves as God‘s 
corroboration to the people of the truth of his prophetic claim.502  
Whilst affirming the soundness of the approach which attempts to verify the 
truth of a prophetic claim by way of miracles, Rāzī prefers another, advanced in 
                                                             
500 See al-Maṭālib 7, pp. 409-20 for the scriptural proofs; for the philosophical proofs see pp. 420-9.  
501 Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, p.115.  
502 On Rāzī‘s discussion in his Muḥassal and al-Maṭālib, of the means by which a prophetic claim is 
verified, see Griffel, ‗al-Ghazālī‘s Concept of Prophecy‘, pp. 106-13.  
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the second division, which reasons as follows: since we know correct belief and 
correct action, when we encounter a man who, announcing his prophethood, 
and calling men to the religion of truth, is successful in perfecting deficient 
human souls, then we can safely conclude that that he is a genuine prophet who 
must be followed. Rather than claiming that this is the sole correct approach, 
Rāzī modestly asserts it has the soundest reasoning (aqrab ilā al-ʿaql) and is beset 
by the least doubt.   
This preferred second approach rests on four grounds.  The first is: 
…that the perfection of man is that he knows Truth in its essence and the 
Good (al-khayr) that he acts in accordance with it. What is meant by this 
is that the state of his perfection is defined by two matters. The first is 
that his theoretical capacity (quwwa naẓariyya) becomes perfect such that 
pure forms are perfectly and completely manifest to it (tatajallā fīhā ṣuwar 
al-ashyā wa ḥaqā’iquhā tajalliyan kāmilan tāmman) free of all mistake and 
error. The second is that his practical capacity (quwwa ʿamaliyya) 
becomes perfect such that he becomes possessed of a capacity (milka) 
which enables him to perform righteous works. By righteous works is 
meant those states which produce aversion to the pleasures of the body 
and desire for the next world and spiritual beings (rūḥāniyāt).  
Developed theoretical capacity inclines his soul towards communion with the 
celestial spirits. Both the prophets and the divine philosophers (al-ḥukamā al-
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ilāhiyūn) concur on this idea of human perfection. The ultimate aim of man 
therefore is to attain perfection (kamāl).503 
This leads us to the second ground on which Rāzī‘s approach to prophethood 
rests. Men fall into three broad categories: the masses which fall short of 
perfection; the saints (al-awliyā) who have reached perfection but are unable to 
lead others to its attainment; and the prophets, perfected humans who lead men 
from the depths of imperfection to the summit to perfection.   
The third and fourth grounds develop the idea of human perfection. The third 
reasons that, although the vast majority of humanity is characterized by 
imperfection, there exists amongst them a hierarchy of perfected humans: at its 
apex is the one who is ‗the most perfect of their number‘ (akmaluhum) who 
exists at the highest level of humanity, being equal to the lowest rank of the 
celestial angels:  
… the most perfect of perfected men (akmal al-kāmilīn) the most eminent 
of eminent and knowledgeable men, is at the furthest horizon of 
humanity. And you already know that the last of each kind (ākhar kull 
nawʿ) is connected (mutaṣṣil) to the first member of the kind which is 
nobler. And the kind which is nobler than humankind <comprises> the 
angels. So the last of humankind is connected with the first member of 
angel-kind. And since we have made it clear that that man exists at the 
highest rank of humankind it must follow that he is connected with the 
world of the angels, mixing with them (mukhṭalitan bihim).504 
                                                             
503 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib  8,  p. 104. 
504 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib  8,  p. 107. 
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The fourth ground asserts that given that the rank of this ‗most perfect‘ human 
is that of the angels; and that since the characteristics of the angels include: 
…freedom from bodily constraints, mastery over the world of bodies, and 
independence from any need of bodily tools in order to act, then so too is 
this human characterized by that which corresponds to these attributes. 
Thus seldom is his attention drawn to the world of bodies (jismāniyāt); 
(but) his action (in the world of bodies) is powerful; his attraction to the 
world of spiritual beings (ʿālam al-rūḥāniyāt) is strong; his theoretical 
power realizes perfection by way of sacred illumination and divine 
gnosis (quwwatuhu mustakmila bi-anwāʿal-jalāyā al-qudsiyya wa’l-maʿārif al-
ilāhiyya); his practical power exerts influence over the bodies of this 
world by various means of action. And that is what is meant by miracles. 
Then having realized these two stations his spiritual power exerts an 
effect on bringing to perfection the souls of those whose theoretical and 
practical capacities are deficient.505   
Just like the celestial angels, he can act directly on bodies in the sublunary world 
with the power of his own soul, without the need of bodily tools. His soul 
nevertheless is drawn to the celestial realm. The ontological state of the 
prophetic figure who has reached complete perfection is to be found at the 
outermost limit of humanity, where he participates in angelhood. He learns 
directly from the angelic world and with his practical capacity he can 
administer the corporeal world: 
                                                             
505 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib  8,  p. 107.  
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the noblest amongst the denizens of the Lower World is the man who has 
attained the theoretical power by which he learns from the Sanctified 
Lights in the Angelic World (yastafīd al-anwār al-qudsīya min ʿālam al-
malā’ika); and the practical power by which he can govern this corporeal 
world in the most proper and perfect way (tadbīr hadhā al-ʿālam al-jismānī  
ʿalā al-ṭarīq al-aṣlaḥ wa’l-sabīl al-akmal.)506  
 The prophet stands at the apex of a hierarchy of perfected individuals. His 
miracles serve not as a means of establishing the truth of his prophethood, but 
as a means of corroborating its truth (taṣdīq).  Rather, his prophetic claim is 
established by the evidence of his ability to perfect. The impulse felt by those 
who would strive towards human perfection and liberation from the world of 
corporeality is the impulse to emulate the prophet, a man unique in the level of 
his perfection, by which he participates in both humanity and celestial 
angelhood. Thus the impulse towards perfection is the impulse towards 
angelomorphosis.   
Al-Sirr and al-Maṭālib display a large degree of convergence in their respective 
eschatologies: the telos of man is perfection; the pursuit of this perfection 
demands the rejection of engrossment in material reality; this perfection 
pertains to his attributes of knowledge and power; perfection of knowledge 
involves some form of noetic connection with spiritual beings which are co-
ordinated with the spheres of the cosmos; the perfection of power, or the 
practical capacity, involves the ability to perform prodigies in the sublunary 
world; complete perfection entails an angelomorphic transformation.  
                                                             




11.4 Perfect Nature and Qualified Ethical Determinism 
 
Now, the ability of humans to attain such perfection varies. This is because the 
human soul derives its perfect nature, a celestial spirit: 
 Rational souls are of many types (anwāʿ kathīra) and different factions 
(ṭawā’if mukhtalifa). Each <rational soul> has its own celestial spirit (rūḥ 
falakī) which is the cause of its existence and is tasked with overseeing its 
welfare (iṣlāḥ aḥwālihā). That celestial spirit is in relation to it like the 
origin, the mine, the source: we have called it the perfect nature (al-ṭibāʿ 
al-tāmm).507 
The perfect nature doctrine guaranteed the superiority of the prophet over all 
other men. Since his celestial spirit was the most superior of all from which men 
could derive, it could explain his ability, uniquely, to receive divine revelatory 
experiences, exert occult power in this world, and most importantly, to bring 
deficient human souls to perfection (takmīl al-nāqiṣīn), which is the mark of his 
prophethood. 
Adopting a deterministic view of human nature in the epistemological 
introduction to al-Maṭālib Rāzī asserts that: 
 rational human souls differ in their quiddity and substance: whilst some 
are ennobled, divine and lofty, others are dark, turbid and base.508   
He explains: 
                                                             
507 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 8, p. 136.  
508 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 1, p. 55.  
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Amongst <human> souls, there are those who, in the origin of their 
substance and quiddity (fī aṣl al-jawhar wa’l-māhiyya) is a divine soul 
which is receptive to the presence of divine sanctity, whose love for it is 
great, whose gnosis of it is profound; amongst <human souls> are those 
who share in these states but they are weak; and amongst them are souls 
which are turbid, dark, devoid of these divine inclinations and spiritual 
dispositions, drowning in the ocean of desires and the darkness of the 
world of senses and vain imagination.509  
Rāzī illustrates the full extent of his ethical determinism with the analogy of 
mountains and the minerals they bear: the vast majority are barren; of the few 
which do indeed bear minerals, but a small minority carry precious metals; of 
those which carry precious metals, the majority require great effort for their 
extraction and refinement. Thus for the vast majority of humans, no amount of 
spiritual austerity and discipline brings improvement. Of the small minority 
who do indeed have the potential, their small spiritual gain will only be won 
after much pain and exertion. But there are a rare few who after but a little 
effort will be afforded tremendous unveilings (mukāshafāt).510 These are precious 
exceptions to the overwhelming mediocrity of human spiritual aspirants. The 
determinism which defines this approach to human nature resonates strongly 
with the account given in al-Sirr that the substances of human souls differ in 
accordance with the differences between the substances of the celestial spirits 
from which they derive. The stark reality of this determinism, however, is 
mitigated by the fact that individual effort can, within the limitations of each 
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soul type, engender improvement in the condition of the soul. Adopting and 
defending this view, Rāzī says: 
…human souls are one genus (jins) which comprises a number of species 
(anwāʿ) which differ in quiddity; within each species are a number of 
individuals which are equal in their quiddity; each species is as a product 
(natīja) which issues from a specific celestial spirit. Thus whilst one 
species might be free, noble and virtuous, possessed of strong intellect 
and beautiful actions, another might be base, evil and dull witted. This 
celestial spirit is the origin (mabda’) of the species and is called, in the 
terminology of the ancient philosophers ‗the perfect nature‘, for the 
reason that an entity which is caused must be of the same genus as its 
cause and similar to it (al-maʿlūl lā budda wa an yakūn min jins al-ʿilla wa 
shabīhan bihā). Each attribute by which any given species of human souls 
is characterized is the result of the influence of the celestial spirit of that 
species, which possesses that attribute in a way that is more perfect than 
the way in which it obtains in the human souls that it engenders. For this 
reason they have called these principles (uṣūl) the perfect nature. Thus 
human souls are like the children of their celestial spirit which for them 
is like a father who shows them love and tenderness. The celestial spirit 
has a special role in the raising of its human souls. If a celestial spirit is 
noble, virtuous and intelligent, then so are the human souls <over which 
it presides>; if it is characterized by the opposite, then so are the human 
souls <that belong to it>. Moreover, since those souls belong to one 
species, then of course it follows that they would share a kinship and 
similarity and for this reason an increased love and affection exists 
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between them. For this reason a boundless love may bind together 
people from different nations whilst two others may harbour an 
indefatigable hatred and loathing for the other. It is most manifest that 
the master of revelation and divine law – peace be upon him  -  
subscribed to this doctrine when said: ―In His possession are souls who 
are like enlisted soldiers: those who have (already) come to know each 
other are in harmony; those who are ignorant of each other fall into 
difference‘.511 
Each human soul shares the same quiddity as its fellow sibling souls which 
derive from the same celestial spirit.512 The prophet, being the paragon of 
human perfection, receives revelation from the most perfect of such spirits. His 
status is thus preserved and unchallenged by the relativizing effect of the 
Avicennan naturalistic account of prophethood.  
 
11.5 Rational proof for the Perfect Nature  
 
The way in which Rāzī arrives at conclusions which are ‗the most apt and 
probable‘ is part of a method of inquiry which gathers and systematizes all 
relevant views on a particular philosophical issue, and attempts to arrive at the 
truth using a process of elimination. According to the principles of scholastic 
argument, the investigator must arrive at a conclusion which can offer 
certainty, by not only positively proving it as a proposition, but also disproving 
                                                             
511 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, pp. 142-3. Ḥadīth, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 1, 371. 
512 The alternative view maintains that the substance of each soul is possessed of its own unique 
quiddity and essence; any similarity that might exist between them relates only to their 
attributes and not their essences. Rāzī lists this last position more for the sake of completeness 
rather than as a serious competitor to the doctrine of the perfect nature, for which he provides 
six proofs (see Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, pp. 145-148). 
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other cometing theories. If he cannot, then the investigation has failed to yield a 
conclusive result. Often this is impossible, and the most compelling or probable 
conclusion (awlā wa-akhlaq), out of a range of possible alternative, might prove 
the only way to avoid simply suspending judgement. Thus must he content 
himself with a probable conclusion which falls short of apodictic certainty. 
Using this approach, Rāzī allows himself to express a view which concurs with 
what he finds to be the most probable out of a range of competing contradictory 
positions; he thus affirms, without pronouncing definitively on a given issue, 
what is muḥtamal (‗probable’) or ghayr mumtaniʿ (‗not impossible‘), in contrast 
with competing positions which he has proven to be, at the very least, closer to 
the impossible. This gives him the flexibility to consider in all seriousness a wide 
range of unusual views.513  Amongst such views he considered were: that the 
celestial poles have their own spheres; that the empyrean might be surrounded 
by innumerable spheres of commensurate might and density; that our universe 
might be just one of many; and of course that the human soul derives from a 
celestial spirit, the perfect nature.514  
Rāzī‘s rational proof for the perfect nature appears as the answer to an even 
more fundamental question relating to what it means to be human: what is the 
cause of the human soul? In the course of establishing the ontological status of 
rational souls, Rāzī swiftly eliminates the possibilities that they are: (1) 
possessed of necessary being; or (2) not possessed of necessary being but are 
eternal and pre-eternal (qadīma azaliyya). He affirms they are possible in their 
essence and have been brought into being within time (mumkin li-dhawātihā 
muḥdathatan ḥudūthan zamāniyan). Being possible, they require an effecter which 
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brings them into existence (mu’aththir wa mūjid). That which brings them into 
being must be either spatially bound (mutaḥayyiz) or subsistent in that which is 
spatially bound, or neither515. The first two of these disjuncts is eliminated for 
the following six reasons:  
1. All things which are spatially bound are alike in their quiddity; thus if 
one were to be a cause of something, then all other spatially bound 
things would be the causes of similar things – and this is patently false.  
2. The philosophers aver that no one thing can be both a receptive (qābil) 
and an active agent (fāʿil) at the same time. Therefore since bodies are 
receptive, they cannot be active agents.  
3. That which is spatially bound has a weaker existence than an abstracted 
substance (aḍʿaf wujūdan min jawhar mujarrad) since the former, in 
contrast with the latter, requires locus and direction (makān wa-jiha). The 
weaker cannot be the cause of the stronger.  
4. The human soul is cognizant of realities, capable of acts whilst a body 
qua body is neither. Souls are thus ―nobler‖ (ashraf) than bodies and the 
noble cannot be caused by that which is in relation to it baser (akhass).  
5. The ability of bodies to exert an effect is dependent on their position 
relative to that which they affect. Thus a bodily effecter firstly affects 
that which is closest; then that which is connected (muttaṣil) to that; then 
that which is connected to that. Its effect on that which is closer is more 
powerful than its effect on that which is further. Were this not the case 
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then the influence of a bodily effecter on objects both near and far would 
be equal. The ability of a body to receive influence is contingent on its 
proximity to the effecting body. Thus an effecting body cannot exert an 
influence over something which cannot be characterized by proximity or 
distance from it. Since a soul is an abstracted substance, uncharacterized 
by distance or proximity, it cannot therefore be caused by a body.516 
6. Since souls are abstracted substances, they are not of the same genus as 
bodies. Thus the latter cannot be causes of the former.  
Therefore the rational soul must be caused by a substance abstracted from 
bodily existence (jawhar mujarrad ʿan al-jismiyya).517 This abstracted entity must 
either be itself a soul which as such acts by means of a corporeal tool (āla 
jismāniyya) or an intellect which as such does not exert its influence by means of 
a corporeal tool. Rāzī dismisses the first of these two disjuncts as false and 
asserts that that which brings the human soul into existence must be an 
intellect.518 However, he rejects the position of those who assert that the cause 
of human souls is the Avicennan Active Intellect which governs all beneath the 
lunar sphere.519 He presents their argument as follows: human souls cannot be 
entities caused by the Necessary Being (maʿlūlāt wājib al-wujūd) since it is 
absolutely unique and transcends all multiplicity (fard munazzah ʿan jihāt al-
kathra) and thus there cannot issue from it a multiplicity of entities caused by it; 
therefore the intellects which govern the nine celestial spheres cannot be 
entities directly caused by the Necessary Being – nor indeed can humans be. 
                                                             
516 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, pp. 263-4.  
517 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, p. 265.  
518 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, p. 265.  
519 Compare Rāzī, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, 2, 281-284, observed by Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, fn. 
45, p. 118.  
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Thus they reason that that which brings human souls into being is ‗the last 
intellect which governs that which lies beneath the sphere of the moon, namely 
the Active Intellect.‘520  Rāzī, however, rejects the argument that only one thing 
can issue from one thing.521 In doing so he opens up the possibility that human 
souls derive from the celestial spirits: 
…it is not impossible (lā yamtaniʿ) that it is the spirits which govern the 
bodies of the planets and the celestial spheres which bring about the 
existence of rational souls.522 
 Furthermore, he says: 
If we say that these human souls belong to different species (anwāʿ 
mukhtalifa) it is not impossible (lam yamtaniʿ) that some could be entities 
caused by (maʿlūlāt) <the movement of> the sphere of Saturn, whilst 
others could be entities caused by <the movement> of the sphere of 
Jupiter, and so on and so forth. Also, it is not impossible (lā yamtaniʿ) that 
one group may <comprise> entities caused by the spirit that governs al-
Shiʿrā al-Yamāniyya whilst a second group <comprises> those which are 
entities caused by the spirit which governs one of the other fixed stars.523 
Each state of perfection realized by the human soul is the result of the influence 
of that human soul‘s cause, the perfections of which are more complete in their 
realization. He says:  
                                                             
520 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, pp. 266. Shihadeh observes that Rāzī rejects the entire notion of the Active 
Intellect (see his Teleological Ethics, p.188, footnote 45).  
521 See al-Maṭālib 4, pp. 381-9 for Rāzī‘s refutation of the argument ‗that only one thing can issue 
from one thing‘.  
522 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, p. 266.  
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Each <state of> perfection realized in that which is caused (maʿlūl) is an 
effect (athar) from (its) cause (ʿilla). The perfection of a state is realized in 
the cause and then that which is realized (al-ḥāṣil) on account of it in that 
which is caused to be (al-maʿlūl) is like a weak effect (athar ḍaʿīf) in 
respect of the (original) perfection. And so it is for this reason that the 
Masters of the Talismans named the spirits which are the principle 
(mabda’) of a certain group of human souls the ―Perfect Nature‖ (al-ṭibāʿ 
al-tāmm) because, being the principle (al-aṣl), (when) an attribute (ṣifa) 
(inheres) in it, it is complete and perfect (tāmma kāmila) whilst when it 
inheres in that which the (Perfect Nature) produces (al-natā’ij) it is weak 
and deficient (qalīla nāqiṣa). The relationship of this substance, which is 
the cause, to that which it produces is as the relationship of the father to 
his children or of the principle to its subsidiary. And just as the 
inclination (injidhāb) of the father to his children is greater than to those 
other than his children, so it is not impossible that the concern of each 
celestial spirit for human souls, which are for them like children, is more 
complete than their concern for that which other spirits produce. It is for 
this reason that the Masters of Talismans say: ‗my perfect nature 
informed me of such-and-such and guided me to such-and-such‘.524 
Rāzī says that this argument for the Perfect Nature merely establishes its 
possibility but can make no stronger claims on certainty: 
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Know that the truth is that this kind of argument (hādhā al-nawʿ min al-
kalām) contains nothing but speech about that which is merely probable 
(laysa fīhi illā bayān mujarrad al-iḥtimāl). 
Having established that the human soul is indeed an abstracted substance;525 and 
then that its cause is an abstracted substance; and having disproved and 
dismissed all competing theories along the way, Rāzī‘s reader will be forgiven 
for expecting that he would now produce a proof which establishes, with some 
degree of certainty, that the perfect nature is the cause of the human soul. But 
as his epistemological introduction to al-Maṭālib observes, in the pursuit of 
metaphysical understanding, we must content ourselves with conclusions that 
are at best the most ―apt and probable‖; and the higher the metaphysical truths 
we pursue, the more tentative those ―probable‖ conclusions must be. To 
increase confidence in such conclusions, spiritual unveiling is required. 
Therefore he says: 
If the lords of unveiling and the masters of spiritual witnessing (arbāb al-
mukāshafāt wa-aṣḥāb al-mushāhadāt) happen to undergo immediate 
experience (tajārib) which strengthens this possibility, then belief (in the 
reality of the Perfect Nature) is also strengthened.526 
So to be sure of the reality of the perfect nature, it must be the object of 
immediate experience. This can only be achieved by means of a noetic 
connection established by spiritual exertion.  
                                                             
525 In the second treatise of al-Maṭālib 7. 




11.6 The Perfect Nature and spiritual discipline  
 
Having established in his introduction to al-Maṭālib that the majority of 
theological and metaphysical investigations will yield nothing more than ‗apt 
and probable‘ conclusions, Rāzī explores a second means by which such 
knowledge may be pursued, namely the method of spiritual discipline (riyāḍa): 
by purifying the heart and focusing on nothing but God, divine illumination may 
lead the aspirant to certainty when the discursive method has failed.527 Thus 
where discursive reasoning may eliminate as impossible a number of views on a 
particular issue leaving but one probable position, divine illumination may 
provide corroboration for it when ‗reflection and inference‘ have failed to 
provide it with the apodictic demonstrative proof necessary for certainty. Later 
we shall see how only spiritual unveiling can confirm the perfect nature as the 
correct account of the origin of the human soul. The path of spiritual discipline 
involves: 
Voiding the heart of everything except the remembrance of God, for the 
substance of the soul insofar as it exists in its original state and innate 
natural disposition (al-jibla al-aṣliyya wa’l-gharīza al-fiṭriyya), is possessed 
of a passionate love for the presence (ḥaḍra) of the Divine Splendour. 
However, when it becomes attached to the body it becomes preoccupied 
with corporeal delights and base pleasures; its immersion in their pursuit 
becomes an obstacle which prevents it from inclining towards the 
original home (al-waṭn al-aṣlī), the essential centre (al-markaz al-dhātī). If 
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man exerts his utmost in the elimination of these (corporeal) accidents 
(ʿawāriḍ) then, whilst the soul retains its original necessary concomitants 
(lawāzim aṣliyya), the veiling dust and obstructing cover will be lifted. 
Then the light of God‘s splendour will become apparent.528    
Spiritual discipline is therefore a means of attaining divinely inspired 
knowledge that is complementary to rather than alternative to the method of 
demonstration and logical proof. Indeed discursive reasoning plays a role in 
preserving from error the soul engaged in the way of spiritual discipline, for 
instance, by disabusing the aspirant of the mistaken belief that a certain truth or 
spiritual state marks the end of the journey for in reality the journey continues 
without end. In fact, Rāzī cautions against the path of spiritual discipline 
without the guidance of discursive reason. He says:  
If the man who is engaged in spiritual discipline has not also embarked on 
the path of reflection and inference (al-naẓar wa’l-istidlāl) then perhaps in 
the levels of spiritual discipline he might experience powerful unveilings 
and overwhelming states and become certain that these states are the 
ultimate unveilings, the highest levels; this might become an obstacle 
preventing him from arriving at the goal. If, however, he is practised in the 
path of reflection and inference and he distinguishes between a <spiritual> 
station that is impossible from that which is possible, then he will be secure 
from this error. So if a man has reached perfection in the path of reflection 
and inference, and is then bestowed perfection in the path of purification 
and spiritual discipline, then his soul will be on the principle of his innate 
disposition (kānat nafsuhu fī mabda’ al-fiṭra), perfectly suited to these 
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spiritual states; such a man would have scaled the gnostic paths of ascent to 
the furthermost limits. It has been related that Aristotle once said: ‗I used to 
drink but <my thirst> was never quenched. But when I drank from this 
ocean it was quenched such that I would never thirst again.‘ Mere speech 
cannot explain these spiritual states; they are beyond the reach of words. 
He who has not tasted does not know. He who has not witnessed cannot 
affirm their truth. And God knows best the Unseen.529     
Detachment from the physical world and sensual stimuli is an essential means of 
disciplining the soul such that it can become receptive to spiritual illumination 
which acts as an adjunct to discursive reasoning. It is one of the chief means by 
which a man may establish connection with his perfect nature. In al-Sirr, 
spiritual discipline, the erasing of physical desire and the magnification of the 
perfect nature induces its appearance.530 So in al-Maṭālib 8, concerning the 
perfect nature, Rāzī says: 
…when in a state of purity and discipline, <the rational soul> is drawn 
towards the celestial spirit, which is its Perfect Nature, its original father 
<then> from that perfect nature the essence of the soul will be imbued with 
a power by which it will be made great and its effect powerful.531  
The perfect nature is: ‗the cause for the coming to be of knowledge and moral 
character in the substance of the human soul‘.532 Since knowledge can only be 
perfected by way of connection with the perfect nature from which illumination 
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is received; and since this connection is impossible without the purification of 
the soul, spiritual discipline becomes necessary to the pursuit of knowledge.  
 
11.7 the Perfect Nature and the Epistemological Ascent 
 
When we encounter the doctrine of the perfect nature in al-Maṭālib, its 
philosophical implications have been woven seamlessly into Rāzī‘s epistemology 
and theory of soul. It is to the introduction of this work that we now turn our 
attention. As we shall see, the influence of the concept in its epistemological 
discussion is subtle but does not elude the scrutiny of the careful reader.  
After introducing the ‗science of the divine‘ (ʿilm ilāhī) as the most noble of all 
sciences, Rāzī chastens the reader‘s intellectual ambition for certainty therein 
with four robust proofs which assert that it is impossible to attain certainty in 
theology. Instead Rāzī advocates for the more humble aim of contentment with 
that which is ‗most probable and apt‘ (al-awlā wa’l-akhlaq).533 The first and fourth 
of these proofs are particularly illuminating for our understanding of the 
perfect nature.534  
The first asserts that the most apparent and fundamental knowledge man can 
possess is that of himself and his own special essence (dhātuhu al-makhṣūṣa). He 
who would know a thing must first know himself as one who knows; knowledge 
of himself as one who knows must be preceded by knowledge of his own special 
essence. Therefore knowledge of his special essence is the most fundamental of 
all knowledge. Rāzī distils the arguments concerning the man‘s special essence 
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to four basic positions: (1) it is simply the bodily structure that we perceive (al-
haykal al-mushāhad); (2) it is a body within this structure; (3) it is an attribute of 
this structure; (4) it is a substance abstracted from the body. Seeing that the 
debates between these four positions are interminable and defy resolution, Rāzī 
concludes that even this most fundamental knowledge is steeped in obscurity.535 
Man is thus trapped in an epistemological bind: he cannot know anything unless 
he knows himself as a knower; he cannot know himself as a knower unless he 
knows his own special essence. Yet he cannot know his own special essence 
unless he knows its cause. Knowledge of his cause would thus appear to be the 
key to knowledge. We have already established in al-Sirr and al-Maṭālib the cause 
(ʿilla) of the human soul as the perfect nature. It can thus be inferred that 
connection with this spirit is essential to the attainment of certainty in 
metaphysical truths.  
The fourth proof which Rāzī deploys in his argument in favour of humbler 
claims to theological knowledge is grounded in the assertion that those who are 
able to attain such insights are rare indeed. He begins his proof by listing three 
possible approaches to knowledge: (1) inferring the effect by means of the cause 
(istidlāl bi’l-ʿilla ʿalā al-maʿlūl); (2) inferring something by means of that which is 
equal to it (istidlāl bi’l-musāwī ʿalā al-musāwī); (3) inferring the cause by means of 
the effect (istidlāl bi’l-maʿlūl ʿalā al-ʿilla). He rejects as redundant, for obvious 
reasons, the first two approaches as methods for attaining knowledge of God, 
leaving only the last, inferring the cause by means of the effect. With this last 
approach to knowledge, the investigator of truth (al-muḥaqqiq): 
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 …ascends from <knowledge of> the effect to <knowledge of> the effecter 
and from created being to the Creator (yaṣʿud min al-athar ilā al-mu’aththir 
wa-yantaqil min al-makhlūq ilā al-khāliq). The human rational soul occupies 
the last rank of sanctified abstracted entities (al-mawjūdāt al-mujarrada al-
muqaddasa) […] Since this is the case it must ascend (tataraqqā) from 
knowledge of itself to knowledge of its cause, and from knowledge of its 
cause to knowledge of the cause of its cause. Thus does it ascend, rank by 
rank until it reaches finally to the presence of the essentially Necessary 
Being, as God says in the Divine Book: ‗and towards your Lord is the final 
end‘; ‗and to God do all affairs return‘ and as He said: ‗He is the First and 
the Last‘. The Reality (al-Ḥaqq, i.e. God) is the First at the <beginning of 
process of> descent from the Reality to creation and the Last at the 
<process of> the ascent from creation to the Reality. And since the 
intermediary levels are numerous, their ranks being hidden from the ken 
of human intellects, the states of those intermediary levels being 
different, just as the ranks of their lights, their domination (qahr) and 
power are different; and since the power of the rational human soul to 
ascend these ranks is weak, then it must of course follow that most 
human souls will remain on one of these intermediary levels. In fact we 
say that most of creation remains in the nadir of sensible worlds. Only 
the rare exception escapes from the sensory world, ascending from the 
world of sensibles to the world of imagination (khayālāt); and of those 
who reach the world of imagination but few move to the world of 
intelligibles (maʿqūlāt). Then in the world of intelligibles, the ranks of the 
sanctified spirits are many. So of course it follows that when they reach 
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the worlds of the illuminations of the intelligibles, most superior 
intellects vanish, becoming annihilated and dissolved in the 
illuminations of these sanctified spirits with the exception of he who is 
aided by an overwhelming power and a divine soul which ascends from 
the <fierce> ginger of Mars to the sweet wine (salsabīl) of Jupiter to the 
camphor (kāfūr) of Saturn; then has he risen over all and gained 
ascendancy over everything and reached the <divine> presence which 
has been sanctified of all concomitants of contingency and the mutability 
of coming to be (lawāḥiq al-imkān wa ghiyār al-ḥudūth) [….]; thus does he 
rejoice in His saying: ‗and so their Lord makes them drink a pure drink‘, 
namely the pure drink that purifies them of all contingency and coming 
to be and He reveals to him the threshold of the Essentially Necessary (al-
wujūb bi’l-dhāt). When you know this, it becomes apparent that few are 
the human spirits that can rejoice in even an atom of the World of Divine 
Splendour (ʿālam al-jalāl).536  
Rāzī‘s description of the journey of theological investigation is striking for its 
planetary allusions and rhetorical language of ascent and we would not be 
violating reason to assume that, when writing it, the Sabian planetary ascent 
cannot have been far from his mind. It posits a tripartite cosmos: the world of 
sensibilia; the world of the imagination; and the world of intelligibles, the levels 
of which are beyond enumeration. The complete theological ascent follows the 
chain of effect and effecter, inferring the latter by means of the former, scaling 
all three worlds, beginning from the world of sensibilia. Just as in al-Sirr, the 
perfect nature is identified in al-Maṭālib as the cause and producer of the effect 
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of the human soul. Knowledge of the perfect nature guarantees knowledge of 
one‘s essence, and thus of the self as the knower. In this way, certainty in 
knowledge becomes possible. Noetic connection with this celestial spirit, 
established by rigorous spiritual discipline, is the sine qua non of embarking on 
the ascent through the spheres of metaphysical knowledge to the uppermost 
limit of philosophical perfection. 
The introduction of al-Sirr declares that the aim of magic is the attainment of 
the noblest of knowledge and power. If the ultimate aim of the human soul is to 
attain perfection in both knowledge and power, then the question arises: does 
the perfect nature, the celestial soul from which the human soul derives, pursue 
an aim in itself? In other words, what is the purpose of the movement of the 
stars? The answer is to be found in the last treatise of al-Maṭālib 7.  
 
It begins with a robust defence of the doctrine that the heavenly bodies and 
celestial spheres are living rational beings, rejecting the classical kalām position 
which maintained the contrary position.537  For this purpose he deploys the 
same eight arguments that he uses in al-Sirr for this aim.538 He asserts that 
celestial souls are substances abstracted from corporeality, possessed of 
particular as well as universal perception and volition. Moreover, they know 
their maker and desire by their motion his worship.539 Examining the issue of 
why their motion is circular, he outlines and rejects four separate positions 
which explain it as natural, concurring with those who maintain that circular 
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motion is the most perfect motion and that their motion is volitional and with 
purpose (gharaḍ).540 He argues that the aim of their circular motion is to obtain 
higher perfections but dismisses the position of Avicenna who argues that, in 
attempting to actualize by their motion the infinity of potential stellar 
configurations, the perfections which they seek are corporeal (jismānī) in 
nature.541 Rather, Rāzī argues as ‗probable‘ (muḥtamal) that they seek the 
perfection of their own souls. There are three aspects to this perfection by way 
of motion: life; knowledge and intellect. Life, Rāzī observes, is characterized by 
light, motion, transparency, and subtlety: the perfection of these characteristics 
is the measure of the perfection of life.542 Knowledge, as acquired by human 
cogitation involves the movement of spirits in his brain; knowledge as acquired 
by the celestial souls involves the perfection of their infinite circular motion.543 
As for intellect, Rāzī adopts what he reports is the position of the astrologers:  
There is no doubt that the celestial movements are causes for the order of 
this world. This being the case, they say: ‗the perfection of the state of 
possible beings is the imitation of God to the extent that human potential 
[allows].‘ It is with this meaning [in mind] that the master of the sacred 
law said: ―Adopt the moral traits of God‖. And it has been transmitted that 
the first philosophers have said: ‗Philosophy is the imitation of God to the 
extent that human potential [allows]‘. There can be no doubt that this 
imitation is indeed a lofty and noble state. And since, in respect of their 
knowledge, gnosis, and virtue, the condition of the celestial spheres is 
more perfect than the human, then to the extent of their potential, their 
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realization of perfection is more fitting. Whilst their motions secure the 
ordering of the lower world, their principle aim is not care for lower 
beings; rather it is the imitation of God insofar as He is the principle of 
order, goodness and mercy.544 
Rāzī‘s speculation, however, does not halt at the celestial spheres. The essences 
of celestial souls, as well as their perfections, are merely possible: they too 
require an effecter (mu’aththir) and a cause. And if the cause of the human soul 
cannot be anything other than an abstracted substance, then so must be the 
case for the celestial soul: just as human souls cannot be directly caused by the 
Necessary Being, which transcends all multiplicity, so too the immediate cause 
of the celestial soul‘s existence cannot be God but an intellect abstracted from 
all corporeality. It is from this intellect that it derives all its perfection by way of 
its eternal motion, driven by a yearning to imitate its cause so that it might 
imitate God.545  
And so, we are now perhaps in a more informed position to appreciate the 
significance of the parting advice which Rāzī offers his reader at the conclusion 
of al-Sirr: 
As for he who would seek knowledge and the complete philosophy (al-falsafa 
al-tāmma), he must invoke the perfect nature (fa-ʿalayhi bi-daʿwat al-ṭibāʿ al-
tāmm).546 
 
                                                             
544 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, p. 363.  
545 Rāzī, al-Maṭālib 7, p.375. 
546 Rāzī, al-Sirr, p. 164.  
360 
 
Chapter 12: Conclusion 
When Rāzī came to write al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī towards the end of 
his life, he had fully integrated into his philosophical-theological summa key 
Sabian doctrines for which he declared sympathy in al-Sirr al-Maktūm, 
notwithstanding his public persona as a theologian writing manuals defending 
the Ashʿarī creed. Between al-Sirr and al-Maṭālib, five Sabian doctrines remain 
consistent: 1) belief in the ensouled nature of the celestial spheres; 2) a qualified 
acceptance of  a science of talismans, the chief tool for performing astral magic; 
3) a teleological approach to ethics which aspired to the perfection of the soul; 
4) belief in the perfect nature as the origin of the human soul spiritual and 
philosophical guide; and 5) an epistemological  celestial ascent in the pursuit of 
this perfection. 
 
He theorized in a profound and personally engaged way on the nature of magic: 
on how it is experienced on the cognitive level; on the spiritual discipline that it 
demands; on the knowledge it requires; and on the mysteries of the ensouled 
universe that its practice could yield. No product of nature or human artifice 
was irrelevant to its comprehensive approach to reality. It was simultaneously a 
spiritual, a scientific, and a philosophical approach to embodied sublunary 
existence, every aspect of which participates in a complex web of celestial 
significance.  The intellectual project of al-Sirr which I have outlined only came 
to fruition with al-Maṭālib in which 1) he responded to the relativizing danger 
which Avicennism posed to the Islamic belief in prophethood, by rooting it in 
the doctrine of the perfect nature, and 2) he offered the philosophically and 
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spiritually aspiring a new, deeply personal soteriology, by means of an 
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